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INTRODUCCIÓN 
Antes de principiar, quiero narrar de la historia de este proyecto que si algo prueba es que 
cuando se escribe la historia del common law uno comienza con certeza, pero nunca sabe dónde 
va a acabar. Esta investigación comenzó su andadura con el proyecto de investigación Vidas por 
el Derecho de la Universidad de Huelva bajo la dirección de profesor Carlos Petit, a la que se sumó 
más tarde la codirección del profesor Jesús Vallejo. En realidad, la investigación con la que había 
comenzado mi período doctoral trataba sobre la biografía intelectual del reputado abuelo del 
realismo jurídico americano, el Juez Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935): en concreto sobre la 
evolución de sus ideas religiosas en relación con su opera magna sobre la historia del common law. 
Con este propósito realicé varías estancias de investigación para recopilar información en la 
Harvard Law School bajo la supervisión del profesor Daniel Coquillette entre 2007 y 2010. Este 
proyecto ha quedado apartado, cocinándose a fuego lento, por así decirlo, pero mi propósito es 
retomarlo en un futuro no demasiado lejano.  
 En el curso de dicha investigación, gracias a la atención del profesor Sebastián Martín que 
supo indicarle mi trabajo al profesor Pietro Costa, recibí una propuesta para preparar un artículo 
para el monográfico de la revista Quaderni Fiorentini del 2011 dedicado al derecho de los jueces. 
Puesto que yo estaba trabajando con Holmes, en un principio mi idea era realizar un trabajo que 
relacionara las teorías sobre la naturaleza del common law del Juez Holmes con la resolución de 
los conflictos laborales que debido a la incipiente revolución industrial de los EE. UU. a finales 
del siglo XIX estaban desbordando los tribunales ordinarios. No es cuestión ahora de entrar en la 
discusión de este problema historiográfico, ni tampoco pormenorizar lo que planeaba para la 
elaboración del artículo; valga sólo decir que, como parte del mismo, me detuve a estudiar ciertas 
opinions que Holmes había emitido como juez de la Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. En 
particular, en uno de esos casos, un grupo de sindicalistas habían sido acusados de conspiración 
por formar piquetes informativos tratando de boicotear el proceso de contratación por parte de un 
empresario recalcitrante. Al margen de los hechos mencionados, lo importante desde el punto de 
vista jurídico es que en la discusión de aquellos casos planeaban una serie de cuestiones de fondo: 
¿Qué tipo de delito es la conspiración? ¿Se trata de un delito de common law? ¿Es un delito 
positivo? ¿Cuál es la definición del mismo?  
12 
 
 El hecho de que se plantearan estos interrogantes en sede judicial implicaba que 
seguramente existía un debate doctrinal al respecto, contemporáneo al propio caso. Lo cual 
significaba que no podía salir al paso consultando el sentido actual del delito de conspiración, 
puesto que era indudable que el mismo es el término ad quem de aquel debate doctrinal de finales 
del siglo XIX. No me quedaba más remedio que consultar la historiografía sobre el delito de 
conspiración, que, lejos de aclararme el asunto, me llevó a interesarme por las propias fuentes 
históricas. Más adelante, en el curso de esta tesis, me detendré a explicar las razones por las que 
la historiografía resulta insuficiente para hacerse una idea del sentido de aquel debate doctrinal 
que planeaba sobre el caso decidido por el juez Holmes. Lo importante es que la consulta de 
aquellas fuentes me llevó por la senda de una nueva investigación sobre la historia del delito de 
conspiración que, para bien o para mal, se ha acabó convirtiendo en mi proyecto doctoral.  
 Entre otros caminos inesperados esta investigación me llevó a interesarme por un caso 
citado hasta la extenuación por la historiografía que nadie ha investigado a fondo hasta la fecha: 
el famoso Poulterers’ Case. Así, que de la Victorian America descendí al mundo extraño de la 
Inglaterra jacobina. Fue en el curso de una estancia de investigación en el University College 
London en 2012 que conseguí las prolijas deposiciones de este caso, cuya secretary hand torturó 
mi vista de miope por más de un año. Es el arquitrabe de la última parte de esta tesis.  
 Y fue entonces, con todo en marcha y con la investigación avanzada, cuando la Profesora 
Marta Lorente me brindó la oportunidad de escribir esta tesis y no otra que hubiera sido muy 
diferente, al abrirme las puertas de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Aquí he podido completar 
las fuentes que mi tesis necesitaba para poder ser escrita en la forma en que la presente. Y he 
encontrado el tiempo y la tranquilidad necesaria para pasar de las acciones a las palabras.  
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GETTING READY FOR WORK 
THE MYSTERY OF CONSPIRACY 
I would like to open this dissertation with a couple of long quotes. The first is from James 
Wallace Bryan, the author that wrote one of the first monographs about the history of the law of 
conspiracy in 1909:  
There is scarcely a more complex topic in the entire domain of British national 
jurisprudence than that of illegal combinations. The law relating to them has been more 
than ordinarily the creature of accident and special conditions. The resultant contradiction 
and confusion introduced into the cases renders extremely difficult the task of extracting 
the underlying principles, tracing their rise and growth, and giving an intelligible account 
of the causes which have determined their subsequent history.1 
The other was written some 70 years later by one the greatest criminal law scholars of all times:  
There seems to be considerable mystery about the development of conspiracy as a general 
inchoate offence… two remarkable transformations occurred in the period from the early 
seventeenth century to the full-blown recognition of conspiracy as an inchoate offence in 
the mid-nineteenth century. First, the doctrine was abstracted so that it eventually applied 
to inchoate agreements to commit violent felonies. Secondly, conspiracy was converted 
from a relatively minor offence into a major felony, punished on a par with the felony 
comprising the objective of the unlawful agreement. Neither of these remarkable processes 
of transformation has received much attention in the literature, and this is not the proper 
framework for the needed historical analysis.2 
 What is so mysterious and elusive about the history of the law of conspiracy? To be sure, 
as Bryan points out, the growth of the law of conspiracy escapes the rational powers of the modern 
scholar. But Bryan’s frustration springs from his unattainable goal of finding the rise and growth 
of the underlying principles of the law of conspiracy. The entangled web of precedents claiming 
to bear upon that law can hardly be reduced to the parameters of doctrinal history and modern 
case-law analysis. It is not only that there is no way of ascertaining clear rationes decidendi or 
obita without incurring in heavy work interpretation, but also that most of what is going on is not 
in plain sight in the case-law, but rather in the background of the lawyer’s mind. Or, to put it in 
                                                 
1 James Wallace Bryan, The Development of the English Law of Conspiracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 
7. 
2 George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1978) 221-3. 
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other words, we cannot disentangle the blackletter of the law from the lawyer who utters it. And 
Bryan’s logical mind would never meet with that lawyer’s.  
 Judging from Fletcher’s dictum, Bryan’s doctrinal attempt at systematizing the history of 
conspiracy failed miserably. Fletcher’s tone is different however. He is not exasperated with 
conspiracy’s lack of logic, but rather annoyed with the gap in our knowledge of the development 
of the modern law of conspiracy. This is not stuff a theoretician should waste his time with. But 
again, any historian that aims at solving the mystery of the transformation of the law of malicious 
prosecution into an inchoate offence is bound to fail miserably as well. They3 would be assuming 
a default theory about meaning that would preclude anything in the way of explanation of that 
transformation. What is a mystery is the transformation. We know the terminus a quo, malicious 
prosecution, and the terminus ad quem, the inchoate offence. But what happens in between is a 
black box. And if we start with opaque terms such as transformation, historical research would 
shed very little light on that box. In the absence of a theory about what transformation is, historical 
accounts are as explanatory as saying that an apple is a seed that transformed itself into a tree that 
transformed itself into the apple.  
 The problem of conspiracy can only be solved if we abandon any doctrinal approach 
altogether and focus instead on its intellectual history. After all, it we remove its normative aspect, 
the history of legal doctrines is but a branch of intellectual history. But that begs the question: what 
is intellectual history anyway? As with any definitional problem, there is no easy answer. To be 
sure, intellectual history must deal with how ideas or concepts originate and change through time, 
but this again begs the question as to what are ideas or concepts and what is originate, and what is 
change. I take that these are things that do not concern most intellectual historians, who take both 
concepts and change as facts of life and simply set about themselves to chart the changes and 
transformations of these ideas through different data points. Indeed, most of the time the process 
would be described with vague words such as transformation, change, development, evolution, 
shift, revolution, growth, transition, switch, rise, fall, decline, emergence, coalesce, crystallize. 
But these words explain nothing in themselves; they simply attest some direction of change. The 
                                                 
3 Henceforward I will use the gender-neutral singular they whenever it is fit.  
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only thing close to an explanation these scholars would give is relating conceptual change to its 
historical context. But again, putting ideas in context is no explanation but an interpretation.  
 If we are to use history to explain conceptual change, we need some theory about what 
concepts are, what their boundaries and structure are, how they are born, and how they change. 
Now, it should be recalled that most of what we know about concepts from the past is gathered 
from written sources. That is, conceptual history after all is nothing but an unprincipled fancy way 
to make diachronic semantics. Thus, what we need is not a theory about concepts but a theory 
about how concepts relate to language, and about linguistic change. In this dissertation, I will resort 
to three such theories, which belong to what is now known with the umbrella term of cognitive 
linguistics.  
 There is no single theory of cognitive linguistics. However, most approaches coincide in 
assuming that language is not different from the rest of our mental life and that consequently the 
meaning of words is governed and must be explained by the same mental processes that govern 
other aspects of our minds such as our perception. This implies that semantic theory would be but 
an aspect of the theory of the mind. It follows that cognitive linguistics strongly opposes the idea 
that words have meanings independent of use that are somehow stored in our brains, and that we 
encode and decode meaning by combining these lexical units according to rules stored somewhere 
else in our brains. It also debunks the idea that we to decide whether to apply a word or not to refer 
to something, we have to resort to abstract definitions.  
 Therefore, it should be kept in sight that what I am going to discuss in this section is 
grounded in theories about how our mind processes, organizes, stores and reuses information by 
means of cognitive structures, and how, through these structures, it is able to create new novel 
structures that are not based on previous experience. Specifically, I will sketch here how these 
cognitive structures become encoded in the language as semantic structures, and how we create 
and structure our categories leading to the gradation of such semantic structures. I will also 
summarily discuss how this semantic structure operates to produce local meaning in discourse and 
thought. Needless to say, this account is far from exhaustive or complete, and my goal here is not 
to contribute to cognitive linguistics. Rather, my approach is pragmatic. I will take some notions 
that we can use to give a more definite shape to conceptual history and that would enable us to 
explain the transformation of the law of conspiracy in more definite and less mysterious terms. 
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These very same notions can also help us to conceptualize the legal mind and legal reasoning in a 
different way than that to which we are used to in our textbooks.  
FRAMES 
 The term of frame, and cognate terms such as schema, script, narrative and idealized 
cognitive model can be generally defined as the “many organized packages of knowledge, beliefs, 
and patterns of practice that shape and allow humans to make sense of their experiences.”4 Another 
definition can be “a schematization of experience (a knowledge structure), which is represented at 
the conceptual level and held in long-term memory.”5 And more specifically with regards to 
language it can be defined as “a knowledge structure required in order to understand a particular 
word or related set of words.”6 
 One illustration of such a knowledge structure induced from our past experiences is what 
we might call the schema of a face. Based on all the faces we have seen, a structure has been 
formed in our minds that is very schematic and abstract: it does not contain all the possible features 
a face should have, and it does not contain particulars that we might have seen in each different 
face. For most of us, this structure probably contains an oval shape with a forehead covered by 
some hair, two eyebrows, two eyes, cheeks, a nose, a mouth, a chin and ears, all arranged in a 
certain symmetrical way. It would probably not omit information about the wrinkles of the 
forehead, or the area between the nose and the upper lip where the moustache grows, or the nostrils. 
It would omit any particular shape we have encountered, or distinctive marks such as moles or 
scars. For sure, the schematic knowledge that a portrait painter or a laryngologist would have of a 
face will vary considerably with regard to ours. This schematic knowledge structure or frame 
allows us to recognize a face when we see one, and not mistake it for a hat. And it is this frame 
that we encode in words such as face, nose, or mouth, and that we evoke when we use these words.  
 The schema of a face is but a frame based on our experience of the world. There are other 
knowledge structures based on our bodily experiences such as the frame of fear or love. But there 
                                                 
4 Charles J. Fillmore, and Collin Baker, "A Frames Approach to Semantic Analysis," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Linguistic Analysis, ed. Bernd Heine and Heiko Narro. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 314. 
5 Vyvyan Evans, and Melanie Green, Cognitive Linguistics. An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2006), 222. 
6 Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 225. 
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are also frames based on our being embedded in a social and cultural setting. The calendric system 
is one such frame, as are social institutions such as marriage or war, the employment relationship, 
or the stock market. This is also the case of political systems such as a republic or a monarchy. All 
these social and cultural experiences also become entrenched in our mind in the form of schematic 
knowledge or frames that we use to make sense of this social world and the words we use to 
describe it.7  
 As suggested above, the meaning of words and grammatical constructions cannot be 
understood except by reference to these frames.8 Now, this meaning comes in the form of these 
chunks of related information. In the example above, the frame FACE is made up of the indicated 
elements that are organized in a certain way. That means that we cannot access that information 
without at the same time accessing the other information that forms part of the frame. When we 
think of a mouth, we think of a mouth in a face. It follows that when we use a word to mean 
something, what we do is profile a concept against a larger background frame. In using the word 
mouth to evoke the frame FACE, we profile that part of the face against the rest. That is why, if 
somebody tells us, “he’s got a big mouth,” we will not picture an isolated mouth but a whole face, 
focusing on the mouth.  
 The main consequence of this phenomenon for semantic theory is the so called 
encyclopedic view of semantics as opposed to the dictionary view. That is, rather than seeing 
words as coupled to single definitions we should look at them as access points to these frames. 
Indeed, if we think that these frames are combined in lager frames (the FACE frame belongs to 
the BODY frame), then words become access points to vast conceptual networks of structured 
knowledge. It follows that that the kind of knowledge we can get from a dictionary based on 
isolated word definitions would never suffice to understand the meaning of a given text. “The full 
meaning of a text is vastly underdetermined by its linguistic form alone.”9. The meaning of a given 
text becomes complete when these frames are activated. Indeed, it can be said that interpreting a 
text is nothing more than setting it against background frames.  
                                                 
7 Filmore and Baker, Frames, 315. 
8 Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 222. 
9 Filmore and Baker, Frames, 315. 
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 Let us now apply what I have said so far to a new example from a culturally embedded 
frame: the frame WASHING TEETH. Based on repeated experience, the main elements of that 
frame would be: 
-The setting is usually a bathroom, whether a private or a public one. 
-The time is usually the morning before going out, or the night before going to bed. 
-There is an agent doing the main action. 
-There is tooth paste. 
-There is a toothbrush, usually set in a glass. 
-The agent puts the toothpaste on the toothbrush. 
-The agent applies the toothbrush against the teeth. 
-The agent washes the mouth and rinses the toothbrush, and places the toothbrush back in 
the glass. 
-The agent begins their day if it is set up in the morning, or goes to bed if it is nighttime. 
Most of the elements of this frame are linguistically anchored or lexicalized with terms such as 
toothbrush, toothpaste, bathroom cabinet, or expressions like brush your teeth.  
 Let us now see how we can interpret the sentence, “Peter took the toothpaste from the 
shelf.” If we assume a dictionary view of semantics, the meaning of this sentence would be the 
result of the combination of the words take, toothpaste, shelve, and Peter. As such, it would give 
us very little information. We would picture Peter taking the toothpaste from a shelf. However, the 
truth is that most of us would imagine a richer picture and would be able to draw many inferences 
that do not follow from the mere meaning of the words. The term toothpaste would immediately 
license us to interpret this sentence against the frame of WASHING TEETH. We would profile an 
agent taking the toothpaste against the rest of the frame. We would most probably picture Peter in 
a generic bathroom, taking the toothpaste from the bathroom cabinet. We would think that Peter 
is about to wash his teeth and that therefore he is beginning or ending his day, etc. 
 Yet, the meaning of the sentence can change altogether if we profile the word shelf against 
the frame SHOPPING AT A SUPERMARKET. We will picture a totally different scene and draw 
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completely different conclusions. This would be likewise the case if it happens to be that we know 
Peter and that he works at a toothpaste factory. We would profile the words shelf and toothpaste 
against the frame FRIEND PETER and within it, against the subframe WORKING AT A 
FACTORY. 
 When given a linguistic input such as the one discussed above, we map a linguistic sign 
against a frame; we are evoking this cognitive frame.10 It follows that the interpretation of linguistic 
input consists of this conceptual operation of frame evocation or connecting linguistic signs with 
these wider frames. Frame semantics is therefore the “study of how linguistic forms evoke or 
activate frame knowledge, and how the frames thus activated can be integrated into an 
understanding of the passages that contain these forms.”11 The basic assumption of frame 
semantics is that “all content words require for their understanding an appeal to the background 
frames within which the meaning they convey is motivated and interpreted.”12  
PROTOTYPE Theory 
 This theory was developed by Eleanor Rosh in the 1970s to account for the results of 
experimental research about how humans form categories. It opposes the view that category 
membership is defined by a set of “necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions.”13 The classical 
example of the problems facing this view is the definition of the category of bachelor as an 
‘unmarried adult male’, which would include exemplars that we do not consider part of it like the 
Pope or a homosexual male.14 That is, it seems that in our experience, deciding whether an instance 
does belong to a category does not depend on a well-defined set of conditions but on other factors.  
 Furthermore, the definitional view of the structure of categories “requires the identification 
of all those features that are shared by all members of a category (necessary features), and that 
together are sufficient to define that category (no more features are required).”15 As Wittgenstein 
pointed out, words like game cannot be reduced to any single set of necessary and sufficient 
                                                 
10 Ib. 316. 
11 Ib., 317. 
12 Ib., 318. 
13 Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 251. 
14 Ib., 160. 
15 Ib., 252. 
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features. For one thing, we would include within it such disparate things such as chess, boxing, 
rugby, bridge, soccer, tennis, hopscotch, ring a ring of roses, soccer, Pac-Man, tic-tac-toe, ball and 
cup, bloody knuckles, beer die, pennies, darts, truth or dare, loose and fast, pig in a poke, just to 
mention a few. As it happens to be, we cannot find a set of features that are shared by all the 
members of the category, and therefore, we cannot come up with a definition that would account 
for them all.16  
 Rosh’s research revealed that most human categories present what she called prototype 
effects. We do not think in abstract terms. Rather, we conceive the categories in terms of what 
would be a good example of it, that is, a prototypical member of it, and what would be a less 
prototypical one. If we are to represent this category, the prototype would be at the center of it. 
Then other members would be at relative distances from this prototype, and some would be at the 
boundaries of the category. In other words, these categories that show prototype categories are 
graded categories.17 It follows from this that, contrary to the definitional view, the boundaries of 
human categories are fuzzy, and that the membership of some exemplars would be uncertain. 
These, indeed, would probably fall within more than one category.18 
The classic illustration of a category presenting prototype effects is that of bird. Most 
people think of a sparrow or a robin as the best representatives of this category. Eagles would be 
somewhere in the middle. Penguins and ostriches are borderline examples of birds.  
                                                 
16 Ib., 253. 
17 Ib., 206. 
18 Ib., 253-4. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that those members that share the greatest number of features 
with the rest of the members would be the prototypes of a given category. By contrast, the members 
that share fewer attributes with other members would be the less prototypical members. For that 
reason, members of a category present family resemblance relations: “while there are no attributes 
common to all members… there is sufficient similarity between members that they can be said to 
resemble one another to varying degrees.”19 In the case of the category game, what characterizes 
all these disparate things is that there is a family relationship. While any single item does not share 
all its features with the rest, it shares some features with some members.  
 As we will show later, we can use this theory to explain how people perceive the structure 
of legal categories such as that of homicide. We can conceive of it as a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, or rather as a fuzzy category made of a series of cases, some of which would 
be more prototypical core and others less prototypical, and thus somewhere in its periphery.  
MAPPINGS, MENTAL SPACES AND BLENDS 
 After briefly discussing the semantic structure of words and the prototype effects within 
categories, it remains to be seen how we produce meaning out of these structures. More 
specifically, we need a model that would explain the dynamic aspects of meaning as it unfolds in 
thought and discourse. Incidentally, this theory would also provide a means of modelling the 
                                                 
19 Ib., 265. 
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processes that lead to semantic diachronic change and help us explain the radial polysemic 
structure of categories like that of conspiracy.  
 The idea that words are simply access points to frames of structured knowledge necessarily 
implies that meaning is something we construct rather than passively receive. But how do we 
construct meaning? The very first thing we should keep in mind is that this is a process that pretty 
much happens under the radar of our consciences. That things and words have meanings seems 
such an obvious, automatic, and mundane thing to us that we cannot imagine the complicated 
mental operations that need to take place before the simplest meaning is produced. The essence of 
these operations are the mappings between different cognitive domains. Mapping is a term 
borrowed from mathematics, and in its most general sense is used to refer to “a correspondence 
between two sets that assigns to each element in the first counterpart a counterpart in the second.” 
Thus, cognitive linguistics take the mappings between domains to be “the unique human cognitive 
faculty of producing, transferring and processing meaning” that explains not only its production 
in discourse but also human reasoning.20 
 The main mappings are the projection mapping, the pragmatic function mapping, and the 
schema mapping. A projection mapping involves the partial projection of part of the structure of 
one domain onto another. The structuring domain is the source domain, and the structured domain 
is the target. This kind of mapping is frequently called up to think and talk about abstract domains 
in terms of less abstract ones by partially transferring structure and lexicon. This is the case of the 
so-called conceptual metaphors like the mapping TIME AS SPACE. The presence of this mental 
operation is attested by expression like: I will be there over the weekend, as the date is coming, 
when the day is over, I should move the meeting up, it happened somewhere in the past, the future 
is before him.21 Another well-known conceptual metaphor is ARGUMENT AS WAR expressed 
in sentences like: your claims are indefensible, he attacked every weak point in my argument, his 
criticisms were right on target, I demolished his argument, I’ve never won an argument with him.22  
                                                 
20 Gilles Faucconier. Mappings in Thought and Language (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1. 
21 Ib., 11. 
22 Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson, "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language," The Journal of Philosophy 77 
(1980): 454. 
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 The pragmatic function mapping “typically corresponds to two categories of objects, which 
are mapped onto each other by a pragmatic function.” Synecdoche and metonymy are very 
important pragmatic functions that allow us to identify an entity in terms of its counterpart in the 
projection. For instance, such pragmatic function mapping takes place in a sentence like “The 
White House made the announcement about its new policy on Russia.” This way, the president of 
the U. S. is identified by the place where he lives and works in the projection.23  
 The third kind of mapping is the schema mapping. This is drawn when we evoke a frame 
to structure a given situation, and it is usually called up by the use of language. The typical case is 
the structuring of a mental space by frames. For instance, the sentence “Jack buys gold from Jill” 
prompts a mental space with the elements Jack, gold, and Jill. This in turn is mapped onto the 
frame of COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE made of the slots buyer, seller, and merchandise.24  
I have already introduced a new term, mental space. A mental space is “a partial structure 
that proliferates when we think and talk, allowing fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and 
knowledge structures.” They are built and linked by these mappings.25 As mentioned above, 
mental spaces can be connected to long-term frames which structure them, but they can be 
activated in many ways, and change dynamically as thought or discourse progresses.26 Normally, 
mental spaces are represented by circles within which there are points indicating elements or 
structure, and lines drawing connections between spaces. This diagram shows the mental operation 
prompted by this abovementioned linguistic input: 
 
                                                 
23 Fauconnier, Mappings, 11. 
24 Ib., 11-12. 
25 Ib., 11. 
26 Gilles Fauconnier, and Mark Turner. The Way we Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Complexity (New 
York: Basic Books, 2002), 40. 
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 So far, we have described the different elements necessary to create a model that would 
account for the production of meaning. Having said that, there is nothing in this model that would 
go beyond the knowledge structures that we already have from repeated experience. We have the 
tools to describe and explain the construction of meaning out of the meanings we already have, 
but nothing in our model licenses us to produce new meaning. We need a theory that would also 
attest for human creativity and imagination, for the creation of new meaning.   
 Fauconnier and Turners have developed a quite popular theory in cognitive linguistics to 
explain the creative aspects of the language like the assemblage of new metaphors and the 
elaboration of counterfactuals. The key to that theory is the idea of conceptual blending, which 
according to them is a unique human capability that not only relates to imagination and creativity 
but also to many other areas of human activity. They came up with this model of conceptual 
blending to explain certain cases in which the linguistic input does not suffice to warrant the 
meaning construction. Simply put, the meaning of a certain expression cannot be modelled by 
simply resorting to frame evocation, nor as instances of conceptual metaphors as described above, 
but all indicates that some other operation generating an unanticipated meaning is present.27  
 The best know example of this is the expression “That surgeon is a butcher.” (I will closely 
follow the description of.28 At first sight this seems to be a case of conceptual metaphor in which 
a target domain SURGEON is being understood in terms of the source domain BUTCHER. The 
different elements of this projection mapping are represented in this table: 
Source: Butcher Mapping Target: Surgeon 
                                                 
27 Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 400-1. 
28 Ib., 401-5. 
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Butcher  Surgeon 
Cleaver  Scalpel 
Animal Carcasses  Human Patients 
Dismembering  Operating  
  
 On closer inspection, we realize that this model cannot account for the meaning of the 
expression. We know that the intent of the sentence is to pass negative judgment of the surgeon, 
implying that they are incompetent. However, if we think of this as a case of conceptual metaphor, 
the negative judgment cannot be transferred to the target domain as it does not belong to the source 
domain. Actually, the frame of a butcher would include an appreciation of this vocation as one 
requiring training and skill. It follows that when we conceive a surgeon as a butcher, a new 
meaning emerges that is different from the frames structuring these mental spaces. Therefore, there 
must be an emerging structure or meaning out of these existing frames that would explain our 
understanding of this sentence.  
The theory of conceptual blending or conceptual integration deals with this emerging 
meaning that is more than the sum of its parts. To begin with, in contrast to the model of projection 
maps, in order to account for the emergent structure, we are going to need a multi-space model of 
meaning construction and an integration network. So, in the example of “That surgeon is a 
butcher,” the model will include two input spaces connected by a generic space. This generic space 
contains abstract information that is common to both input spaces and warranting the mappings 
between the elements of both. This abstract information illuminates the shared structure of both 
mental spaces. To these, we should add a blended space that contains the emergent structure. This 
emergent structure arises out of the combination of elements from both input spaces, but its 
meaning cannot be totally derived from them. It also includes meaning that is not in either of them.  
With this model, we can now give an account of the meaning of the sentence. In the new 
emergent structure or blend, elements of both input spaces are combined. There is a surgeon, a 
patient, and an operating theater. Yet other elements from the input spaces are not transferred to 
the blend. For instance, the slaughterhouse, or the cleaver, or the animal carcasses are not 
transferred to the blend. And most importantly, the skills of a surgeon are not projected either, but 
rather those of a butcher. Thus, in the new space there is a surgeon in an operating theater but with 
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the skills of a butcher. This is the new meaning which is a combination of elements of both input 
spaces but that is not a projection from any of those input spaces. Neither of the frames structuring 
the butcher or the surgeon spaces contain a butcher surgeon. And because the emergent structure 
is partially organized by the structure projected from the surgery input, we then draw the 
conclusion that this surgeon with the skills of a butcher cannot be but an incompetent one.  
Summing up, the simplest blends emerge in these networks of mental spaces composed of 
two input spaces, a generic space, and the blend. But integration networks with several input spaces 
are possible. Between these two input spaces there are going to be matchings or counterpart 
connections. The generic space will contain abstract structure induced from the two input spaces. 
The blend can contain structure projected from the generic space and the input spaces, but also 
structure that is not present in the inputs. The projection of elements from the inputs onto the blend 
is selective. The emergent structure that appears in the blend but is not present in the inputs arises 
by three different processes. By composition of the elements of the input spaces, by pattern 
completion or recruiting of familiar frames, and by elaboration of the blend or running the blend 
(i.e. imagining the new scenario created by composition and completion).  
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As suggested earlier, conceptual blends do not only account for linguistic creativity. This 
theory is meant to be a universal explanation of the way we think and it explains a wide variety of 
manifestations of human ingenuity. I will show how intellectual and cultural history could be used 
to show how pervasive this phenomenon of conceptual blending is, and how historical research 
could be enriched with a theory that gives us the tools to express the birth of new ideas and 
conceptual change in a more articulated way.  
28 
 
 There are certain times in human history when two different cultures come together for one 
reason or another. It is safe to say that when that happens, a vast process of conceptual blending 
would ensue among the members of both cultures. Indeed, the most spectacular blends would 
probably be produced as a result of such an encounter. At least this was the outcome of the 
conversion of the barbaric tribes to Christianity during the Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages. 
Blends between elements of both cultures can be seen everywhere in the historical and 
archaeological record. For instance, in rendering the Gospel understandable to the Saxons—
recently and brutally converted by the Carolingians, the old Saxon poem of Heliand or ‘savior’29 
(circa 830) draws from two input spaces: from the traditional Germanic epic poems that reflect the 
warrior ethos and the social structure of that people, and from the Gospel story30 (which in turn 
can be thought of as a blend between Jewish religious beliefs and practices and Hellenistic 
thought). In the poem, we can see how elements from these input spaces are combined in a new 
unique emerging structure that does not correspond to either of them.  
 In the blended space of the Heliand, Jesus is the landes uuard or 'guardian of the land' and 
the thiodo drothin or ‘lord of the peoples.’ The Virgin Mary is presented as an adalcnosles uuif or 
‘woman of noble lineage.’ King Herod is a boggebo or ‘giver of rings.' The apostles are gisidos or 
‘companions, retainers’ of Christ, and Peter is his suerthegan or his ‘sword-theng.’ The desert 
where Jesus was tempted is a forest. The ship where the disciples sail the sea of Galilee is a hoh 
hurnidskip or ‘high-horned ship’ used in the northern waters. The infant Christ is clothed with 
jewels and the shepherds are grooms looking after horses. The marriage at Cana becomes a typical 
Germanic Lord feast. Jesus enters Jerusalem as a lord on foot rather than on an undignified donkey. 
Likewise, as a Saxon lord who would seek young sword-wise warriors as retainers gathers about 
him ‘youths for disciples, young men and good sword-wise warriors.’ Mathew is a cuninges thegn 
that is a ‘king's thegn and a drohtines man or ‘the Lord's retainer’ who finds in Jesus ‘a more 
generous mead-giver than he had ever had before as a liege lord in this world.’ (267) The disciples’ 
'Lord, teach us to pray’ becomes gerihti us that geruni or ‘reveal us the runes.’31 
                                                 
29 Henceforward, I will use single quotation marks to refer to concepts. 
30 Richard A. Fletcher, The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to Christianity (Berkley; Los Angeles: California 
University Press, 1999), 266. 
31 Ib., 265-7. 
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 Perhaps even more astonishing is the Franks Casket. This is a small box named this way 
after one of its nineteenth century owners, Augustus Frank, and is made of whale’s bone, probably 
dating from the early-eighth century Northumbrian Renaissance. The remarkable thing about this 
artifact is the way it is decorated. On its sides, several scenes are carved. On the left side, there is 
a representation of the Roman foundational myth with Romulus and Remus being nourished by a 
She-wolf. The rear panel contains the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. On the lid, these 
depictions are already suggestive of multiple blendings in operation, but let us focus on the front 
panel where this phenomenon is more visible. This panel is divided into two juxtaposed scenes. 
On the left-hand side, there is a depiction of the Germanic myth of Weland the Smith. As the story 
goes, Weland was abducted by the King Nithad who lamed and forced him to craft magnificent 
art. When the occasion presented itself, Weland planned his revenge and escape. Thus, before 
escaping, he murdered the king’s sons. He turned their skulls into goblets and used them to serve 
drink to the father, and their eyeballs into dazzling gems which he gave to the mother as a present. 
And finally, he raped and impregnated the king’s daughter.32 
On the right-hand side of the front panel, we find the three magi bringing gifts for the 
newborn Christ child. Is there any explanation for this most startling juxtaposition or is it just a 
random assortment of scenes taken from here and there? It can be argued that in this front panel 
we have maybe one of those rare occasions in which two input spaces of an integration network 
appear in the flesh in a physical object and not just as a representation of mental processes. The 
Weland’s input space is structured by a certain narrative of the Germanic values, whereas the 
Adoration of the Magi’s input space is structured by the narrative of the Christian values. There 
would be a generic space signaling commonalities between the two narratives. But what does it 
mean? It is clear that the meaning of this juxtaposition does not arise from any of these input 
spaces, but that it is an emergent structure arising from a blend of both spaces. Thus, it has been 
suggested that the front panel represents the ideals of good and bad lordship of the warrior ethos. 
Christ is the good lord to whom you bring gifts as a sign of loyalty. Nithad is the bad lord who 
abuses his followers and for that they should get back at him.33 Thus, we have that in the generic 
space there is the aspects lord, demeanor of a lord, reaction to the demeanor of a lord. And it is 
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Early Anglo-Saxon England,” Speculum 84 (2009): 549-581. 
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only in the blended space where the new meaning can arise. Without it, we cannot take Christ as 
a good lord, as the space of the Gospel does not include this possibility. Nor in the space of the 
Germanic myth is there any Lord named Christ and son of God. To account for the meaning of the 
juxtaposition of the two panels, we need this emerging structure.  
 
These are dramatic cases of conceptual blends. As has been brought home several times in 
this chapter, the theory of conceptual blend accounts for the production of new meaning in on-line 
processes like thought and discourse. This means that these blends are mainly ephemeral and for 
local purposes. There is the possibility that these blends become culturally entrenched and fixed. 
It is clear that the blend between the warrior ethos and the Christian Gospel arose out of contingent 
demands as the converted Germanic peoples found it hard to reconcile the culture of forgiveness 
with their own. The blended version was more palatable. In the end, however, this vengeful 
Christianity did not survive the period of conversion and these are vestiges of local blends that 
died out with the thought that succored them. But, as suggested above, the very Gospel is an 
instance of a blend that not only survives but that becomes the center of a new culture.  
Therefore, the theory of the conceptual blending that explains how new ideas are created 
out of old ones can be supplemented with diachronic semantics, or with history for that matter, 
that would describe how these blends that are constantly born, and constantly die out, sometimes 
become frames themselves, capable of structuring our thought and discourse.  
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THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
To go back to the law of conspiracy, there is no doubt that we can exact great benefit from 
these conceptions of frame, prototype effects, and blending for the purposes of legal history. For 
one thing, the way common lawyers are said to think, by analogy, is itself a form of projection 
mapping that lends itself to modelling as integration network. The common law itself can be seen 
as the result of this relentless process of generation of emergent spaces every time a case is argued 
by drawing analogies not only with other cases, but also with different branches of the law, with 
different legal traditions, or even with other domains alien to legal analysis such as theology, 
ethics, or political thought. Some of these mappings between rules would be ephemeral and lead 
to no change of the law, but other blends would become legal categories that would help framing 
legal reasoning.  
We can attest the existence of these blends in multiple ways. The most direct way is by the 
presence of the lexicon belonging to a certain branch of the law within another area of the law. 
This indicates that there might be a blending operating between the two. Other times we have to 
adopt an onomasiological perspective and look at the invocation of concepts or rules belonging to 
a domain different to that of the discourse where it occurs. Sometimes the blending is motivated 
by terms capable of invoking several different frames and prompting the phenomenon of 
frameshifting. We will see all of these operating within the law of conspiracy.  
What follows is an attempt, as experimental as it can be, to account for the conceptual 
history of the law of conspiracy in light of these notions of frame, prototype effects and blends. 
This is what I mean by the expression conceptual genealogy in the title. I realize that both terms 
have a certain pedigree within the domain of conceptual history and that because of that may lead 
to a certain misunderstanding. As I see it, conceptual and genealogy are frequently used in the 
same sense as transformation and mystery. It is in the way that historians shrug explanations off. 
In this dissertation, by using that expression I indicate that I want to describe the semantic structure 
of the term conspiracy within the legal domain as a result of a diachronic process of conceptual 
mapping (by analogy, framing or metonymy) and blending. Or, to put it in more general words, I 
want to explain in these terms how the common law tradition has developed over time. In this 
sense, I hope now that these vague terms such as development, acquire a more precise and definite 
meaning.  
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Before I sketch out the plan of the thesis, I should say a word about the periodization of 
this conceptual genealogy. I will focus on the period from the inception of the law of conspiracy 
in the reign of Edward I to the birth of the modern law of conspiracy in the Early Modern Period. 
As for the terminus ad quo, there is nothing to say since this is where the historiography starts. 
The terminus ad quem may seem arbitrary. Indeed, if we are to make a history of the law of modern 
conspiracy, nothing short of the late nineteenth century would be inaccurate and incomplete. And 
this was my original purpose. Needless to say, this is not feasible, nor can it be encapsulated in a 
single dissertation. Not at least if conceptual genealogy is to be made. Therefore, I have opted for 
stopping at the point where traditionally the historiography of conspiracy first detects that the law 
of conspiracy was undergoing a huge transformation: William Hawkins’s rendition of it. However, 
I should say that the one attempted here is not the most traditional route to the law of modern 
conspiracy. As we will see in short, the historiography has always started from the nineteenth-
century problem of the trade unions and worked its way backwards to the fountains of modern 
common law conspiracy. At most, some attempts have been made to describe the medieval 
conspiracy, but rarely without a view to connect it with modern conspiracy. This thesis, instead, 
will try to enlighten the mystery process by which the medieval law transformed into the modern 
one, without retrospective projections of any kind. Furthermore, ending with Hawkins implies 
including the two leading cases that laid the conceptual foundations of subsequent eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century case-law: The Poulterers’ Case (1611) and Starling Case (1665). 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will give an account of the key issues and the frame 
within which the historiography of conspiracy has been written. Next, I will tackle the problem of 
the inception of the law of conspiracy and inquire into the reasons why the concepts embraced 
within that expression were indeed lexicalized as conspiracy. The third chapter will lay the 
foundations of issues that will be later discussed in the fifth chapter. It deals with the doctrine that 
the will must be taken for the deed and how its meaning is localized within the law of homicide 
and the law of treason. The fourth chapter describes the process of blending that would lead to the 
emergence of a new action of conspiracy different from the medieval one, and the ramifications of 
this change for the domain of the law of conspiracy. Finally, the last chapter draws from the two 
previous tributaries to show what analogies and blends were drawn in the Poulterers’ Case and 
Starling Case, resulting in the rearrangement of the law of conspiracy. 
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1. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
The historiography of the law of conspiracy was inaugurated on the occasion of the mid-
Victorian trade unions issue and the movement for the codification of the criminal law of England 
that the Indian Penal Code had set into motion. Other than from Early Modern sources, most of 
what we know about the medieval conspiracy was first cobbled together by authors who saw in 
the labor issue an opportunity to gain allies and advance the codification of criminal law. Theirs 
was to be an exercise in the doctrinal or internal history of the law of conspiracy with a view to 
provide a rational basis for the codification of criminal law. History was the handmaid of 
codification, to paraphrase Maitland. It was inevitable that they would bring their codifying ideals 
and ideas to bear on their historical inquiry as well as the concerns of organized labor. Thus, in 
using the historical method, they ran the risk of putting the cart before the horse, beginning first 
with the concept of conspiracy they needed, and only later working out its historical development 
as they saw fit. Furthermore, their history was to be consequential, as they laid the ground for the 
development of a historiographical tradition that revisited and cultivated the issues that they raised 
at that time.  
1.1 THE CODIFICATION OF CONSPIRACY 
1.1.1 THE TRADE UNIONS ISSUE 
 The much-debated question of the status of trade unions and their practices in nineteenth 
century-Britain reached its climax by 1871. After the age of the Combination Acts in which Trade 
Unions and their practices were banned altogether under penalties that ranged from a few months 
to a year of imprisonment, the Tory settlement of 1825 laid the framework for the next decades in 
which trade unions, strikes and boycotts were decriminalized within certain boundaries. The law 
was vague and open to interpretation, particularly as to the extent to which the common law of 
conspiracy applied to trade unions. This invited different and contrasting views that ranged from 
the view that the Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to the Combination of Workmen 1825 (6 Geo 4 
c 129) had negatively created a right to unionize and strike, to those who thought that trade unions 
and their practices remained essentially illegal with some exceptions carved out by that law. By 
the 1850s, it was becoming clear that the courts would tighten those exceptions to limit the ability 
of the trade unions to strike. This involved not only the interpretation of the penal clauses of the 
Act of 1825, but also the construction of the common law of conspiracy.  
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 This Tory settlement came to an end with the disenfranchisement of part of the working 
classes and the arrival of a new Liberal government in 1868 that was eager to deliver to this 
constituency by trying to fix the labor issue. As a result, two laws were passed which replaced the 
Act of 1825: the Trade Union Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict c 31),34 and the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict c 32). Though the common law of conspiracy was not abrogated, the 
second provision of the Trade Union Act carved out a wide immunity for the members of trade 
unions: “The purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of 
trade, be deemed to be unlawful so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal 
prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise.”35 This was complemented with the penal clause of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act which in the most convoluted way possible allowed for the 
application of the common law conspiracy to acts unlawful under this law: 
Nothing in this section shall prevent any person from being liable under any other Act, or 
otherwise, to any other or higher punishment than is provided for any offence by this 
section, so that no person be punished twice for the same offence. Provided that no person 
shall be liable to any punishment for doing or conspiring to do any act on the ground that 
such act restrains or tends to restrain the free course of trade, unless such act is one of the 
acts herein-before specified in this section, and is done with the object of coercing as 
herein-before mentioned. 
 The new law was tested almost immediately. In December 1872, the gas stokers of London 
decided to go on a strike demanding that workers who had been victimized by the gas industry for 
their involvement in a recent successful campaign to raise their wages and end Sunday work were 
reinstated. As their demands were not met, they walked out putting London under the risk of total 
darkness. The companies managed to keep a limited supply of gas lighting by bringing in unskilled 
workers, and though the strike fizzled out, they showed no mercy.36 Prosecutions were brought 
against the leaders of the strike for “conspiring to interfere with the free will of the gas company 
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in the management of its business by the use of improper threats and molestation,” and for 
“conspiring to commit an offence under the Master and Servant Act by breaking their contracts.”37 
 The defense counsel warned that should the strikers be convicted on the first count virtually 
“any combination to induce an employer to do something he might not otherwise want to do could 
constitute a criminal conspiracy.” Brett J38 dismissed this contention and instructed the jury that 
“if there was an agreement among the defendant by improper molestation to control the will of the 
employers, then I tell you that would be an illegal conspiracy at common law, and that such an 
offence is not abrogated by the Criminal Law Amendment Act”. The gas stokers were convicted 
on the first count. Though the maximum sentence provided for such offence under the Master and 
Servant Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 141) was of three months, Brett applied the common law of 
conspiracy extending it to twelve months of imprisonment because of their “disregard of public 
safety.”39 
  Though the government remitted eight months the sentences—keeping the principle that 
the punishment of a conspiracy to commit a statutory offence might be more severe than the 
offence’s one—this did not stop criticism of the sentence to mount up in the press as an example 
of judicial activism and class bias. As Brett’s principle was ready to be used by the courts in 
subsequent cases if they saw it fit, risking turning the new legislation on the law of strike into a 
dead letter, the Home Office thought it convenient to query government law officers whether the 
law should be amended to avoid the application of the common law of conspiracy, and whether it 
should be “retained, amended or abolished.”40 
 The case also ignited a public debate as to the application of the common law conspiracy 
to conducts that were lawful when done individually, as well as to whether punishment should be 
harsher when unlawful conducts were committed individually. James Fitzjames Stephen and 
Robert Samuel Wright, two Benthamites who would become champions of the codification of the 
criminal law of England, seized the opportunity to bring the newly enfranchised labor to the cause 
                                                 
37 Ibidem, 171-172. 
38 Again, I follow the OSCOLA recommendation for referring to a judge in a case by using the capital letter ‘J’ without 
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39 Curthoys, Government, 172. 
40 Ib., 176-177. 
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of the codification of criminal law by framing the labor issue as one that could be cured by bringing 
certainty and affirming the principle of legality in criminal law. In 1870, Wright had been asked 
to draft a criminal code for Jamaica by the Colonial Office, which he concluded in 1874. Stephen 
was responsible for the revision of the draft, and it is possible that the decision to draft his own 
penal code was formed while working on this revision.41 The attitudes of both men towards 
organized labor seemed to differ nevertheless. Since 1872, Wright drafted legislation on behalf of 
the Trade Unions Congress, a version of the act that would replace the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act which was later abandoned, and some of the crucial provisions of the Conspiracy and 
Protection of Property Act of 1875. It was said in a meeting of the Trade Unions Congress that 
“there was no man in England to whom they were more indebted for the improved labour laws 
under which they lived.”42 Stephen, by contrast, who would rally the working classes behind his 
project of codification in a meeting of the Trade Unions Congress, had them stalling and hurtling 
his draft criminal code when they realized that “it did not repeal the law of conspiracy…  [nor] 
secure the right of public meeting.”43 We will see more about this later.  
However, it is difficult to say, from their technical writings, whether Stephen had made a 
tactic alliance with, and whether Wright was a friend of, labor. Reading what they wrote regarding 
the common law of conspiracy, one gets the impression that they were as concerned with the right 
of workers to organize and strike, as with not alienating the judiciary, or the conservative forces 
in Parliament. Stephen, for instance, would initially denounce Brett’s rule as an instance of how 
judges took advantage of the obscurity and vagueness of the common law to punish whatever 
conducts they disapproved of without giving the workers the chance to know whether they were 
committing any offence. He further added that this creative sentence took the attention away from 
the true offence, which was the breaking of contracts in situations that might affect the public 
safety.44 Later though, he would admit that Brett was onto something when he laid down his 
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doctrine, but that it was perhaps not worth keeping it if it meant taking away the right to organize 
from labor.45 
1.1.2 CODIFICATION IDEAS AND IDEALS 
 For Stephen, the codification of the criminal law of England was “the reduction of the 
existing law to an orderly written system, freed from needless technicalities, obscurities, and other 
defects… the process must be gradual… particular branches of the law [must] be dealt with 
separately, but each separate measure intended to codify any particular branch must of necessity 
be more or less incomplete.”46 The first thing we should note here is that the codification of the 
criminal law is not conceived as the creation of a new body of law out of rational or scientific 
universal principles, but rather as putting into writing an existing body of unwritten law (that may 
nevertheless express such universal principles). Codification thus involved not only translating the 
common law into a statutory language, removing obscurity, ambiguity, and unnecessary 
complexity, but also arranging it is a rational way, systematizing it. This fell short of reform, but 
definitely it comprised two levels of intervention on the common law rules. One implying the 
conceptualization of those rules, and another their grouping together into greater categories and 
areas of the criminal law. Ultimately, the final goal was the codification of the entire common law 
to which the codification of the criminal law was only partial. That also meant that Stephen was 
aware that there would be interactions between the codified criminal law and the uncodified 
common law.  
 Stephen’s view of the criminal common law was that that “there is probably no department 
which is so nearly complete in itself as the criminal law,”47 a law “extremely detailed and explicit 
[which]… leaves hardly any discretion to the judges.”48 The “extreme completeness and 
minuteness of the English criminal law” was so because it was “put together slowly and bit by bit 
by parliament on the one hand and the judges of the superior courts on the other.” It followed that 
“a code which was not founded upon and did not recognize these characteristics of the law of 
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England would give up one of its most valuable characteristics… and it would necessitate the re-
opening and fresh decision of a great number of points which existing decisions have settled.”49 
 Thus, Stephen not only views the criminal common law as a body of law, but as one which 
is complete and therefore autonomous. In other words, he presents the criminal common law as a 
sort of code of unwritten law in need of articulate expression in a formal code, one that would 
preserve this “precise and explicit character… by giving the result of an immense amount of 
experience in the shape of definite rules.”50 This experience is the second important characteristic 
of this complete body of law: it is the result of history. But what history? In this approach, history 
itself is the codifying force. It had composed this complete and comprehensive set of rules that is 
there ready to be put in definite form. Indeed, this body of law is complete because of its own 
protracted historical development that allowed “the most powerful legislature and the most 
authoritative body of judges known to history” to slowly but surely fill in every single possible 
gap. This view of history as constructing a complete code of criminal law piece by piece would 
shape Stephen’s approach to the study of the history of the common law, which would become a 
preliminary and necessary stage in the process of codification. One can foresee that under such 
premises parliamentary debate about the penal code would not be one about the substance of the 
criminal law, but about its form. The substance is a matter only for scholars to determine through 
historical inquiry. We will see later see the consequences of this premise for the historiography of 
conspiracy.  
 This codifying view of history, and this conception of the common law as a complete body 
of law, was in striking contrast with the more traditional declaratory and principle-based approach 
that a judge like William Erle could express. The following long passage is worth reproducing to 
illustrate this view and to bring out the contrast with Stephen’s:  
there are some relations between man and man which do not change… and the rules of law 
relating thereto do not change. There are other relations which are perpetually changing as 
society progresses, and conflicts of rights caused by this perpetual process of change is the 
subject of a perpetual process of adjustment, according to the principles contained in the 
common law…Every rule of the common ought to be applied with some limitation of 
reasonableness in degree… the relations of man upon man… cannot be defined till the laws 
of matter, and also the laws of mind are within the limits of certain knowledge, and till 
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social progress is stopped. Definite rules may not be expected… a perpetual process of 
adjustment… is effected by the principles of the Common Law… these principles originate 
practically from the people… [they] may be acted on long before a complete language is 
framed… The principles are applied at first in the concrete; gradually they grow into rules 
of wider application; and the judiciary men and the legislative men adopt them… If the 
origin of the principles of the common law is to be traced beyond their practical existence, 
they seem to originate from conscience… the words of [jurists]… would not have been 
handed down if they had merely expressed their intuitions before their highest faculties had 
been trained by long and painful efforts both to understand the relations of man to man, 
and the words of wide extension expressive of those relations, and also to know how far 
those relations had been so adjusted by the men who had gone before as that their 
adjustment had been adopted into the usages of the people and grown into law; such 
adoption being the process by which living law grows.”51  
Compared to Stephen’s legislative prose, this very passage is illustrative of Erle’s judicial 
prose: vague, bloated, wordy, unnecessarily solemn. But it is also an example of the ideas the 
judiciary may entertain as to the nature of the common law and its history. First, the common law 
is not a complete and comprehensive body of rules but it includes a collection of principles of wide 
expression and of wide application which are to be applied to the ever-changing circumstances. 
Though these principles seem to originate in conscience, they are to be apprehended by expert 
study of the customs of the people and the growth of the law into which they have found expression 
as they have been applied to these ever-changing conditions of society. In other words, these 
principles are to be found by a process of induction. Thus, Erle’s method of dealing with the case 
law goes in the opposite direction: from the specific and concrete to general principles. Indeed, 
within this view the case law was nothing more than evidence of these principles. The alleged 
purpose of the legal scholar and the judge would not be to ascertain and map the common law with 
detail and precision but to reduce it to general operational principles which are to be flexibly 
applied to changing circumstances.  
This view necessarily entails that the judge is going to play a central role as the agency that 
bridges the gap between the wide principle and the present case by deducing and declaring the rule 
that applies to it. Stephen did not share this declaratory view of the common law and the judiciary, 
and he rather considered that when acting in this capacity, judges were truly legislating. 
Consequently, the case law being law rather than evidence of the law, “when a judge is called on 
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to deal with a new combination of circumstances… he is bound to decide in accordance with 
principles already established, which can neither disregard nor alter, whether they are to no 
previous decisions or in books of recognised authority.”52  
For Stephen, the power of the judges to create new law was exercised through “the 
undisputed power of interpreting written and declaring unwritten law, in a manner generally 
recognized as of conclusive authority.”53 That is through the judicial interpretation of statutory 
law, the filling in of the gaps in the law, and the declaration of the common law. With regard to 
the latter, he contended that:  
Though the existence of this power as inherent in the judges has been asserted by several 
high authorities for a great length of time, it is hardly probable that any attempt would be 
made to exercise it at the present day; and any such attempt would be received with great 
opposition, and would place the bench in an invidious position. The last occasion on which 
such a course was taken was the treatment of conspiracies in restraint of trade as a common 
law misdemeanour. I have given the history of this matter, and it is by no means favourable 
to the declaration by the bench of new offences.54  
In this passage, Stephen displays his attitude towards judicial lawmaking through the power 
to declare the common law. Indeed, the very same law of conspiracy as declared by the courts in 
the cases leading to that of the gas stokers, was an example on how this power could be abused, 
and how legislating ex nihilo could be contested as an interference with the legislative power. In 
general, regarding the critical matter of the criminal law, Stephen thought that the age of judge-
made law had come to an end for good, and that the judiciary should no longer intermeddle with 
the legislative power: 
In times when legislation was scanty, the powers referred to were necessary. That the law 
in its earlier stages should be developed by judicial decisions from a few vague generalities 
was natural and inevitable. But a new state of things has come into existence. On the one 
hand, the courts have done their work; they have developed the law. On the other hand, 
parliament is regular in its sittings and active in its labours; and if the protection of society 
requires the enactment of additional penal laws, parliament will soon supply them. If 
parliament is not disposed to provide punishments for acts which are upon any ground 
objectionable or dangerous, the presumption is that they belong to that class of misconduct 
which it is not desirable to punish. Besides, there is every reason to believe that the criminal 
law is, and for a considerable time has been, sufficiently developed to provide all the 
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protection for the public peace and for the property and persons of individuals which they 
are likely to require under almost any circumstances which can be imagined; and this is an 
additional reason why its further development ought to be left in the hands of parliament.55 
Summing up, we have seen how Stephen argued that the criminal law of England “has been 
brought into its present condition by a long series of judicial decisions and statements by text-
writers… though the form in which it is expressed is to the last degree cumbrous and 
inconvenient,” and how its codification consisted in translating this complete body of law into 
statutory language and into rational structure without touching its substance. We have also seen 
how he desired that the code would not be contested or nullified by judicial lawmaking. With this 
aim in mind, it remains to be seen how and to what extent the codification of the criminal law was 
to be carried over.  
First of all, Stephen considered that there was only a portion of the common law that had 
to be reduced to written law, namely excuse and justification, some parts of procedure, and “the 
definitions of murder, manslaughter, assault, theft, forgery, perjury, libel, unlawful assembly, riot, 
and some other offences of less frequent occurrence and importance.”56 One immediately misses 
the definition of conspiracy in that list, but this is a matter I will deal with later. Secondly, given 
the “great richness of the law of England in principles and rules, embodied in judicial decisions, 
[this] no doubt involves the consequence that a code adequately representing it must be elaborate 
and detailed.” We should recall that we have just seen how Stephen argued that this 
comprehensiveness of the criminal law, combined with the doctrine of stare decisis, made the 
English judge particularly unfree. However, and thirdly, the code would preserve whatever power 
the common law gives to the judiciary in the form of general clauses because “such a code would 
not (except perhaps in the few cases in which the law is obscure) limit any discretion now 
possessed by the judges. It would simply change the form of the rules by which they are bound.”57 
This, as we will see, was not true in the case of the law of conspiracy.  
Next, while maintaining the power of the judges to fill the gaps, Stephen’s Code was to 
extinguish their power to create new law ex nihilo. However, he chose a compromising formula 
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that would on the one hand “answer to any cry which might be raised as to the danger of a general 
repeal of the unwritten common law than upon any more serious grounds,” while on the other hand 
would virtually abrogate the criminal common law. That formula had been first put into writing in 
the Indian Penal Code and provided that “every person should be liable to punishment under it, 
and not otherwise, for every act to which it applied.”58 Such a provision would “put an end to a 
power attributed to the judges, in virtue of which they have (it has been said) declared acts to be 
offences at common law, although no such declaration was ever made before.”59 
However, since there is no explicit repeal of the common law, if “any one were [sic] to do 
an act which would have been criminal before it passed, and which was not forbidden by its 
provisions, he would still be liable to punishment under the old law.”60 Obviously, the success of 
this strategy depends on how exhaustive the Code is. In order to prevent the criminal law from 
reverting into unwritten law “any offence known to the common law… [ought not] unintentionally 
[be] omitted from the Code. If any such offence exists, it must be one which, after the most careful 
search and inquiry, was unknown to every member of the Criminal Code Commission, and is 
unmentioned in any of the voluminous text-books which… [should be] carefully searched from 
end to end. Such an offence, if it exists, can scarcely be of any real danger to society.” Furthermore, 
one might argue that, this exhaustive codification, combined with the comprehensiveness of the 
criminal law would also prevent the common law from flourishing again through judicial 
interpretation. Only with regards to justification and excuse, did Stephen foresee the need for 
judges to have the power to fill the gaps.61 Stephen was persuaded that maintaining the common 
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law of justification and excuse was beneficial since through this “a man morally innocent, not 
otherwise protected, may avoid punishment.”62 
In sum, Stephen’s project of codification of the criminal law of England represented a 
compromise between Benthamite ideals and the forces which were opposed to them. Bentham 
conceived of the Code as a primary, rather than a secondary rule. It was first and foremost a written 
code of conduct for the citizen to follow. Hence it follows that it should be public and certain, its 
style simple and understandable, and its form rational and complete. By contrast, a criminal system 
based on unwritten rules such as those of the common law defeated all its purpose of guiding the 
conduct of the citizen as it was uncertain and unknown to anyone outside of the legal profession. 
This led to abuse and oppression, particularly through retroactive rules created by the judiciary in 
clear violation of the division of powers.63 Bentham called this use of the power of the judiciary 
to declare the common law, that is, the idea that they were declaring existing law, a fiction.64 
On the other hand, the legal profession was all too ready to denounce that the codification 
of the common law would deprive the legal system from its flexibility to adapt to social change. It 
was to appease their fears that Stephen pointed out that the criminal common law was a complete 
body of law, which combined with the doctrine of stare decisis, left very little flexibility to the 
judges indeed.65 Codification would not abrogate the common law offences, but only try to prevent 
them from growing back again.  
It follows from this strategy that sought to prevent the Hydra of judicial lawmaking that 
historical research was to play a major role in the codification process. History would be a 
preliminary stage aimed at ascertaining and mapping out all the criminal common law with 
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precision and detail. Next, we are going to see how these ideas revealed themselves in the debate 
about the law of conspiracy.  
1.1.3 THE INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AND THE WIDE RULE 
 Stephen’s interest in the offence of conspiracy went back a few years before the gas stokers 
case. As we will see, the argument by which he appealed to the trade unions to join forces in the 
codification of the criminal law, according to which this offence had been used by the judiciary, 
was not new either. But his view on this offence was more nuanced that what his involvement in 
the debate that followed that case might suggest. In his very first comprehensive work on the 
criminal law he started out with Lord Denman’s antithesis defining conspiracy as “a combination 
to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.” According to Stephen this was 
“not really an antithesis at all. The real definition would be a combination to do an unlawful act 
whether that act is or is not the final object of the combination.” He also explained that within that 
definition “the word ‘unlawful’ is taken in so wide a sense that it might include almost any form 
of immoral, unpatriotic, disloyal, or otherwise objectionable, conduct which involves a plan 
concerted between two or more persons.”66 Expressed in this way conspiracy appeared as one of 
those general rules that gave wide discretion to the judges. Indeed, for Stephen far more important 
than this rather substantive definition of vague boundaries was what was going on behind it: 
To the present day judges exercise a modified power of legislation in declaring certain acts 
to be criminal on the broad ground of their immorality and tendency to injure the public, 
but they do so by the aid of a fiction so refined that it is difficult, at first sight, to see that it 
is a fiction. This fiction consists in treating as a crime, not the very acts which are intended 
to be punished, but certain ways of doing them. The law of conspiracy is, perhaps, the most 
complete illustration of this. According to the law of conspiracy, a crime may be committed 
by the agreement of several persons to do an act which, if done by a single person, would 
not have been criminal…the power of determining what specific actions men may not 
combine to do is, in reality, a legislative power; and it is the form of legislation by  means 
of which the courts most frequently exercise in the present day the prerogative, which in 
former times was distinctly claimed for the Court of King’s Bench, of being the custos 
morum.67  
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This passage contains, in a nutshell, Stephen’s view on the common law of conspiracy. 
Firstly, in using this wide principle, the courts were not applying it to the present case, but were 
secretly exercising the legislative power to punish what the judges thought immoral or dangerous 
to the public, or, as he put it, the prerogative of “being custos morum.” Secondly, Stephen does 
not mean by fiction the improper use of a rule to work a desired effect, in a rather instrumental 
way. In this case, the rule itself gives wide discretion to the judges. The fiction here might be called 
metonymic fiction. This “plan concerted by two or more people” is an ingredient of the conducts 
that the courts thought it necessary to punish, but the courts punished it as if it were the main crime 
when in fact it was just a circumstance aggravating such conducts. In other words, there are certain 
conducts which may not amount to more than a civil wrong, but that become aggravated when 
other circumstances concur such as when more than one person gets involved in them in a 
concerted way. The way the courts have found to punish these aggravated wrongs is by punishing 
only a part of them, the planning and acting together. Thirdly, this empty façade of an offence 
implies that the case law of conspiracy should not be studied and analyzed with a view to construct 
a coherent category of substantive law, but rather with a view to reconstruct the offences that had 
grown out of its application. It is a totally different way of approaching the interpretation of the 
case law, less concerned with extracting the principles expressed in the cases than with asserting 
the policy considerations behind it. In other words, once given this wide rule, Stephen would be 
less concerned with forming a theory of the law of conspiracy, a coherent doctrine, than with 
spelling out the offences created through its fictitious use. This would be a major departure from 
the traditional approach to the offence of conspiracy that one might find in the treatise literature. 
That is, instead of the fusion of the cases in one single theory, he would do the fission and parceling 
out of the category in a series of discrete offences.  
Stephen frames the wide rule in two ways that are not exactly equivalent. On the one hand, 
he talks of conspiracy as “a crime that may be committed by the agreement of several persons to 
do an act which, if done by a single person, would not have been criminal” On the other hand, it 
would be “a combination to do an unlawful act whether that act is or is not the final object of the 
combination.” If by unlawful act we understand, as Stephen does, a category embracing both 
criminal acts as well as acts that under some normative system, whether axiological or utilitarian, 
would be considered reprehensible, then the former definition includes the latter, but not the other 
way around. In other words, the first definition may include acts that are lawful, and therefore not 
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reprehensible under any moral system. Furthermore, for Stephen, the uncertainty of this definition 
lies in the term unlawful, which enables the court to decide which conducts to make punishable. 
But what does the agreement mean anyway? 
Expressions like “agreement to do an act” or “combination to do an unlawful act” are in 
themselves ambiguous and can mean several things. To be more precise, they can evoke different 
frames. If two people agree to do something, it means that they plan on doing something together, 
and that they therefore have a common or shared purpose. In other words, they are ready to 
cooperate toward some common purpose. The frame of cooperation in which two or more people 
work together toward some common purpose presupposes that these people have planned and 
agreed on that before. Thus, the idea that these expressions clumsily hint at is that of cooperation 
between many individuals as an element that aggravates a conduct that would otherwise have been 
merely immoral. For instance, as Stephen puts it, “a man might innocently issue a circular 
calculated to deceive the public as to the trade which he carried on; but if the directors of a joint-
stock bank conspired to do so, they commit a crime.”68 Similarly, there are certain lawful 
individual conducts which may change their nature when performed in a coordinated way with a 
view to produce an aggregate effect, as when workers decide not to work.  
1.1.3.1 THE HISTORY OF THE WIDE RULE 
As for the origins of this wide principle, and how it became an offence, in the General 
View, Stephen offers a strange explanation of why “conspiracy, which is one out of the many 
possible aggravations of an act, should have been selected as the one by which its criminal 
character should be determined.” Namely: 
The probable explanation is, that in earlier times the most prominent conspiracies were 
usually attended with great violence, and that, in defining the crime words were used which 
included offences of much less importance than those which were originally contemplated. 
The statute 33 Ed. I st. 2, which contains a definition of conspirators, shows what sort of 
offences the legislature had in their mind, though their definition includes many minor 
offences; just as the definition of highway robbery—which was suggested by armed 
horsemen, who made a profession of plunder—is generally applied in the present day to 
some commonplace criminal, who pulls a few shillings out of the pocket of a drunken 
companion on his way home from a public-house.  
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If I’m not mistaken, what Stephen means here is that the conspiracy was born as a statutory 
offence, that of an agreement to falsely maintain pleas and false accusations. However, it was later 
put in more abstract and general terms, as embodying the offence of an agreement to do something 
unlawful. These terms included conducts much less serious that the ones that had initially 
prompted the statute. In other words, conspiracy was born as a statutory, very concrete and ad hoc 
offence, and was likely subsequently generalized by the courts at some point while keeping its 
nature of being a punishable offence. 
In this work, Stephen gives no account about when and how the law of the statute 
Definition of Conspirators 1305-6 (33-34 Edw 1) was generalized.  He later completed this 
historical sketch, but did so by giving a different account as to how the wider rule had emerged. 
He pointed out that “conspiracy was the very first crime which was ever defined by statute,” and 
that the offence the statute created:  
was levelled at an abuse which perverted the whole course of justice, and frequently 
produced disturbances bordering on civil war—the banding together of the nobility and 
their tenants against each other, either by perverting the course of justice or by violence. 
When a powerful man wanted to dispose of his enemy by the help of his tenants and other 
dependants, he could either prosecute him maliciously in some of the criminal courts… or 
attack him with the strong hand. In either case the parties had to ‘confeder or bind 
themselves’ together.69  
Later, the Star Chamber extended its jurisdiction over this offence and in:  
One of its decisions (the Poulterers’ case) first established the doctrine that an agreement 
to commit a conspiracy as defined by the statute of Edward I, was itself a misdemeanor, 
although no overt act of maintenance or the like followed upon it—a decision which, I 
think, the words of the statute would warrant. Be this how it may, much of the present law 
consists of an expansion of this principle and its application to other offences than the crime 
of conspiracy as defined by the Act of Edward I.70 
Stephen then goes on to explain how the “doctrine that acts highly immoral or mischievous 
might be treated as crimes, though they fell under no recognized head of criminality,” that is, the 
idea that “down to comparatively modern times the courts of law exercised a very wide discretion 
in determining that large classes of acts were criminal, not because they were breaches of any 
specified law, but because they were highly mischievous to the public,”  combined with “the 
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doctrine established by the Poulterer’s case” to produce the law of conspiracy, that is the law that 
“all combinations of two or more persons for an unlawful purpose are themselves criminal.”71   
In this passage, Stephen is being vague and obscure. He justifies not giving more details 
about the process by which the combination of these two doctrines yielded the law of conspiracy 
in that “it would be tedious to trace out in detail.” At first sight, it may seem that Stephen is 
suggesting that the Poulterers’ Case doctrine that “an agreement to commit a conspiracy as defined 
by the statute of Edward I, was itself a misdemeanor, although no overt act of maintenance or the 
like followed upon it” embodied an embryonic form of the doctrine of attempts, that may develop 
as it was applied “to other offences than the crime of conspiracy.” But the idea of an agreement to 
commit a crime as a sort of attempt is very different from the idea that “combinations of two or 
more persons for an unlawful purpose are themselves criminal.” The latter describe a substantive 
offence, no matter how vaguely, whereas the former derives its criminality from the crime these 
persons agree upon. To put it in different words, the notion of attempt is always relative to a 
criminal conduct. The agreement would be punished as an attempt at the crime in question and not 
because it is in itself considered to be criminal. But then, how does the wide rule arise from this 
narrower one that is limited to attempts as Stephen suggests? One possible interpretation is that 
what Stephen means is that as the courts at the time also punished conducts that were immoral or 
mischievous as criminal though not under any statute, conspiracies to commit such immoral 
conducts were punished as attempts. Thus, they would have passed on to the case law, and when 
the courts no longer punished such conducts, courts would have generalized the law of conspiracy 
under this wide principle including agreements to commit crimes, and also immoral or 
mischievous conducts. In this case, the new wide principle would no longer include the idea of 
attempt, though agreements to commit crimes could be punishable under it.  
However, we should keep in mind the ideas Stephen had expressed in the General View. 
There he was less interested in establishing a concept of conspiracy than in explaining the use of 
the law of conspiracy to produce certain desired outcomes. And for that purpose, he needed a 
wider, rather than a narrower rule. The best explanation is that he was trying to integrate within 
the theory he had expressed earlier in the General View, the account of the origins of the modern 
law of conspiracy of people like Wright who thought rather that the law of conspiracy was basically 
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a branch of the law of attempts.72 Central to Wright’s argument was the doctrine that was born in 
the Star Chamber out of the precedent of the Poulterers’ Case. Probably because the wider rule 
included the punishments of attempts, though it could not be reduced to the idea of attempt, and 
without being specific as to how it was transformed, Stephen engulfed the doctrine of the Star 
Chamber and made it an intermediate stage in the emergence of the wider rule. Indeed, later, in his 
History of the Criminal law of England, referring to the wider rule, he would say that “conspiracy 
has much analogy to an attempt to commit a crime,” and then maintain that “the Star Chamber 
first treated conspiracies to commit crimes or indeed to do anything unlawful as substantive 
offences.”73 However,, as we have already seen, the wide rule expressed the idea of criminal 
cooperation rather than the idea of attempt: the idea that “on the one hand, isolated acts of 
wickedness or vice shall not be treated as crimes, and that, on the other, combinations for a wicked 
purpose shall be treated as crimes though the act to be done would not be a crime if done by an 
individual.”74 That is, it expressed the idea that concerted planning made certain conducts criminal, 
and that the courts, for lack of a better tool, had punished them on the grounds of their concerted 
planning.  
So, whereas in the sketch of the General View the wide rule derived from the medieval 
statute, in this new historical sketch, the wide rule derives from a principle established in a case 
related to the medieval statute. In this way, a distinction appeared between a medieval offence of 
conspiracy and a modern one, which was conceptually unrelated to the medieval one, though 
historically connected to it. At this point, he stuck to the idea expressed in the General View that 
links the medieval offence of conspiracy to the conduct of maintenance, to the rivalries between 
noblemen within the context of what would be later called bastard feudalism. Furthermore, though 
the letter of the statute giving the definition of conspirators embraced other forms of perversion of 
justice, he limited the medieval conspiracy to the incitation of false prosecutions. Later, however, 
in keeping with the idea that modern and medieval conspiracies were conceptually unrelated, in 
the History, the medieval conspiracy would become primarily a civil wrong rather than an offence, 
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and the link between medieval conspiracy and maintenance would disappear, and would instead 
be replaced by the link between the medieval conspiracy and the modern malicious prosecution: 
The earliest meaning of conspiracy was thus a combination to carry on legal proceedings 
in a vexatious or improper way, and the writ of conspiracy, and the power given by the 
Articuli super Chartas to proceed without such a writ, were the forerunners of our modern 
actions for malicious prosecution. Originally, therefore, conspiracy was rather a particular 
kind of civil injury than a substantive crime, but like many other civil injuries it was also 
punishable on indictment, at the suit of the king.75  
1.1.3.2 SPECIAL CONSPIRACIES 
 As stated earlier, Stephen was not as concerned with coming up with a substantive offence 
of conspiracy as with the exercise of legislative power that the courts had carried out through this 
wide rule. Therefore, for Stephen, the codification of the law of conspiracy involved the detailed 
listing of the offences that had emerged out of the instrumental application of this doctrine, and 
their arrangement under the headings of the categories of offences they really belonged to. As we 
have already seen, for Stephen, the conspiracy was an element of these offences. This element had 
fictionally been used to punish them, but they could not be reduced to conspiracy only. There was 
no substantive offence of conspiracy, but rather fictional uses of the wide conspiracy. In this 
regard, I will talk of the special conspiracies approach to distinguish it from the approach that 
would consist in creating a single unified general category of conspiracy, maybe with the 
specification of several subcategories of conspiracy, or with the similar approach of reducing 
conspiracy to a single type of offence. This approach, as will be seen, reflected more closely the 
casuistic and unprincipled growth of the common law. This may be due to Stephen’s strategy of 
repealing the common law only with reference to the offences included in the Code, rather than 
using a general wholesale abrogation of the common law.  
 Already in 1873, Stephen put forth an outline for parceling the law of conspiracy “under 
the heads of conspiracies combinations for any of the following purposes: 1. The perversion of 
justice. 2. The commission of crimes. 3. The promotion of political disturbances. 4. Fraud. 5. 
Immorality. 6. The restraint of trade. 7. The Injury of individuals by means other than fraud.”76 It 
should be noted how in this arrangement, conspiracy as an attempt is just one more type of special 
conspiracy rather than the core of a substantive category. In Annex I, one can chart how Stephen 
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developed this outline through the Digest of the Criminal Law, which he intended as his move 
towards the codification of the criminal law of England,77 and the Draft Penal Code he finally 
prepared, and under what types of offences he finally placed these headings. A quick look suffices 
to realize how faithfully Stephen translated the casuistic growth of the law of conspiracy. For 
instance, despite including the definition of conspiracy to commit a crime as “when two or more 
persons agree to commit a crime,”78 Stephen Code’s still goes on to define offences that would be 
included within this such as the conspiracy to kill the Queen79 or the conspiracy to commit 
murder.80 
1.1.3.3 RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
 With regards to the conspiracy in restraint of trade, Stephen claimed that, before the passing 
of the Act of 1825, “every combination to affect the rate of wages was regarded as a conspiracy, 
though it admits of much argument whether this was by virtue of a principle of the common law 
of because the old combination laws then in force made the objects of the combination criminal in 
themselves.”81 In saying this, Stephen was echoing Wright’s central arguments; that isolated 
precedents of conspiracies in restraint of trade before these acts were not such but rather cases of 
attempt (i.e. conspiracies) to commit crimes under the Combination Acts. Stephen, as usual, 
remained on the fence. Later, he would concede that “no case has ever been cited in which any 
person was, for having combined with others for the raising of wages, convicted of a conspiracy 
in restraint of trade at common law before the year of 1825.”82 He would nonetheless add that it 
was also true that there were some dubious cases that “explain the undoubted fact that in the year 
1825 an impression prevailed that a combination to raise wages would constitute an indictable 
conspiracy.”83 
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 This Act of 1825 narrowed the criminal law of conspiracy “by permitting combinations for 
the purpose of regulating wages,” and extended it “by subjecting various forms of intimidation and 
molestation to special penalties, whether practiced by individuals or by combinations of 
individuals.” Finally, Stephen continued, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871 had given 
trade unions immunity from this newly found conspiracy in restraint of trade “unless their object 
is to compel masters or workmen to do or not to do certain specified acts either by violence or 
threats of violence to person or property, or by picketing or by rattening.”84  
However, coming to Brett J’s principle in the gas stoker’s case, he conceded that it could 
be classified as a conspiracy “for the purpose of injuring individuals by means other than fraud,” 
consisting in the agreement “to compel a person by the force of numbers to do against his will 
anything which causes him loss or pain.” Though Stephen implied that this was indeed a case of 
judicial legislation, he foresaw that the principle could fill gaps in the criminal law, particularly 
with reference to those cases in which “a person [is] singled out for persecution by his enemies.” 
However, he conceded that this principle “overlaps the exceptions which legalize what used to be 
conspiracies in restraint of trade… the evil of maintaining a vague and loose doctrine which may 
be so used as to render nugatory a statute passed in order to settle a long and warm controversy 
seems to… overbalance the value of the bare chance of its being useful in some strange and new 
combination of circumstances.”85 
This principle was an attempt at coming up with a formula wide enough to determine when 
collective action might be considered illegal other than when it aims at coercion. He imagined such 
cases as trade unions bringing “their power to bear on employers in order to effect political or 
religious objects,” or for instance “a deliberate combination to ruin an author or a professional man 
[such as] a body of people combined to hiss an actor whenever and wherever he appeared… or to 
watch a man and sue him in civil courts whenever an excuse for doing so occurred.”86 In the present 
case of the gas stokers it was a work stoppage with the purpose to force an employer to reinstate 
campaign organizers. Under this principle, the questions would be whether that was a legitimate 
purpose under the Criminal Act Amendment Act and whether they intended to injure the employer. 
                                                 
84 Stephen, Conspiracy, 5. 
85 Ibidem. 
86 Ib. 
53 
 
There is a problem of circularity with this definition because the “means other than fraud” is in 
this case the “force of numbers,” that is, acting in combination. So, this would be a combination 
to injure an individual by acting in combination. Or, to put it in other words, it was cooperation 
with the purpose of acting in cooperation. This is a consequence of the schizophrenic way of 
conceptualizing collective action from the point of view of the agreement, so that the whole point 
is not determining when acting together or in concert is illegal but when agreeing to act together 
is illegal, and then punishing the acting together because it was preceded by an illegal agreement.   
As said earlier, Stephen’s considerations on the law of conspiracy took place within the 
context of the call of the Home Office to determine whether the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
should be amended, or the common law of conspiracy amended or abrogated altogether. Stephen’s 
recommendations departed from the pursued policy of carving exceptions to the common law of 
conspiracy, which in his words was “like trying to scoop a hole in quicksand.”87 That left only two 
options, either amending the statute or the common law. Ideally, as his outline of special 
conspiracies pointed out, the best option for Stephen would have been to codify the law of 
conspiracy, but he feared “that our prospect of an English Penal Code is very remote.” 
Furthermore, he warned that “the law of conspiracy is the part of the criminal law which should 
be codified last… the law relating to political offences, to cheating, and to intimidation ought to 
be put into a much more definite condition that they are in at present before the law of conspiracy 
which patches up their defects can be safely repealed.” Therefore, Stephen was not favorable to 
unifying and simplifying solutions such as that of the Indian Penal Code, which reduced conspiracy 
to a form of abetment88 as long as the criminal law of England showed gaps in areas like the 
offences against public justice, cheating, intimidation and insult.89  
Stephen recommended to amend the law of conspiracy so as to provide “as a general rule, 
qualified, if necessary, by special exceptions, that no conspiracy to commit any offence should be 
punished more severely than the offence itself might have been punished if committed,” and also 
“limiting the law of conspiracy as to acts directed against individuals to cases in which the object 
was to be effected by the perversion of the course of justice, crime, and fraud, the law relating to 
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conspiracies affecting the public at large being left as it stands at present.”90 Thus, by the end of 
this article, which, with the excuse of the debate about the gas stokers, had allowed  him to sketch 
his plan for the codification of the law of conspiracy, Stephen introduced a new principle, a 
principle that he had mentioned earlier, the principle he really believed should have controlled the 
gas stoker’s case. This principle was that such work stoppages as the one the gas stokers were 
involved in were illegal insofar as they affected the public at large.  
1.1.3.4 THE REPEAL OF CONSPIRACY 
How did Stephen finally go about these recommendations in his Penal Code? Firstly, as 
can be seen in Annex I, he pretty much carried over the special conspiracies into the Code, and did 
not give a general, substantive definition of the offence of conspiracy. Furthermore, at first sight, 
since there is no trace of it neither in his Digest nor in his Draft Penal Code, it seems that Stephen 
omitted the special conspiracy “for the purpose of injuring individuals by means other than fraud.” 
In the Digest he defined the conspiracy in restraint of trade as “an agreement between two or more 
persons to do or procure to be done any unlawful act in restraint of trade,”91, adding that “the 
purposes of a trade union are not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, unlawful,” 
and that “ no act in contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and 
workmen is unlawful… unless a person doing it would be punishable for it on indictment, or liable 
to be imprisoned… on summary conviction.”92 That is, only when the purpose of trade unions was 
to commit a crime were them punishable. And the punishment should not exceed the punishment 
for the offence they agreed to commit.93 
The principle that collective action was sometimes criminal independently of the 
criminality of the purpose slipped into his Digest in the form of the undefined misdemeanor of acts 
involving public mischief because “acts deemed to be injurious to the public have in some instances 
been held to be misdemeanors… although such first mentioned acts were not forbidden by any 
express law, and although no precedent exactly applied to them… in the case of agreements 
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between more persons than one to carry out purposes which the judges regarded as injurious to the 
public, in which case such acts have been held to amount to the offence of conspiracy.”94 
However, this suggested misdemeanor did not figure in Stephen’s Draft Criminal Code, 
for the very same reason that there were no provisions limiting the prosecution of agreements in 
restraints of trade to criminal purposes. As the Royal Commission in charge of reviewing it put it 
in its report, “the Bill repealed in effect all common law offences for which it provides substitutes, 
but left untouched all common law offences for which it did not so provide… the sections of the 
Draft Code which deal with this subject comprise treasonable conspiracies… seditious 
conspiracies… conspiracies to defile women… conspiracies to murder… conspiracies to 
defraud… conspiracies to commit indictable offences… and conspiracies to prevent by force the 
collection of rates and taxes… the law as to trade conspiracies we have left untouched” (Criminal 
Code Bill Commission 1879, 16). This was the reason why trade unions were disappointed with 
Stephen’s Draft Criminal Code and blocked it in Parliament, though considering the Digest, it 
does not seem that this was Stephen’s choice.  
As for the wide rule, the Royal commission argued that “an agreement to do an ‘unlawful’ 
act has been said to be a conspiracy; but as no definition is to be found of what constitutes 
‘unlawfulness,’ it seems to us unsatisfactory that there should be any indictable offence of which 
the elements should be left in uncertainty and doubt.”95 Yet, since the Code could have explicitly 
repealed this principle, no matter how dubious its existence was, this begs the question of whether 
this was a loophole that gave the courts the opportunity to revive the law of conspiracy again.  
1.1.4 The Attempt Theory of the Law of Conspiracy 
 As stated earlier, at the time the debate of the law of conspiracy broke out, Stephen was 
working with Robert Samuel Wright in the drafting of the Jamaica Penal Code, and joined forces 
with him to bring workers to the cause of the codification of the criminal law of England. I also 
mentioned that Wright’s own intervention in that debate came out just within a month of Stephen’s. 
Wright was a longer monograph, and judging from its content, there is no doubt that both men 
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were communicating with each other and sharing their ideas about how to deal with the law of 
conspiracy.  
1.1.4.1 ATTEMPT BY CONSPIRACY 
Conceptually, Wright conceived the law of conspiracy as a part of the law of attempts. That 
is, he understood the attempt by conspiracy as a type of attempt, in the same way that the Indian 
Penal Code had made the accomplice by conspiracy a type of accomplice. In his own words, “the 
law of conspiracy is in truth merely an extension of the law of attempts, the act of agreement for 
the criminal purpose being substituted for an actual attempt as the overt act.”96 Under this 
definition, the meaning of agreement seems to be that of some external act by contrast to the 
purpose it expresses.97 Indeed, the agreement works both as evidence of the intent as well as an 
overt act: “the mere act of agreement for execution of a criminal design being treated not merely 
as a sufficient evidence of the design but also as an ‘overt’ act or act in furtherance of the design.” 
However, as he himself absurdly admits, “it is seldom that direct proof occurs of an actual 
agreement by words or signs, and the agreement is commonly inferred from apparent concurrence 
in acts which might of themselves be made to serve the same purpose,”98 but would not these acts 
be an attempt themselves? Is it not absurd to make the agreement the attempt, and the attempt 
evidence of the agreement?99 Furthermore, Wright contradicts this view elsewhere and defines 
agreement as “a mere mental state or state of agreement or concurrence: —an act or state which 
in itself is plainly neutral and conveys no associated idea of praise or blame.”100 In that case, the 
agreement cannot be an overt act. Indeed, his use of the term overt act, traditionally an act in 
evidence of a criminal intent, betrays the intention to fit the vocabulary and the rules of the 
volitional doctrine of the attempt in the clothing of the modern substantive view of the attempt, 
and it shows the tensions this causes. Indeed, to create even more confusion, at some point Wright 
assimilates overt act to the actus reus that is necessary to complete a crime: “every crime consists 
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of a state of intentionality—some form of intention or of carelessness—and an overt act or an 
omission to perform a duty.”101 
The main consequence of making conspiracy a kind of attempt was that the law of 
conspiracy became “merely an auxiliary to the law which creates the crime,”102 since “an 
agreement or combination is not criminal unless it be for acts of omissions (whether as ‘ends’ or 
as a ‘means’) which could be criminal apart from the agreement.103 That is, the criminality of the 
agreement derives from the criminality of the purpose, which is supposed to be a statutory or 
common law offence. That means that within this view, it is not up to judicial interpretation, and 
therefore judicial discretion, to determine whether the conspiracy was legal or not by declaring the 
purpose to be unlawful independently of any law or precedent.   
Wright traced back the origins of this doctrine to the Star Chamber and the Poulterers’ 
Case: 
The modern law of conspiracy has grown out of the application to cases of conspiracy, 
properly so called and as defined by the 33 Edw. 1, of the early doctrine that since the gist 
of crime was in the intent, a criminal intent manifested by any act done in furtherance of it 
might be punishable, although the act did not amount in law to an actual attempt… [it was] 
finally settled… in 1611 (Poulterers’ Case), that although the crime of conspiracy properly 
so called, was not complete unless in case of conspiracy for maintenance some suit had 
been actually maintained, or in a case of conspiracy for false and malicious indictment the 
party against whom the conspiracy was directed had been actually indicted and acquitted… 
the agreement for such a conspiracy was indictable as a substantive offence, since there 
was a criminal intent manifested by an act done in furtherance of it, viz., by the agreement 
and from this time, by an easy transition, the agreement or confederacy itself for the 
commission of conspiracy came to be regarded as a complete act of conspiracy, although 
traces of the original distinction between a completed conspiracy and the mere agreement 
or confederacy to commit it long continued to be found… and grew into a rule that a 
combination to commit or to procure the commission of any crime was criminal and might 
be prosecuted as a conspiracy, although the crime might have nothing to do with the crime 
of conspiracy properly so called.104 
 In this passage, Wright thinks that the application of the doctrine that the will must be taken 
for the deed (when there is some overt act showing the former) to the medieval law of conspiracy 
                                                 
101 Ib., 54. 
102 Ib., 63. 
103 Ib., 48. 
104 Ib., 6. See also p. 22.  
58 
 
“by an easy transition,” and by generalizing the attempt to commit conspiracy within 33-34 Edw 
1 to agreements to commit any offence became the modern attempt. There are several problems 
with this explanation. Firstly, apparently, he previously had said that the crime defined by 33-34 
Edw 1 consisted in “confederacy or alliance for the false and malicious promotion of indictments 
and pleas, or for embracery or maintenance of various kinds,”105 that is, an agreement to commit 
certain perversions of justice with no reference to a requirement of actual perversion of justice. 
Then, one might wonder, as Stephen did, whether the agreement itself is not within the law. Why 
is it necessary to invoke the doctrine of the will for the deed? 
  Secondly, Wright’s thesis about the origins of this doctrine implies the bifurcation 
between modern and medieval conspiracy, which would be conceptually unconnected although 
historically related. However, if the principle first stated in the Poulterers’ Case was that 
agreement to commit a conspiracy within 33-34 Edw 1 was itself a crime, and was then generalized 
into the principle that an agreement to commit a crime was a crime, why was this agreement called 
a conspiracy when it had nothing to do with the crime of conspiracy? As will be shown later, the 
context of the application of the doctrine that the will stands for the deed in the Poulterers’ Case 
was very narrow. Indeed, I will establish the narrow basis of this case and show how Wright’s 
explanation obscures the conceptual reasons for which this principle was invoked in the Star 
Chamber in this case in the first place. Furthermore, the idea of the agreement as the evidence of 
criminal intent is not explicitly mentioned in the Poulterers’ Case, but rather in subsequent cases 
after the Star Chamber was abolished. Finally, the transition from the doctrine of the will for the 
deed to modern attempt was all but easy, contrary to what superficial analogies may suggest.106  
1.1.4.2 THE WIDER RULE 
 As a part of his theory of the law of conspiracy as part of the law of attempts, Wright 
needed to disprove the opposite theory of the wide rule. Wright contended that “a suggestion of a 
general doctrine that a combination may be criminal, although that which it proposes would not 
be criminal apart from the combination, begins to appear in the arguments of counsels towards the 
close of the 17th century.” Then, “by the end of the 18th century an impression appears to have 
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grown up amongst lawyers, which can only be described by the double proposition that a 
combination to do an unlawful act is criminal, and that in this phrase ‘unlawful’ does not 
necessarily mean ‘criminal’.”107 As implied by the use of the words suggestion and impression, 
Wright did not believe that apart from these imaginations, the rule had ever been applied to any 
actual case. Thus, to debunk these opinions, he went through the case-law of conspiracy to find 
out whether there were traces of the wide rule.108 And he organized his inquiry according to the 
arrangement laid down by Stephen into a series of discrete special conspiracies, integrating within 
his own argument Stephen’s ideas.  
 With regards to the “combinations against the government.” he argued that “these cases 
appear not perhaps to establish but still tend strongly to establish a rule that combinations directed 
against the government or public safety may be criminal, although the acts proposed might not be 
criminal in absence of combination: but they furnish no indication of the rule, supposing it to 
exist.”109 In the cases of “combination to pervert or defeat Justice” he found that “the acts proposed 
were, at the times when the cases were decided, punishable on indictment or information, or at 
least as contempt of court.” Most of the acts combined upon in cases of “combination against 
Public Morals and Decency” were “punishable irrespectively of combination.”110 As for the 
“combination to defraud,” they originally referred to criminal conducts, and “when certain kinds 
of cheats had ceased to be indictable when committed by one person, they continued to be 
indictable when done or planned by persons in combination.”111 With regard to the “combination 
to injure individuals otherwise than by Fraud,” Wright held that “authorities on the whole strongly 
favor the view that… it is not as a general rule criminal unless criminal means are to be used… 
[though] expressions are to be found in some cases which imply a doubt as to the universality of 
the rule.”112 Finally, Wright, did not find any evidence that agreement in restraint of trade ever was 
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criminal and “up to the present the doctrine has not been established by any binding authority.”113 
Furthermore, there was “not sufficient authority for concluding that before the close of the 18th 
century there was supposed to be any rule of common law that combinations for controlling 
masters or workmen were criminal, except where combination was for some purpose punishable 
under statute.”114 For that reason, he added that  “if such a rule is established by cases decided 
since the passing in 1825 of the 6 Geo. 4 c. 129… this… is a modern instance of the growth of a 
crime at common law by reflection from statutes, and of its survival after the repeal… somewhat 
in the same manner in which combinations for certain kinds of frauds continued to be criminal 
after those frauds had ceased to be punishable apart from the combination.”115 Wright, like 
Stephen, believed the law of conspiracy as applied to trade unions to be a very recent invention. 
The only difference is that Stephen gave legitimacy to this recent development through the power 
entailed in the wider rule, whereas Wright’s assimilation of the law of conspiracy to the law of 
attempts made this a flagrant unwarranted interference of the courts into the sphere of 
legislation.116  
 In sum, Wright’s analysis of the cases out of which Stephen’s special conspiracies would 
have emerged, strongly suggested that many of these cases could be explained by reference to the 
doctrine of the attempt by conspiracy, as survivals of former crimes which had stopped to be 
punished. Other cases are simply inconclusive or equivocal. In any event, for Wright, there is no 
evidence of the application of the wide rule. In that sense, Lord Denman’s antithesis had been 
misinterpreted as declaratory of a general principle when it was “not intended to be a complete 
definition of criminal combination.”117 
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Having said that, Wright examined the use of such a rule in the criminal system. In the case 
of minor offences, he conceded that “there may be cases in which the concurrence of several 
persons for committing an offence may essentially change its character, and so enhance its 
mischief that the joint act may properly be treated as a crime… but that whoever undertakes the 
task of criminal legislation ought to consider different kinds of minor offences separately, and to 
specify in the written law the kinds in which the guilt is liable to be treated as enhanced by 
combination.”118 With regard to breach of contract he also conceded that “so long as the law 
continues in any case to consider a breach of contract as a fit subject for punishment, it cannot be 
said that there may not be instances in which a concert to break, or even to counsel the concerted 
breach of such contracts may be properly visited with a punishment greater than that which is 
inflicted on a sole offender.”119 
Likewise, “acts which are not punishable in one person may properly be treated as crimes 
when they are done by several persons acting in agreement.” This is particularly the case with 
regards to “acts which are necessarily collective and which cannot for physical reasons be 
committed by one person,” as well as “certain frauds and perversions of justice, which ought to be 
punishable independently of the agreement” but are not, but can be reached “by a power to punish 
the concerted acts.”120 However, “this use of the doctrine involves an important delegation of a 
legislative power in a matter in which the exercise of such power ought to be carefully guarded, 
since the legislature admits its own inability to discover the principles on which legislation ought 
to proceed.”121 Other than these cases, Wright objected “to any general rule that agreement may 
make punishable that which ought not to be punished in the absence of the agreement.”122 Yet he 
again admitted that “there might be cases in which acts done by several persons in agreement ought 
to be punished, although the same acts ought not to be punished if done without agreement. But 
these cases ought to be specified and carefully defined.”123 
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Wright’s ambiguous final recommendations, wrapped up in a continuous rhetorical back 
and forth, are a perfect illustration of the complexity of interests involved in the debate on the law 
of conspiracy. It is clear that Wright thinks that the law of conspiracy should be reduced to a form 
of attempts, and that under no circumstance should the wide rule be considered for codification. 
Yet, at the same time, he is willing to make room within his own theory for Stephen’s special 
conspiracies. In conclusion, though he admits that certain conducts could be aggravated by 
cooperation and that aggregate action might change the nature of that action, Wright cannot 
conceive of any general principle of liability for collective behavior that does not involve wide 
judicial discretion.  
Wright’s own view of the law of conspiracy was “undoubtedly inspired by his sympathy 
for the labor movement.”124 By narrowing down the scope of this offence, and linking it to existing 
offences, he was tying up the hands of the courts. By disproving the existence of the wide rule, he 
was depriving them of their tool. In that sense, the mere shadow of the existence of common law 
conspiracy before the landmark Poulterers’ represented a threat. Thus, it should not come as a 
surprise that Wright devoted some lines in two notes that were probably added after the book was 
completed, to disprove Coke’s assertion according to which the medieval conspiracy was in 
affirmance of the common law,125 and the opinion expressed in the Poulterers’ Case that there was 
a general common law of conspiracy. Indeed, Wright sets about to show that the medieval 
conspiracy was created through a series of statutes and that there was no reference to any common 
law conspiracy before that. As we will later see, one of the consequences of this thesis about the 
origins of the medieval common law was to make conspiracy a civil wrong, which later was also 
a made crime. This in turn gave preeminence to the meaning of conspiracy as it was later embodied 
in the writ of conspiracy, over the actual meaning that conspiracy might have had at the time of 
the enactment of those statutes. And this explains why Wright believed that “from very early times 
‘conspiracy’ and ‘confederacy’ were distinguished as different crimes… ‘conspiracy’ becoming 
appropriated to false and malicious indictments, while ‘confederacy’ was especially used to 
designate combinations for maintenance.”126 Wright had the opportunity to put his ideas into 
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practice in the Jamaica Criminal Code,127 which, in contrast to Stephen’s, abrogated the common 
law,128 and he restricted the definition of conspiracy to the agreement to commit a crime, merging 
it with the Indian Penal Code theory of conspiracy as a form of abetment under the title “Abetment 
and Conspiracy,” which was preceded by the title “Attempts to Commit Crimes.”129 
In conclusion, for Stephen, and most probably for Wright too, legal history was not an 
intellectual endeavor to pursue for its own sake. It was first and foremost a method aimed at 
revealing the existing law and its historical development as a prelude to codification. That means, 
firstly, that the historical inquiry was to be driven by the systematic goals of codification. History 
ought to yield materials ready for codification. As Stephen put it, “history and analysis, so far from 
being inimical, are complementary to each other, and neither can be dispensed with. History 
without analysis is at best a mere curiosity; and analysis without history is blind.”130 Analysis 
supplies “a starting point for any amount of historical investigation, by the help of which it will be 
possible to compare the degree in which various systems of law have embodied the great leading 
principles which ought to pervade all speculation on the subject”131 It also means that the 
contextual constraints of the codification process were to shape the historical inquiry. Thus, the 
starting point of their historical inquiry into the law of conspiracy was guided by the need to 
ascertain the common law of conspiracy in order to stop its application to those practices of the 
trade unions that had been decriminalized by statute. They both began with their own theories as 
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to the nature of the law of conspiracy, and then worked out its history in a way that fitted and 
confirmed that theory.  
1.2 CONCEPTUAL CONTINUITY OF THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
 Bringing out the notion of cooperation as an element of certain crimes, and therefore related 
to Stephen’s thesis that the aggravation of certain conducts by cooperation was used by courts to 
punish these conducts, J. W. Bryan elaborated a rather different account of the historical 
development of the law of conspiracy. In it, the common law of conspiracy dated back to the 
Middle Ages, and though it was not connected to the modern conspiracy through a line of 
precedents, there still existed a conceptual relationship between the two. It follows that Bryan’s 
account contradicted both the bifurcation thesis as well as that of the statutory origins of the law 
of conspiracy. Indeed, modern conspiracy was rather a conceptual leap with regard to the medieval 
statutes, which now appeared as a historical accident that had truncated the common law of 
conspiracy. 
 Bryan based his thesis that there was a common-law conspiracy in that the statutes which 
first referred to conspiracy by name presumed the existence of an offence. Since these statutes did 
not define the term conspiracy, “it is obvious that the execution of these acts with justice and 
uniformity would have been impossible in the absence of an already existing body of custom 
supplying a more or less accurate description of the offence denounced.”132 He further argued that 
since these statutes only provided a civil remedy for this wrong, and 33-34 Edw 1 statutorily 
defining conspiracy for the first time directed the justice of oyer and terminer to have transcript 
thereof, there must have been an offence at common law which this statute put into writing.  
It follows from that that offence of conspiracy preceded the civil remedy which was 
“probably an innovation.”133 However, in later developments, “the criminal aspect of conspiracy 
was far less important than the civil,” and in those few criminal cases that we have records off, the 
substance “worked out by the courts in connection with civil actions of conspiracy were closely 
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followed.”134 So, in spite of antedating the civil remedy, the criminal conspiracy derived its 
substance from the way courts developed the civil remedy.  
 Drawing mainly from the Mirror of Justices, Bracton and Britton, Bryan inferred that the 
notion of the “special dangers to be apprehended from concerted evil-doing” was beginning to 
grow “in the virgin soil of the common law quite independently of the Edwardian statutes.”135 This 
notion did not appear first in an abstract and general way but in the context of an increase in “false 
accusations, vexatious suits, and fraudulent perversions of justice” naturally following the 
“improved methods of procedure in the king’s courts.” Particularly, the “perversion of a new 
process of indictment… would soon attract the attention of the judges.” Since “such enterprises 
almost always require the coöperation [sic] of a plurality of performers… the judges would soon 
observe that the false prosecution might be in some degree hindered by an interference with the 
original combination.” Thus, “the conspiracy would in time come to be considered as at least an 
element in the offence, and punished as such.”136 It was “an element to be taken into account, but 
was not in itself a complete crime.”137 
Thus, when the Definition of Conspirators was passed, “it was in the nature of a 
codification of existing law… intended to set out the entire law of conspiracy as it was then 
understood.”138 However, since the “conception of the offence had not as yet been logically and 
completely worked out by the legal thought of the age,” the consequence of this statute putting 
into writing the common law was that it “clothed it with a finality and rigidity which prevented its 
gradual improvement by the slow and silent processes of the common law.”139 
In sum, the nub of Bryan’s contention was that the notion of criminal cooperation was 
beginning to emerge in the common law by the thirteenth century, particularly within the context 
of false prosecutions, when the series of statutes dealing with conspiracy prematurely fixed its 
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substance within the boundaries of a special conspiracy, thus preventing the courts, through the 
increase of the case law, from eventually reaching a general principle.  
This seed of the modern concept of conspiracy that medieval courts had begun to approach 
would have to wait until the Early Modern Era to finally blossom. The first stage in the 
development of the modern conspiracy was the principle that “the bare unexecuted conspiracy is 
a complete offence.”140 Though Bryan found some authorities pointing out to this principle as early 
as the reign of Edward III, he agreed both with Stephen and Wright that “the great impetus toward 
the principle that an unexecuted conspiracy is criminal came from several cases decided in the 
Court of Star Chamber at the beginning of the seventeenth century.”141 These decisions culminated 
in the “famous Poulterers’ Case… wherein… it was said that a bare conspiracy is punishable 
independently.”142 This decision was not supported by precedent, and departed from the principle 
of the criminal and civil law of conspiracy that “the offence was not complete until the person 
injured had been indicted, tried, and acquitted,” as it has been developed by the courts since the 
passing of the Edwardian statutes. Yet, Bryan contended, the case was not decided upon this 
general principle expressed in the obita of the case, but rather on the narrow grounds that “persons 
guilty of concerted efforts to secure the conviction of an innocent person upon a capital charge 
may be punished for conspiracy, although the false prosecution end otherwise than in an acquittal 
by verdict.” 143 In that sense, the Poulterers’ Case mirrored in the criminal law the development 
of the civil action on the case. Thus, as later cases interpreted the Poulterers’ Case as having been 
decided on the wider principle, “a doctrine probably valid as to a limited class of evil combinations 
thus came to be extended over the entire field of such enterprises,” making this case “one of the 
historic landmarks upon the highway of English legal history.”144 Thus, by the early eighteenth 
century, “the principle that a bare conspiracy is punishable as a crime was accepted with little 
question.”145  
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Bryan goes on to describe the growth of modern conspiracy according to the purposes with 
which this principle punishing cooperation was applied pretty much along the lines of Stephen’s 
special conspiracies: “agreements to perform acts directly harmful to the public,”146 “combinations 
to defame and to extort money by blackmail,”147 “combinations to cheat or defraud,”148 
“conspiracy to commit a crime,”149 “conspiracies to accomplish a merely immoral purpose,”150 
and “conspiracies among merchants and others to raise the price of merchandise, and among 
workmen to enhance their wages.” Thus, “by the end of the eighteenth century, the definition of 
criminal conspiracy included combinations for a number of objects besides the older law.”151 In 
these cases, the idea that the “conspiracy is the gist of the offence quite independently of the acts 
done” was rarely applied, and “in most instances the combination was treated as an element in the 
offence, or as matter of aggravation, emphasis being laid upon the acts done.”152 Even in cases “in 
which it was held that the conspiracy was the gist of the offence, the acts done were described in 
some detail in the indictment.”153 Hence, except in a few passages, “the judges do not attempt, 
until the nineteenth century, to justify the punishment of a bare agreement to commit an unlawful 
act.”154 
1.3 THE MEDIEVAL CONSPIRACY 
 Since Stephen and Wright maintained the bifurcation thesis, there was no use to dwell on 
the Middle Ages (unless it was to cast away the slightest possibility of a common law conspiracy 
prior to the Early Modern Period). Bryan, instead, defended that the history of the concept of 
conspiracy as “concerted evil-doing,” and therefore gave far more space to the medieval 
conspiracy than Stephen or Wright. However, his was essentially a history of the rise and 
development of modern conspiracy, with a medieval prelude.  
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 The consequence of this is that very little was known about the medieval conspiracy. 
Furthermore, because of the focus on the modern conspiracy and the issues that the debate of the 
trade unions had raised, the focal point had exclusively been the origins of the medieval offence, 
with little or no attention at all to its development up to the Early Modern Period. The publication 
of Percy Henry Winfield’s The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure in 1921 was 
to fill this historiographical gap.  
 The very two elements juxtaposed in that title reflect both Winfield’s approach to this 
subject as well as the origins of his work. As he himself tells us in the preface, the book had grown 
out of an original research on the history of the law of conspiracy that ended up becoming a book 
about the law of abuse of process, including its history. Though it initially was a single book, the 
modern part was later detached in a separate volume called The Present Law of Abuse of Legal 
Procedure (1921). Winfield confesses that he had had to “detach the historical from the modern 
part and to publish each of these separately instead of as one book… [but] this process of 
detachment was not altogether easy.”155 It follows that for Winfield, the study of historical legal 
development was an integral part of the description of the law, and that his was another exercise 
in the doctrinal history of conspiracy that was inaugurated with Stephen and Wright, and so much 
in line with contemporary attempts to “uncover and systematize the principles of tort law and 
contract.”156 It also follows that he was to focus on the development of conspiracy as a form of 
abuse of process, a legal category in which Winfield included other wrongs such as maintenance, 
champerty, agreements affecting legal procedure, malicious prosecution, abuses by judicial 
officers, embracery, and barratry.  
 This focus on the notion of abuse of legal procedure is precisely why Winfield turned to 
the Middle Ages. Almost half of this book on the history of the law of conspiracy deals with the 
growth of the medieval conspiracy, whereas a scarce ten pages address the development of modern 
conspiracy in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, Winfield attempted to grasp the substance of 
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the wrong of conspiracy understood as an abuse of legal procedure almost exclusively from the 
writ of conspiracy and its interpretation in court during that period.  
Winfield takes as a point of reference for the meaning of the medieval conspiracy the 
definition of conspirators contained in the ordinance of 33-34 Edw 1. He suggests that the 
ordinance codified a meaning which was already in use though maybe in a vague way; the meaning 
of a combination to abuse legal procedure.157 But this is a general expression that embraces 
different conducts. More specifically, by abuse of procedure in the case of conspiracy, Winfield 
mainly refers to people binging or procuring false criminal charges against innocents.158 Thus, he 
distinguishes between conspiracy as false accusation and the other wrongs originally listed in the 
Definition of Conspirators, such as maintenance and champerty, and consequently addresses these 
wrongs in separate headings as separate abuses of legal procedure. As stated earlier, Winfield 
derives the meaning of the medieval conspiracy from the form the writ of conspiracy took as a 
remedy mainly for wrongful prosecution.  
This also means that Winfield deemphasizes the cooperative aspect of this wrong. Bryan 
had made “concerted evil-doing” the genus of which concerted wrongful prosecution was a 
species. For Winfield, “combined wrong-doing” was a necessary element of the writ of conspiracy, 
but not the wrong itself.159 In that sense, his account appears to be consistent with Stephen’s and 
Wright’s bifurcation thesis, according to which the medieval conspiracy was essentially the wrong 
of false prosecution, and had nothing to do with the modern conspiracy that grew out of the 
principles first laid down in the Star Chamber.  
However, Winfield indicates that there was evidence that “illegal combinations of other 
kinds… were known” to the common law before the statutes dealing with conspiracy, though the 
term “conspiracy does not seem to have been used to refer to them.”160 Likewise, there was some 
indication that combinations to abuse legal procedure were illegal though there was no clear 
formulation of the concept before the definition of conspirators.161 And there was abundant 
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evidence that conspiracy was used to refer to illegal combinations of different kinds, including 
trade combinations, after the passing of the conspiracy statutes.162 
In addition to that, Winfield distinguishes between the civil procedure by writ of conspiracy 
and the criminal procedure initiated by indictment and punished with the so called villainous 
judgment.163 In contrast to Bryan, he seems to belief that the criminal procedure was not prior to 
the statute 4 Edw 3 c 11 (1330).164 This implies that the substance of the offence was essentially 
the same as that of the wrong as developed by the courts from the definition of conspirators. At 
least that follows from the fact that Winfield is not specific about whether the prosecution of 
conspiracies embraced other abuses besides false prosecutions (Winfield, Conspiracy, 102-107). 
The only real difference between the two of them is that in the criminal proceedings the 
combination was the gist of it.165 
So, far from subscribing to the bifurcation thesis, Winfield was closer to Bryan’s thesis. 
For him the common law had come up with the idea of punishable combinations of certain kinds, 
and that combinations to abuse procedure were punished as such before the Early Modern Period. 
Maybe, because of that, Winfield’s discussion on conspiracy in the Star Chamber is really brief 
and focuses only on the question of how the court extended its jurisdiction to conspiracy.166 But 
no reference is made to the principles laid down in the Poulterers’ Case. Indeed, for Winfield the 
Star Chamber was nothing but a stage in the process of expansion of the meaning of conspiracy, 
so that by the seventeenth century, “the original meaning was disappearing, save for the idea of 
combination, and it was not difficult to tack on to that idea almost any conceivable evil object that 
two or more persons might have.”167 As the process went on, “about the beginning of the 18th 
century, we have decisions or indications in decisions that criminal conspiracy had been extended 
to include combinations (1) to accuse, but not necessarily before a Court, of some offence; (2) to 
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commit embracery; (3) to cheat; (4) to sell goods at a fixed price… (5) to extort money.”168 The 
principle by this time was that “combination was the gist of the offence” and that the purpose of 
the combination need not be criminal in the sense of statutorily defined “where the combination is 
against the government… where the combination is to pervert justice, otherwise than by false 
accusation, though the perversion of justice may not be criminal apart from the combination… 
[possibly] combinations against public morals and decency… combinations to injure individuals 
otherwise than by fraud…[and possibly] combinations to raise wages… though such demands if 
made by individuals would not be.”169  
Thus, Winfield’s thesis about the relationship between medieval and modern conspiracy 
was neither the bifurcation nor the leap, but rather the expansionary thesis. On the one hand, he 
derived the modern wider sense of conspiracy from the medieval criminal sense, though maybe 
not from the writ of conspiracy. On the other hand, he took pains to demonstrate that there was no 
common law conspiracy, neither civil nor criminal, before the statutes that created the writ first 
and provided a definition later.170 The doctrine of modern conspiracy derived from a statute, but 
its meaning was the generalization of an idea that was already there rather than the expression of 
a brand-new principle. In other words, modern conspiracy ultimately derived from the law of abuse 
of legal procedure, at least in its criminal branch. Thus, we see how focusing on the medieval 
conspiracy changed the view as to how to understand modern conspiracy.  
1.3.1 THE STATIONARY THESIS: CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE STATE 
 Not much has been written about the medieval conspiracy since the publication of 
Winfield’s book, but it is worth taking a big leap in our narrative to be able to witness a surprising 
turn in the history of the medieval conspiracy, and its relationship with the modern one. In the 
words of its proponent, the new historiographical thesis was that “the crime of conspiracy was not 
made by Star Chamber and the seventeenth-century courts, or by the courts at all: it took shape in 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and Parliament was concerned with it almost from 
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its own beginning as an institution, because it was always an offence against the public authority 
of the state.”171  
 The nub of Harding’s thesis relies on his interpretation of the concept of conspiracy during 
the Middle Ages. A conspiracy was a private sworn association against public authority. According 
to Harding, the conjuration or “oath-taking was the central element of conspiracy in the middle 
ages, when social order depended on oath of loyalty to lords and rulers which could be transformed 
into communal oaths of solidarity against the authorities” The oath-taking was particularly 
dangerous to the public authority not only because it “gave an objective form to political dissent 
making it distinguishable from the overt attacks on rulers in which it might be expressed,” but also 
because it could subvert “the area of legal procedures and relationships, for these relied much on 
the oaths of witnesses and jurymen.”172 
 Thus, “English lawyers were applying a wide concept of conspiracy to disrupt public 
administration.”173 Harding believes that the invocation of the concept that was circulating in the 
Middle Ages was prompted by the bill procedure in the mid thirteenth century and the subsequent 
“temptation to invent or embellish the bill of complaint, and to corrupt the jury which had to 
pronounce on its worth.”174 Conspiracy embraced not only this form of corruption of legal process 
but also “maintenance, embracery and champerty.” And this idea of corruption of legal process by 
a sworn association “was joined to conspiracy in its political sense, for the developing processes 
of law and government were turned into a medium for harassment of one’s enemies.”175 In sum,  
conspiracy was the first crime to be defined in parliament because it threatened the whole 
system of justice on which the state was being erected, and perverted the great new means 
of political communication between the king and his subjects by bills of complaint… 
conspiracy in the sense of private alliance, not treason narrowly defined as attacks on the 
royal persons, was the real crime against the state in the fourteenth century… that 
conspiracy was not assimilated to treason but remained a separate crime was because sworn 
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alliances were too much a part of the aristocratic way of life for the king to be permitted to 
bring them within the scope of the penalties meted out to traitors.176 
As for the modern conspiracy, Harding dismissed the idea that anything new had been 
decided in the Poulterers’ Case.177 What we call modern conspiracy “was not extension by judges 
from abuse of legal procedure to agreements for any purpose, but the definition of a number of 
substantive offences out of the multifarious criminal activities of sworn associations” which were 
considered as “subversive associations of the common people.”178  
Harding was very right in pointing out that “to understand the full significance of 
conspiracy in the development of English law and administration we need to shift our attention 
from the civil writ and “the case-law on which legal historians have tended to concentrate, rather 
at the expense of the statutes.”179 This focus on the statutes and their immediate effects led him to 
point out the clear conceptual connection between conspiracy as false prosecution and 
maintenance, champerty and embracery. And he was also right in focusing his attention on the 
conjuration or oath-taking as an element of the concept of conspiracy. But he fell victim to the 
same sin as his predecessors: the single-theory view of the history of the law of conspiracy.  
He tried to reduce conspiracy to a single category of boundaries clearly defined and distinct 
from the growth of the case law. The merit of his definition of the concept of conspiracy is that for 
the first time he sought it outside the legal sources that have constituted the basis of the history of 
conspiracy. He did not seek it either in the medieval statutes themselves, or in the different 
principles laid down in its copious case law. Rather, he based himself on a general medieval use 
of the term to refer to the political plot or intrigue to overthrow the government. From this, he 
derived the concept of sworn association against the public authority. However, he had to construct 
this concept to include in it associations to pervert justice. It is obvious that such associations 
cannot be considered against public authority but in an interpretive way as associations that 
undermine the government or the whole community, though their primary purpose is not to 
overthrow the government. In this point, however, Harding is not very clear, and he seems to 
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associate the criminality of conspiracy to a medieval distrust of private associations, as if 
authorities always saw the potential for subversion in any association.  
As I say, Harding is right in bringing out certain aspects of the medieval conspiracy that 
most authors have disregarded. But it seems far-fetched to conclude that modern conspiracy is 
nothing more than the medieval idea of private association “against the whole community” as 
applied to specific conspiracies. He is simply overstretching his single theory to explain the law 
of conspiracy as a unified whole under a single principle, which in his case implied a historical 
continuity, for this principle would have originated in the Middle Ages. His was a stationary thesis 
as to the relation between medieval and modern conspiracy.  
Harding’s interpretation illustrates the traps inherent to the study of conspiracy. He 
basically identifies the term with the meaning it holds within the domain of the political crime of 
high treason. As we will see, the political intrigue is just one of the meanings the term can take. In 
other words, Harding neither considers the semasiological nor the onomasiological levels of the 
term conspiracy. A sworn association against the public could be named in many ways other than 
as a conspiracy, and this term does not necessarily mean the same within the context of the political 
discourse than in the medieval statutes that gave birth to the offence of conspiracy. Yet, in some 
way, Harding was right in trying to draw some structural connection between the two. He was 
wrong in believing that the semantic structure of conspiracy was a hierarchical one in which the 
political sense was the hypernym, and the association to pervert justice a species of it. But, as we 
will see, there must be some structural, and possibly a genealogical relation, between the different 
meanings of conspiracy that explain the use of the term. Indeed, my thesis is going to be that they 
all probably derive, by conceptual operations such as metonymy/meronymy, from the same frame 
of organized or collective action.  
1.4 SUPERSEDING THESIS 
 Holdsworth’s opus magnus is an illustration of how subsequent historians came up with a 
synthesis of the different historiographical paths that had been taken in the history of the law of 
conspiracy.180 In his synthesis, the relationship between medieval and modern conspiracy was 
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understood in terms of a continuity and expansion, as if the modern conspiracy had superseded the 
medieval one. He subscribed to Winfield’s thesis that though there were some indications that 
conspiracy might have been a wrong before the Edwardian statutes, the substance was uncertain 
and it was not until the “statutes of Edward I’s reign gave a writ of conspiracy that the offence 
definitely emerged.”181 He also maintained that though the definition of conspirators of 33-34 Edw 
1 “covered a wide ground… most of the cases brought under the writ of conspiracy were cases of 
conspiracy to indict or appeal others for criminal offences.”182 By the time Holdsworth wrote, the 
existence of the Eyre’s royal order of 1279 was already known, and he took notice of it, but he 
considered it no more than yet another instance of the pre-Edwardian vague references to 
conspiracy.183 For that matter, he concluded that “we must therefore regard these statutes and the 
writ given by them as the starting point of the modern law on this subject.”184  
 The above sentence almost seems a slip of the tongue185. One is inclined to think that he 
meant the starting point of the law of conspiracy without further qualification. But Holdsworth 
considered that “the Court of Star Chamber had enlarged the scope of the offence of conspiracy.”186  
Furthermore, that Holdsworth saw such a continuity between the medieval and modern conspiracy 
as to consider the former the starting point of the latter is demonstrated through his belief that, in 
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the medieval conspiracy, “although the plaintiff could either indict the defendant for conspiracy or 
sue him for damages, the gist of the proceedings was not the damage which he had suffered, but 
the act of conspiracy.”187 In other words, it seems that Holdsworth considered the ground of the 
writ the conspiracy to falsely indict, not the false indictment.  
 Holdsworth understood the modern conspiracy as “springing from these two diverse yet 
connected roots” of the conspiracy in relation to the administration of justice and the developing 
law of attempts. Though by that time conspiracy was being dealt with by the Star Chamber, the 
classification of conspiracy as an offence against the administration of justice “was ceasing to have 
the meaning which it once possessed, because conspiracies which had no reference to false 
accusations were being punished by the Star Chamber.”188 Thus, in this court conspiracy came “to 
be regarded as a form of attempt to commit a wrong,”189 and then “just as it punished all kinds of 
attempts to commit wrongful acts… it punished all kinds of conspiracies to commit the many 
varied offences punishable either by it or by the common law courts.”190  
 In this passage, what Holdsworth says is closer to Wright’s view that conspiracy was a sort 
of attempt, and that it derived its criminal liability from the criminality of the act conspired upon. 
Elsewhere, however, Holdsworth uses a different language that brings him closer to Stephen’s 
wide rule. He contends that the court of Star Chamber “punished criminally not only conspiracies 
to abuse the process of the courts, but also conspiracies to commit any wrongful act.”191 Indeed, 
he goes on to say that the crime of conspiracy was committed “by an agreement to do an unlawful 
act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.” This Denman’s principle included “an act [which] 
may be sufficiently unlawful to render an agreement to do it a criminal conspiracy, though it cannot 
be brought under any of the recognized categories of the crime or tort”. Though the principle had 
been settled after the Restoration, it “originates in the criminal equity administered by the Star 
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Chamber” and was based on the idea that “these acts were contrary to public policy, and therefore 
a conspiracy to effect them must be treated as a crime.”192  
 In keeping with Stephen’s thesis of the instrumental view of the law of conspiracy, 
Holdsworth admitted that the modern conspiracy is “an elastic doctrine… [that] gives the law a 
power of so developing its principles that they are kept in touch with the needs and ideas of the 
age.” In that sense, it had been “used legitimately to strike at practices and courses of conduct 
which are contrary to the established principles of the common law, and are obviously dangerous 
to the state,” but it could also “be used to give effect to the political prejudices of the judges.”193  
 Thus, Holdsworth combined the attempt theory with the instrumental theory of the law of 
conspiracy194. Yet the background of these theories was the problem of the application of the law 
of conspiracy to trade unions. From that standpoint, it became even clearer that both views are 
incompatible. The conceptualization of conspiracy to the law of attempts left no space for judicial 
legislations, and limited its punishments to criminal conducts. That attempts to commit torts and 
acts that are not torts could be visited with punishments made nonsense. The criminality of such 
conducts, as Stephen and Wright rightly saw, depended on the element of cooperation. But this is 
a different concept than that of attempt: either aggravation of tortious conduct by cooperation, or 
aggregate action.  
 It is worth mentioning that though Holdsworth admits the instrumental character of the 
doctrine of conspiracy, he does not endorse any theory against judicial lawmaking. Or to be more 
precise, he seems to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate lawmaking. The latter takes 
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place when the judge gives voice to his own views, whereas the former is controlled by the policy 
principles enshrined in the common law. There is no better illustration of the former that his 
interpretation of the application of the law of conspiracy to trade unions. According to Holdsworth, 
there was a very old doctrine “of the common law that all persons ought to be allowed to carry 
their trades freely, subject only to any restrictions or regulations which might be imposed by the 
law.”195 Or, to put it in other words, the common law “aimed at… the removal of the danger of 
arbitrary restraints… on the freedom to dispose of one’s capital and labour at one’s will.”196 Thus, 
“it was inevitable that the courts should hold that combinations of masters which were entered into 
in order to force down wages or force up prices, or combinations of men which were entered into 
in order to force up wages or diminish the length of the working day, were indictable conspiracies.” 
In this way, Holdsworth disagreed both with Wright’s and Stephen’s view that the doctrine 
restraint of trade was of very recent origin and that the law of conspiracy had never been applied 
to trade unions before the passing of the Act of 1825. His was a strange combination of arguments: 
on the one hand, he relied on the existence of the wider rule as the basis of the application of the 
law of conspiracy to trade unions, on the other hand, this application was grounded on the common 
law principle “of freedom of trade subject only to restraints imposed by law.” 197 In other words, 
the purpose that these combinations pursued was already illegal at common law, and not just 
because legislation had been passed to forbid these combinations during the eighteenth century. 
He conceded, however, that after 1871 and 1875, “the Legislature had freed from criminal taint 
certain combinations to affect wages and other conditions of labour.”198  
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2. CONSPIRACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 
2.1 LEGISLATING THE CORRUPTION OF JUSTICE 
 The coming into being of the offence of conspiracy cannot be separated from the 
festering problem of judicial corruption that Edward I had inherited from Henry III (Sayles, 
Dissolution, 84-85). As for the seriousness of the problem, suffice to say as an illustration 
how a commission appointed after Edward I’s absence between 1286 and 1289, revealed that 
a majority of the justices of the King’s Bench and the Common Pleas had been involved in 
crimes, some of them as serious as tampering with evidence, forfeiting offices, forgery of 
documents, or even murder. It comes as no surprise that people at the time sang that “sunt 
justiciarii, quos favor et denarii alliciunt a jure.”199 
 The genesis of the offence of conspiracy through the statutes 20 Edw 1, 28 Edw 1 c 
10, and 33 Edw 1 is connected to contemporary legislation concerning this problem of 
judicial corruption. Not only were the terms used in these contemporary abuses also 
employed in the former statutes, but most importantly, the conceptual frame to which all of 
them refer to is the same.  
2.1.1 CORRUPTION OF ROYAL OFFICERS 
 The concept of a bribe—some form of payment or other reward that a judicial officer 
takes in exchange for some advantage he might give in any business in which this officer is 
involved—appears in the Statute of Westminster I 1275 (3 Edw 1 c 26). Namely, in this 
statute’s preemptive measures that “no Sheriff, nor other the King’s Officer, take any Reward 
to do his Office, but shall be paid of that which they take of the King.”200 Likewise, bailiffs 
of sheriffs have to swear that they will not fail to do right “for any love, hatred, fear, reward, 
or promise, and that they will conceal the secrets.”201 However, it seems that the most 
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frequent form of bribery was an arrangement to have a share in the chose in action. In this 
sense, the statute provides that “No Officer of the King by themselves, nor by other, shall 
maintain Pleas, Suits, or Matters hanging in the King’s Court, for Land, Tenements, or other 
Things, for to have part or profit thereof by Covenant made between them.”202 In this statute, 
we have three more elements: a pending plea from which it follows that one of the parties is 
bringing the officer, and a formal agreement to share in the thing.  This agreement is the 
bribery or corruption itself. The unlawful conduct that the officer is expected to perform with 
regard to some legal business in order to benefit or advance the interests of the party bribing 
is referred to with the rather general and opaque term maintain. The same term appears in c 
28 of the statute dealing with sheriffs and court clerks: “q[e] nul Clerk de Justice ne de 
Visconte ne meintege parties en quereles, ne bosoignes q[e] sont en la Court le Rey.”203 
According to Britton, the articles of the inquest have to question juries “concerning sheriffs… 
that have maintained suits or the parties to actions, and have procured false inquests, whereby 
justice has been hindered.”204 
The agreement to have a share in the thing first appears under the term champerty in 
the Statute Westminster II 1285 (13 Edw 1 c 49), in the context of the great judicial scandal, 
which deals with the things in action that the high judiciary is not supposed to take as reward 
or bargain: 
THE Chancellor, Treasurer, Justices, nor any of the King's Council, no Clerk of the 
Chancery, nor of the Exchequer, nor of any Justice or other Officer, nor any of the 
King's House, Clerk ne Lay, shall not receive any Church, nor Advowson of a Church, 
Land, nor Tenement in Fee, by Gift, nor by Purchase, nor to Farm, nor by Champerty, 
nor otherwise, so long as the Thing is in Plea before Us, or before any of our Officers 
; nor shall take no Reward thereof And he that doth {contrary to this Act} either 
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himself, or by another, or make any {Bargain,} shall be punished at the King's 
Pleasure, as well he that purchaseth, as he that doth sell.205 
 Similarly, Britton makes the taking of choses in action an article of inquest: 
Also concerning our officers who have maintained any wrong, or have accepted the 
presentment to any church, of which the advowson was in litigation in our Court, and 
let such be punished according to the statutes; or who have maintained any plea by 
champerty or in any other manner; and whether they have hindered justice in any 
point; and of the fees which they take, and of whom, secretly or openly (Nichols 1901, 
I, 37b).206 
2.1.2 CORRUPTION OF JURORS 
 Another idea that is formulated in these statutes is the giving to and taking of bribes 
by jurors who are to perjure themselves returning verdicts. The term conspiracy was first 
used to refer to the corruption of jurors in the writ that was issued in 1279 by Edward I to his 
justices in Eyre, giving them the following instructions by which one more article was added 
to the Eyre of 1278: 
Dominus Rex mandavit Iusticiariis suis itinerantibus in diversis comitatibus breve 
suum in hoc verba. Edwardus dei gratia etc. Iusticiariis suis itinerantibus in com' Kant' 
salutem. Quia datum est nobis intellegi quod quidam maliciosi homines de pluribus 
comitatibus regni nostri propter incrementum utilitatis proprie proniores ad malum 
quam ad bonum quasdam detestabiles confederationes et malas cogitationes, prestitis 
mutuo sacramentis, ad amicorum et benivolorum suorum partes in placitis et loquelis 
ipsos contingentibus in comitatibus illis utpote in assisis, iuratis et recognitionibus 
fallaciter manutenendas et defendendas, et ad inimicos suos fraudulenter grauandos, 
et in quantum in ipsis est plerumque exheredendos, inter se facere presumpserunt, et 
nos considerantes grauibus periculis et dampnis innumeris que tam nobis quam 
ceteris de regno nostro ex huiusmodi hominum malicia provenire possent, in futurum 
eorundem insolentiam congruis remediis reprimere volentes, vobis mandamus quod 
in singulis comitatibus in quibus vos itinerare contigerit ista vice de huiusmodi 
confederatoribus et conspiratoribus quanto diligentius poteritis inquiratur. Et si quos 
                                                 
205 “Chaunceler, Tresorer ne Justice, ne nul de Consayl le Roy, ne Clerk de la Chauncelerye, del Escheker, ne 
de Justice, ne autre Ministre, ne nul del hostel le Roy Clerk ou lay, ne puisse receivre Eglise ne Avoeson de 
Eglise, ne tere ne tenement, [ne fee, ne par doun '] ne par achat ne a ferme, ne a chaumpart, ne en autre manere; 
taunt come la chose est en plee devaunt no[us] ou devant nul de noz Ministres, Ne nul loer [ne] seyt pris. E ki 
ceste chose face, ou par lui, ou par autry, ou nul [baret y face] seyt puni a la volente le Roi ausi bien celui q[e] 
le purchacera, com celui q[e] le fera.”  
206 “Et ausi de nos ministres que ascun tort ount meytenu/ou ascun esglise ount receu: dount la vowson ad este 
debate en nostre court/et ceux soient punys solonc lestatute/ou que aueront meyntenu nul plee a champart/ou 
en autre manere/et si ilz eyent ascune droit desturbe en nul point/et de fees que ilz parnent/et de qui couertement 
ou apertement,” Britton I, 37 b. 
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inde culpabiles inveneritis sine dilatione capi et in prisona nostra salvos custodiri 
faciatis, donec aliud inde preceperimus; et hoc nullatenus omittatis.207 
The form of corruption this writ is trying to tackle is an agreement between jurors and 
possibly other parties (utpote in assisis, iuratis et recognitionibus) to support litigants in pleas 
(partes in placitis et loquelis), by perjuring themselves (fallaciter) in deception of court 
(fraudulenter) to disturb right (in ipsis est plerumque exheredandos) for some reward 
(propter incrementum utilitatis proprie).  
This writ that was issued in 1279 would later become the model for the article of the 
eyre De mutuis sacramentis added to the chapters of the eyre since then as the Novum 
capitulum per breve Regis. The same article De mutuis sacramentis is sometimes annexed to 
the Vetera Capitula¸ and sometimes to the Nova Capitula Itineris.208 The stereotyped 
versions added to each of these articles varied slightly. In the Vetera Capitula, inquest is to 
be made “of those by Oaths bind themselves to support or defend the Parties, Quarrels and 
Businesses of their Friends and well-wishers, whereby Truth and Justice are stifled.”209 In 
the Nova Capitula,  it is to be made “of those who bind themselves by mutual Oaths, unjustly 
or justly to defend fraudulently Parts of Pleas or Suits affecting their Friends or Well-wishers, 
as in Assises, Juries, Recognizances, whereby they cannot be convicted in such Pleas or Suits 
according to the Truth.”210  
Compared to the language of the writ of 1279, in these versions of De mutuis 
sacramentis, there is no direct reference to bribes, although it is implied. By contrast, in 
Britton’s paraphrase and extended version of the articles of the Eyre, corruption appears 
along with intimidation. In this rendition, corruption of jurors is of the essence of the offence: 
                                                 
207 Helen M. Cam, Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some Aspects of Thirteenth Century Administration, vol. 11 
of Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, edited by Paul Vinogradoff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1921), 58-59. 
208 Ib., 58. 
209 “de hiis qui sacramentis se astringunt ad partes vel loquelas {negocioru[m]} amicoru[m] benevoloru[m] 
sustinendas vel defendendas, per q[uo]d veritas et justici suffoca[n]tur,” SR, I, 234. 
210 “Item de hiis qui mutuis sacrame[n]tis, injuste seu juste astringunt ad partes placito[rum] vel loquelaru[m], 
amicos vel benevolos tangent[er], fraudulent[er] sustinend[um] vel defendend[um], ut in Assisis, Juratis, 
Recognitionib[us], p[er] quod rei veritas in h[u]i[us] placitis vel loquelis inde no[n] possunt convinci, &c.,” SR, 
I 238. 
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Let it be also inquired concerning confederacies between the jurors and any of our 
officers, or between one neighbour and another, to the hinderance of justice; and what 
persons of the county procure themselves to be put upon inquests and juries, and who 
are ready to perjure themselves for hire or through fear of any one and let such 
persons.211 
As this passage reveals, the corruption of juries could happen at a collective level as indicated 
in the articles of inquest or, perhaps more frequently, at the level of single jurors perjuring 
for hire (See for instance the petition of the abbot of Abingdon in Edward I, Roll 2 (1290) 
item 58). An illustration of how singled suborned jurors could operate appears in the 
description of the ground upon which jurors in the criminal procedure could be challenged: 
We will also, that if any man, who is indicted of a crime touching life and limb, and 
perceives that the verdict of the inquest, on which he has put himself, is likely to pass 
against him, desires to say that any one of the jurors is suborned to condemn him by 
the lord, of whom the accused holds his land, through greediness of the escheat, or 
for other cause by any one else, the Justices thereupon shall carefully examine the 
jurors, whether they have any reason to think that such slander is true. And often a 
strict examination is necessary; for in such case inquiry may be made, the jurors are 
informed of the truth of their verdict; when they will say, by one of their fellows, and 
he peradventure will say, that he heard it told for truth at the tavern or elsewhere by 
some ribald or other person unworthy of credit; or it may happen that he, or they, by 
whom the jurors have been informed, were intreated or suborned by the lords, or by 
the enemies of the person indicted, to get him condemned.212 
The former passage also illustrates how jury corruption was inevitably linked to the 
corruption of the officers responsible for impaneling them. Thus, in addition to this inquiry 
about corrupt juries there should be inquiry “also concerning sheriffs, who… have 
maintained suits or the parties to actions, and have procured false inquests, whereby justice 
                                                 
211 “Et ausi soit enquis de alloignaunte de iours par entre nos ministres et eux ou par entr[e] veisin et veisin en 
arrissement de droiture /et quex du counte se procure[n]t estre mys en enquestes et jorres/et queux se voilent 
parjurer pour lower/ou pour ascune doute de nuly,” Britton I, 1, 38. 
212 Et volons que chescu[n] que soit encoupe de vie et de membre & se apperceyue que le verdict del enqueste 
ou il se au[r]a mys deyue passer encontre luy/et voille dire q[ue] ascun des iorours le est procure del dampner 
par son seigniour de qui il tie[n]t la terre par covetise del eschete our par autre: q[ue] les iustices sur ceo 
examinent les iorours ententiuement/si nul les eit fait ente[n]dre tiel eslaundre estre verite/et souent ad mester 
bon examineme[n]t/car en tiel cas lenquerer coment les iorours seuent la verite de lour verdict/ou  ilz dirrount 
par ascu[n] de la compaynye/cely perauenture dirra que il le countent pur verite a la tauerne/ou ailiours de ascun 
ribaud ou autre/a q[ue] home ne doit rien crere/ou p[er]auenture cely ou ceux par quer les iorors serrount 
ensenses:auerount estr[e] pries ou procures p[er] les seigniours/ou par les enemies al endite pur lyu dampner” 
Britton, I, 13. 
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has been hindered.”213 Thus, the packing of juries was one of the malfeasances to which the 
term maintenance could refer to when linked to the sheriffs.  
Sometimes the corruption of criminal juries took the form of criminal enterprises. In 
1249, we are told that people from Winchester who robbed foreign merchants:  
have craftly entered into a conspiracy amongst themselves, that no one of them shall, 
on any account, accuse another; and thus their conspiracy and cunning has escaped 
the knowledge of you [the king]… [and with] those persons, too, whom he [the 
justiciary] had appointed as inquisitors, were confederates and abettors of robbers… 
[and with] some whom the king had deputed, as guardians and bailiffs, to protect that 
part of the country, and to apprehend or drive away robbers… [and with] some even 
who were superintendents of the king’s household, and crossbow-men in his 
service.”214  
In this case, a series of agreements had been used to protect and guard off criminals 
from criminal justice. Firstly, these people involved in criminal activity promised each other 
not to become approvers of the others in the event of being caught. Secondly, these people 
had also agreed with the juries of presentment so that their crimes would not be reported to 
the king’s justices. Finally, there was agreement between the criminals and the king’s officers 
in the county so that they would not arrest and imprison them. It should be said that it follows 
from Matthew Paris’s account that there was an economic side to these agreements in that all 
who supported the robbers benefited from the robberies perpetrated against the merchants. 
Though it is not explicitly mentioned, it is probable that as part of these agreements jurors 
and royal officers received bribes or, most probably, a part of the stolen goods as theftbote. 
2.1.3 BARRATRY AND CORRUPTION 
 I use barratry here in the sense of moving or instigating of false actions. There is an 
explicit reference to them in the Statute Westminster I 1275 (33 Edw 1 c 33), which states 
that “no Sheriff shall suffer any Barretors {or Maintainers of} Quarrels in their Shires, neither 
Stewards of great Lords, nor other unless he be Attorney for his Lord, to make Suit, {nor} to 
                                                 
213 “Et ausi de viscontes que eyent pris fyns et amerciaments de gentz de lour baillie que ilz ne sorent destreintz 
de estre chyuallers/et en ceo cas sou[n]t amerciables/ou que meintenent quereles et parties pledau[n]tz/et eyent 
procure fauz enquestes par quel droiture fuit arrerie,” Britton I, 35a-35b. 
214 Matthew Paris, English History, trans. J. A. Giles, vol. 2 (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent 
Gardent, 1853 [1250-1255]), 295, 297. 
85 
 
give judgments in the Counties nor to pronounce the judgments.”215 This clause regarding 
the possibility of false judgment shows the other side of barratry. As such, this conduct goes 
hand in hand with judicial corruption, particularly with that form of corruption which is the 
sharing in the spoils of the false suit. So, for instance, the Statute Westminster II 1285 (13 
Edw 1 c 36) refers to the incitation of false suits by the holders of local courts so that they 
can give false judgments to obtain fines: 
FORASMUCH as Lords of Courts, and other that keep Courts, and Stewards, 
intending to grieve [their Inferiors,] where they have no lawful mean so to do, procure 
other to move Matters against them, and to put in Surety and [other] Pledges, or to 
purchase Writs, and at the Suit of such Plaintiffs compel them to follow the County, 
Hundred, [Wapentake,] and other like Courts, until they have made Fine with them 
at their will.216 
Likewise, if the barrator is to be successful in his enterprise he has to secure the 
collaboration of royal officers that will accept their false actions, or arrange favorable panels, 
etc. So, for instance, the Mirror tells us that perjury is committed by “those officers of the 
king who knowingly maintain false actions, false appeals, or false defences.”217 Or, he would 
have to make sure that the false action would be pleaded in court for which we are told that 
the pleader was “bound by oath that he will not knowingly maintain or defend wrong or 
falsehood, but will abandon his client immediately that he perceives his wrongdoing.”218 Or, 
in the case of civil pleas, it is probable that he would arrange the forgery of evidence to use 
in court. Thus, the abovementioned Statute of Westminster I c 28 abovementioned in addition 
to forbidding court clerks and sheriffs from maintaining parties with business in court, it also 
                                                 
215 “q[e] nul Visconte ne seoffre baretour meintenir pa[r]oles en Conte; ne Seneschaus de g[ra]nt Seygnurs, ne 
autre sil ne seit attorne son Seygnur a suite fere ne render les Jugemen[t]s des Contez ne ponu[n]cier les 
Jugemen[t]s, sil ne seit especialment prie.” 
216 “Et quia d[omi]ni cur[tis] & alii qui cur[tis] tenent & senescalli, volentes gravare subditos suos cum non 
h[ab]eant legalem viam eos gravandi, procurant alios movere querelas versus eos & dare vad[ios] & offerre 
pleg[ios], vel impet[ra]re br[ev]ia & ad sectas huj[us]modi querenciu[m] compellunt eos sequi Com[itatum] 
Hundr[edum] & Cur[tis] quousq[ue] finem fec[er]int cum ip[s]is p[er] voluntate vua.” 
217 “Tuz ceux ministres le Eei qe meintenent faus actions fausses appealx ou faus defenses a escient,” Mirror, 
bk 1, c 5. 
218 “Chargeable par serement qil ne meintendra ne defendra tort ne faussine a soun escient, einz guerpera son 
client quel oure qil puisse soun tort apercevoir,” ib. 
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provides that they shall not “work any Fraud, whereby common Right may be delayed or 
disturbed.”219 
I use here the concept of moving or instigating false actions in a broad sense, so as to 
include those who bring or encourage false accusations. At the time, these statutes were being 
passed, accusations were initiated either by appeal or by presentment by a jury, which by that 
time could already be based on a bill of complaint brought or drafted privately at court. The 
Statute Westminster II c 12 takes notice of the instigation of false appeals: 
FORASMUCH as many, through Malice intending to grieve other, do procure false 
Appeals to be made of Homicides and other Felonies by Appellors, having nothing 
to satisfy the King for their false Appeal, nor to the Parties appealed for their 
Damages, It is ordained, That when any, being appealed of Felony surmised upon 
him, doth acquit himself in the King s Court in due Manner, either at the Suit of the 
Appellor, or of our Lord the King, the Justices, before whom the Appeal shall be 
heard and determined, shall punish the Appellor by a Year's Imprisonment, and the 
Appellors shall nevertheless restore to the Parties appealed their Damages, according 
to the Discretion of the Justices, having respect to the Imprisonment or Arrestment 
that the Party appealed hath sustained by reason of such Appeals, and to the Infamy 
that they have incurred by the Imprisonment or otherwise, and shall nevertheless 
make a grievous Fine unto the King. And if peradventure such Appellor be not able 
to recompense the Damages, it' shall be inquired by whose Abetment or Malice the 
Appeal was commenced, if the Party appealed desire it; and if it be found by the same 
Inquest, that any Man is Abettor through Malice, at the Suit of the Party appealed he 
shall be distrained by a judicial Writ to come before the Justices.220 
 As for the jurors moving false accusations, the infamous Company of the Pouch offers 
a good example of their modus operandi. In this case the sheriff had entered into a 
confederacy with jurors he later impaneled to “indict persons, and the other save them, for 
                                                 
219 “Ne fraude ne face par co[m]mune dreiture delaer ou destorbie.” 
220 "Quia multi p[er] maliciam volentes alios gravare p[ro]curant falsa appella fieri, de homicidio & allis 
feloniis, p[er] appellatores nichil h[ab]entes unde D[omi]no Regi p[er] falso appello nec appellatis de dampnis 
respondere possunt; Statutu[m] est q[uo]d cum [ali…] sic appellatus de felonia sibi impo[s]ita se acquietav[eri]t 
in curia Regis modo debito, vel ad sectam appellatoris vel D[omi]ni Regis, Justic[iarii], coram quib[us] auditum 
erit huj[us]modi appellu[m] & t[er]minatum, puniant appellatorem p[er] prisonam unius [- -] & n'omin[us] 
restituant hujusmodi appellatores appellatis dampna sc[un]d[u]m discrec[i]om Justic[iarii], h[ab]ito respectu ad 
prisonam vel arrestac[i]o[en]m, quam occ[asi]one huj[us]modi appello[rum] sustinuerunt appellati, & ad 
infamiam, quam p[er] imp[ri]sonamentum vel allo modo incurrerunt, & n'omin9 versus D[omi]n[u]m Regem 
gravius redimant[ur]. Et si forte hujusmodi appellatores non h[ab]eant unde pred[i]c[t]a dampna restituere 
possint, inquirat[ur] p[er] quo[rum] abettum formatum fit huj[us]modi appellum p[er] maliciam, si appellatus 
hoc petat, et si inveniatur p[er] illam inquisic[i]o[ne]m q[uo]d aliquis sit abettator p[er] maliciam, p[er] breve 
de judicio ad sectam appellati, distringatur ad veniendu[m] coram Justic[iarii].” 
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bribes.”221 That is, there was an agreement between the jurors and the sheriff to accuse falsely 
to extort money from their victims. Also, we are told by the Mirror of Justices that after 
dozens have received presentments from the four villages, “they are bound to accuse 
conspirators who have unlawfully procured that a guilty person shall be saved, or that an 
innocent person shall be indicted at such inquests.”222  
2.1.4 THE ORDINANCE OF CONSPIRATORS 
The next step in the tackling of judicial corruption was the so-called Statute of 
Conspirators 1293 (20-21 Edw I):  
WHERE it is contained in our Statute that none of  our Court shall take any Plea to 
Champerty by Craft nor by Engine; and {that no} Pleaders, Apprentices, Attornies, 
Stewards of Great Men, Bailiffs, {nor any} other of the Realm, {shall take for 
Maintenance or the like Bargain, any manner of Suit or Plea against other,} whereby 
all the Realm is much grieved, and both Rich and Poor troubled in divers manners; It 
is Provided by a common Accord, That all such as from henceforth shall be attainted 
of such Emprises, Suits, or Bargains, and such as consent thereunto, shall have 
Imprisonment of Three Years, and shall make Fine at the King's Pleasure 
Our Lord the King, at the Information of Gilbert Rowbery Clerk of his Council, hath 
commanded, That whosoever will complain himself of Conspirators, Inventors and 
Maintainors of false Quarrels, {and Partakers thereof,} and Brokers of Debates, that 
{Gilbert Thornton shall cause them to be attached by his Writ, that they be before our 
Sovereign Lord the King, to answer unto the Plantifs by this Writ following:} 
The King to the Sheriff Greeting, We command thee, That if A. of B. give thee Surety 
for prosecuting his Claim, then put by Gages and safe Pledges G of C that he be before 
us from the Day of the Holy Trinity in Fifteen Days, wherever We shall then be in 
England, to answer to the aforesaid A. of a Plea of Conspiracy and Trespass according 
to our Ordinance lately thereof provided, as the said A. can reasonably show that he 
ought to answer to him thereof. And have there the Names of the Pledges and this 
Writ. Witness G. de Thornton.  
And if any Man shall be convicted at the Suit of any Complainant of any such 
Offence, let him be imprisoned until he hath satisfied the Party grieved, and towards 
the King let him be grievously redeemed.223 
                                                 
221 Nichols, Britton, 79, n (1). 
222 “Sunt il charchables dencuser les conspiratours qi eient procure desavoer ' ascun peccheour ou denditer 
innocent en teles enquestes,” Mirror, bk 1, c 13. 
223 CUM [con]tenu seit en n[ostr]e estatut ke nul de n[ostr]e Curt enprenge play a champart, ne par art ne par 
engin, {Cunteurs ne atturnez ne aprentifs, seneschaus des hautz homes baillifs ne autres de la [ter]re nenprengent 
a champart ne par autres barettours de'} tute manere de play, {ou} tute manere de gent, parunt tote la [ter]re est 
greve, riches & poures sunt travaillez en mutz de maneres: Purveu est par [com]mun acord ke tuz ceus ke 
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 The Statutes of the Realm list this as a statute of uncertain date. The uncertainty of 
the date derives from the uncertainty of its structure as there is evidence suggesting that it 
might be a concoction of two different laws. According to the commissioners, all English 
editions printed this as a single statute, but under the name of Statute of Champerty. There 
are some old printed copies, however, that divide the statute in two different parts enacted at 
separate dates. The first part corresponded to the Statutum of Champerty, dated either in 11 
Edw 1 or 20 Edw 1. The second part was the Statutum de Conspirators, dated either in 33 
Edw 1 or of unknown date. It follows from these editions that it is possible that other editions 
simply consolidated these two into one single statute. On consideration of internal and 
external evidence, Winfield inconclusively narrows down the dates to either 20 Edw 1 or 21 
Edw 1 for the first part, and believes that the second part was most likely passed in 21 Edw 
1.224 
As part of the evidence that the second part was probably passed in 21 Edw 1, 
Winfield points out that this second part of the Statute of Conspirators bears a “strong family 
resemblance” to the Ordinance of Conspirators 1293, particularly in that the latter seems to 
foreshadow the writ that the Statute of Conspirators fleshes out. Moreover, the writ is to be 
crafted against a recent ordinance: 
Statute of Conspirators Ordinance of Conspirators 
Our Lord the King, at the Information of 
Gilbert Rowbery Clerk of his Council, 
hath commanded, That whosoever will 
Concerning those who wish to make 
complaint about conspirators 
arranging for pleas to be initiated 
                                                 
desoremes sunt atteintz de celes enprises {suten e Bargayngnurs,} e ceus ke a cele chose assentent eyent la 
prison de trois annz, e ne purkaunt scient reintz a la volunte le Rey.  
D[omi]n[u]s Rex mandavit nunciante Gilb[er]to de Roubires cl[er]ico de [con]silio d[omi]n[i] Reg[is], q[ou]d 
quicumq[ue], volu[er]it se [com]q[ue]ri de [con]spiratorib[us] f[als]a[rum] q[ue]rela[rum] sust[e]ntatorib[us], 
inventorib[us] , & manutenentib[us] querela[rum] f[als]a[rum], ut inde p[ar]tem h[ab]eant & [con]troversa[rum] 
bargainatorib[us] {q[oud], Gilb[er]t[us] de Thorton p[er] b[r]e[ve] fa[ciat] eos attachiari q[oud] sint cor[am] 
d[omi]n[o] Rege [con]querentib[us] respondere p[er] hoc b[rev]e}. Rex Vi Vic[ecomes] sal[u]t[e]m ; 
Precipimus t[ibi] q[uo]d si A. de B. fec[er]it te secu[rum] de clam[orem] suo p[ro]s[equendo], tunc pone p[er] 
vad[ios] & salvos pleg[ios] G. de C. q[uod], sit coram nobis a die S[an]c[tisim]e T[ri]nitatis in xv. dies, 
ubicumq[ue] tu[n]c fu[er]im[us] in Angl[iae], ad respondend[um]  p[rae]fa[c]to A. de  pl[ac]ito [con]spiracionis 
& transgressionis s[e]c[um]d[u]m ordinac[i]o[n]em n[ost]ram nup[er] inde  p[ro]visam, sicut idem A.  
rac[i]onabilit[er] monstrare pot[er]it q[uo]d ei inde respondere debeat. Et heas ibi no[m]i[n]a plegio[rum] & 
hoc br[ev]e. T. G. de Thornton, &c. 
224 Winfield, Conspiracy, 22-28. Cf. Bryan, Conspiracy, 9, 11; 3 HEL 400. See also the note to the Statute of 
Conspirators in the Statutes of the Realm.  
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complain himself of Conspirators, (1) 
Inventors and Maintainors of false 
Quarrels, [and Partakers thereof,] 
and Brokers of Debates, that [Gilbert 
Thornton shall cause them to be attached 
by his Writ, that they be before our 
Sovereign Lord the King, to answer unto 
the Plantifs by this Writ following:]  
  
The King to the Sheriff Greeting, We 
command thee, That if A. of B. give thee 
Surety for prosecuting his Claim, then 
put by Gages and safe Pledges G of C 
that he be before us from the Day of the 
Holy Trinity in Fifteen Days, wherever 
We shall then be in England, to answer 
to the aforesaid A. of a Plea of 
Conspiracy and Trespass according 
to our Ordinance lately thereof 
provided, as the said A. can reasonably 
show that he ought to answer to him 
thereof. And have there the Names of 
the Pledges and this Writ. Witness G. de 
Thornton. 
 
maliciously in the country, as brewers 
of discord, maliciously maintaining 
and sustaining those pleas and 
disputes at champerty or so that they 
might have some other advantage 
from it, they are to come henceforth 
before the justices appointed to the lord 
king's pleas, and there they are to find 
security that they will prosecute their 
complaint. And the sheriffs are to be 
ordered by a writ of the chief justice 
and under his seal, that they are to be 
attached to appear before the king on 
a certain day: and swift justice is to be 
done there. And those who are 
convicted of this are to be severely 
punished, in accordance with the 
discretion of the aforesaid justices, by 
prison and ransom; or such 
complainants are to wait for the eyre of 
the justices in their parts if they wish, 
and sue there etc.225 
 
 The connection between this Ordinance, and the Statute of Conspirators becomes 
even more plausible in consideration of a royal mandate not mentioned by Winfield and 
enrolled in 1293, the very same year that the Ordinance was passed, and which bears a closer 
                                                 
225 “De illis qui conqueri voluerint de conspiratoribus in patria placita maliciose moveri procurantibus, ut 
contumelie braciatoribus placita illa et contumelias, ut campipartem vel aliquod aliud comodum inde habeant 
{maliciose} manutenentibus et sustinentibus, veniant decetero coram justiciariis ad placita domini regis 
assignatis, et ibi inveniant securitatem de querela sua prosequenda. Et mandetur vicecomitibus per breve 
capitalis justiciarii et sub sigillo suo quod attachientur quod sint coram rege ad certum diem, et fiat ibi celeris 
justicia. Et illi, qui de hoc convicti fuerint, puniantur graviter juxta discrecionem justiciariorum predictorum{per 
prisonam et redempcionem}; aut expectent tales querentes iter justiciariorum in partibus suis si voluerint, et 
ibidem sequantur etc.” Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1306, Text and Translation," in The Parliament 
Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005), 
item 96. 
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resemblance to the first part of the second part of the Statute of Conspirators in the Statutes 
of the Realm:  
Statute of Conspirators Royal mandate  
Our Lord the King, at the Information of 
Gilbert Rowbery Clerk of his Council, 
hath commanded, That whosoever will 
complain himself of Conspirators, (1) 
Inventors and Maintainors of false 
Quarrels, [and Partakers thereof,] and 
Brokers of Debates, that [Gilbert 
Thornton shall cause them to be 
attached by his Writ, that they be before 
our Sovereign Lord the King, to answer 
unto the Plantifs by this Writ 
following:]  
Dominus rex mandavit, nunciante 
Gilberto de Rouburs clerico de consilio, 
quod quicumque voluerit se conqueri de 
conspiratoribus, falsarum querelarum 
sustentatoribus et inventoribus, 
manucaptoribus et sustentatoribus 
falsarum querelarum ut inde partem 
habeant et controversiarum 
braciatoribus, quod Gilbertus de 
Thornton' per breve suum faciat eos 
attachiari quod veniant coram rege inde 
querentibus responsuri.226 
 Thus, all seems to suggest that the second part of the Statute of Conspirators was a 
concoction of the Ordinance of Conspirators of 1293, and that the writ that was ordered to be 
framed that same year was provided in fulfillment of the provision of that ordinance that 
complainants should have remedy by writ against conspirators. Indeed, one may ask whether 
the Statute was ever legislated. Sayles points out that the Statute of Conspirators does not 
correspond to any statutory record, but rather to private collection, and that there is no record 
case in which the punishment provided by was ever enforced.  
This is where we come to the conceptual problem, since most commentators seem to 
think that the second part of the statute is conceptually detached from the first part. This in 
turn directly relates to our frame approach.  
 Though Winfield remains on the fence with regard to the problem as to whether this 
is one or two different statutes, he seems to agree with the idea that internally it has two parts 
as “it concerns itself in its first part mainly with champertors, and in its second part chiefly 
with conspirators and maintainers,” and that “the preamble refers to a statute prohibiting 
champerty on the part of the members of the King’s court and maintenance on the part of 
                                                 
226 Paul Brand, ed., “Edward I: Parliament of 1306, Appendix: Additional Information and Related Material for 
Roll 6, Text and Translation,” in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 
96. CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005). 
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anybody else.”227 This is true for the translation, but if we turn to the original it is no longer 
defensible: 
Translation Original  
WHERE it is contained in our Statute that 
none of  our Court shall take any Plea to 
Champerty by Craft nor by Engine; and 
{that no} Pleaders, Apprentices, Attornies, 
Stewards of Great Men, Bailiffs, {nor any} 
other of the Realm, {shall take for 
Maintenance or the like Bargain, any 
manner of Suit or Plea against other,'} 
whereby all the Realm is much grieved, and 
both Rich and Poor troubled in divers 
manners; It is Provided by a common 
Accord, That all such as from henceforth 
shall be attainted of such Emprises, Suits, or 
Bargains, and such as consent thereunto, 
shall have Imprisonment of Three Years, 
and shall make Fine at the King's Pleasure 
 
Our Lord the King, at the Information of 
Gilbert Rowbery Clerk of his Council, hath 
commanded, That whosoever will complain 
himself of Conspirators, (1) Inventors and 
Maintainors of false Quarrels, [and 
Partakers thereof,] and Brokers of Debates, 
that [Gilbert Thornton shall cause them to 
be attached by his Writ, that they be before 
our Sovereign Lord the King, to answer 
unto the Plantifs by this Writ following:] 
CUM [con]tenu seit en n[ostr]e estatut ke 
nul de n[ostr]e Curt enprenge play a 
champart, ne par art ne par engin, 
[Cunteurs ne atturnez ne aprentifs, 
seneschaus des hautz homes baillifs ne 
autres de la [ter]re nenprengent a 
champart ne par autres barettours de'] 
tute manere de play, [ou'] tute manere de 
gent, parunt tote la [ter]re est greve, riches 
& poures sunt travaillez en mutz de 
maneres: Purveu est par [com]mun acord ke 
tuz ceus ke desoremes sunt atteintz de celes 
enprises [suten e Bargayngnurs,] e ceus ke a 
cele chose assentent eyent la prison de trois 
annz, e ne purkaunt scient reintz a la volunte 
le Rey. [Done a Berewyk sur Twede Ian du 
regne le Rey Edward, fiz le Rey Henr[i], 
vintime.] 
Perhaps the most important point here is what Winfield is presupposing and/or 
implying: that champerty, maintenance, and conspiracy are independent offences. But the 
very tenor of the first part of the statute relates both concepts of maintenance and champerty 
(“none of our court shall take any Plea to Champerty”). Winfield seems to ground his 
argument in that prior statutes referring to the taking of bribes are always in relation to royal 
                                                 
227 Winfield, Conspiracy, 24. 
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officers (3 Edw 1 c 25, c 26, c 49),  but the first of these statutes prohibits that they “shall 
maintain Pleas, Suits, or Matters hanging in the King’s Court, for Land, Tenements, or other 
Things, for to have part or profit thereof by Covenant made between them,” and 3 Edw 1 c 
28 forbids that “Clerk of any Justice, or sheriff {take part}in any Quarrels {of} Matters 
depending in the King’s court.”   
It is true that the first part of the Statute of Conspirators is related to 3 Edw 1 c 25, c 
26, c 33, and 13 Edw 1 c 49, but this is because they are all an expression of the same 
conceptual frame of judicial corruption. The prototypical description of that frame is that of 
someone who enters in an agreement with an officer that he would support someone else 
bringing false suit in land for profit, usually a share of the land. Obviously, though it is not 
specified here, maintaining a false plea in a royal court involves returning false verdicts, 
which in turn involves corrupting the juries directly or through the sheriff or other officers. 
Similarly, maintaining a plea in a local court involved giving false judgement, which in turn 
involved interfering with the court suitors. Words like conspirators refer to this agreement, 
whereas words like craft, engine, or inventors refer to the purpose of the agreement to deceive 
justice usually by devising false actions (and this includes the forgery of false evidence); 
champerty and partakers refer to the promise that there will be a profit for the parties involved 
in the agreement; brokers of debates, brewers of discord, and controversarium braciatoribus 
refer to the people bringing or inciting the false suit, the barrators.  Maintenance refers to the 
misdeeds of corrupt officers, juries, lawyers to uphold the false suit.  
The connection with the frame first expressed in the articles of the Eyre becomes 
more apparent if we consider that it seems that the purpose of the Statute of Conspirators was 
to provide a remedy by writ out of the King’s Bench.228 Such a remedy would be speedier 
than waiting for the next Eyre for those who aggrieved to report about these people who had 
entered such agreements. Indeed, if we accept that the Statute of Conspirators refers to the 
writ provided by the Ordinance of Conspirators, the latter not only offered this writ before 
                                                 
228 The Statute of Conspirators says that Gilbert Thornton, who was CJKB shall “cause them to be attached by 
his writ.” The ordinance that those complaining of conspirators “are to come henceforth before the justices 
appointed to the lord king’s pleas…and the sheriffs are to be ordered by a writ of the chief justice and under his 
seal, that that they are to be attached.” Sayle argues that, at least during the reign of Edward I, this was a judicial 
writ and not an original one out of chancery. For his attempt to explain the Articuli Super Chartas and other 
contemporary references to this as a writ out of chancery see 58 SS lx.  
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the King’s Bench for “those who wish to make complaint about conspirators…” but also 
allowed such complainants “to wait for the eyre of the justices in their parts if they wish, and 
sue there, etc.” This probably referred to the new bill procedure, by which the juries of 
presentment would learn about offences which they would later present in response to the 
articles of the eyre. Both the need to tackle the problem of corruption in a speedier way and 
the consequent application of the new bill procedure appear in the next relevant statute, 
Articuli Super Cartas 1300, 28 Edw 1 c11: 
IN Right of Conspirators, false Informers, and evil Procurers of Dozens, Assises, 
lnquests and Juries, the King hath provided Remedy for the Plaintiffs by a Writ out 
of the Chancery; and notwithstanding, he willeth that his Justices of the one Bench 
and of the other, and Justices assigned to take Assises, when they come into the 
Country to do their Office, shall upon every Plaint made unto them, award Inquests 
thereupon without Writ, and shall do right unto the Plaintiffs without Delay229. 
Thus, in conformity with the logic of providing speedier and more effective justice 
against conspirators, this statue widens the range of remedies by allowing bills of complaint 
of such a wrong to be brought before the itinerant justices. In other words, it gives jurisdiction 
to these itinerant justices over conspirators. Thus, we have the full spectrum of possibilities 
to deal with this evil: the eyre, the King’s Bench, and the itinerant justices of assizes, gaol 
delivery, and oyer and terminer.  
It should be mentioned that though the Statute of Conspirators refers to maintenance 
in a general way in relation to barrators, it refers to barrators (false informers) as embracers 
(evil procurers) of both civil and criminal juries (Dozens, Assises, Inquests, and Juries).  In 
other words, of necessity barratry included what would later be called embracery, including 
bribing the sheriff to pack a jury with friends, bribing the juries directly, or perhaps laboring 
or intimidating them. The juries who would perjure themselves as a consequence of the 
embracery would maintain the false pleas or accusation.  
                                                 
229 “En droit des Conspiratours, faus enfourmours, & mauveis p[ro]cureours des duzeines, enquestes, assises, 
& jurees, le Roi ad ordene remedie as pleintifs par bref de Chancelerie; & ja dumeins voet, q[e] ses Justices de 
Iun banc& de lautre, & Justices as assises prendre assignes, q[ua]nt il viegnent en pais a fere leur office, de ceo 
facent leur enquestes a chescuny pleinte, santz bref, & santz delai, & facent droit as pleintifs.” 
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From this point of view, it becomes apparent that the next chapter of the Articuli 
Super Cartas (c 11) does not only refer to corruption of royal officers by champerty but it is 
also connected to the one mentioned above: 
none of his Ministers shall take no Plea [for Maintenance,] by which Statute [other 
Officers] were not bounden before this time; the King will, that no Officer nor any 
other, for to have part of the Thing in Plea, shall not take upon him the Business that 
as in Suit; nor none upon any such Covenant shall give up his Right to another.”230 
In this statute, we have reference to agreements between royal ministers to support 
pleas to have a share in the thing. The word used to refer to such agreement is covenant rather 
than conspiracy.  
2.2 THE WRIT OF CONSPIRACY IN ACTION 
 Perhaps the best way to illustrate the way in which the concepts involved in these 
statutes are interrelated within the frame that would be known as conspiracy is through the 
inspection of some cases that either by writ or petition flowed to the royal courts during these 
years. Regarding those cases, I will distinguish between those concerning corruption and 
barratry in civil actions and those in criminal proceedings. Firstly, because judging from the 
letter of these statutes, particularly the Articles of the Eyre and the Statute of Conspirators, it 
seems that agreements concerning civil suits fell more naturally within their scopes than 
agreements concerning criminal proceedings. In fact, the latter was closer to the statute 13 
Edw 1 c 12. Secondly, from a substantive point of view, corruption and barratry in civil 
actions are normally moved by economic incentives, whereas in criminal proceedings, 
though this economic incentive is not altogether absent, most of the time they are moved by 
personal grudges. Thirdly, conceptually speaking, most of the cases concerning civil 
proceedings have to do with the disturbance of rights, whereas the cases concerning criminal 
proceedings have to do with wronging people. Indeed, this distinction may have something 
to do with the fact that during its early state, this was always referred to as a writ of conspiracy 
and trespass.  
                                                 
230 “nul de ses Ministres ne preist nul plai a champart, & p[er] cel estatut autres q[e] Ministres ne estoient pas 
avant ces houres a ceo lieez, voet le Roi, q[e] nul Ministre, ne nul autre, pur part aver de chose q[e] est en plai, 
enpreigne les busoignes q[e] sont en plai; Ne nul sur tieu covenant soen droit ne lease a autri.” 
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2.2.1 DISTURBANCE OF RIGHT BY JUDICIAL CORRUPTION AND BARRATRY 
 Following the letter of the Articles of the Eyre, and the Statute of Conspirators, 
subsequent cases of corruption and barratry were framed as agreements in support of parties 
to pleas for profit. We will first look at the cases of corruption by litigants concerning pending 
litigation, and later move to barratry, which often involved the corruption of jurors and 
judicial officials, as well as judicial fraud.  
 As for the corruption of jurors, an early case shows us jurors changing their verdicts 
for profit. In 1293, an action of conspiracy was brought against assize jurors before the King’s 
Bench alleging that the plaintiff had successfully sued an assize of novel disseisin against 
certain prior, and that after that, the latter complained against the judge in that case before 
the auditores querelarum, leading to a reexamination of the jurors and a judgment for the 
prior. The plaintiff complained that the jurors “have procured and abetted the prior to have 
them come before the auditors and promised that they would deny their verdict a let him have 
the land back in return for various gifts.”231 So, rather than being procured by somebody else, 
the jurors were involved in barratry, encouraging one of the parties to bring a new false suit. 
Single jurors were also up for hire, ready to influence the other members of the jury. In a 
petition to the king made in 1290, we learn of a certain juror who was removed in the Eyre 
of Berkshire for conspiracy, but who nevertheless was reinstated by a corrupt judge who had 
been promised a church in a writ of right for the advowson of that church by the plaintiff, 
and who promised the corrupt juror fifteen acres of land.232 Jurors were not only corrupted 
to give false verdicts, but also to make false assessments. In the case of William Hardegrey 
v. Alan Altman and others (1294) 58 SS 197, pl 103, it was alleged that in a previous case 
concerning the seizure of cattle, the plaintiff “by the conspiracy and confederacy which he 
made between them in this matter with the aforesaid John Amy and the others, who were the 
jurors of the aforesaid inquisition at the taking of the aforesaid inquisition, prevailed so much 
upon the aforesaid jurors that they taxed… [the plaintiff’s] damages by reason of the 
                                                 
231 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1302, Appendix: Original Petitions and Related Material for Roll 
2, Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 96. 
CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005). 
232 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1302, Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 96. CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005), item 58. 
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aforesaid plea at ten pounds”. After the defendant paid part of that excessive assessment, the 
money was “shared among the aforesaid jurors by reason of the aforesaid assessment.”  
 Corruption by local officers as an agreement to support a party for profit was also 
framed as conspiracy. We know for instance, of a petition of the Londoners to the king 
complaining that justice was never done to complainants because city clerks and officials 
were involved in “conspiracies and machinations” and were being retained by those about 
whom complaints were made.233 Thus, rather than a bribe, corruption in this case took the 
form of a more permanent relationship between master and client, which was based on a fee 
or annuity or the expectation of future benefits on the part of the latter from the former.   
 However, most cases of corruption involved the bringing or inciting of false pleas. In 
Gerald vs Ralph (1293) 57 SS 168 pl 73, we have a case of barratry and corruption of jury. 
The defendant was accused of having arranged with two others that one of them was to bring 
a writ of novel disseisin against certain manor “by his conspiracy and for ten marks… and 
also in order to have champarty [sic] of the aforesaid manor if perchance he had been able to 
establish his right.”. Furthermore, they also “falsely and maliciously fabricated with regard 
to this a certain verdict and arranged for it to be presented and recited by the jurors of that 
assize before the justices etc., before whom the assize was taken,” which the jurors presented 
as a verdict.  
 The case of the parson of Souldern reveals how it was the legal counselor who most 
prototypically would incur in barratry as he had the legal knowledge to defend parties 
regardless of the merits,234 to incite others to bring false actions, and to arrange false verdicts 
and false evidence for profit. The parson was accused of having hindered the prosecution of 
a plea “by his conspiracy and the confederation between himself and the opposite party and 
likewise the jurors of the country”. He was also accused of having prevented the collection 
of a feudal service “by his conspiracy,” and also of having “advised her to bring a certain 
assize of mort d'ancestor against them for the manor of Souldern with appurtenances, 
especially as he would have champart thereof if she could have proved her right to it.” By 
                                                 
233 Ib. 
234 See the oath of the pleader, Mirror, Bk 2 c 5. 
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his conspiracy he also advised other person “to implead… [the plaintiffs] before the justices 
of the bench with regard to thirty marks, promising him an inquisition of the country to suit 
his wishes if it should in any way happen that they were impleaded as far as an inquisition, 
and this {he did} especially that he might have champart [sic] thereof.” He also “procured 
and advised etc. [another]… to bring a certain assize of novel disseisin against… [the 
defendants] with regard to a hundred acres of land etc. in Souldern, and he maintained that 
plea at his own expense etc.” Likewise, in another action of novel dissessin “by his 
conspiracy etc. procured… [some] jurors of the aforesaid assize and also maintained that 
plea.”235 Among other things, the parson defended his privileged position as “it is lawful for 
everyone of the realm to help his friends in their rights in the lord king's court etc. or to advise 
etc. against their enemies.”236   
 Sometimes the barratry was just a means by defeated parties in previous litigation to 
undo the effects of a judgment or to work out the desired effect by other means. A case which 
involved the corruption of judges was brought in 1297 before the King’s Bench against a 
justice of Assize. The plaintiff alleged that he had successfully brought an action of abetment 
(under the statute of 13 Edw 1 c 12) against one who had procured someone else to appeal 
him of various robberies. As a consequence, he had obtained damages which were to be 
raised by the sheriff from the goods and chattels of the defendant. As this was executed, the 
latter sued a writ of trespass against the former with respect to the seizing of these goods. 
Thus, the former came before one of the justices who heard the action of abetment, who 
promised that he would avow his judgment and warrant him for the goods. However, the 
judge, “by the conspiracy and confederacy made between” the defendant, another person and 
him, disavowed his judgment and that he had awarded anything to the plaintiff. So that, as a 
consequence, this was convicted in the said action of trespass.237 We do not know whether 
the judge was bribed, neither whether the other party was acting as a counselor for the 
                                                 
235 Thomas of Lewknor and Lucy his wife v. John, parson of Souldern (1294) 58 SS 22, pl 10. 
236 Ib., 26. Cf. William de Welbye vs William of Hemswell (1301) 2 Inst 563 where one of the defendants, also 
a parson, successfully alleged his privileged position as communis advocatus.  
237 William Gregory v John du Bois (1297) 58 SS 73, pl 29. 
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defendant, but it is quite likely that there was such an arrangement. There is no indication of 
the verdict in this action however. 
  Likewise, the bishop of Durham, who, in an action of mort d’ancestor, had 
unsuccessfully pleaded that the plaintiff was a bastard, arranged counter-litigation with the 
sisters of the deceased to bring another action of mort d’ancestor against the said bishop of 
Durham so that the action would be stayed, and the title contested. The plaintiff in the first 
action petitioned the king to inquire into this “conspiracy and collusion” and to ensure that 
“he be not defrauded of justice by the suit of his aunts, maliciously fabricated against the 
same John to disinherit him.”238 The purpose of this petition thus, was not to redress a wrong, 
but to stay the new legal proceedings and determine the first cause.  
 It was also possible that barratry was preceded by the forgery of legal documents 
upon which the false litigation ensued. In the case of Ralph of Banbury v. Robert son of Henry 
(1298) 58 SS 73, pl 43 the defendant, along with others, was accused “through the conspiracy 
and confederacy made between them… to have maliciously drew up together and made a 
certain false will” in which a rent falsely was bequeathed to a certain woman. They also 
arranged that they should maintain this woman and her husband “in champarty [sic] so that 
they would plead the aforesaid false will.” And after they so did so, “they divided that rent 
among them in accordance with the conspiracy etc. made between them.” In John Giffard v. 
Geoffrey of Stonehouse (1298) 58 SS 80, pl 47 the defendant was attached to answer a writ 
of conspiracy alleging that he and another had “maliciously devised and made” a false bond 
where the plaintiff supposedly had bound himself to enfeoff the defendant’s father or his heir 
for ten pounds worth of land or else to pay them two hundred pounds, a hundred pounds to 
the king, and a hundred more in aid of the Holy Land, and “falsely and maliciously caused a 
certain seal to be fabricated” and affixed to the deed. After the death of the defendant’s father, 
the latter made the deeds and the conditions known, intending to demand and recover the 
land or else enforce the penalties. 
 Finally, there is a petition that illustrates how these cases related to the world of 
bastard feudalism that was crystalizing by the end of thirteenth-century England. In this 
                                                 
238 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1307, Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 96. CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005, item 198. 
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petition, Richard complained that after having taken seisin of certain lands as a rightful heir 
for three weeks or more, his older bastard brother Robert “made an agreement with sir John 
de Grey and gave him ten marks to eject the aforesaid Richard from his inheritance and 
maintain the aforesaid Robert in his land, so that the aforesaid Richard was ousted from the 
said tenements by the power and force of the aforesaid sir John de Grey.” The said Richard, 
as he “saw that he needed to have aid to maintain himself… allied himself through marriage” 
with one who approached Sir John de Grey “and gave him fifteen marks to oust” the bastard 
brother and reinstate him. Then the elder brother approached Reginald, the father of sir John 
de Grey, “and sold his right to the said sir Reginald and his heirs by collusion between sir 
Reginald and sir John and him,” so that this ejected Richard. Then Richard brought an assize 
of novel disseisin against Reginald, but the latter, along with his son John, “so procured and 
threatened” the jurors that “through their harshness and their menaces which they made the 
truth could not be enquired or found.” For all “this encompassing and this conspiracy,” the 
petitioner prayed remedy to the king who answered that he was to “get a remedy in chancery 
by writ of champarty [sic] or otherwise according to the nature of this petition, if it seems 
expedient to him.” This writ probably meant the writ of conspiracy.239 
 In these cases, we can see how, at this point, the frame of the agreement to support a 
plea for profit encompassed the concepts that would be later referred to with the terms 
maintenance, champerty, barratry, and embracery. Thus, it included mere bribery as well as 
the different corrupt arrangements to have a share of the chose in litigation, and the 
fabrication and incitation of false suits. Furthermore, the scope of these agreements extended 
to all the agencies that took part in the legal process (suitors, jurors, judges, officers, clerks) 
as well as third parties that could interfere with the process. There was, however, certain 
uncertainty as to the conceptual boundaries of the wrong which was emerging as is evidenced 
by the fact that there were still alternative lexicalizations for this action either as a writ of 
champerty or of conspiracy.  
As to what plaintiffs sought with this action, sometimes they alleged economic loss 
as a consequence of the false litigation: In Thomas of Lewknor and Lucy his wife v. John, 
                                                 
239 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1302, Appendix to Roll 12: Original Petitions and related materials, 
Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 96. CD-
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parson of Souldern (1294) 58 SS 22, pl 10, the plaintiffs declared that “they incurred very 
great loss.” In William Gregory v. John du Bois (1297) 58 SS 73, pl 29, the plaintiff “has 
suffered damage to the value of two hundred pounds, and he produces suit thereof etc.” In 
Ralph of Banbury v. Robert son of Henry (1298) 58 SS 73, a “loss to the value of forty 
pounds” was declared.  And in John Giffard v. Geoffrey of Stonehouse (1298) 58 SS 80, the 
plaintiff affirmed that he “has suffered loss to the value of fifty pounds.” 
Most interestingly, it seems that that plaintiffs might have sought the review of 
verdicts based on false pleas and false evidence, and tainted by corruption, through the writ 
of conspiracy, and therefore to prevent or revert the effect of such false verdicts.240 For one 
thing, the defendant in Thomas of Lewknor and Lucy his wife v. John, parson of Souldern 
(1294) 58 SS 22, pl 10, argued that with regard to an assize for which the plaintiffs had lost 
certain tenements, “he says that the justices, before whom that assize was taken, proceeded 
to take the aforesaid assize by the common law of the realm, and by the verdict of that assize 
they deprived the aforesaid Thomas and Lucy of the aforesaid custody by judgement, and 
that judgement still stands firm and cannot and by right ought not to be quashed by that writ 
of conspiracy.” There is no indication of the opinion of the court, but the plaintiffs withdrew 
from the action. Likewise, in William Hardegrey v. Alan Altman and others (1294) 58 SS 
197, pl 103, where excessive damages had been awarded by a corrupt jury, it was defended 
that the “plaint does not sound in conspiracy but rather for the purpose of attainting the jurors 
of the aforesaid inquisition of a false oath, which cannot be done without a writ of attaint 
from the chancery, and also for the purpose of quashing the judgement given upon the verdict 
of the aforesaid inquisition before the justices of the bench, which likewise cannot be done 
without a chancery writ.” Furthermore, in this case, the defendant jurors also prayed their 
immunity as jurors and that the remedy in case of false verdict was the action or attaint: 
                                                 
240 As for review before the verdict, in the civil cases there is no indication that the main proceedings should be 
concluded before suing conspiracy. A petition to the king shows an attempt to quash a false action by alleging 
that it had been brought “by conspiracy and collusion,” Brand, “Parliament of 1305,” item 198. Indeed, there is 
some suggestion that the action of conspiracy might have been used for the abusive purpose of staying legal 
procedure. The Mirror tells us that it was an abuse to bring writs of audita querela, or conspiracy without the 
substance of the complaint (Mirror bk 2 c 5). This is a mysterious reference to the writ of audita querela which 
is usually dated in the reign of Edward III; Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law. 
5th. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956 [1929]), 394; 2 HEL 344. In Richard vs Geoffrey et al (1293) 57 SS 
160, pl 70, when asked what conspiracy was, the plaintiff admitted that he did not know and withdrew from the 
action.  
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they were indeed on the aforesaid inquisition, but they plainly say that with regard to 
this they made a good and lawful oath and that that oath still stands good. And, 
inasmuch as whatever they did in this matter they did in accordance with the law and 
custom of the realm and with what can be avowed before God and men, and also, if 
perjury has been in any way committed against the same William through their oath, 
the aforesaid William has his recovery against them by a writ of attaint from the 
chancery or otherwise by law of the land. 
On the connection between attaint and the writ of conspiracy as means of review of 
corrupt verdicts, the subsequent development of the villainous judgment with which 
conspirators were visited when prosecuted through criminal proceedings may be revelatory. 
The punishment of the perjured jurors was so similar to the villainous judgment that it has 
been suggested that the latter developed “by accretions—some perceptible, some 
imperceptible” from the former.241 
Before we move on to the use of the writ of conspiracy in criminal proceedings, a 
word needs to be said about the different ways of framing these cases of corruption and 
barratry in civil proceedings. In framing them as agreements to support parties to pleas for 
profit, the emphasis is laid on corruption and the instigation of false suits. However, the latter, 
which constitute most of these cases, can be also framed as frauds to deceive a court into 
depriving someone of his property. Indeed, in the language of these cases, as well as the 
abovementioned statutes, we have seen the use of words that can evoke that frame such as 
collusion, machination, fabrication, invention, craft, engine, and fraud. This is also the case 
of the word maliciously, which often cooccurs with falsely, and which within this context 
should rather be taken as meaning intention to defraud or deceive rather than hatred or 
intention to cause harm. Thus, the same situation can be potentially framed as a corruption 
and barratry, backgrounding the collusion or fraud, or as a collusion, backgrounding the 
corruption and barratry. This means that there is the possibility of a semantic shift in the legal 
meaning of conspiracy towards the second frame of collusion or deception of a court of law 
to obtain property, and hence towards collusion in general.  
2.2.2 EXTORTION AND WRONGDOING BY JUDICIAL CORRUPTION AND BARRATRY 
 Regarding corruption and barratry in criminal proceedings, most cases are concerned 
with the institution of criminal proceedings by making or instigating false accusations. In this 
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sense, we should distinguish between the institution of such proceedings for the purpose of 
extorting people, and those aimed at harming them.242 The former comes more easily within 
the scope of the frame of an agreement to support a false plea for profit, whereas the latter 
has more in common with the Statute Westminster II 13 Edw 1 c 12, which provided remedy 
for a particular kind of barrator, the one who abetted false appeals.  
2.2.2.1 EXTORTION 
 Other than the abovementioned case under the reign of Henry III of the Winchester 
jurors who had formed a sort of criminal enterprise to prevent the prosecution of thieves who 
robbed foreign merchants for a share in the spoils, the first case of abuse of criminal justice 
for an economic purpose was brought by the writ of conspiracy. In Gilbert vs Hugh Ragun 
and others (1281) 55 SS 76, pl 55, the plaintiff complained that the defendants “conspirators 
and confederates together for saving and condemning whom they willed in assizes, juries 
and inquisitions, wherefore… [they] by their aforesaid confederacy falsely and maliciously 
indict the aforesaid Gilbert of the aforesaid death and of certain other trespasses, because he 
refused to pay blackmail, and on account of this procure his arrest and imprisonment.”243 
Likewise, in 1302, the infamous Company of the Pouche was formed when the sheriff of 
Northampton “made a confederacy with several others of the county, that some of them 
should indict persons, and the others save them, for bribes, according as the same sheriff 
should arrange the panels,” that is, some would indict innocent people, while others would 
save them on payment of blackmail.244  
 Sometimes, however, extortion was more of an opportunistic affair. In Rex v. Robert 
de Herle Hilary (1299) 58 SS 84, pl 5, it was manifested that the defendant, having desired 
                                                 
242 For instance, the Ordinance of the Forest 1306 (34 Edw 1 c1) refers to those indictments made “upon the 
Command of one or perhaps two of the Foresters, or upon the Command of one or perhaps two of the Verderers; 
who from hatred or otherwise maliciously, that they may extort Money from some one, do accuse or indict 
whom they will; and thereupon do follow grievous Attachments, and the innocent Man is punished, who hath 
incurred no Fault or Offence at all” (ad d[i]c[tu]m unius, vel forsan duo[rum] de viridariis, qui ex odio, aut alias 
maliciose, ut ab aliquo pecuniam extorqueant, quenq[ue]m accusant vel indictant, & exinde sequnt[ur] 
attachiamenta g[ra]via, & punit[ur] innocens quem nulla om[n]nio culpla seu delictum constringit).  
243 Cf. the oath of the juror “to accuse conspirators who have unlawfully procured that a guilty person shall be 
saved, or that an innocent person shall be indicted at such inquests” (Mirror Bk I, c 13), as well as the articles 
of the Eyre abovementioned.  
244 Nichols, Britton, I, 38, n (1). 
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for a long time to get a manor, and having learned that a felony had been committed in which 
the owner of the manor could be involved, “he immediately procured her malicious 
indictment.” After she had made a security promising to enfeoffing him of the said manor 
against a fine of two hundred marks, he “falsely, maliciously and by conspiracy procured a 
certain false inquisition of his confederates. And by that false inquisition the same… was 
falsely acquitted and released.” 
2.2.2.2 WRONGDOING 
 Most of the cases in which the writ of conspiracy was brought for corrupt criminal 
proceedings have less to do less with economic incentives, and more with the venting of 
personal grudges by either inciting or bringing false accusations. In this sense, during this 
early stage, the writ was used for all varieties of formal accusations instituting criminal 
proceedings in a court of law, as well as imputations of offences out of court.  
 As for false indictments, in William Belle v Hugh le Cornwaleys and others (1298) 
58 SS 61, pl 35, the plaintiff complained that the defendants “by the conspiracy and 
confederacy made between them falsely and maliciously procured the indictment of the 
said… [plaintiff] for divers robberies and burglaries of houses before the lord king's coroners 
and bailiffs,” and also that after being imprisoned for that accusation, the defendants had tried 
to fabricate evidence by putting the things he was supposed to have stolen in his house. Both 
things were found by the jury who also found that it was all done “by the hatred and malice 
he had towards” him.245 In this case it seemed that the defendants were not indicting jurors, 
but rather procuring them. The case of Thomas Piroun v. Adam of Walden (1298) 58 SS 80-
1, pl 48 illustrates how this procurement was done. According to the plaintiff, Adam of 
Walden, “by means of the conspiracy and confederacy maliciously made between him and a 
certain Adam Prat and by the gifts and promises which they made to twelve jurors of 
Loveden, abetted and procured those twelve to indict the aforesaid Thomas at the sheriff's 
turn… for thefts, robberies, murders and other crimes.” 
In other cases, it was probable that the defendants were the indicting jurors 
themselves. Thus, in Simon Typet and Alice his wife v. John Amy (1298) 58 SS 63, pl 36, the 
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allegation was that the defendant “by his conspiracy and confederacy indicted the aforesaid 
Alice of divers thefts.” In Nicholas of Thornton v. Peter Ivel and others (1299) 58 SS 86, pl 
52, the defendants were said to have, “by the conspiracy and confederacy made between them 
at Lincoln, indicted the aforesaid… constable of the castle of the aforesaid town, of 
harbouring thieves.” 
 In addition to false indictments, there were also cases of abetment of false appeals. 
Hence, in Nicholas of Thornton v. John of Romsey and others (1294) 58 SS 34-35, pl 16, the 
plaintiff alleged that John of Romsey and the others “maliciously and by their conspiracy 
made a confederation together and for their bribe they prevailed upon a certain… an 
approver… to appeal the aforesaid Nicholas of harbouring… companion… the approver.” 
Similarly, in Ralph de Bylesfeld v. William of Oakham (1297) 58 SS 49, pl 27, it was said 
that the defendant “procured by his conspiracy and the confederacy made between him and 
a certain Agnes Chaumpeneys of… and through his bribes to the same Agnes that she should 
appeal” the plaintiff. In the case of the Prior of St. Neots v. Warin son of Warin (1297) 58 SS 
50 pl, 28, among other things, Warin had “procured a certain Denise of Weald to sue a writ 
of rape before the lord king against that prior, and the aforesaid Warin purchased that writ in 
that Denise's name. And he handed it over publicly in the county court of Huntingdon and 
there announced that a certain appeal was made against that prior.” 
 Writs of conspiracy were also brought for incitation of accusations of lesser offences 
as well as of felonies. In Robert del Hul v. Ralph Elsy and William le met (1297) 58 SS 53, 
pl 30, the plaintiff complained that “by the conspiracy and confederacy made between them 
procured a certain William the chaplain of Burnham and John son of Hervey of Burnham 
falsely and maliciously to present before the sheriff at his turn… [that the defendant] was 
said to have ploughed up with his plough a great part of the lord king's highway.” In Gilbert, 
prior of St. Catherine's without Lincoln v. Thomas of Exton (1301) 58 SS 106-7, pl 62, the 
defendant along with another, “by the conspiracy and confederacy maliciously made between 
them… falsely and maliciously leagued themselves together that they would give the 
treasurer and barons of the lord king's exchequer.. to understand that the same prior levied 
the lord king's aforesaid money by means of a certain roll containing a great sum of money, 
and he rendered his account of his aforesaid receipts at the aforesaid exchequer by a certain 
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other roll, containing in it five hundred marks fewer, and he kept the said five hundred marks 
in his own possession in deceit of the lord king's court.” 
 Similarly, there were cases of accusations of ecclesiastical offences. Thus, in Prior of 
St. Neots v. Warin son of Warin (1297) 58 SS 50, pl 28, among other wrongs, the defendant 
was said to have accused the prior of incontinence before the bishop of Lincoln. Likewise, in 
the case of Adam de Whytine and Johanna his wife v. Thomas son of Stephen of Blyth and 
Robert of Burton (1300) 55 SS 95, pl 55, “through the conspiracy and confederacy made 
between them”, the defendants presented that the plaintiff had committed adultery for which 
she was cited before the visitor of the archbishop of York. And in 1301, someone sued two 
parsons for conspiracy on the grounds of a previous false suit in an ecclesiastical court.246 
 Finally, the writ of conspiracy was used to remedy mere imputations of offences out 
of court which amounted to raising false reports or rumors. In Prior of St. Neots v. Warin son 
of Warin (1297) 58 SS 50-1, pl 28, Warin had made a conspiracy with another, and “by 
reason of the aforesaid conspiracy announced and proclaimed and caused the aforesaid 
William and Adam to proclaim through the whole countryside that the aforesaid prior” had 
publicly expressed his support to the French king. In William de la Hoke v. master Clement 
of Patcham and others (1298) 58 SS 63-64, pl 37, the defendants “by conspiracy and 
confederacy made between them... up a certain letter for the purpose of accusing the aforesaid 
William of homicides, thefts and harbourings of thieves,” and sent that letter to the king who 
ordered his imprisonment thereof. In Master John de Tybetot v. Humphrey Cryketot and 
others (1298) 58 SS 82, pl 49, the defendants were accused of “by the conspiracy and 
confederacy made between… [making] a malicious imputation against the same master John 
that he had in contempt of the lord king excommunicated the lord king's bailiff.” As a 
consequence of this accusation, the bailiff complained before the auditor of having been 
improperly excommunicated by the plaintiff.  
It should be noted that some of these cases where there is a false imputation of an 
offence such as it would bring the defendant before a court of law are described as defamation 
or slander. Thus, in the case of Prior of St. Neots v. Warin son of Warin (1297) 58 SS 50, pl 
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28, the spreading of false rumors that the plaintiff was expressing his support to the king of 
France was said to be a “slander [which] reached the council of the lord king of England and 
the barons of his exchequer, wherefore the lord king conceived a mighty indignation against 
that prior.” In Adam de Whytine and Johanna his wife v. Thomas son of Stephen of Blyth and 
Robert of Burton (1300) 55 SS 95, pl 55, the defendants were said to have “defamed… 
Johanna… with respect to… adultery,” and the defendants defended that “Johanna was never 
defamed, harassed or oppressed through their conspiracy, but through common rumour.” In 
Gilbert, prior of St. Catherine's without Lincoln v. Thomas of Exton (1301) 58 SS 106, pl 62, 
a false information of embezzlement was considered a “disgrace and slander.” 
 Most of the cases in which criminal proceedings are instituted by formal accusation 
include allegations of the imprisonment of the plaintiff as a consequence of it, usually until 
he could clear himself.247 Though there is no direct allegation of vexation in any of these 
cases, that of Stephen of Holderness v. Robert Mengy and William Mareny (1294) 58 SS 18, 
pl 7, cannot be described except in that way. There, the plaintiff complained that the 
defendant, a bailiff, not only had procured that he was convicted of a false indictment of 
trespass, but had also procured him to be falsely sued, and attached him to appear for an 
inquisition only to find out later that he was not impaneled for the same. In addition to harm, 
the complainants also alleged economic loss as a consequence of the unlawful prosecution248 
 As already suggested, the word malice, which along with falsely invariably appears 
in these cases of false accusation, could evoke different frames according to the context. That 
within this one it profiles the concept of evil intent arising of ill will or hatred against the 
background of justification of prosecution is evidenced by these cases in which there is 
specific reference to the concept. Thus, in Ralph de Bylesfeld v. William of Oakham (1297) 
58 SS 49, pl 27, it was explained by the plaintiff that the defendant was in debt to him, and 
that “in order to avoid payment of the same debt procured by his conspiracy and the 
confederacy made between him and a certain” woman that this should appeal the plaintiff of 
                                                 
247 55 SS 76, pl 55; 58 SS 34, pl 16; 58 SS 61,62, pl 35; 58 SS 63, pl 36; 58 SS 63, pl 37, though there is a false 
report because of which criminal proceedings are instated; likewise, 58 SS 82, pl 49; 55 SS 86, pl 52. 
248 58 SS 18, pl 7; 58 SS 54, pl 16; 58 SS 49, pl 27; 58 SS 49, pl 27; 58 SS 52, pl 29; 58 SS 53, pl 30; 58 SS 63, 
pl 36; 58 SS 63, pl 37; 58 SS 73, pl 43; 55 SS 80, pl 47; 58 SS 82, pl 49; 55 SS 86, pl 52; 55 SS 95, pl 55; 58 
SS 106, pl 62. 
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homicide, and that this was a “conspiracy made in malice.” The Prior of St. Neots explained 
in his suit that the mother of the defendant had been amerced in his court several times, and 
that the he had prayed him to remit these amercements. And that since he refused to remit 
them, the defendant entered into a conspiracy with two others and “procured them to harass… 
[him] as much they could.”249 The prior of St. Catherine’s without Lincoln complained that 
the defendant, “for the purpose of altogether destroying that prior and his aforesaid house, 
falsely and maliciously leagued” with others to falsely inform about him to the Exchequer. 
The jury indeed found that “by malice aforethought and prearranged conspiracy between [the 
defendant and another] … sent word to various rectors of churches in those parts that those 
rectors should agree with [them]… and join themselves with them to prosecute and maintain 
the said conspiracy and malice prearranged between them, to the end that they might destroy 
the aforesaid prior and his house even as the same prior had previously destroyed them.”250 
 Sometimes the defendants reply having a good cause for suspicion. In his action, John 
de Tybetot argued that, because he had refused to supply the defendant with corn, “by the 
conspiracy and confederacy made” with others, the latter “made a malicious imputation 
against” him.251 Adam de Whytine argued in his suit that the defendants had accused him of 
adultery with one Johanna with the intention to cause them “to expend their goods and endure 
undue toil and trouble.” The defendant replied that she “was never defamed… through their 
conspiracy, but through common rumour.”252 Similarly, in William Belle v. Hugh le 
Cornwaleys and others (1298) 58 SS 61-62, pl 35, it was defended that “it was common 
rumour throughout all the district that the aforesaid William was guilty of thefts, as is 
aforesaid, and for that cause he was arrested and not by their conspiracy.” The jury, however 
found that “Hugh le Cornwaleys by the hatred and malice he had towards the aforesaid 
William Belle procured the indictment of the same William for the aforesaid robberies and 
other felonies, and afterwards he put a certain charter in that William's bed, saying that the 
same William had stolen the aforesaid charter.” And Adam of Walden defended the writ 
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brought by Thomas Piroun arguing that “it was common rumour of the countryside that the 
aforesaid Thomas was a thief and housebreaker, for which reason he was indicted in due 
manner by the aforesaid dozen before the sheriff at his aforesaid turn and not by his 
conspiracy or false confederacy.”  
 In most of these cases, the party bringing the suit had been previously acquitted of 
the offence falsely charged upon them. In one case, it was defended that the plaintiff “does 
not say in his plaint that he went away acquitted of the aforesaid appeal before the justices or 
in any other way in form of law,” to which the court agreed.253 Likewise, in another case it 
was successfully defended that the complaint about a false presentment should not be 
answered because the defendants “were indeed presentors before the aforesaid sheriff and 
presented the aforesaid presentment against him, which still stands unchanged.”254 
2.2.2.3 DISTURBANCE OF RIGHT, EXTORTION AND WRONGDOING 
 That disturbance of right, extortion and wrongdoing were connected with judicial 
corruption both of civil and criminal proceedings is evidenced by the oaths that the legal 
agencies involved in them had to take. Already in Anglo-Saxon law the accuser’s foreoath 
said that “by the Lord, I accuse not N either for hatred or for envy, or for unlawful lust of 
gain; nor know I anything soother; but as my informant to me said, and I myself in sooth 
believe” (2 HEL 108, Stephen). The Statute of Exeter255 provided that the oath of the juror 
of the Grand Inquest should be “I will truth say, and nothing conceal, nor suffer to be 
concealed nor suppress before you, for Promise or Gift, for Terrour or Doubt, nor for Affinity 
or Alliance, nor for Love or Hatred, nor by others abetting or procuring.”256 In the Statute for 
Oaths of the King's Officers, the sheriff had to swear that “I will not leave [right and reason] 
for Rich nor for Poor, neither for Love nor for [Gain '] but I will lawfully do it.”257 The Oath 
                                                 
253 58 SS 49, pl 27. 
254 58 SS 53, pl 30, 54. 
255 This and the following statutes are classified by the Statutes of the Realm as of uncertain date; I therefore 
only provide their title, but no date or regnal year.  
256 “Jeo dirrai v[er]ite e rien ne concelerai ne soffai estre celee ne murdrai devaunt v[ous] p[ur] p[ro]messe, 
doun, ne tremour, ne doute ne affinite, ne aliaunce, ne am[our], ne haine, ne p[ar] aut[er] abet, ou 
p[ro]curement.” 
257 “E ceo ne lerrai [right and reason] pur Riche ne pur puore ne pur amour ne pur haunge, qe leaument nel 
fray.” 
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of the Sheriff pledged that “lawfully and rightfully you will treat the People of your 
Bailiwick, and to every one you will do right, as well to the Poor as the Rich, in that which 
to you belongeth to do: And that for Gift, nor for Promise, nor for Favour, nor for Hate, you 
will not do wrong to any, nor disturb the Right of another.”258 According to the Form of the 
Oath of those of the King’s Council (uncertain date), these councilors had to swear that “you 
will not leave for any Man, for Love, nor Hatred, for good Will, nor for ill Will, but that you 
will cause to be done to every one, of what Estate or Condition soever lie be, Right and 
Reason, according to your Power and Knowledge; And that of none will you take any Thing 
for doing of Wrong or delaying of Right.”259 Escheators swore that “for Gift, nor for Promise, 
nor for Favor nor Hate, you will not do Wrong to any, nor the Right of another will you 
disturb” (The Oath of the Escheators)260. Finally, Mayors and Bailiffs promised that “for 
Greatness nor for Riches, nor for Gift, nor for Promise nor for Favour, nor for Hate, you will 
not do Wrong to any; that you will disturb no Right” (The Oath of Mayors and Bailiffs).261 
2.2.2.4 GENEALOGY OF THE WRIT OF CONSPIRACY AS APPLIED TO WRONGDOING 
 One more thing needs to be said about this use of the writ of conspiracy to remedy 
wrongful prosecution. On close inspection, the similarities with 13 Edw 1 c 12 are striking, 
thus suggesting that the writ of conspiracy was a conceptual blend between the frame of 
conspiracy as encoded in the Edwardian legislation, and that statute.  
 Indeed, 13 Edw 1 c 12 refers to those who incite accusations out of ill will as those 
who, “through Malice intending to grieve other, do procure false Appeals to be made of 
Homicides and other Felonies by Appellors,” or “by whose Abetment or Malice,” or “Abettor 
through Malice.” It provides remedy “having respect to the Imprisonment or Arrestment that 
the Party appealed hath sustained by reason of such Appeals, and to the Infamy that they have 
incurred by the Imprisonment or otherwise.” And it requires that those “being appealed of 
                                                 
258 “Loiaument & a droiture auxibien a poure come a riche, en ce qe a vous appent  afaire; et q[e] por doun ne 
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ne p[re]ndrez pur tort faire ne droit delaier.” 
260 “Pur don[e], ne pur promis, ne pur favor, ne haire, tort ne feres a nully, ne auter droiture ne distourbere.” 
261 “Pour hautesse, ne pour richesse, ne pour don, ne pour promis, ne poir favor, ne pour haier, tort ne faires a 
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Felony surmised upon him, doth acquit himself in the Kings Court in due Manner, either at 
the Suit of the Appellor, or of our Lord the King, the Justices.”  
 It could be said that this use of the writ of conspiracy expanded the narrower focus of 
13 Edw 1 c 12, which was limited to criminal proceedings by false appeals. Indeed, the 
overlapping between the two actions in case of procurement of false appeal was not missed 
by defendants who pleaded it to bar the action. In 58 SS 34, 35, pl 16, where the complaint 
was that the defendants had by their conspiracy bribed an approver to appeal the plaintiff of 
harboring criminals, the former said “that he ought not to be answered on this writ, because 
they say that that plea is a plea of abetment and sounds more in abetment than in conspiracy 
and, inasmuch as the aforesaid Nicholas can have his recovery by writ of abetment which is 
more suitable to his case.” 
 Indeed, if we go further back in the genealogy of this action, it is evident that 13 Edw 
1 c 12 was conceptually related to the writ of odio et atia, which provided remedy for false 
imprisonment upon appeals or indictments out of ill will, and with the action of defamation, 
both in Ecclesiastical and local courts, which remedied the false imputation of offences for 
which canonical purgation might ensue.262 I will discuss now the way in which all of these 
laws relate to the frame of justification of prosecution.  
2.2.2.5 WRONGFUL PROSECUTION AND JUSTIFICATION 
Through the writ of conspiracy, a remedy was offered for false accusations and false 
imprisonments. Since this remedy paralleled those offered by the statute 13 Edw 1 c 12, the 
writ of odio et atia, and the action for defamation in ecclesiastical and local courts, it is 
palpable that litigants drew on these actions as models for the writ, creating a blend between 
the writ of conspiracy and them—in this sense, we should recall that the prototypical meaning 
of this writ would be agreements to bring and/or support false pleas for profit, in disturbance 
of right. Thus, the resulting offence was something like the making or inciting by agreement 
of false accusations out of ill will and without just cause as a consequence of which innocent 
people are imprisoned and aggrieved.  How are we to understand this wrong in more abstract 
                                                 
262 At this time, people who had been indicted and acquitted could bring actions for defamation against the 
indicting jurors in ecclesiastical courts; Plucknett, Concise, 127. 
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terms? In other words, how are we to classify this wrong as remedied by the law of 
conspiracy? 
 One way to frame this offence is as one against the administration of justice. We can 
understand it as an abuse or perversion of justice, that is, as a misapplication or misuse of the 
process of law to produce an effect other than that intended by it. Most of the historiography 
of the medieval conspiracy takes this view about the offence of conspiracy, emphasizing that 
criminal process is being used for a purpose other than the administration of justice, rather 
than the wrongful purpose itself.263 Within this view, the wrong itself is not the harm caused 
to the party, but a more abstract one against public justice, or against the state. And it implies 
that one has a right to do something or an office that can be misused.  
 However, another way to put it, in more general terms, is as the commission of a 
wrong against an individual without justification. Indeed, it can be argued that a false 
imprisonment is a wrong against the individual freedom, that a false accusation is a wrong 
against the person’s reputation, and that the accusation, particularly when it is of felony, 
when successful, is indeed a wrong against life and property as his land and chattels escheat 
to his lord or to the king in defect of the latter. I will argue that the medieval law took the 
second view rather than the first, that there was no emphasis on the abstract notion of abuse 
of justice but rather on the wrongs committed through justice. And this is consistent with the 
fact that these conducts were remedied through actions as wrongs for which individuals 
sought compensation.  
The expression ex odio presupposes the frame of justifiable homicide, which in turn 
is embedded within the theological model of homicide. Within this model, the starting point 
should be an absolute prohibition of committing homicide as prescribed by God’s law. With 
that starting point we find that there are situations that immediately need to be justified. This 
is particularly true of the fact that human justice involves the exercise of capital punishment. 
Thus, those involved in the administration of justice not only commit or are accomplices of 
homicide, but can all be presumed to have an intention to cause the death of somebody by 
the mere fact of being involved in it. The solution to this moral problem is to consider that 
                                                 
263 “Ancient conspirators are those who combine, and so far they resemble their present descendants. But 
combine to do what? In effect to abuse legal procedure,” Winfield, Conspiracy, 2. 
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the administration of justice is a justified situation in which a person can intend and bring 
about the death of another for the sake of justice.264 
But this then raises the question as to when this justification does not hold. It is here 
where motives matter. Bracton tells us that when one commits homicide in the administration 
of justice it is not justified “if done out of malice or from pleasure in the shedding of human 
blood [and] though the accused is lawfully slain, he who does the act commits a mortal sin 
because of his evil purpose.”265 By contrast, when it “is done from a love of justice, the judge 
does not sin in condemning him to death, nor in ordering an officer to slay him, nor does the 
officer sin if when sent by the judge he kills the condemned man.”266 And he further adds 
that “both sin if they act in this way when proper legal procedures have not been observed.”267 
(Bracton, II, 340). Thus, we have that the lawfulness of the legal homicide depends on the 
motives of those involved in the administration of justice, whether they pursue justice for its 
own sake, or whether they instead act out of ill will and blood thirst. Likewise, to be lawful, 
the homicide must be under due process of law, and a summary execution will not be lawful 
even if it is pursued to advance justice. Furthermore, it should be noted that this intention to 
cause the death of somebody by these motives is qualified as a corrupt intention. Another 
term to refer to that concept is the term malice.  
The more general problem that lies behind this problem of homicide is that the 
administration of justice involves causing several harms such as arresting, imprisoning, and 
                                                 
264 In Bracton’s classification of homicides, one heading is homicide “in the administration of justice, as when 
a judge or officer kills one lawfully found guilty,” Bracton, II, 340. The frame of justifiable homicide can also 
be viewed within the context of the rise of royal criminal justice and the slow but sure displacement of the 
traditional systems of blood feuds and compositions as a way of dealing with crime. It can be argued that hatred 
and greed were two of the emotions that were at the basis of this system as it was designed to quench the thirst 
of blood with money. The Church condemnation of these emotions might be but an attempt to purify the new 
system of justice springing from God itself from the remnants of a pagan past. It was also a way to prevent that 
Godly justice, as delegated upon the king as his vicar, would relapse into the old ways. An accuser now was a 
representative of that justice and could not be seeking revenge and blood, nor be encouraged by the expectation 
that land would escheat into his hands. Rather, they should act in discharge of their duty to prosecute criminals 
and do justice and only with reference to the legal process. 
265 “Si sit ex livore vel delectatione effundendi humanum sanguinem, licet ille iuste occidatur, iste tamen peccat 
mortaliter propter intentionem corruptam.” 
266 “Si vero hoc fiat ex amore iustitiae, nec peccat iudex ipsum condemnando ad mortem, et praecipiendo 
ministro ut occidat eum, nec minister si missus a iudice occidit condemnatum.” 
267 “Peccat uterque si hoc fecerit iuris ordine non servato.” 
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punishing persons. In that sense, it can be said that all prosecutions are wrongful, the 
difference being that when the defendant is justified then it would be damnum absque inuria. 
Therefore, any action in furtherance of the same can be presumed to have an intention to 
cause harm, and can only be justified with reference to the motives that move those who carry 
out these actions, as when prosecutors and other trial officers seek revenge or profit.  
 In the example above, Bracton talks about cases in which there is a just conviction. 
As we see, this is not enough for justifying a legal infliction of harm. There must be a rightful 
mind as well; it cannot be for the wrong reason. What about the cases in which there is an 
unjust prosecution and/or conviction? Then, this state of mind would inevitably become part 
of the standard of error as well. Harm caused by error would only be justified if done in 
pursuance of justice, and would become liable if springing from that evil heart. Indeed, we 
would then be talking about a true miscarriage of justice and not of an error.268  
We find this frame of justifiable harm invoked both in ecclesiastical and secular laws 
regulating the conduct of accusers. Thus, the Constitution Auctoritate dei patris which 
created defamation, provided for the excommunication of all who “for the sake of hatred, 
profit or favour, or for whatsoever other cause, maliciously impute a crime to any person,”269 
rendering defamation dependent upon the motives of the defamer. The same requirement that 
reports are not out of hatred and with just cause appears in the process of canonical purgation: 
“the fame must be public; private opinion would not suffice. It must be held as the opinion 
of trustworthy persons; the opinions of one’s enemies of habitual perjurers did not count. 
And there must be some real suspicion of crime; idle rumour was not enough.”270 
Likewise, with the writ of odio et atia, the pre-trial action that allowed prisoners to 
challenge their accusers on the grounds that they had made their accusations out of hatred 
and spite relied on the frame of justifiable wrong. This writ has been suggested to be as old 
                                                 
268 It might be argued that this is the case of the abovementioned Auctoritati dei patris, but the truth of the 
imputation was never admitted as a defense against the action of defamation in Ecclesiastical courts. So, even 
in the accusation was true, the action stood; R. H. Helmholz, The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
from 597 to the 1640s., vol. 1 of The Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 582-3. 
269 Ib., 572. 
270 R. H. Helmholz, Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (London: Selden Society, 1985), xxiii. 
114 
 
as the reign of Henry II, but the earliest evidence goes back to the beginnings of John’s 
reign.271 The writ reached its maturity in the thirteenth century, but its use declined in the 
next century, and it became an antiquity until early modern commentators decided to unearth 
it as part of Magna Carta.272 The main purpose of the writ seemed to be the release of 
prisoners pending trial at the next eyre273 or as Bracton puts it, “but since it is iniquitous that 
the innocent as well as the guilty be kept in prison for a long time, therefore, at the doleful 
plaint of kinsmen and friends and by grace of the lord king, an inquest is ordinarily made as 
to whether such persons imprisoned for homicide were guilty of the said death or not, that is, 
whether they were appealed because of hate and spite.”274 The accusations being challenged 
could be either in the form of appeals or indictments.275 Though it seems that it was not 
limited to accusations of homicide, it also seems that this was the most common form of the 
writ.276 It is unclear whether the writ was cursory or not.277 The writs commanded the sheriff 
to make an inquisition278  whether the accused “ was accused (or ‘appealed’) of that death 
because of hate and spite or because he is guilty thereof. And if because of hate and spite, 
                                                 
271 Winfield, Conspiracy, 17; Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 4. 
272 Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 6-8; Winfield, Conspiracy, 21-22 
273  Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 2, 7. Cf. Winfield, Conspiracy, 21-24; Winfield ventured that the purpose of the writ 
was neither to release prisoners pending trial, nor to quash unwarranted appeals, but mainly to allow appellees 
to avoid trial by battle and put themselves before a sworn inquest. Indeed, Winfield suggested that the writ de 
odio et atia manifested the royal dislike of the appeal procedure and how its inquisition procedure was a 
stepping stone that paved the way for resorting to jury trial after 1215. More recently, Susanne Jenks has argued 
that scholars like Winfield believed that the purpose of the Writ had initially been to challenge and put an end 
to the appeal procedure, and that after 1215, the main purpose was to release prisoners pending trial. The 
problem is that these scholars did not distinguish between two contemporary procedures: the writ of odio et atia 
and the plea odio et atia to the appeal after the prisoner had made answer to the charge. The purpose of the writ 
was clearly to release prisoners before trial, but the purpose of the plea of odio et atia to an appeal was to quash 
it, thus ending the procedure. Consequently, when these scholars thought to be talking about the writ of 
conspiracy before 1215, they were probably talking about the exception instead; Jenks, "Odio et atia," 3-4.  
274 Bracton II, 346: “Sed quoniam iniquum est quod innocentes sicut illi qui criminosi sunt diu inclusi 
detineantur in carcere, ideo ad lacrimosam querelam parentum et amicorum, de gratia domini regis fieri solet 
inquisitio, utrum huiusmodi imprisonati pro morte hominis culpabiles essent de morte illa vel non, et utrum 
appellati essent odio vel atya.” 
275 Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 2, 4; Winfield, Conspiracy, 19-20. 
276 Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 6; Winfield, Conspiracy, 19. 
277 Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 5; Winfield, Conspiracy, 20. 
278 This very procedure was very soon perverted and provisions had to be adopted to prevent Sheriffs too willing 
to help prisoners from impaneling biased jurors; Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 4; Winfield, Conspiracy, 21. 
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because of what hate and what spite and who is guilty thereof”.279 If the inquisition taken 
before the sheriff found against the accuser, a writ was issued to the sheriff to bail the accused 
once he had found sureties that they would come to court to stand trial. A verdict finding no 
hatred or spite, by contrast, meant the accused remained in prison until trial.280  
Regarding the question posed to the jury, that is, whether the accused was appealed 
because of hate and spite or because he was guilty, this can be interpreted in two ways. If we 
think of the conjunction as having an exclusive value, then the finding of one implies the 
negation of the other. But it can also be interpreted coordinately as requiring both, in which 
case the jury would have to establish two questions: whether the appeal was improper, and 
whether the accused was innocent. However, I think the most plausible interpretation is that 
by culpabilis in this context, the writ did not refer to the question of guilt but to that of 
suspicion. We should remember that in the medieval mindset an accusation to which the 
appellor swore was half a conviction, and that the line between suspicion and guilt was very 
fine. That is why an instance of the jury verdict could be that the prisoner “non est culpabilits 
de morte predicta, set quod tali odio et atia appellatum.”281 It is also the reason why some 
variants of the formula found in the exceptions were “utrum ipse appellat per hanc atiam et 
per hoc odium an justa causa et quia inde culpabilis sit282  or  “si ipsi sunt culpabilits de morte 
illa et si appellum istud factum sit per odium et athiam an justa causa.”283 In these phrases, 
culpabilis appears as the opposite of odium an justa causa. That is, the accusation was 
brought not in pursuit of justice and without a reasonable cause. In other words, the question 
was whether there were grounds or cause to prosecute the accused or not, and whether the 
accuser acted in pursuance of justice. Furthermore, in Bracton’s definition, there were yet 
two more questions for the jury to establish in case odio et atia was detected: “And if because 
                                                 
279 Bracton II, 347: “Rettatus sit vel appellatus de morte illa odio et atya vel eo quod inde culpabilis sit. Et si 
odio et atya, quo odio et qua atya, vel quis inde culpabilis sit.” Initially, the writ did not include the issue of the 
innocence of the accused, but it then became the standard form in the thirteenth century; Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 
4; Winfield, Conspiracy, 15-16. 
280  Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 2, 6; Winfield, Conspiracy, 16. It is likely that this inquiry into innocence made 
Winfield believe that this was a forerunner of the jury trial. 
281 C 144/3/1 cit. in Jenks, n. (53) 17. 
282 Calendar of Close Rolls IV, 264-5; cit. in Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 18, n (49). 
283 Calendar of Close Rolls VII, 49-50, cit. in Jenks, “Odio et atia,” 18, n. (49). 
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of hate and spite, because of what hate and what spite and who is guilty thereof”.284  This 
further inquest cannot but mean that the jury had to find what the reason of the enmity 
between accuser and accused was, that is, whether there was any dispute or conflict pending 
between them. 
Finally, since in the thirteenth century trial jurors were drawn out of the indicting 
jury, judges were advised to inquire about the way the jurors informed themselves, because 
they sometimes found out that “many scandalous things may be discovered. It sometimes 
happens that a lord accuses his tenant, or causes him to be indicted and a crime imputed to 
him, through a greedy desire to secure his land in demesne, or one neighbour accuses another 
through hatred and the like.”285 Thus, motives similar to those that disqualified an appellor, 
constituted the grounds to challenge indicting jurors to become trial jurors.286 
2.2.2.6 HOMICIDE IN WILL 
 In conclusion, there is plenty of evidence that contemporaries understood 
imprisonment and other parts of the legal process as wrongs inflicted through the machinery 
of justice. In those cases where the defendants could not deny having brought a false 
accusation, the fundamental question was whether they had a justification for committing 
such wrongs. Motive and purpose were thus central, for according to the theory, one is 
justified if one does so for the sake of justice and not because of personal grudge. The 
standard defense in these cases is having a reasonable cause of suspicion, such as that it was 
public fama that the accused had committed a crime. This defense, however, does not 
necessarily deny ill will. One can act upon some factual reasonable ground, and still hate the 
accused person. Thus, rather than implying, the law presumes that when there is a reasonable 
                                                 
284 “Et si odio et atya, quo odio et qua atya, vel quis inde culpabilis sit,” Bracton II, 347. 
285 “Multæ inveniri poterunt inconvenientiæ. Evenit quidem quandoque quod dominus tenentem suum indictat, 
vel indictare facit et ei crimen imponi ob cupiditatem terram suam habendi in dominico, vel vicinus vicino 
propter odium et huiusmodi,” Bracton II, 404. 
286 Jenks takes this passage to be referring to exceptions of odio et atia in indictments “in order to prevent 
unjustified accusations from being made in the first place,” but there is no indication that if judges found an 
indictment suspicious the indictment was quashed and the prisoner released. Rather, the process of challenging 
is aimed “ut ad iudicium securius procedatur et ut periculum et suspicio tollatur;” This interpretation is indeed 
consistent with Jenks’s further illustration that the exception was not always available in a case where “an 
indicted person is acquitted because the people he was supposed to have killed were all still alive and because 
the jury found out, quod indictatus fuit odio et atia et per abettum,” Jenks, “Odio et atia,”12, n. (14). 
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ground for suspicion the accusing party was acting for the sake of justice and not out of 
malice. 
 Thus, from this point of view, the false accusation of felony can also be considered 
as a form of homicide, or as an attempt of homicide when the accusation fails. Put in other 
words, be a homicide under color of law. There is some evidence of this view in 
contemporary authors. The talionic punishment for the Roman crimen calumniae which 
visited the accuser with the wrong he had intended on the accused, on the basis of which 
Bracton reinterprets the procedure by appeal, also attests to this view of the false accusation 
as an attempt of murder: “if the appellor is vanquished let him be committed to gaol to be 
punished as a false accuser (but he will lose neither life nor members, though according to 
the laws he would be liable to the talionic penalty if he had failed in his proof.”287 The Mirror 
of Justices classifies as homicides in will those: 
who torture a man so that he confesses to a mortal sin he has not committed, and, to 
alleviate torment, preferring death, falsely confess a felony… [and] those who are 
brought to their end by the records of coroners or justices… also false jurors, false 
witnesses, and those who appeal others or defame them by indictment, or otherwise 
accuse persons falsely so that it is not their fault that death does not follow… [also] 
those who imprison folk in such places, or put them in such pain, that it can be found 
by inquest that they were nearer death by such evil places or pains. In three ways was 
God killed, for Longinus killed him in fact with the others who hung or tortured him. 
By tongue or by word Pilate killed him, for he ordered his killing, and by will the 
false witness killed him, as did all those consenting thereto.288 
 Thus, he argues that “those who appealed or indict an innocent man of a mortal crime 
and do not prove their appeals or assertions… were formerly adjudged to death, but king 
Henry I ordained this mitigation, that they should be adjudged, not to death, but to corporal 
punishment.”289 Britton, likewise, argues that the offence of homicide “inasmuch as this 
felony may be committed under colour of judgment through malice of the judge, or under 
some other pretence, as by false physicians and bad surgeons, and by poison and sundry other 
ways, our pleasure is, that all those who have committed such secret felonies be indicted; and 
                                                 
287  “Si autem appellans victus fuerit, gaolæ committatur tamquam calumniator puniendus, sed nec vitam amittit 
neque membra, licet secundum leges ad talionem teneretur si in probatione deficeret,” Bracton, II, 386. 
288 Mirror bk I, c 9. 
289 Mirror bk I, c 16. 
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also those who falsely for hire, or in any other manner, have condemned, or caused to be 
condemned, any man to death by means of a false oath.”290 
 I should draw attention to the expressions homicide in will and secret felony used by 
the Mirror of Justices and Britton to describe this form of homicide. By them, they emphasize 
the mental element as the most important aspect in rendering certain conducts criminal. This 
is consistent with the idea of the wrongful prosecution as depending on the motives of the 
prosecutor.  
Furthermore, this view of the wrongful prosecution as a form of homicide can be seen 
in the way it brings forward premeditation, which is the distinctive aspect of murder, as one 
of the elements of the offence. Thus, in the case of Gilbert, prior of St. Catherine's without 
Lincoln v. Thomas of Exton (1301) 58 SS 106, pl 62, 106-7 it was alleged by the plaintiff that 
the defendants: 
by the conspiracy and confederacy maliciously made between … for the purpose of 
altogether destroying that prior and his aforesaid house, falsely and maliciously 
leagued themselves together that they would give the treasurer and barons of the lord 
king's exchequer at York on the Morrow of Michaelmas in the aforesaid year to 
understand that the same prior levied the lord king's aforesaid money by means of a 
certain roll containing a great sum of money, and he rendered his account of his 
aforesaid receipts at the aforesaid exchequer by a certain other roll, containing in it 
five hundred marks fewer, and he kept the said five hundred marks in his own 
possession in deceit of the lord king's court. 
 And the jury found that: 
by malice aforethought and prearranged conspiracy between them… sent word to 
various rectors of churches in those parts that those rectors should agree with that 
Thomas and Richard and join themselves with them to prosecute and maintain the 
said conspiracy and malice prearranged between them, to the end that they might 
destroy the aforesaid prior and his house even as the same prior had previously 
destroyed them, as the same Thomas and Richard asserted… Thomas and Richard, 
continuing their malice, gave the treasurer and barons of the exchequer to understand 
that the aforesaid prior had falsely and in deceit of the lord king and his court levied 
his money.291  
                                                 
290 “Et ceux ausi q[ue] fausement pur lower ou en autr[e] manere ou[n]t nul home dampne ou fait dampner a la 
mort p[ar] fauz serme[n]tz,” Britton, I, 14. 
291 58 SS 107-108. 
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2.2.3 SOLE DEFENDANT  
 Despite the allegation of conspiracy, most of the early cases brought under the new 
writ were actions against a sole defendant. This is in stark contrast with the narrow 
requirement of the latter form of action of conspiracy that there should be a plurality of 
defendants. And it suggests that cooperation was not considered part of the wrong nor 
aggravated it. The wrong is not the combination to bring a false accusation or to defraud 
someone of his property, but rather that these wrongs were committed by conspiracy. That 
is, these wrongs were committed by means of corruption and barratry. That is why there can 
be a sole defendant and that he can still allege conspiracy. Indeed, these statutes talk about 
conspirators rather than conspiracy in abstract terms. Conspirators are those corrupted or 
corrupting others, as well as the barrators. One can allege that the defendant disinherited or 
falsely accused him by corrupting a jury, or that a jury by corruption did falsely accuse or 
disinherit him.  
2.3 THE DEFINITION OF CONSPIRATORS 
 In 1305, the first trailbaston commission was issued by parliament ordering the 
trailbaston justices to try at the suit of the king those who disturb the peace intimidating jurors 
and retaining malefactors. The justices that visited York wrote a letter complaining that no 
serious indictment had been made as many of the serious offences were concealed “par 
procurement et aliaunces des genz du pais.” Corruption indeed seemed endemic in that part 
of the country, as the Yorkshire eyre of 1294 revealed “that there were son man and so 
influential maintainers of false plaints and champertors and conspirators leagued together to 
maintain any business whatsoever etc. that justice and truth are completely choked.” As a 
way to extend the insufficient commission and allow the justices to make inquiries into 
conspiracies, it is almost certain that the opportunity was seized to cast the new ordinance of 
conspirators, also known as the Definition of Conspirators, add it to the ordinance of 
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trailbaston, and send its transcript to the justices.292. The ordinance, as it appears in the 
Parliamentary Rolls,293 states the following: 
The ordinance concerning conspirators. 
Conspirators are those who make alliances 
among themselves by oath, agreement, or 
through some other bond, that each will help 
and support what the other undertakes in 
falsely and maliciously indicting or causing 
to be indicted, or falsely acquitting, people, 
or falsely initiating or supporting pleas, and 
also those who have children under age 
appeal people of felonies, through which 
they are imprisoned and greatly harmed, 
and those who retain men of their area by 
robes or payments, to support their evil 
undertakings and to suppress the truth, both 
those who take and those who give, and 
stewards and bailiffs of great lords who 
through lordship, office or power undertake 
to maintain or uphold pleas or disputes for 
parties, other than those which concern the 
estate of their lords or themselves. This 
ordinance and final definition of 
conspirators was made and definitively 
agreed by the king and his council in this 
parliament etc. And it is ordained that the 
justices appointed to hear and determine 
various trespasses and felonies in each 
county of England are to have a transcript of 
it etc.  
Ordinacio de conspiratoribus. Conspiratours 
sount ceux qui sentre alient par serment, 
covenaunt, ou par autre alliaunce, qe chescun 
eidra et sustendra autri emprise \de/ fausement 
de fausement et maliciousement enditer ou 
faire en diter, ou fausement acquiter les gentz, 
ou faussement mover plees ou meintenir, et 
auxi ceux qe fount enfauncz deincz age 
appeler la gent de felonies, par quei il sount 
emprisonez et moult grevez, et ceux qe 
receivent gentz de pais a leur robes ou a leur 
feez pur meintenir lour mauveis emprises et 
pur verite esteindre, auxi bien les pernours 
come les donours, et seneschaux et baillifs de 
grauntz seignurs qui per seigneurie, officie, ou 
poeir, enpernent ameintenir ou sustenir pleez 
ou baretz pur parties, autres qe celes que 
touchent lestat lour seignurs ou eux meismes. 
Ista ordinacio et finalis diffinicio 
conspiratorum facta fuit et finaliter 
concordata per regem et consilium suum in 
hoc parliamento etc. Et ordinatum est quod 
justiciarii assignati ad diversas 
transgressiones et felonias in singulis 
comitatibus Anglie audiendas et terminandas  
{Altered from 'terminendas' by a later 
hand}habeant inde transcriptum etc. 
  
 The version of this ordinance by the Statutes of the Realm, 33-34 Edw I (1305-6), 
includes a definition of champertors that appears in the printed copies, and which therefore 
                                                 
292 Harding, Conspiracy, 97; George Sayles, "The Dissolution of a Guild at York in 1306," The English 
Historical Review 55 (1940): 83-98, 85). Sayles presents the issuing of the new ordinance of conspirators and 
the commission of trailbaston as simultaneous, and aimed at the same purpose, but gives no indication of any 
causal relation between them. See also 58 SS liv.  
293 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1305, Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005), item 183.  
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can be a later addition, thus reflecting the belief that champerty and conspiracy are different 
offences: 
Champertors be they that move Pleas and 
Suits, or cause to be moved either by their 
own Procurement, or by others, and sue 
them at their proper Costs, for to have Part 
of the Land in variance, or Part of the Gains 
Campi Participes aunt qui per se vel per alios 
placita movent vel movere faciant;et ea suis 
sumptibus prosequuntur, ad campi patem, vel 
pro parte lucri habenda 
  The affirmation of the ordinance as the final Definition of Conspirators had led many 
commentators into believing that the purpose of the ordinance was to put an end to the 
uncertainty about the unknown substance of the offence of conspiracy and fix its meaning.294 
Considering that almost thirty years had passed between the first order to the justices in Eyre, 
and all the legislation and the case-law related to the writ of conspiracy, it would be more 
advisable to describe this ordinance as in the way of consolidation.  
 Indeed, these different bits and pieces, some statutory, some of judicial development, 
were combined and put together in this final Definition of Conspirators. Thus, part of the first 
clause relates to the order of the Eyre of 1278, to the ordinance of conspirators, and to the 
articles of the eyre: 
33 Edw 1 
(1305) 
Order of the Eyre of 
1278 
Vetera capitula Nova capitula Ordinance of 
Conspirators (1293) 
 Conspirators 
are those who 
make 
alliances 
among 
themselves 
by oath, 
agreement, or 
through some 
other bond, 
that each will 
help and 
support what 
the other 
undertakes… 
  Of those by 
Oaths bind 
themselves to 
support or defend 
the Parties, 
Quarrels and 
Businesses of 
their Friends and 
well-wishers, 
whereby Truth 
and Justice are 
stifled. 
Also of those who 
bind themselves 
by mutual Oaths, 
unjustly or justly 
to defend 
fraudulently Parts 
of Pleas or Suits 
affecting their 
Friends or Well-
wishers, as in 
Assises, Juries, 
Recognizances, 
whereby they 
cannot be 
convicted in such 
Concerning those who 
wish to make complaint 
about conspirators 
arranging for pleas to be 
initiated maliciously in 
the country, as brewers of 
discord, maliciously 
maintaining and 
sustaining those pleas 
and disputes at 
champerty or so that they 
might have some other 
advantage from it 
                                                 
294 Winfield, Conspiracy, 33; 3 HEL 403. Cf. Bryan, Conspiracy, 20. 
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falsely 
initiating or 
supporting 
pleas, 
Pleas or Suits 
according to the 
Truth 
Conspiratour
s sount ceux 
qui sentre 
alient par 
serment, 
covenaunt, 
ou par autre 
alliaunce, qe 
chescun eidra 
et sustendra 
autri 
emprise… , 
ou 
faussement 
mover plees 
ou meintenir, 
 quidam maliciosi 
homines de pluribus 
comitatibus regni 
nostri propter 
incrementum 
utilitatis proprie 
proniores  ad malum 
quam ad bonum 
quasdam detestabiles 
confederationes et 
malas cogitationes, 
prestitis mutuo 
sacramentis, ad 
amicorum et 
benivolorum suorum 
partes in placitis et 
loquelis ipsos 
contingentibus in 
comitatibus illis 
utpote in assisis, 
iuratis et 
recognitionibus 
fallaciter 
manutenendas et 
defendendas, et ad 
inimicos suos 
fraudulenter 
grauandos, et in 
quantum in ipsis est 
plerumque 
exheredendos, inter 
se facere 
presumpserun 
De hiis qui 
sacramentis se 
astringunt ad 
partes vel 
loquelas 
{negocioru[m]}a
micoru[m] 
benevoloru[m] 
sustinendas vel 
defendendas, per 
q[uo]d veritas et 
justici 
suffoca[n]tur 
Item de hiis qui 
mutuis 
sacrame[n]tis, 
injuste seu juste 
astringunt ad 
partes 
placito[rum] vel 
loquelaru[m],amic
os vel benevolos 
tangent[er], 
fraudulent[er] 
sustinend[um] vel 
defendend[um], ut 
in Assisis, Juratis, 
Recognitionib 
De illis qui conqueri 
voluerint de 
conspiratoribus in patria 
placita maliciose moveri 
procurantibus, ut 
contumelie braciatoribus 
placita illa et 
contumelias, ut 
campipartem vel aliquod 
aliud comodum inde 
habeant \maliciose/ 
manutenentibus et 
sustinentibus 
  
 The other part of the first clause codifies the extension of the writ to criminal 
proceedings, and was likely modelled on 13 Edw 1 c 12: 
Ordinance of Conspirators (1305) 13 Edw 1 c 12 
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Conspirators are those who make alliances 
among themselves by oath, agreement, or 
through some other bond, that each will help 
and support what the other undertakes in falsely 
and maliciously indicting or causing to be 
indicted, or falsely acquitting, people… and 
also those who have children under age appeal 
people of felonies, through which they are 
imprisoned and greatly harmed 
FORASMUCH as many, through Malice intending 
to grieve other, do procure false Appeals to be made 
of Homicides and other Felonies by Appellors… 
having respect to the Imprisonment or Arrestment 
that the Party appealed hath sustained by reason of 
such Appeals, and to the Infamy that they have 
incurred by the Imprisonment or otherwise 
Conspirators are those who make alliances 
among themselves by oath, agreement, or 
through some other bond, that each will help 
and support what the other undertakes in falsely 
and maliciously indicting or causing to be 
indicted, or falsely acquitting, people… and 
also those who have children under age appeal 
people of felonies, through which they are 
imprisoned and greatly harmed, 
Quia multi p[er] maliciam volentes alios gravare 
p[ro]curant falsa appella fieri, de homicidio & allis 
feloniis, p[er] appellatores nichil h[ab]entes… 
respectu ad prisonam vel arrestac[i]o[en]m, quam 
occ[asi]one huj[us]modi appello[rum] sustinuerunt 
appellati, & ad infamiam, quam p[er] 
imp[ri]sonamentum vel allo modo incurrerunt, 
 The clause extending conspiracy to those retaining other people to support their 
undertakings and suppress the truth relates to the petition we have seen of the people of 
London retaining clerks and royal officials.295 The last clause concerning maintenance by 
Stewards and Bailiffs bears upon the Statute of Conspirators and 3 Edw 1: 
Ordinance of Conspirators 
(1305) 
Statute of Conspirators 3 Edw 1 c 33 
and stewards and bailiffs of 
great lords who through 
lordship, office or power 
undertake to maintain or 
uphold pleas or disputes for 
parties, other than those 
which concern the estate of 
their  
none of our Court shall take any 
Plea to Champerty by Craft nor 
by Engine; and [that no '] 
Pleaders, Apprentices, 
Attornies, Stewards of Great 
Men, Bailiffs, [nor any '] other of 
the Realm, [shall take for 
Maintenance or the like Bargain, 
any manner of Suit or Plea 
against other,]  
no Sheriff shall suffer any Barretors 
{or Maintainers of} Quarrels in their 
Shires, neither Stewards of great 
Lords, nor other unless he be 
Attorney for his Lord, to make Suit, 
{nor} to give judgments in the 
Counties nor to pronounce the 
judgments, 
 et seneschaux et baillifs de 
grauntz seignurs qui per 
seigneurie, officie, ou poeir, 
nul de n[ostr]e Curt enprenge 
play a champart, ne par art ne par 
engin, [Cunteurs ne atturnez ne 
q[e] nul Visconte ne seoffre baretour 
meintenir pa[r]oles en Conte; ne 
Seneschaus de g[ra]nt Seygnurs, ne 
                                                 
295 Paul Brand, ed.,"Edward I: Parliament of 1290, Text and Translation," in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., CD-ROM (Scholarly Digital Editions: Leicester, 2005), item 48. 
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enpernent ameintenir ou 
sustenir pleez ou baretz pur 
parties, autres qe celes que 
touchent lestat lour 
aprentifs, seneschaus des hautz 
homes baillifs ne autres de la 
[ter]re nenprengent a champart 
ne par autres barettours de] tute 
manere de play, [ou] tute manere 
de gent 
autre sil ne seit attorne son Seygnur a 
suite fere ne render les Jugemen[t]s 
des Contez ne ponu[n]cier les 
Jugemen[t]s, sil ne seit especialment 
prie 
 It is true that saving the giving of fees and liveries, bribes are not explicitly mentioned 
in the new ordinance whether by champerty or any other arrangement. However, the articles 
of trailbaston recovered from the session held in Kent included inquests “de illis qui 
manutenent placita pro pecunia vel pro parte rei implacite habendo false et maliciose etc. et 
etiam de conspiratoribus et confederatis;” and also “de illis qui pro muneribus pactum 
fecerum et faciunt cum pacis Regis perturbatoribus et eos conduxerunt et conducunt ar 
ververandum vulnerandum et maletractandum etc., et etiam pro eo quod in assisis, iuratis 
recognittionibus et in inquisitionibus pro muneribus vel minis etc.”296 
 Champerty is also mentioned in the statute 4 Edw II c 11 (1330) that would confer 
jurisdiction upon the justices of assizes over the crimes dealt with at the eyre:  
ITEM, Where in Times past divers People of 
the Realm, as well great Men as other, have 
made Alliances, Confederacies, and 
Conspiracies, to maintain Parties, Pleas, and 
Quarrels, whereby divers have been 
wrongfully disinherited; and some ransomed 
and destroyed; and some, for fear to be 
maimed and beaten, durst not sue for their 
Right, nor complain, nor the Jurors of 
Inquests give their Verdicts, to the great hurt 
of the People, and {Slander} of the Law, and 
common right ; It is accorded, that the Justices 
of the one Bench and of the other, and the 
Justices of Assises, whensoever they come to 
hold their Sessions, or to take Inquests upon 
Nisi prius, shall enquire, hear, and determine, 
as well at the King's Suit, as at the Suit of the 
Party, of such Maintainers, Bearers and 
Conspirators, and also of them that commit 
Champerty, and of all other things contained 
in the foresaid Article, as well as Justices in 
Item p[ur] ceo q[e] avant ces houres, 
plusours gentz du roialme, auxibien g[e]ntz, 
come autres, ount fait alliaunces, 
confederacies, & conspiracies, a meyntenir 
parties, pleez, & quereles, parount plusours 
gentz ount este atort desheritez; & ascuns 
reintz & destruz; & ascuns, p[ur], doute 
destre mahemez, & batuz, noserent pas 
seuyr lour droit, ne pleindre, ne les jurours 
des enquestes Io[r] verditz dire, a g[ra]nt 
damage du poeple & arerissement de la lei, 
& de c[e]oe droit ; Si est acorde, q[e] les 
Justices del un Baunk & del autre, & les 
Justices as assises prendre assignez, a totes 
les foitz qil vendront a faire lour sessions, ou 
a p[re]ndre enquestes, s[u]r Nisi prius, 
enqueregent, oient, & t[er]minent, auxibien 
a la seute le Roi, come a la seute de p[ar]tie, 
sur tieux meyntenours, emp[re]nours, & 
conspiratours, & auxint de Champartours, & 
des totes autres choses contenuz en dit 
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Eyre should do if they were in the same 
County ; and that which cannot be determined 
before the Justices of the one Bench or the 
other upon the Nisi prius, {for shortness of 
Time,} shall be adjourned into the {Place} 
whereof they be Justices, and there be 
determined as Right and Reason shall require.  
article, auxiavant come Justices de eyre 
ferroient, sils fuissent en mesme le Countee; 
& ceo q[e] ne poet estr[e] t[er]mine devant 
les Justices del un Baunk, ou de lautre, s[u]r 
le Nisi prius, p[ur] brefte de lour demoer en 
pais, seit ajournee en Ies places dont ils sont 
Justices, & illoeqes t[er]minee, selonc droit 
& reson. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of the trailbaston commissions, another petition was made 
to the king by the jurors of these sessions foreshadowing the later disqualification of 
conspirators to serve in juries and to appear in court. It stated that many people convicted of 
conspiracy or trespass appeared later and procured themselves to be put onto the inquests 
along with the people who had indicted them, and to confound them. It was provided that: 
With regard to conspirators, if they have made false alliances, in order to maintain 
falsehoods, or have procured to have themselves put on inquisitions before any 
officials of the lord king for some profit to be gained from this, so as to support a 
false party, or if they have received bribes from both parties for that reason, and are 
properly convicted of this before justices, or have freely acknowledged it before them, 
they are henceforth not to be put on any juries, inquisitions or assize.297 
2.3.1 THE TRAILBASTON IN ACTION 
The case of a guild of merchants at York taken by the trailbaston justices would 
illustrate how this new definition was put into practice. It was started by a bill of complaint 
brought before these justices at York in 1306. It should be recalled that this procedure had 
been first established in the Article Super Chartas. The jury found that certain people from 
that town had entered into a confederacy or conspiracy to have their disputes decided among 
themselves and not by outsiders keeping the profits thereof, to shift away the tax burden from 
themselves onto the poorer people of the city, and to support each other’s pleas whether right 
or wrong as against those outside their guild. Thus, they formed the “guild brethren,” 
appointed new officers in the city, and held secret conventicles and courts to determine their 
                                                 
297 “De conspiratoribus, si ipsi fecerunt falsas consideraciones, ad falsitates manutenendas, vel procuraverunt 
se ipsos poni in inquisicionibus coram aliquibus ministris domini regis pro lucro capiendo, ea occasione ut 
falsam partem manuteneant, vel si munera ex utraque parte ea occasione ceperunt, et de hoc coram justiciariis 
rite convincantur, vel gratis coram eisdem hoc cognoverunt, decetero in aliquibus juratis, inquisicionibus, vel 
assisis non ponantur,” Brand, Parliament of 1307, item 201. 
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causes. The defendants were adjourned to appear at Westminster where they were adjudged 
for the said confederacy and conspiracy that they should be imprisoned and heavily 
ransomed, and that the guild should be dissolved.298 The convicted conspirators complained 
later to parliament that after having been “convicted before the council of a certain conspiracy 
and collusion”, their fellow citizens refused to allow them to participate again in the city 
government to which it was responded that they should be restored to their previous status 
within the city.299 Of these charges of corruption, only the last one properly fell within the 
purview of the new ordinance, though the other two can be said to be within the spirit of a 
law passed to empower the justices to deal with local corruption. The punishment resembles 
that provided by the Statute of Conspirators. 
2.3.2 THE ARTICLES OF THE EYRE IN ACTION 
 Before we move on to the next relevant piece of legislation concerning the 
disturbance of private right by corruption and barratry, a word must be said about how this 
issue was prosecuted through inquests on the chapters of the eyre. Unfortunately, other than 
the rolls of the Shropshire eyre of 1256,300 I have not been able to check eyre records prior 
to the last ordinance of conspirators (1305). However, the records of the eyres of Kent (1313-
14), London (1321), and Northamptonshire (1329) at the beginning of the reign of Edward 
II should suffice to give us an idea of what the prosecution of conspiracy as encoded in the 
article De mutuis sacramentis was like.  
2.3.2.1 THE FORMULA DE MUTUIS SACRAMENTIS 
 In the indictments and verdicts that those cases resulted in, we can find different 
variants of the stereotyped formula of this article of the eyre. In (1313) YB 6 Edw II, Corone 
[6], 24 SS 62, the defendant had been indicted of “having conspired with others, under the 
bond of mutual oaths, to suppress truth and justice, etc.” In (1313) YB 6 Edw II, Corone [6], 
24 SS 62, the indictment was that the defendants “are conspirators and confederate together 
that each shall support the other in what action soever he may be maintaining.” In Rex v. 
Hackford, Depham, Hatfıeld And Others (1321) 85 SS 40, the defendants were arraigned of 
                                                 
298 Sayles, Dissolution, 85-89. 
299 Brand, Parliament of 1307, item 202. Sayles, Dissolution, 89. 
300 Alan Harding, The Roll of the Shropshire Eyre of 1256 (London: Selden Society, 1981). 
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“conspiracy and of a false alliance to maintain as well the plaints of others as their own 
plaints, by an oath taken between them.”301 In Rex v. Madefrei (1321) 85 SS 51, the charge 
was that the defendant acted by “coven and confederacy with Thomas, parson of the Church 
of St. Nicholas Coldabbey, and of being bound by mutual oaths with him for maintaining 
both his own plaints and those of other men falsely and wrongfully.” In Rex v. Atte Swan 
(1321) 85 SS 52, the charge was that the defendants “had been leagued together by mutual 
oaths to maintain all manner of plaints, without any consideration of falseness or of truth.” 
2.3.2.2 MALFEASANCE BY CORRUPT OFFICERS 
 In some of the cases, the conduct under the articles involved frauds perpetrated by 
the corruption of local officers. The Mayor of London, John Gisor, was indicted of having 
made a conspiracy and confederacy by which he maintained the pleas of his confederates by 
delaying justice. He also was accused of having tampered with the register of the city to 
release on mainprise a suspect of homicide as a freeman thereof. He was found innocent “of 
the conspiracies or confederacies… [and] of any maintenance” but guilty of the latter.302 
Relating to the indictment of John Gisors, Robert Kelsey and others were charged with 
“having previously conspired together” and then tampering with the register of the city with 
the abovementioned purpose. Robert sustained that he was a common serjeant of the city 
assisting that felon the best way he could, and that he was not responsible for his release, 
which was the province of the mayor and other officers. The justices responded that this did 
not reply to the charge that he “conspired and plotted the fraud and malice above-said” 
referring to the tampering of the register.303 Also in connection to this case, one Roger was 
also indicted for being a conspirator with Robert and for having taken money from a person 
                                                 
301 Cf. The record JI/I/547A, m. 61d as reproduced on p. 42: “together with others, were bound by mutual oaths 
to maintain false plaints, and that each one of them would maintain the deed and enterprise of the other”; also, 
the Corpus MS., fo. 80 version, p. 42: “having been confederate together with others of the City of London, 
with mutual oaths that every one of them would maintain the plaints of the others, and if any one of them should 
take upon himself to maintain the plaint or the concern of any other many they would all diligently maintain 
that concern or plaint, justly or unjustly.” 
302 Rex v Gisors (1321) 85 SS 47. 
303 Rex v Kelsey and Others (1321) 85 SS 50. 
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indicted of receiving felons before he was mainprised, although he was replevisable. He was 
found not guilty of the conspiracy, but they found that he had taken the money.304 
2.3.2.3 BARRATRY  
 Barratry was another of the practices the justices of eyre expected to learn from 
through the inquests. In some cases, only legal and economic support of pending litigation 
was involved. In (1321) YB 14 Edw II, conspiracy [1] 85 SS 40, we have a case involving 
the disturbance of private right through barratry. Among other things, the defendants were 
indicted for having “confederate together with others of the City of London, with mutual 
oaths that every one of them would maintain the plaints of the others, and if any one of them 
should take upon himself to maintain the plaint or the concern of any other many they would 
all diligently maintain that concern or plaint, justly or unjustly.” Thus, “by their wrongful 
false confederation and maintenance,” they had taken the wardship of certain children under 
age, that is, they had supported the plea of one Roger, as part of the confederacy, as against 
the person who had the custody of the children. The defendants claimed that they were neither 
“confederated together nor bound by an oath or in any other manner to maintain false plaints 
or enterprises” in the city. They further added that they supported Roger “in good faith and 
not by evil confederation,” and one of them said that he was “a near kinsman of the said heir, 
and therefore fully entitled to support that party,”305 and that they had allied with Roger in 
that case “only by just means.”306 The court said that since “none who are strangers (to the 
litigants) ought to make any alliance to maintain a plaint, and (the jury) has found that you 
were allied together to maintain (as above), you are (liable) to judgment.”307  
 Though it is not explicitly mentioned, it seems that by maintenance what was meant 
was giving counsel to one of the parties and probably countenancing attempts to influence 
the court. In that sense, it is interesting that they tried to defend good faith, and that the 
previous conspiracy in this context amounted to a collusion and evidence of an intent to 
defraud or deceive. It shows how a frame could be shifted for the purpose of legal argument: 
                                                 
304 Rex v Palmer (1321) 85 SS 50. 
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306 Ib., 44. 
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within the frame of fraud, the intent to defraud is a central element. The court, however, did 
not think that fraud was relevant in the present case, where there was no intentionally crafted 
false plea but rather a dispute in which the defendants had interfered according to their 
agreement. 
 The facts in YB 3 Edw 1II, Corone [166] (1329) 97 SS 221 apparently contradict the 
principle according to which no alliance should be made to maintain a party. The plaintiff, 
having agreed to maintain by champerty, did not complain that the defendants did the same, 
but of a form of fraud which was the ambidexterity or taking money from both sides.308 In 
his count, the plaintiff explained that, whereas “he was unable to maintain his suit alone 
without help from others who were greater than he,” in an action of formedon he had made 
a covenant with two others that “they would aid him in maintaining the aforesaid suit and 
they would pay expenses so that he could recover the two messuages, and that after he had 
recovered the two messuages he would enfeoff them.” And to secure the performance they 
entered into a bond that they would pay a certain sum, and that he would enfeoff them of 
another messuage, on condition that once he had recovered the two messuages he would 
return the money, and they would return his messuages. Then, he complained that the 
defendants turned on him and “by confederacy and conspiracy between them, adhered to the 
adverse party and abandoned Geoffrey’s suit and took a feoffment of both the messuages 
from the person against whom the writ was brought.” Geoffrey tried to have his messuage 
back, but they refused. The defendants argued that this was an action of “champarty” which 
was available only to tenants, and that, in all events, conspiracy could be brought by writ and 
indictment only but not by bill as the plaintiff had done. Scrope CJ laid down that champerty 
can be punished only at the king’s suit, and agreed with the defendants that conspiracy could 
only be brought by writ or indictment. The justice was apparently oblivious of 28 Edw 1 c 
10, which enabled complainers to bring bills of procedure before itinerant justices. The 
argument about champerty also shows that as late as 1329, it was an offence only committed 
by corrupt royal officials though there were already suggestions that there may be an action 
as well.  
                                                 
308 For another case of ambidexterity see YB 6 Edw II, Corone [6] (1313) 24 SS 62. 
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 There were also cases of barratry by bringing and arranging false pleas to extort others 
for profit and corrupting local officials. In Rex v Parson of St. Nicholas Coldabbey (1321) 85 
SS 48, 49, the parson, along three others, was indicted for being “bound by mutual oaths for 
the maintenance of false pleas,” and for being “a champertor, in making a profit from such 
false pleas.” The jury found that he “was bound… for the maintenance of false plaints and 
that he is a common maintainer of false pleas.” They also found that one of them, being a 
bailiff in the city and “wishing to oppress the people by getting gain from them” had had 
people attached to answer before court “and extorted large sums of money from them 
unjustly, of his own malice and deed.” It was further established that the parson “was a 
maintainor [sic] of such pleas in the said court… for the extortion of money in this matter, 
and was a champertor of the fines and amercements.” Likewise, in Rex V. Madefrei (1321) 
85 SS 51, Madefrei was charged with “coven and confederacy” with the said parson, “and of 
being bound by mutual oaths with him for maintaining both his own plaints and those of 
other men falsely and wrongfully.”  
 The case of Rex v Atte Swan (1321) 85 SS 52 was concerned not only with barratry 
by false suits to extort money, and the corruption of local officers, but also with embracery. 
In this case, Henry, a bailiff, and Thomas, a parson, were indicted for being “leagued together 
by mutual oaths to maintain all manner of plaints, without any consideration of falseness or 
of truth.” They both “had involved divers persons in pleas before him, by the abetment and 
counsel of the said Thomas, so that they might be able to take (money) from both parties (to 
the plea).” It was also claimed that Henry “falsely procured a certain inquest to be made… 
and that by his procurement” the defendant was sentenced to pay damages. All this was 
established by the jury, who also found that Henry had unjustly distrained people to compel 
them to come before him so that “by his malice and deed he, together with the said Thomas 
and others, might extort money from them.”  
In addition to these cases of extortion, a case of wrongdoing in the way of vexation 
by bringing a false suit and fraud was Arnald v Brandon and Bery (1321) 86 SS 127. In this 
case, the complaint was that the defendants had brought a writ of account in the name of 
another person by which the plaintiff had been imprisoned, as a consequence of which he 
lost a pending plea of mayhem. 
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 Another case involving the interference with juries was (1313) YB 6 Edw II, Corone 
[205] 24 SS 145, where presentment was made that the defendants, “together with other 
conspirators, procured the dozen of Ruxley to conceal” offences to the Eyre justices. Indeed, 
these Eyres sometimes produced some awkward situations. In Rex v Hackford, Depham, 
Hatfıeld and Others (1321) 85 SS 40, the jury of presentment was made of people who 
belonged to the other local faction than that of the defendants. On being challenged, members 
of that local faction who were present approached the coroners who had to choose other 
jurors. Later, members of that jury would themselves be indicted for conspiracy by the other 
faction, and some of them would refuse to put themselves before the country on the grounds 
of bias (85 SS 46).309 In Rex v Refham and Others (1321) 85 SS 51, 53 on the summons of 
the eyre, the defendants “made an assembly at the Leaden Hall on Cornhill, and leagued 
themselves together mutually to maintain the confederacy made previously… to confound 
the trusty and to conceal the truth, so that transgressors should not be punished in the Eyre 
aforesaid.”  
These cases reflect the concern of the eyre with the corruption of local government, 
of which judicial corruption was only a part. Consequently, the concept of conspiracy to 
maintain was sometimes expanded to include other aspects of local politics. Thus, in (1321) 
YB 14 Edw II, conspiracy [1] 85 SS 40, the defendants, who belonged to one of the factions 
of the city, were indicted not only with conspiracy to maintain maintenance but also of 
tampering with the election of local officials so that “by their confederation and enterprise 
they have so great a mastery that no such election can be held in these days except according 
to the will of the aforesaid William of Hackford and his other fellow maintainers.” And also, 
“when an aid was to be levied in the City for the use of the lord King this aid was assessed 
by the said William of Hackford and the others confederated with him so that their 
confederates should be spared and others of the City oppressed.” Naturally, the other faction 
was indicted for assessing taxation and tallage so that “whoever they wished to elevate or 
oppress might be tallaged by them accordingly, keeping the third penny of every collection 
for themselves” (Rex v Waltham (1321) 85 SS 49). Thus, it makes perfect sense that when 
prosecuted for the king in the context of the eyre, conspiracy was seen as an offence not only 
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against the peace, but also aimed at “the perversion of justice,” (24 SS 145, 146) or “the 
fraudulent deception of the lord King and against his Crown and dignity, and to the 
destruction of the middling people” (85 SS 51, 53).310 
2.4 MAKING GOOD FRIENDS 
2.4.1 THE FRATERNIZING MODEL OF MUTUAL PROTECTION AND AID 
 Having discussed the development of the law of conspiracy during the reign of 
Edward I, we should turn now to the frame which was evoked in the use of such terms as 
conspiracy, confederacy, maintenance, or procurement: the fraternizing model of mutual 
cooperation.  
Mutual self-help is a derivative form of cooperation. Cooperation entails a group of 
people working together with a joint intent or engaging in a course of conduct or undertaking 
with a common or shared purpose.311 By contrast, mutual help or helpfulness involves that 
“the goal is shared only through the relationship of the helper to the individual whose goal it 
actually is. The emphasis is on the relationship to that individual, not upon the goal itself.”312 
What characterizes this form of cooperation is that the common goal is not to complete a task 
by a division of labor, or to bring about certain effect by aggregate individual action but to 
support or aid each other’s individual interests or needs as they arise. This, however, does 
not preclude the possibility that by virtue of that bond of self-help these people might also 
engage in purely cooperative tasks or in certain coordinated conduct with a shared purpose 
in mind.  
According to this model, when people engage in mutual cooperation they do so 
because they are tied together to mutually support each other by a form of personal 
association or relation. That means that they have to cooperate with each other, and that they 
have to provide for each other by virtue of this bond. When a person thus bound demands 
cooperation from another to advance their goals or interests or to provide for their needs, that 
                                                 
310 As argued earlier, this being considered as an offence against the public is not the reason why the offence 
received the name of conspiracy, which was rather a linguistic accident.  
311 Cf. Mead’s definition as “the act of working together to one end” Margaret Mead, Introduction to 
Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, ed. Margaret Mead, 1-19 (New York; London: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937), 8. 
312 Mead, Introduction, 17. 
133 
 
person is asking for help or assistance by virtue of this existing bond between them as 
members of a group. In other words, that party is procuring the party bound to him to do 
something for him. When someone cooperates, or works together with another toward 
advancing that person’s goals or interests or providing for their interests, this person is 
helping or supporting the person asking for assistance by virtue of this bond, as members of 
the same group. In other words, that party is maintaining the party to whom it is bound. It 
follows that within this frame only people bound together can ask each other favors, and help 
each other.  
In traditional societies, these ties and personal relations that make possible mutual 
cooperation are created by means of what has been called the fraternization contract, that is, 
a status contract that changes “the social status of the persons involved.” Thus, these contracts 
are means for one person to “become somebody’s child, father, follower, vassal, subject, 
friend, or, quite generally, comrade.” By contrast, the purposive contract does not “affect the 
status of the parties nor… [give] rise to new qualities of comradeship but… [aims] solely, as, 
for instance, barter, at some specific (especially economic) performance or result.” 
Particularly, these contracts made the person “something different in quality (or status) from 
the quality he possessed before. For unless a person voluntarily assumed that new quality, 
his future conduct in his new role could hardly be believed to be possible at all. Each party 
must thus make a new soul enter his body.” That is why, at an early stage, this fraternization 
contract involved the performance of magic rituals that symbolized the creation of this new 
soul.313 It would be the oath or “a conditional self-curse, calling for the divine wrath to strike” 
the parties contracting in case they fall into anti-fraternal conduct what constituted “the most 
universal of all fraternization pacts.”314 
 Mutual defense and assistance associations created through these fraternization 
agreements became very common in Early Medieval Europe. These could be temporary 
associations as those involving merchants in a voyage who came together to defend the vessel 
                                                 
313 The Bachiga of East Africa, for instance, seal their pacts of ritual blood brotherhood by swallowing a little 
of each other’s blood in the belief that breaking the oath will cause the blood to swell up and kill the transgressor; 
Mead, Introduction, 128.  
314 Max Weber. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Vol. 2. (Berkley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1968), 672-673. 
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in case of attack.315 But they could also be permanent life associations as the guilds which 
bound their members to defend each other against aggressions as well as to assist each other 
in economic hardship or in legal affairs as by acting as oath-helpers.316 The medieval 
commune also originated as a sworn association for the mutual defense and assistance of its 
members but linked to a location.317  
The fraternization ritual by which these self-help associations were born was the 
exchange of mutual oaths or conjuratio. Another fraternization ritual that is very important 
to our purposes is that of the conspiratio.318 We see this ritual in early Christian liturgy as the 
mouth-to-mouth kiss “by which the participants shared their breath or spirit with one 
another,” and symbolized “their union in one Holy Spirit, the community that takes shape in 
God’s breath” creating a “fraternal spirit in preparation for the unifying meal.”319 In the 
Middle Ages this ritual of the kiss was used alternatively to the oath in status contracts. For 
one thing, in France the ceremony of homage included the kissing on the mouth of chief and 
subordinate “symbolizing accord and friendship.”320 and therefore mutual loyalty321. And in 
England there are examples of this equalitarian ritual being performed as a part of 
subinfeudation deals. In 1247 an promise to give a daughter with a fourth furlong of land was 
backed with a kiss,322 and in 1341 after doing homage to their new lord both a husband and 
his wife kissed him.323 Indeed, in the Middle Ages, it is not infrequent to find both rituals 
combined, particularly in the formation of guilds and the organization of political plots.324 
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Thus, in the Middle Ages, both conjuratio and conspiratio are used indistinctively to refer to 
associations or personal bonds created by oath to provide mutual aid and protection against 
other people, particularly to those characteristic forms of association by oath which were the 
guild and the commune.325 
 The language which codified the fraternizing model of mutual assistance and 
protection against enemies comes mainly from the legal field. Thus, the language used to 
describe the frame of these fraternization contracts betokens the civil and religious 
authorities’ attitude towards them as reprehensible conducts. The frame can be defined as 
taking place when two or more people promise each other to help or aid each other against 
their enemies, consent or agree to each other’s promises, and perform a fraternization ritual 
which might include both oath and mouth-to-mouth kissing. Words encoding the formal 
aspects of this mutual help agreement are alliance, confederacy, conjure, or conspiracy. 
Though the ritual of mutual oath taking is properly speaking the conjure, by metonymic 
extension the other words originally designating other rituals and/or covenants came to mean 
the same agreement by oath to mutually support and defend each other.  
As mentioned above, these associations of self-help can be permanent or temporary. 
Temporary associations are formed with a view to deal with some specific issue, usually an 
imminent problem, for which eventual assistance and support is needed.326 In this case, words 
encoding the substantive aspects of this agreement, the plan or course of conduct that is 
expected to be engaged with to deal with the specific matter, and in fulfillment of this goal 
of supporting each other are scheme, design, machination, practice, covin, collusion, or plot. 
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Sometimes these agreements are preceded by a discussion and deliberation about what course 
of conduct should be taken, which is encoded in words such as consultation or conference. 
Again, by metonymic extension, the words used to describe the agreement by oath could 
describe the planned conduct or the deliberation and vice versa.  
Sometimes, this fraternization contract does not take place in advance, but on the spot 
as many people gather together to defend themselves against an imminent attack or 
aggression or to take immediate action against their common enemy.327 Words describing 
such gatherings with the purpose of self-help in which the people meeting enter into a 
temporary alliance with each other are conventicle, congregation, coadunation or assembly.  
By metonymic extension, the words used to describe the agreement by oath can refer to the 
meeting and vice versa.  
2.4.2 FRATERNAL AGREEMENT AND LITIGATION  
 In traditional societies, it has been a well-established principle that parties other than 
the litigants or the judicial officers must not interfere with legal procedure. Only those who 
either have a personal interest in the case or have a personal relation with any of the litigants 
can come to court or otherwise act in their assistance. This included kinsmen, friends and 
followers who by virtue of their personal relation were indeed bound to help them. We can 
see this principle of family or group solidarity that dovetails with the principle of no 
interference in litigation in the medieval compurgation, or in the duty that compels the kin of 
the victim to appeal the offender, or in the method of collective liability of the suretyship that 
made the members of a tithing responsible for each other’s appearance in court to respond 
for a crime. We can also see this principle in the fiction that the Roman advocate was giving 
his services gratuitously because of a personal connection with his client rather than because 
of a fee which could not be officially charged.328 
 If we interpret the articles of the eyre and the statutes on conspiracy in light of these 
twin principles, it follows that they refer to unlawful fraternizing agreements justifying the 
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interference of third parties in the legal business of other people. In other words, it is possible 
that to avoid being disqualified from appearing in court, or assisting parties in their disputes, 
people who did not belong to the nascent legal profession entered into this fraternizing 
agreements to help or maintain their friends against their enemies. This idea was expressed 
by the parson of Souldern who, on the accusation of interfering in other people’s causes, and 
encouraging them to bring litigation, argued that “it is lawful for everyone of the realm to 
help his friends in their rights in the lord king's court etc. or to advise etc. against their 
enemies.”329 In Rex v. Hackford, Depham, Hatfıeld and Others (1321) 85 SS 40, one of the 
issues was whether the defendants had unlawfully maintained a party to a case concerning 
the wardship of two children. One of the defendants explained that he had assisted his wife 
because “I was a party along with my wife, who could not be received (to plead) without 
me.” Another said that “Peter says that he is a near kinsman of the said heir, and therefore 
fully entitled to support that party in justice.” For Herle J, this was “an alliance of parentage 
and of affinity”. Stanton J laid down that “none who are strangers (to the litigants) ought to 
make any alliance to maintain a plaint.”330  
A prospective litigant would seek the synergies from other parties that may assist 
them in the management of the suit. There are plenty of tasks that would require the 
cooperation of other parties such as helping to secure the presence of witnesses, buying and 
serving processes, paying expenses or informing juries of the facts, not so speak of giving 
counsel.  It is all but natural that to avoid the principle of non-interference they would enter 
into these fraternizing agreements that would allow them to “make many friends and of the 
best” (Bellamy, Bastard Feudalism and the Law 1989, 58). Yet at the same time, the 
management of litigation could also involve unlawful activities apart from the interference, 
such as the bribery of officers and jurors, not to speak of the invention of false suits and the 
fabrication of evidence. Thus, in the words of the writ to the justices in eyre of 1279, what 
rendered such fraternizing agreements in support of friends against enemies unlawful was 
that they were “propter incrementum utilitatis proprie proniores,” and that they were “ad 
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malum quam ad bonum,” that they were “fallaciter… [et] fraudulenter grauandos… 
plerumque exheredendos.”  
It is important to realize that the problems of the interference of third parties in the 
legal process, and that of judicial corruption and barratry, were combined within the same 
legal framework. Thus, the terms of the fraternizing frames such as conspiracy, maintenance 
and procurement became catchall terms to refer to barratry, corruption, fraud and the many 
wrongs and infringements that were brought about by means of these conducts.  
2.4.3 BASTARD FEUDALISM AND THE MANAGEMENT OF LITIGATION 
A final aspect that bears on the medieval conspiracy is its connection with the culture 
of bastard feudalism, and how it might explain why the law turned against the fraternizing 
agreements in litigation.  
Land feuds played a prominent role in the lives of the landed classes of later Medieval 
England. These disputes were settled using two strategies that were often complementary: 
litigation and force.331 The former was an expensive and uncertain proposition to be left to 
the courts. That’s why litigants tried to secure success by careful litigation management 
which involved several practices taking place in a grey area where the legal could easily 
become illegal.  
  Among the things that fell within the legal side of this grey area was what 
contemporaries called laboring: laboring witness and jurors. As for the former, litigants were 
expected to seek favorable witnesses and to secure their appearance, but they were probably 
not allowed to couch them.332 Regarding jurors, the parties could inform them about their 
respective merits before trial,333 they could pay for their expenses at their request334, and the 
successful party was supposed to pay a “juror’s dinner,” after the case was decided.335 
However, these practices could easily turn illegal. A party approaching a juror to inform him 
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could also bring pressure to bear by letting them know who his protector was, or instead 
addressing the social superiors of the jurors if they could be approached.336 The illegality was 
more flagrant when they prevented the jurors from coming to trial to cause a delay or they 
attempted to bribe them, sometimes at their request.337 But the most common strategy 
perhaps, and the one that made authorities most uneasy, consisted in attempts at packing 
juries with persons either akin to one’s affinity or to one’s master’s affinity, or had any 
connection whatsoever to any of the parties.338  
 Obviously, this practice involved further illegal activity as it required meddling with 
the officer who held the keys to the jury: the sheriff339. This could be accomplished by means 
of direct corruption or bribery.340 We are told that, as members of the gentry, sheriffs were 
probably already a part of one or another faction in the county, which was a signal for the 
lucky ones “to bring suits against a number or rivals and oppressors.”341 In addition to this 
enormous power to tilt litigation and criminal prosecution one way or the other, sheriffs could 
also take advantage of their office at the request of an ally, or after some bribe, to delay legal 
proceedings and vex and harass the other party by failing to serve a writ,342 by arresting or 
fail to arrest someone, by levying fines and allowing unauthorized bails.343 Similar effects 
could be pursued by resorting to court clerks and by making friends and allies, or people 
eager to make a profit or to secure a position, counter sue.344 Likewise, the office of the JPs 
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was another place from which to defend one’s allies, particularly in securing that prosecution 
for riot did not proceed.345 
 What transpires from these practices in which litigants got involved is that litigation 
management could not have been possible without tapping into one’s social resources, “a 
man’s relationships with his lord, his friends, his clients, his tenants and servants, the  
possibility of outside backers, and the disposition of such important local officials as the 
sheriff.”346 Without cooperation from external parties, the management of litigation was to a 
great extent ineffective and the odds of success became thinner, if not impossible, when the 
other party did have the backup of other people. As one defendant put it, the “best protection 
when there was a writ of novel disseisin out against him was to ‘make many friends and of 
the best.”347 Litigation within the context of the late medieval land wars was a social matter 
in which parties relied on networks of mutual assistance. This is as much to say that the court 
was one of the places in which the so called bastard feudalism became more visible.348 
 Bastard feudalism could be narrowly understood as designating a form of feudalism 
in which the service indenture contract has superseded the early medieval homage, and the 
fee or the promise of a future benefit or support has displaced the fief. In a broader sense, it 
refers to a social order emerging out of this new social relation between master and client, as 
opposed to the social order emerging from land tenure. Regarding the latter, I am aware that 
the historiography of the bastard feudalism has been entangled in debates about the 
opportunity of this label, about whether this was weaker a bond that that between lord and 
vassal leading to a much more unstable social arrangement, and about the vexed question of 
the origins of bastard feudalism, and of whether the Anglo-Norman England did not show 
similar patterns of behavior. To our purposes, it is a useful way to describe the arrangements 
that lay behind the offenses relating to the management. Furthermore, taken in its broader 
sense as a social order, nowhere is the mutual interclass cooperation between lesser nobility 
and magnates, and gentry and commoners, better exemplified than in the court room.  
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 What were these networks of mutual interclass cooperation like? The simplest 
example of this idea lay at the apex of the social hierarchy: the great lord’s affinity, the 
network of people who were bound to the lord either as his allies, his retainers, or as his 
household servants, and as his tenants. This bond entailed mutual assistance. The social 
inferiors were expected to “‘help him forward’, that is to say, increase his family’s wealth 
and prestige.” Among other things, in the case of what we could properly call his clients, 
retainers and associates, this implied things like what has been described as laboring the jury, 
which was an activity that the lord was not supposed to do himself, and that might involve 
more things than simply informing and trying to persuade the jury of the rightness of a 
claim.349 
 On the other end, the members of the affinity, particularly the lord’s clients, expected 
his protectors to help him in the management of litigation. This could be done by direct 
intervention of the lord, or simply by letting it be known that he was under his protection. 
Likewise, the lord was expected to arbitrate quarrels between the members of the affinity and 
“instruct them not to resort to direct action or the law courts.” Furthermore, the lord would 
provide for offices in his administration or broker the client’s candidacy to a royal position.350 
Sometimes, clients tried to secure this good lordship through bribes or the promise of sharing 
the spoils of litigation with their lord, and it is to be presumed that the lords rewarded their 
clients the same way.351  
 In sum, we should presume that this modus operandi at the upper echelons of late 
medieval English society was reproduced by the lower ones. For one thing, these on the lower 
echelons would always be members of some affinity, and as such linked to other people 
through these ties of mutual help. But, presumably, they would forge similar bonds with 
people below them. And at the lowest level possible one could always count on the kin and 
the closest family for help in litigation. Not to mention that those commoners, who dwelled 
in the ever-growing in importance towns and cities, resorted to similar strategies to manage 
their disputes and conduct the life of the city.   
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2.5 THE NARROWING OF CONSPIRACY 
 As discussed above, during the reign of Edward I, the disturbance of private right, 
vexatious litigation, extortion, and wrongful prosecution by corruption and barratry were 
crammed into the law of conspiracy as expressed in the Definition of Conspirators. This wide 
scope may explain the popularity of the writ of conspiracy which, only in a single term in 
1297, counted no less than fifty-three actions in the King’s Bench.352 Inevitably, such success 
came hand in hand with abuse of the writ, particularly as a means to intimidate and get back 
at indicting jurors after their acquittal.353 Alarmed that it might discourage people from 
serving as jurors, the authorities discontinued the issuing of the writ of conspiracy for a while, 
but this was throwing the baby out with the bathwater.354 
 Slowly but surely, the courts narrowed the scope of both the civil action and the 
criminal proceedings from its high-water thirteenth-century mark. The process was long, 
overarching the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Though far from attending to 
chronological issues, Winfield’s scrutinized and digested this late medieval case-law and that 
excuses giving any detailed account thereof here.355 To our purposes, suffice to take a quick 
gander at the destination point of this journey to see how differently early modern lawyers 
understood conspiracy compared to the way their Edwardian counterparts would have 
explained it.  
 To begin with, for the first time since the Edwardian statutes, we have abstract 
substantive definitions of the wrong of conspiracy as opposed to the fact-laden accounts of 
the books and the writs. Fitzherbert states that: 
A Writ of Conspiracy lieth where two, three or more Persons of Malice and Covin do 
conspire and devise to indict any Person falsly, and afterwards he who is so indicted 
is accquitted, no he shall have this Writ of Conspiracy against them who so indicted 
them. But this Writ lieth against two Persons at the least who do so conspire; for if 
one Person of Malice and false Imagination do labour and cause another falsly to be 
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indicted, the Party who is so indicted, shall not have a Writ of Conspiracy, &c. but an 
Action upon the Case against him who caused him falsly to be indicted.356 
And also, that “a Writ of Conspiracy doth not lie against the Indictors.”357  
 Staunford explains that “al comen ley, cest brief gisoit auxibien in acquital sur appel, 
coe il fait a cest iour in acquital sur enditement,” that “cestuy qui serra charge in conspiracy, 
duis estre charge que il ceo fist faulxement & maliciousement sans ascun bo[n] ou droitful 
foundation,” and that “conspiracy ne peut estre commise p[ur] un person solement, eins deux 
al meyns, & pur ceo cel action ne voet estre maintenus vers un solement.”358 Furthermore: 
Si apres le conspiracy, les conspiratours sount iures sur lenquest del inquerie des 
felonies, & ills ove le remenant del enquest queux son iures ove eux, enditont cestuy 
vers qui ill on conspire de felony in cel case nul briefe de conspiracy gist vers eux, eo 
que ne peut estre intendu falx ou malicious quaunt ils ceo font par vertu de lour 
serement, & ceo ove auters que eux mesmes.359 
 Coke defines it this way: 
Conspiracie is a consultation and agreement between two or more, to appeale, or 
indict an innocent falsely, and maliciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause 
to be indicted or appealed; and afterward the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict 
of twelve men: the party grieved may be relieved, and the offender punished two 
wayes. First, by a writ of conspiracy, which is a civill or common action at the suit of 
the party, wherein the plaintife shall recover damages, and the defendant shall be 
imprisoned. Secondly, by indictment at the suit of the king, the judgment whereof is 
criminal.360 
Les Termes, by contrast gives a terse definition, according to which: 
Conspiracie is a writ and it lyeth where two or more knit themselues together by oth, 
couenant, or other maner of aliāce, that euery one shall helpe other for to indict or 
appele any man of felonie, then hee which is by such maner indicted or appealed shall 
haue this writ, But this writ lieth not against the indictors.”361  
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In these definitions, both the scope of the civil action and the offence of conspiracy 
had been restricted to wrongful prosecution.  There is no word about the application of 
conspiracy to civil proceedings in either Staunford, Coke, or Les Termes. Fitzherbert has 
something to say: he believes that “there are divers other Writs of Conspiracy grounded upon 
Disceit, and Trespass done unto the Party, which are properly Actions of Trespass upon the 
Case” (FNB 116 A) as “against those who conspire to forge false Deeds which are given in 
Evidence by which Land is lost.” (FNB 116 D). He takes conspiracy properly to mean 
wrongful prosecution, and what once was a huge part of it, is now a different form of action. 
This oblivion may be explained by the fact that, during the fifteenth century, the writ of 
conspiracy as applied to civil litigation was likely superseded by other remedies such as 
decies tantum, deceit, and audita querela, thus falling out of use. 
The other elements of the modern writ of conspiracy have to do with the restriction 
of its use. The acquittal requirement is not really new, as we have seen, but the plurality 
requirement, that is, that conspiracy is not actionable against a sole defendant, and the 
immunity of the indicting jurors are. It should be noted that Fitzherbert, Staunford, and Coke 
emphasize malice aforethought and the absence of justification, but this was probably the 
consequence of the action on the case about which Fitzherbert talks. We will come back to 
this later. 
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3. THE WILL FOR THE DEED 
 Before we move on to the rise of the modern law of conspiracy, we should stop to 
discuss the development of another doctrine that would play a very important role in this 
process. I am talking about the doctrine expressed by the apothegm of the will for the deed.  
 This apothegm is normally used to refer to the subjective conditions of criminal 
liability in relation to what we would call today an attempt. But we should be careful not to 
project the present onto the past. As it appears at the time, it cannot be considered to express 
a substantive offence, nor does it hint at a general theory of attempts. Rather, the use of this 
apothegm is highly contextualized. It normally occurs within the domain of homicide to refer 
to special forms of homicide that do not fit within the core of this category. To put it in other 
words, contemporaries do not think of the attempt to commit homicide as a substantive 
offence, but rather, in distinguishing different forms of homicide, they talk about the 
homicide by attempt; what they would call the homicide in will.  
 This theory of the homicide in will is important to the development of the law of 
conspiracy because, as we will see, a false accusation could be considered as such. And that 
view opened the gates to considering a failed false accusation as a homicide by attempt. But 
it is also important because the scholars that will be discussed in short prompted a curious 
form of conceptual blend by reframing the uncomfortable formulation of the first form of 
high treason: compassing or imagining the death of the king. Under this interpretation, what 
this first treason would punish would be a form of homicide by attempt. But this would mean 
bringing part of the category of treason within the periphery of the domain of homicide. It 
would be a homicide by attempting to kill the king. This intellectual operation may seem 
irrelevant, but reframing this treason as a form of homicide leads to think of the conduct less 
in exceptional terms and more in the same terms that would apply to the conviction of 
homicide; less like treason and more like regicide.  
 I should also mention that within the domain of treason, the expression the will for 
the deed itself is all but unambiguous. There are at least two main meanings that arose at the 
time. The hard version would be that intent in itself is the punishable element in crime, and 
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that the subsequent action is but evidence of it. The softer one would be that in considering 
the form of liability a failed homicide, intent must be considered rather than the action itself.  
 Finally, the discussion of this reframing of high treason also implies attesting changes 
in the semantic structure of conspiracy. As it happens to be, the fraternizing agreement was 
one of the central parts of the political intrigue as these people bound themselves against their 
enemy, the king. By metonymic extension it came to be used to mean stages of the meeting 
and plotting of it, if not political intrigue itself. This way, the term conspiracy would become 
linked to the frame of the homicide in will as well as that of wrongful prosecution. In this 
sense, I will also discuss other uses of the term conspiracy within the frame of treason which 
were consequential for the development of the law of conspiracy after the fall of the Star 
Chamber.   
 What follows is an analysis of the lexical and semantic structure that expressed these 
ideas among the main theorizers of high treason, with a focus on the term conspiracy.  
3.1 HOMICIDE IN COKE 
 According to Coke, the category of ‘homicide’ can be defined as “hominis caedium” 
or “hominis occisio ab homine facta,”362 that is, the ‘killing of man by man’ or ‘death by 
man’. Sometimes Coke uses to slay as a synonym for killing,363 and both terms with the 
meaning of ‘to cause to die.’364 This latter definition entails an action and a consequence that 
can or cannot follow such action.  In other words, to kill somebody is not to engage in a, 
clearly defined action, but to produce or bring about the effect of the death of man. This can 
be clearly effected by innumerable conducts, many of which need not bring about such effect.  
The structure of this category which “comprehendeth petit treason, murder, and that 
which is commonly called manslaughter”365 is primarily organized around several qualities 
that can be predicated of the agent or subject of the ‘killing’, and eventually, in the periphery, 
concerning the patient or victim of the killing. More specifically, these qualities refer to the 
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state of mind of the person causing the death. But as we will also see, they also bear 
considerations as to the nature of the conduct of killing.  
3.1.1 THE FRAME OF HOMICIDE 
 Given the genus of homicide as ‘killing,’ the structure would be organized respecting 
a series of subjective distinctions made concerning the defendants, that is, the agent of the 
killing, and another set of distinctions concerning the circumstances surrounding the killing.  
3.1.1.1 MALICE AFORETHOUGHT 
 Of those subjective distinctive properties, the first and most important element 
structuring the category of homicide is that of malice aforethought, which Coke defines as 
“when one compasseth to kill, wound, or beat another, and doth it sedato animo.”366 This 
expression works indeed as a compound noun in which the main element is the ‘malice’ and 
the qualifying property is that of ‘being aforethought.’ Malice refers to this ‘intent to kill, 
wound, or beat another’, that is, the intent ‘to cause the death of a man.’ What qualifies this 
intent is the fact of ‘being aforethought.’ This meaning is also referred to with terms as 
forethought, prepensed, and praecogitata, and most important of all, as compasseth.367  In 
other words, all these words here come to express the idea that the ‘intent to kill somebody’ 
precedes the actual ‘killing of somebody,’ and therefore, it is not more or less simultaneous 
to this action; That is why this ‘malice aforethought’:  
must be malice continuing untill the mortall wound, of the like be given. Albeit there 
had been malice between two, and after they are pacified and made friends, and after 
this upon a new occasion fall out, and the one killeth the other; this is homicide, but 
not murder, because the former malice continued not.368 
In other words, this intent to kill was decided beforehand, and the actual killing was 
thus planned action. Hence, the time at which the intent to kill was formed is going to be an 
important element in distinguishing the several kinds of homicides Coke considers. This 
precedence in time of the ‘intent to kill’ entails that the action or actual killing is caused not 
by overwhelming emotions or passions which had taken control of one’s will as in sudden 
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occasion, when “the heat of the blood kindled by ire was never cooled,”369, but is done sedato 
animo, that is, in cold blood, in full control of one’s emotions. Thus, precedence in time of 
planned action, by contrast to the sudden occasion, hints at whether there were passions or 
emotions involved, or whether the criminal was being rational and able to control his 
emotions.  
This continuity of the intent applies also to the solicitation of crime so that when “A 
command B to kill C, and before the act be done, A repenth and countermand his 
commndement, and charge B not to do it: if B after killeth him, A is not accessory to it: for 
the malicious minde of the accessory ought to continue to do ill until the act done.”370  
3.1.1.2 VOLUNTARINESS 
 Next comes an aspect that qualifies whether “the law shall couple the event to the 
cause”371 when the proximate cause apparently is human action. A homicide is voluntary 
when the action causing the death is controlled by the defendant’s own will.372 In contrast, a 
homicide happens by misadventure or misfortune when the action causing the death is not 
controlled by the defendant’s own will. In other words, voluntariness indicates that the cause 
of the death should be attributed to the defendant’s will, whereas its negation, misadventure, 
entails some other external force to which the death should be attributed instead of the 
defendant’s will.  
3.1.1.3 SOUND MEMORY AND AGE OF DISCRETION 
 Another important subjective element in structuring the category of homicide has to 
do with the mental capacity of the defendant, and consequently, whether they can be held 
liable. One question is whether the defendant caused the death of somebody being compos 
mentis or not. In the English translation, the meaning of this Latin expression is ‘of sound 
memory,’373  meaning ‘mentally sound.’ Therefore, the antonymous meaning would be that 
of ‘insanity.’ It should be recalled that for Coke, this is not a defining feature of persons but 
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a mental state, which has a temporal dimension.374 Another element concerning the 
defendant’s mental capacity is whether they are within “the age of discretion,”375 which is 
fourteenth years old.376  
3.1.1.4 FELONIOUSNESS 
Likewise, a way of distinguishing between types of homicide is to differentiate 
between those that are considered felonious, meaning that they are ‘unatonable and subject 
to punishment,’ and those that are not felonious and therefore liable to other lesser penalties 
such as forfeitures, or are candidates for some form of mitigation.377 
3.1.1.5 CONSUMMATION 
  As mentioned above, killing is understood as ‘to cause somebody to die.’ This 
instrumental definition entails the employment of some means by which the death of a person 
is brought about, such as “by poison, weapon sharp or blunt, gun, crossbow, crushing, 
bruising, smothering, suffocating, strangling, drowning, burning, famishing, throwing down, 
inciting a dog, or bear, &c. to bite, or hurt.” These are actions that involve some form of 
direct violence or aggression to the body of a person, but there are also other indirect actions 
such as “laying a sick man in the cold”378  or “the commandement… expressly to the killing 
of another”379 that do not entail immediate violence.  
  This definition of homicide also implies that such instrumental actions have the effect 
that “death ensueth” them,380 and should be connected to it as its cause.381 That is, the 
definition of homicide as ‘causing someone to die’ entails a conduct that constitutes the 
means and the cause by which the death is effected, which, if there is a homicide, must be 
consummate and should be the cause of death. Thus, the notion of ‘consummation’ is not one 
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that is directly formulated, but it is entailed by the definition of killing as ‘causing someone 
to die.’ As we will see, this notion is involved in the structuring of the subcategory of 
murders.  
3.1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE CATEGORY OF HOMICIDE 
 Coke points out four main hyponyms of homicide: petit treason, felo de se, murder 
and manslaughter.382  Of these, only the latter two are relevant to our discussion and will 
therefore be addressed. The two are direct antonyms as they can be distinguished from each 
other upon whether the ‘killing of somebody’ is done with malice aforethought or not.  
3.1.2.1 MANSLAUGHTER 
 Though Coke occasionally uses it as synonymous with homicide, manslaughter has 
a more specific meaning of ‘killing of somebody not with malice aforethought,” and as such 
it is an antonym of murder. As Coke puts it, “there is no difference between murder, and 
manslaughter; but that the one is upon malice aforethought, and the other upon sudden 
occasion: and therefore, is called chancemedley” In this excerpt, it seems as if the hyponym 
manslaughter receives the name of the main component differentiating it from murder: 
sudden occasion, which is also called chancemedley, and which is an antonym of malice 
aforethought. However, manslaughter also appears as a larger category that is structured 
attending as to whether the ‘manslaughter’ is done voluntarily or by misadventure. 
Furthermore, among the voluntary manslaughters, he distinguishes between ‘felonious 
voluntary manslaughers’ called chancemedley, and ‘non-felonious voluntary 
manslaughters.’383  
3.1.2.1.1 CHANCEMEDLEY 
 According to Coke, “homicide is called chancemedley, or chancemelle, for that it is 
done by chance (without premeditation) upon a sudden brawle, shuffling, or contention… so 
as killing of a man by chance-medle, is killing of a man upon a sudden brawle or contention 
by chance.”384 As said earlier, this means that the intent to kill is almost simultaneous to the 
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killing, for which there cannot be ‘malice aforethought.’ The cause or motive of the homicide, 
as was suggested, cannot be traced back to the will of the manslaughter but to the “heat of 
the blood kindled ire.”385 As it happens to be, a man possessed by his emotions or passions 
has somehow diminished rational capacity; he is not fully in control of his faculties the way 
a man who plans his action is. The distinction is nicely illustrated by this example Coke gives 
us: 
If two fall out upon a sudden occasion, and agree to fight in such a field, and each of 
them go and fetch their weapon, and go into the field, and therein fight, the one killeth 
the other: here is no malice prepensed, for the fetching of the weapon and going into 
the field, is but a continuance of the sudden falling out, and the blood was never 
cooled. But if they appoint to fight the next day, that is, malice prepensed.386 
3.1.2.1.2 THE PERIPHERY OF MANSLAUGHTER 
 Thus, the prototype of manslaughter is this sudden occasion or the case of a homicide 
during a fight. There are other cases that resemble the fight in that they are not malicious, but 
which do not constitute real offences because they are not felonious and therefore are 
candidates for pardon.  
 Like chancemedley, this homicide is done without ‘malice aforethought.’ Coke 
explains that it happens “when a man doth an act that is not unlawful, which without any 
evill intent tendeth to a man’s death.”387 The act is not unlawful because it happens “by 
misadventure, per infortunium, or casu,”388 that is, it is not voluntary, or caused by a willed 
action intended to cause the death of somebody, but rather by accident, as when somebody 
pruning a tree, leaves a branch dropping upon somebody, or a ball hits the arm of a barber 
making him to slit his client.389 These are actions with the unintended consequences of killing 
somebody. So, this category receives the name of misadventure, which is synonymous with 
infortunium, and an antonym of murder.  
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 Another subcategory of manslaughter includes those actions that are “voluntary, and 
yet being done upon an inevitable cause are no felon.”390 This subcategory, which can be 
named as ‘self-defense’ since it was such manslaughter, is also qualified as se defendendo. 
In this subcategory, the inevitable cause or inevitable necessity means that there is prior duty 
to retreat which cannot be fulfilled because there is no way to escape, such as “if A. assault 
B. so fiercely and violently and in such a place and in such a manner, as if B. should give 
back, he should be in danger of his life.” Given the condition of the prior duty to retreat, this 
is homicide in self-defense and not a felony because “it is not done in felleo animo,” but 
“upon inevitable cause,”391 that is, “inevitably in defense of himself.”392  
However, the periphery of ‘self-defense’ includes cases in which there is no inevitable 
cause and no attempt to retreat, “as if a thief offer to rob or murder B. either abroad or in his 
house, and thereupon assault him, and B. defend himselfe without any giving back, and in 
his defense killeth the thief, this is no felony; for a man shall never give way to a thief, &c. 
neither shall he forfeit any thing.”393 Likewise, officers who in the course of their office have 
to defend themselves against assault or find violent resistance, “are not bound by law to give 
back” and if to kill somebody is not a felony either.394 
3.1.2.2 MURDER 
 If the prototype of manslaughter is the homicide that happens in a fight, murder is, by 
contrast, planned homicide. Thus, Coke defines murder as: 
When a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth within 
any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king’s 
peace, with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party, or implied by law, so 
as the party wounded, or hurt, &c. die of the wound, of hurt, &c. within a year and a 
day after the same.395  
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In addition to the mental capacity, in this definition, an action and its effect or 
consequence are the features of killing. However, the defining trait distinguishing it from 
manslaughter is the ‘malice fore-thought.’ As we will see, this adds one more level to the 
causal chain, for this intent must precede the action that causes the death. Thus, if the action 
is considered to have “sprang out of the root of malice,” it seems that the very essence of 
murder lies in that malice aforethought with regard to which the action and the effect are but 
mechanical consequences. Coke, however, annexes a clause about implied malice which 
seems to run against that idea.  
3.1.2.2.1 THE PERIPHERY OF MURDER 
 This fact suggests that the structure of the subcategory of murder is going to be 
formed by a core corresponding to the foregoing definition, and a periphery of cases which 
do resemble that core but lack some of its elements.  
MURDER BY MALICE IMPLIED 
 Coke further subdivides this category according to “the manner of the deed,” “the 
person slain,” and the “person killing,” which are the motives by which the law implies 
malice. But as a matter of fact, the malice can be only said to be implied, that is, inferred 
from the circumstance in the first of the divisions which embraces those who “killeth another 
without any provocation on the part of him,” and “the poisoning of any man, whereof he 
dieth within the year.” The other cases are within the boundaries of manslaughter, as when 
royal officers are killed while performing their duty, or negligence or recklessness as the case 
of the homicide in the course of a robbery, or “if a prisoner by the dures of the gaoler, 
commeth to untimely death.”396 
MURDER OF MISFORTUNE 
 There are also conducts which, though naturally falling within the category of 
misfortune, are considered murderous because of their unlawful nature: 
If one shoot any wild fowle upon a tree, and the arrow killeth any reasonable creature 
afar off, without any evill intent in him, this is per infortunium: for it was not unlawful 
to shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a cock or hen, or any tame fowle or 
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another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killeth a man, this had been murder, 
for the act was unlawful.397 
However, this contravenes the principle that in misfortune the intent rather than the 
effect of the action is the basis for criminal liability. Thus, it seems that in these cases, the 
anomalous nature of this type of murder was sanctioned with lesser punishments. As Coke 
puts it, in these cases: 
this is murder; for that he had an ill intent, though that intent extended not to death, 
and though he knew not the party slaine. For the killing of any by misadventure, or 
by chance, albeit it be not felony, quia voluntas in delictis, no exitus spectator; yet he 
shall forfeit therefore all his goods and chattels, to the intent that men should be way 
so to direct their actions.398 
MURDER BY ABETMENT  
As we said earlier, if homicide is the bringing about of the death of somebody by 
some means, these can sometime be indirect means, such as the abetment of somebody to 
commit a crime. This situation departs from the core of murder in that, in the example, the 
person committing the deed that causes the death is the same as the person who has planned 
it, and has the malice aforethought. However, in the case of solicitation, the perpetrator is the 
instrument of the author of the crime. In that case, therefore, the “commandment” is 
considered to be the action that causes the death. However, there is a situation analogous to 
misfortune when the effect of the commandment might not be the intended one so that “if A 
command B, to kill C, and B by mistaking killeth D in stead of C, this is murder in B because 
he did the act…. but A is not accessory, because his commandement was not pursued; and 
his consent, which must make him accessory, cannot be drawne to it, for he never 
commanded the death of D.”399 
However, there are cases of this “misfortune” that are considered murder, as “where 
death ensueth upon that act which is commanded, though death it selfe be not commanded, 
there he is accessory to it, for there the commandement is the cause of death.” The difference 
here is not whether the death is intended and commanded to be cause, but whether it is the 
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consequence of the act commanded, or not. That is, the accessory is held liable of all the 
consequences that follow the action he commands whether he intended them or not.400 
MURDER BY FALSE ACCUSATION 
Within murder, concerning indirect murders, and somehow related to solicitation, 
Coke notes that “there is another kind of murder (which is not holden for murder at this day) 
… ceux auxi que fauxement pur lower, ou en auter manner ount ascun home damne ou fait 
damner au mort, &c. yet this is murder before God. And David killed Uriah with his pen, and 
these men with their tongue.”401 In this passage, Coke is probably thinking of the trial jury, 
and obviously of cases in which there is false judgment. However, within this case of indirect 
homicide there is a situation that is analogous to that of the misadventure, not because there 
is an unintended effect, but because there is no consummation or no intended effect. And this 
is where we reach the doctrine that the deed must be taken for the fact. It is time to go back 
to Coke’s definition of conspiracy. I shall reproduce it again: 
Conspiracy is a consultation and agreement between two or more to appeale, or indict 
an innocent falsely and maliciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause to be 
indicted or appealed; and afterward the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of 
twelve men: the party grieved may be relieved, and the offender punished in two 
wayes. First, by a writ of conspiracy, which is a civill or common action at the suit of 
the party, wherein the plaintife shall recover damages, and the defendant shall be 
imprisoned. Secondly, by indictment at the suit of the king, the judgement whereof is 
criminal.402  
3.1.2.2.2 THE ANCIENT LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
 In order to understand what Coke’s view of the offense of conspiracy was, how he 
placed it as a type of homicide, and what this means, we have to keep in mind what Coke 
suggests in the paragraph citing Britton above, that the punishment of such behavior has 
indeed started  “before the raigne of H. 1.,” when “they which plotted, or compassed the 
death of a man under pretext of law by bringing false appeales, or preferring untrue 
indictments against the innocent of felony, who being duly acquitted, both the appellant and 
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his abbettors were to suffer death.”403 Yet, later on, “king H. I. by authority of parliament did 
mitigate the severity of this ancient law (lest men should be deterred and afraid to accuse) 
and did ordaine that if the delinquents were convicted at the suit of the party, they should 
make satisfaction, and be fined and imprisoned: but if they were convicted by judgement at 
the suit of the king… then they should lose the freedome of the law.”404 This belief regarding 
the source of the offense of conspiracy led Coke to conclude that the thirteenth century 
statutes were “but in affirmance of the common law,” and that the punishment at the suit of 
the king was also at common law.405 In other words, for Coke, the statutes providing the writ 
were only declaratory of what had been the ancient law.  
 This fact would explain why, in his definition of conspiracy, Coke does not resort to 
the terms of the Statute of Conspirators’ but rather uses his own ones, defining it as a “a 
consultation and agreement between two or more, to appeale, or indict and innocent falsely, 
and maliciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed; and 
afterwards the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of twelve men.”406 This alternative 
definition seems to be molded on the abovementioned ancient definition of those who 
“plotted, or compassed the death of a man under pretext of law by bringing false appeales, 
or preferring untrue indictments against the innocent of felony, who being duly acquitted, 
both the appellant and his abettor were to suffer death.”407  
 But what does this ancient law have to do with the medieval offense? Were those two 
the same thing? What was that ancient law more specifically? For one thing, both in Coke’s 
definition and in the ancient one there is a shift of focus from the false indictment to the 
purpose to which this false indictment was a means to. And this purpose is that of causing 
somebody to die, since this is the consequence of a successful indictment of felony. 
Elsewhere he says that conspirators seek to “attaint and overthrow the innocent” or “the death 
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and shedding of the blood of an innocent.”408 If we trace down the source from which Coke 
draws the conclusion that there was an ancient law that the medieval statute of conspirators 
mitigated, this ancient law becomes apparent.  
As discussed earlier, the Mirror of Justices classified false accusations as homicides 
in will, committed by those “who appeal or indict an innocent man of a mortal crime and do 
not prove their appeals or their assertions; and such were formerly adjudged to death, but 
King Henry I ordained this mitigation, that they should be adjudged, not to death, but corporal 
punishment.”409 This homicide in will was indeed defined as the offence of having “the will 
to kill but do not kill” committed also by:   
Those who torture a man so that he confesses to a mortal sin he has not committed, 
and to alleviate torment, preferring death, falsely confesses a felony. And sometimes 
such persons are brought to their end by the records of coroners or justices. And in 
like case are those by whom cripples, children, and others who cannot walk are cast 
and left in desert places, or in such spots they if they do not die of hunger it is no 
thanks to those who put them there, albeit God sends them aid… also false jurors, 
false witnesses… this sin is likewise committed by those who imprison folk in such 
places, or put them in such pain, that it can be found by inquest that they were nearer 
death by such eveil places or pains. In three was God killed, for Longinus killed him 
in fact with the others who hung or torture him. By tongue or by word Pilate killed 
him, for he ordered the killing, and by will the false witnesses killed him, as did all 
those consenting thereto.”410   
 In other words, all these conducts are characterized by the fact that they are indirect 
means to commit homicide either by letting the circumstances or having others to work out 
the desired effect, though this effect never comes true. These situations and conducts are 
bound by the same principle that “those who have the will to kill… are to be adjuged to death 
for their corrupt intention, albeit they did not kill according to their purpose.”411 
That is, according to the Mirror, these are instances of behaviors that are subject to 
the doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed, which is consistent with the fact that 
there is no way to know these indirect homicides except when they fail. This is the ancient 
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law. But the doctrine that the will should be taken for the deed should not throw us off. We 
should rather focus on why and where Coke pulls off this doctrine. The Mirror, as mentioned, 
does not call it by name but as a “homicides in will.” The doctrine comes in handy to explain 
why this appears in the periphery of murder. And what is it that appears? It is a situation that 
resembles that of murder, but which does not fall within its definition: there is ‘malice 
aforethought’, which is here referred to as “plotting and compassing the death of a man by 
pretext of law,” or “consultation and agreement between two or more to appeale, or indict an 
innocent falsely and maliciously of felony,” there is an action in the form of a false 
indictment, but there is no death following it because the defendant is acquitted. In other 
words, this is a homicide in which all the elements of murder are present except for the death 
of the victim. Thus, it becomes part of the periphery of murder in that it resembles it but is 
not such because there is no consummation. This anomaly about the category of murder is 
explained by Coke resorting to the ancient doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed.  
It follows that conspiracy is interpreted here as ‘malice aforethought,’ and is as such 
synonymous with plotting, compassing, imagining.412 This view of the false accusation as a 
type of murder is clearly consistent with the way Coke frames the definition of conspiracy as 
a “consultation and agreement between two or more, to appeale, or indict an innocent falsely, 
and maliciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed; and 
afterward the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of twelve men.”413  
It is true that the term consultation connotes a collective endeavor such as a meeting, 
but the focus here is not so much on the meeting as it is on the content and occasion of the 
same: to kill somebody by false accusation. Likewise, the term agreement connotes the fact 
that there is some form of abetment in that probably one of the parties is arranging others to 
bring a false bill of indictment, to bear false testimony, etc., but the important thing here is 
the purpose of the agreement. Regarding that purpose, it should be said that in this view of 
the false accusation related to murder, there is a failure. That is, there is an action in pursuance 
of the malicious intent, which does not have the expected effect. That action indeed is the 
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false indictment, and the whole point of this interpretation is that it should be punished as a 
sort of murder because of its intent or purpose.  
3.2 HIGH TREASON IN COKE 
3.2.1 COKE’S ANALYSIS OF THE TREASON ACT 1351 
 Coke’s discussion of the crime of high treason is presented as a commentary of the 
statute Treason Act 1351 (25 Edw 3 st 5 c 2), declaring the sorts of behaviors that ought to 
be considered as treason, which he quotes both in Law French and in the English translation. 
The three types of acts of treason, or treasonous behavior that are relevant to the problem of 
conspiracy are: compassing the death of the king, levying war against the king, and adhering 
the king’s enemies, respectively quoted and translated by Coke in this way:414 
Language Death of the king  Levying of war 
Law French Quant home fait compasser ou 
imaginer la mort nostre 
seignor le roy, madame sa 
compaigne, ou de lour 
fitzeigne et heire. 
Si home leve guerre enconter 
nostre seignior le roy en son 
realme, ou soit aidant as 
enemies nostre dit seignor le 
roy en son realme, donnant a 
eux aid, ou comfort en son 
roialme, ou per aylours, et de 
ceo provablement soit attaint 
de overt fact per gents de lour 
condition 
English When a man doth compasse or 
imagine the death of our lord 
the king, of my lady his 
queene, or their eldest sonne 
and heire. 
If a man doe levie warre 
against our lord the king in his 
realme, or be adherent to the 
kings enemies in his realme, 
giving to them aide and 
comfort in his realme or 
elsewhere, and thereof be 
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provably attainted of open 
deed by people of their 
condition. 
 
In these quotes, we already find some of the central lexical elements of the field of 
high treason, regarding the abovementioned subfields of compassing the death of the king, 
levying war against the king, and adhering the king’s enemies: compasser/compasse, 
imaginer/imagine, leve guerre/levie warre, soit aidant/be adherent, overt fact/open deed. The 
meaning of these terms is going to depend largely on the semantic relations that relate them 
to other terms as they are integrated in larger fields as Coke interprets the different clauses 
of this statute.  
To begin with, Coke considers treason as a structured category or “membrum 
divisum” which is divided into six different “classes or heads.” He describes the concepts 
concerned here, and corresponding to three of these classes of acts of treason, as “compassing 
or imagining the death of the King/Queen/Prince and declaring the same by some overt 
deed,” “levying war against the king,”415 and “adhering to the king’s enemies.”416 In giving 
these definitions, Coke is already interpreting the original statute since the clause regarding 
the overt deed did not appear in the case of compassing the death of the king, but as a 
procedural clause indicating that the treason of levying war against the king was to be 
“probably attainted of open deed by people of their condition.”417 Coke justifies this 
interpretation in that a subsequent statute418 explicitly made compassing to kill the king a 
felony, from which Coke implies that in addition to compassing “there must be some other 
overt act or deed tending thereunto, to make it treason within the statute of 25 E. 3.”419 
Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to enact the said statute, making it illegal to 
merely compass something.  
                                                 
415 Ib., 3. 
416 Ib., 4. 
417 Ib., 2. 
418 3 Hen 7 c 14 
419 3 Inst 38. 
161 
 
3.2.2 ATTEMPT THEORY OF THE TREASON OF COMPASSING THE KING’S DEATH 
As to the first of these two treasons, at first sight, three elements can be distinguished: 
the act of compassing, the object or matter of such act—the death of the king—, and the overt 
act that Coke has added to this definition. In order to determine the conditions of liability, 
the questions arise as to how this conduct should be understood and what the relation between 
compassing and the overt act is. This requires further interpretation of the meaning of these 
two terms.  
One way to interpret these terms is by mapping them onto the doctrine that the will 
must be taken for the deed. In Coke’s words: “Let us see first what the compassing the death 
of a subject was before, and at the time of the making of this statute, when voluntas 
reputabatur pro facto. And Bracton saith, that spectatur voluntas et non exitus, et nihil interest 
utrum quis occidat, aut causam mortis preaebeat.”420 
3.2.2.1 WILL AS THE INTENDED EFFECT OF THE ACTION 
Coke believed the Treason Act enacting this treason of compassing the death of the 
king to be declaratory of the common law,421 and to be grounded on the same principle that 
regulated the liability for compassing the death of the subject. In the abovementioned 
passage, the maxim states that in compassing the murder of a subject, the will must be taken 
for the action, and that the will of the action must determine liability without regard to the 
effect of the action. What s Coke means by voluntas is further clarified if we compare this 
passage to that from where the quote is excerpted. In there, Bracton discusses homicide by 
misfortune and accident. The whole passage goes as follows: 
{Accidental homicide}… may be committed in many ways, as where one intending 
to cast a spear at a wild beast {or does something of the sort, as where playing with a 
companion he has struck him in thoughtless jest, or when he stood far off when he 
drew his bow or threw a stone he has struck a man he did not see, or where playing 
with a ball it has struck the hand of a barber he did not see so that he has cut another's 
throat, and thus} has killed a man, not however with the intention of killing him; he 
ought to be absolved, because a crime is not committed unless the intention to injure 
exists, <It is will and purpose which mark maleficia, nor is a theft committed unless 
there is an intent to steal.>as may be said of a child or a madman, since the absence 
of intention protects the one and the unkindness of fate excuses the other. In crimes 
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the intention is regarded, not the result.It does not matter whether one slays or 
furnishes the cause of death.422 
Although this passage occurs in the context of misfortune, Bracton mentions at least 
four different meanings of voluntas, some of which do not have to do with that context: as 
the target or end towards which an action is thought as a means as compared to the unintended 
effect of it, as voluntariness as opposed to involuntary body movement, as the intended 
meaning of a harmful action, and as moral agency or capacity to tell right from wrong.  
In quoting Bracton, Coke is drawing an analogy between accident and failure, 
between the end of an action as opposed to its unintended harmful effect, and the expected 
or desired harmful effect of an action as opposed to its failure.  Thus, Coke focuses on the 
distinction between the effect of the action, which might be the death of somebody, and the 
purpose of that action. In the cases where the action has the effect of killing someone, the 
‘purpose’ of such action is the decisive element in determining the lack of criminal liability. 
Upon this argument, Coke draws the conclusion that if the ‘purpose’ is the gist of the liability 
where the effect was unintended, then it is too when the action did not have the intended 
criminal effect. In that case, the principle of liability that the will must be taken for the action 
means that the expected effect of the action must be taken for the real unexpected effect of 
the action.  
3.2.2.2 THE ACTION AS FAILED EXECUTION 
In the case of accident or misfortune, there is a harmful action, a homicide. However, 
in the case of compassing the death of somebody, the action need not be harmful, but “must 
causam mortis praebere, that is, declare the same [purpose] by some open deed tending to 
the execution of his intent, or which might be the cause of death.” An action ‘tending to the 
execution of its intent,’ is an action intended as a means to bring about the death of the victim; 
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an intermediate act. One may wonder how far this intermediate act might be from 
consummation. Coke is not thinking of just any intermediate act but of those “which might 
be the cause of death”. This requirement restricts the scope of the principle to harmful actions. 
Indeed, Coke provides cases of assault to illustrate this type of action tending to the execution 
of the intent (assault can be reframed as failure to murder just by the murderous intent): as 
when a “man’s wife went away with her avowterer, and they compassed the death of the 
husband, as he was riding towards the sessions of oier and terminer and gaole-delivery, they 
assaulted him and stroke him with weapons, that he fell downe as dead, whereupon they 
fled”. Likewise, when “a youth… would have stolen the goods of his master, and came to his 
masters bed, where he lay asleepe, and with a knife attempted with all his force to have cut 
his throat; and thinking that he had indeed cut it, he fled.”423 A third case was when “a man 
had imagined to murder, or rob another, and to that intent had become infidiator viarum, and 
assaulted him, though he killed him not, nor took anything from him.”424 
3.2.2.3 COKE’S CONCEPT OF ‘ATTEMPT’ 
From a contemporary point of view, it can be said that Coke is trying to formulate a 
concept of ‘attempt’ understood as ‘a failure to commit a crime’ This implies an action which 
puts into execution a frustrated purpose to commit the crime. His view combines the 
subjective approach with this form of liability: inasmuch as the attempt is conceived as the 
means to realize some criminal purpose, it does not matter how close the action is to 
consummation. Yet, at the same time, for Coke, not all acts in execution of a criminal purpose 
are attempts of murder but only such acts as might have caused the death of the victim. Such 
are criminal not only in connection with the purpose, but are capable of an objective 
definition by the law as it is clear that the offender has crossed a threshold of no return. Thus, 
within this view, the doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed concerning the liability 
of such attempt means that the failed action must be punished as if it had been consummated. 
That is, as if the expected result (the will) had taken place (the deed).  
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3.2.2.4 LEXICAL STRUCTURE OF THE BLENDING BETWEEN THE ATTEMPT AND THE COMPASSING THE DEATH OF 
THE KING 
It should be recalled at this point that Coke believed the statute Treason Act to be a 
statement of the common law, and therefore of the law of attempt as it applied to regicide. 
The same principles which applied to the case of compassing the death of the subject applied 
to the case of compassing the death of the king. Thus, he was blending the notion of attempt 
expressed with the apothegm that the will must be taken for the deed with the definition of 
treason. One of the consequences of this conceptual blend is that the lexicon of the said 
treason of compassing the death of the king would be applied to the description of the said 
notion of attempt. This means that if we understand the concept of ‘attempt’ as ‘failed action 
in execution of a criminal purpose,’ the opposition voluntas\factum\exitus is mapped onto the 
opposition compassing\overt act, which now will designate the component concepts of the 
notion of attempt ‘criminal purpose’ and ‘failed action’. The new relationship that was 
established between the two terms was that the overt act was the execution of the compassing, 
which therefore was the cause of the overt act. These are consequently the causative and 
executive senses respectively of these terms.  
Together, in their new dresses, compassing and overt act encode the notion of 
attempt. In this way, these terms are incorporated into the domain of criminal liability: 
Compassing and overt act designating the conditions for the imputation or attribution of the 
legal consequences following the unconsummated crimes. However, these terms did not 
originally belong to the frame of attempt, but rather to the frame of high treason where, as 
we will see shortly, they designated different things and had a different relation. The blending 
of these two frames caused some troubles, as Coke’s interpretation did not match either the 
relationship existing between overt act and compassing or the structure that the overt act had 
within high treason.  
3.2.3 VOLITIVE THEORY OF THE TREASON OF COMPASSING THE DEATH OF THE KING 
3.2.3.1 OPEN WAR 
 As said earlier, the statute Treason Act did not mention the overt act in relation to the 
treason of “compassing or imagining the death of the King, Queene, Prince.” The expression 
overt act derived from another clause of the statute, that providing that “if a man… be 
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adherent to the king’s enemies in his realme, giving them aide and comfort in the realme or 
elsewhere, and thereof be probably attainted of open deed by people of their condition.”425 
This implied joining the monarch’s enemies by some form of private bond or confederacy 
with the enemy, as when “a subject conspire (sic) with a foraine prince to invade the realm 
by open hostility.”426 The adjective open indicates a sense of ‘public’ by contrast to the 
private agreement which is illustrated by the expressions “in open war against the king,”427 
open hostility,428 and open rebellion.429 The open deed therefore has an evidential value: it is 
merely a procedural requirement since given its nature such private agreement and joining 
cannot be known and tried until it has not been manifested and made public by an act of open 
hostility. It is that act, in the end, that makes the treason.  
3.2.3.2 COMPASSING AS A CRIME 
Therefore, in Coke’s definition of the treason of death of the king by “compassing or 
imagining the death of the King, Queene, Prince, and declaring the same by some overt 
act.”430 compassing appears as the criminal activity itself, and the overt act as an evidence of 
it. That is why, from the evidential point of view, compassing/imagining is described as a 
“secret in the heart.”431 And as such, it “is to be discovered by circumstances precedent, 
concomitant, and subsequent”432 Therefore, there should be “direct and manifest proof, not 
upon conjectural presumptions, or inferences, or straines of wit; but upon good and sufficient 
proof.”433 This is the overt act which can be described as evidence of a secret conceiving of 
the death of the king. 
This evidential definition of the overt act is quite different from that of its attempt 
sense. If the crime is consummated with having the purpose merely, and the overt act is just 
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something revealing it, this does not agree with the restrictions imposed upon the overt act 
that it must be an act in execution of this will, and that it must be such as might cause the 
death. In this attempt interpretation, intent is the central aspect in determining the criminal 
liability of the overt act, but not the crime itself. Indeed, the overt act is an action that comes 
before the commission of the crime itself since it puts it into execution. In the evidential 
reading of the crime, the overt act is a central element in proving the liability for a crime 
which has already been committed. It is one thing to consider the conceiving of the death of 
the king as a crime to be proved by its execution, and quite another to consider that the failed 
execution of such a plan is an attempt to commit regicide. Evidence is always by nature ex 
post facto, whereas the attempt is ex ante.  
3.2.3.3 STRUCTURE OF THE ‘OVERT ACT’ 
 It is perhaps due to the interpretation of the statute as including procedural 
requirement of “direct and manifest proof,” that the question of admissible evidence 
concerning this treason of planning the death of the king received the attention of the courts, 
leading to the development of a sort of special law of evidence. Indeed, it can be said that a 
great part of the law of this act of treason of compassing the death of the king is rather law 
of evidence, and that there is very little case-law development of the substance of the criminal 
behavior of plotting.  In this law, we can see that the relationship between proof and the thing 
proved is not always a natural one as might indicate the words that it is “to be discovered by 
circumstances precedent, concomitant, and subsequent.”434 Rather, it seems that the 
relationship is forensic and exists only in the law. In that sense, if we approach the 
relationship between evidence and the thing it proves as a semiotic one between a symbol 
and its meaning, the rules of evidence can be understood as rules of interpretation, that is, 
rules establishing a relation between the meaning of secret purpose and the significant overt 
act. Thus, the relation between overt act and compassing was conventional. In that sense, in 
developing the category of overt act, the courts were also creating synonyms of compassing. 
Words, acts dethroning or coercing the king, preparing the execution of the plan, and 
adhering the king’s enemies were considered evidence of such overt act.  
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3.2.3.3.1 WORDS 
The problems caused by the fact that Coke uses a vocabulary belonging to a different 
domain to describe the idea of attempt is further illustrated by the construction of the different 
actions that are considered as evidence of the compassing of the death of the king, much of 
which fall short from failures in the execution of such purpose, and some of which can hardly 
be considered within the definition of evidence of a secret planning of the king. Indeed, a 
plan might be revealed or discovered by acts that are not in direct execution of it, as is the 
case of words. Thus, in his discussion of the concept of ‘attempt’ Coke argued that:  
It was not a bare compassing or plotting the death of a man, either by word, or writing, 
but such an overt deed... to manifest the same. So as if a man had compassed the death 
of another, and had uttered the same by words or writing, yet he should not have died 
for it, for there wanted an overt deed tending to the execution of his compassing. But 
if a man had imagined to murder, or rob another, and to that intent had become 
infidiator viarum, and assaulted him, though he killed him not, not took anything from 
him, yet was it felony, for there was an overt deed.435  
Yet, he goes on to concede that by the ancient law: “in the case of the king, if a man 
had compassed, or imagined the death of the king… and had declared his compassing, or 
imagination by words or writing, this had been high treason, and a sufficient overture.”436 
And that although “divers latter acts of parliament have ordained, that compassing by bare 
words or sayings should be high treason… all they are either repealed or expired.” Yet the 
reason for such restriction is a matter of procedural certainty: 
And it is commonly said, that bare words may make an heretic, but not a 
traytor without an overt act. And the wisdom of the makers of this law would 
not make words only to be treason, seeing such variety amongst the witnesses 
are about the same, as few of them agree together.437  
It is also a matter of policy as: 
Not only the ignorant and rude unlearned people, but also learned and expert 
people minding honesty, are oftentimes trapped and snared, yea, many times 
for words only, without other fact or deed done or perpetrated: therefore… 
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there must be and overt deed. But words without an overt deed are to be 
punished in another degree, as an [sic] high misprision438 
This distinction between overt act and words is simply a matter of the quality of the 
evidence. Mere words are considered unreliable evidence not only in that there are different 
versions, but also in that frequently they might express or declare a plan only in the surface 
but in reality, a mere wish or a way of saying. But for the same reason, written words are 
considered sufficient evidence of planning as “set downe in writing by the delinquent 
himselfe, this is a sufficient overt act within the statute.”439 
3.2.3.3.2 DETHRONING, COERCING AND PREPARATIONS    
 There are several acts which are considered evidence of compassing the death of the 
king. This is the case of acts leading to, or with the purpose of, dethroning the monarch as 
“he that declareth by overt act to depose the king, is a sufficient overt act… and so is to 
imprison the king into his power, and manifest the same by some overt act.440  It also includes 
acts threatening or coercing the monarch’s will as taking “the king by force, and strong hand, 
and to imprison him until he hath yeelde to certaine demands”, or to intend “to goe to the 
court where the queen was, and to have her into their power, and to have removed divers of 
her counsel, and for that end did assemble a multitude of people.” Likewise, it covers acts of 
preparation but short of the execution of the plan “as if divers doe conspire the death of the 
king, and the manner how, and thereupon provide weapons, powder, poison, assay harness, 
send letters, &c. or the like, for execution of the conspiracy.”441  
3.2.3.3.3 OTHER TREASONS AS EVIDENCE 
 Sometimes acts which fall short of the other two treasons analyzed here are 
considered as evidence of the compassing of the death as when “a subject conspires with a 
foraine prince beyond the seas to invade the realme by open hostility, and prepare for the 
same by some overt act.” Yet the general rule, saving statutory exceptions, it that one kind 
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of treason “cannot be an overt act for another. As for example: a conspiracy is had to levy 
warre, this (as hath been resolved) is no treason by this act until it be levied.”442 
3.2.3.4 LEXICAL STRUCTURE OF THE VOLITIVE VIEW 
 We are now ready to see how the vocabulary involved in the description of this 
treason of ‘conceiving the king’s death’ is consequently structured. The purpose is referred 
to by the terms compassing, imagining, plotting, intent, machinating, counselling, invent, 
devise and conspiracy. The evidence of such purpose is designated with the terms act and 
deed. In that sense, the purpose is contained within the definition of this act. From the 
epistemological and procedural point of view, there is a relationship of opposition between 
them, here signified by the terms secret and overt/open, designating their knowability or 
unknowability respectively. Within the type of acts that constitute evidence there is still a 
further distinction between word and act, with the distinction within the words sometimes 
between bare and spoken words, and written or publicly uttered words.    
3.2.3.4.1 CONSPIRACY   
The term conspiracy already appeared in Coke’s discussion of the Treason Act as a 
synonym for compassing, meaning to have conceived the death of the king. The use of this 
term within this context is rare, nevertheless, and was probably influenced by the Elizabethan 
statutes. Furthermore, the paradigmatic relations it establishes with other words seem to 
suggest that the meaning is rather that of a collective purpose in the form of a ‘plan’ as in the 
sentence “if divers do conspire the death of the king, and the manner how, and thereupon 
provide weapons, powder, poison, assay harness, send letters, &c., or the like, for execution 
of the conspiracy.”443  This is also the case of  the sentence “if many conspire to levie war, 
and some of them do levie the same according to the conspiracy, this is a high treason in all, 
for in treason all be principals and war is levied.” In other words, whereas words like 
compassing or imagining do not restrain the possibility of a single individual compassing, 
the term conspiracy clearly does.”444  Indeed, another syntagmatic element associated to the 
term conspiracy, the purpose of “levy war,” suggests that in addition to the meaning of 
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‘planning’, it might also be used to mean an ‘alliance or confederacy against an enemy’. That 
is why it forms expressions like “a conspiracy is had to levie warre” or “If a subject conspires 
with a foraine prince beyond the seas to invade the realme by open hostility.”445  
The concept of alliance against an enemy, and the concept of conceiving or thinking 
of, as being designated both by the same term is further illustrated by Coke’s commentary 
on the statute of 3 Hen 7 c 14. This statute was enacted to complete the statute Treason, 
within the scope of which, “if actual deeds be not had,” did not fall “false compassings, 
imaginations and confederacies had against any lord, or any of the kings counsel, or any of 
the kings great officers in his household, as steward, treasurer, and comptroller.”446 For the 
prevention of such deeds it was made a felony  for “any servant sworne, and his name put 
into the chequer roll of his household, whatsoever he be, serving in any manner, office, or 
roome, reputed, had and taken, under the state of a lord, make any confederacies, compassing, 
conspiracies, or imaginations with any person or persons, to destroy or murder the king, or 
any lords of his realme, or any other person sworne to the kings counsell, steward, treasurer, 
or comptroller of the kings house.”447 
The offence the statute is referring to is a form of cooptation of the king’s 
disillusioned servants so that they were abetted to murder members of the king’s council or 
any of the high officers. Thus, the central concept involved here is that of an alliance or 
confederacy against an enemy. This concept is not only signaled by the terms confederacy 
and conspiracy, but also by the syntagmatic relations illustrated in the sentences “false 
compassings, imaginations, and confederacies had against any lord,” and “if any servant… 
make any confederacies, compassings, conspiracies or imaginations with any person or 
persons.”448 The first formulation reminds us of the false oath had against somebody, which 
was so characteristic of the alliance by conspiracy in the Middle Ages as discussed in the 
second chapter. The second indicates that alliances need to be made or created, as with any 
bond, and that it should be with the concurrence and consent of several people. Within these 
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constraints, the words compassing and imaginations appear here in paradigmatic relation to 
confederacy and conspiracy, and clearly the meaning to have a purpose is secondary to the 
idea of entering into an alliance. Alliances are made by certain people, against certain people, 
and with certain purpose.  
Coke, nevertheless, interprets this statute from the point of view of his attempt theory 
of the overt act. According to that theory, the purpose of an action stood for the action when 
its effect was either unintended or frustrated. That meant that mere compassing revealed by 
some overt act was not the treasonous behavior, but rather a failed or aborted regicide. This 
statute demonstrated that “besides the confederacy, compassing, conspiracy, or imagination, 
there must be some other overt act or deed tending thereunto, to make it treason within the 
statute 25 E. 3. And therefore, the bare confederacy, compassing, conspiracy, or imaginations 
by words only, is made felony by this act. But if the conspirators doe provide any weapon, 
or other thing, to accomplish their devilish intent; this and the like is an overt act to make it 
treason.”449  
In this view, the terminology of high treason was applied to refer to this concept, so 
that the compassing designated the criminal purpose, and the overt act the failed action. 
Likewise, the term compassing designated all the terms in paradigmatic relation with it such 
as confederacy, compassing, and imagination. Thus, conspiracy and confederacy appear 
ripped off of their social aspect, as a form of volition or cognition, as opposed to their 
execution into an action. This is even clearer when, in talking about how the king’s servants 
being closer to his counsellors and high officials made it easier to try to kill them, Coke 
comments that “such attempt and conspiracy was before this parliament made by some of 
this kings household servants.”  Finally, the purpose to which the volitive conspiracy is 
referring to can be merely expressed by words or acted upon. To such unacted but expressed 
purpose Coke refers with the term bare added to conspiracy.450 
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3.2.4 LEVYING WAR  
3.2.4.1 MEANING AND SOURCE 
 The other act of treason that touches the issue of conspiracy is when “a man doe [sic] 
levie warre against our lord the king in his realme.” According to Coke, this was “high treason 
by the common law, for no subject can levie warre within the realme without authority from 
the king,”451 and the statute Treason Act simply declares or states it. The meaning of levie 
warre involves an “actual rebellion or insurrection,” though the minimum requirement is that 
several people meet together “bearing of armes in warlike manner.”452 However, the meaning 
of levy war was liable to interpretation, in part due to subsequent legislation, in part due to 
its interpretation by lawyers.  
3.2.4.1 COGNITIVE THEORY OF LEVYING OF WAR 
 The first change in meaning we can speak about is that of the creation of the cognitive 
levying of war in Elizabethan times. Following the scheme of the volitive view of compassing 
the death of the king, the statute 13 Eliz 1 c1 (1571) made it an act of treason to: 
Compasse imagyn invent devyse or intend... to levye Warre against her Majesty 
within this Realme or without… and suche Compasses Ymaginacions Invencions 
Devises or Intentions or any of them, shall malitiously advisedly and expressly utter 
or declare by any Pryntinge Wrytinge Cyphryng Speache Wordes or Sayinges.  
Thus, though the term overt act is not directly used, the structure clearly reveals the 
opposition compassing/over act, where the evidence of the purpose to levy war is merely 
verbal. Furthermore, though the statute does not use the term conspiracy to describe the idea 
of having such purpose, Coke does so in saying that “during the life of the queen, a 
conspiracy to levie war was high treason, though no war were levied; and upon that law, 
Bradshaw, Burton, and others, were attainted of high treason, for conspiracy only to levie 
war.” However, Coke denies that the volitive levying of war was a treason by the Treason 
Act: “a compassing or conspiracy to levie ware, is not treason for there must be a levying of 
war in facto.” In this very passage, he nevertheless combines the volitive reading of levying 
of war with those other executive readings and social meanings of it. Thus, “if many conspire 
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to levie war, and some of them do levie the same according to the conspiracy, this is high 
treason in all, for in treason all be principals, and war is levied.”453  
3.2.4.2 CONSTRUCTIVE TREASON 
 The other change in the meaning of levy of war came with the construction of the 
crime in legal proceedings. As said earlier, a levy of war involves an insurrection or rebellion, 
and the use of force. These are objective elements. But acts short of insurrection or rebellion 
became treasons under this heading on the grounds that they involved the usurpation of the 
king’s authority as when “any levy war to expulse strangers, to deliver men out of prisons, 
to remove counsellors, or against any statute, or to any other end, pretending reformation of 
their own heads, without warrant.”454 Likewise, certain civil disorders such as: 
if three, or foure, or more, doe rise to… alter religion established within the realme, 
or laws, or to go from town to town generally, and to cast downe inclosures, this is a 
levying of war (thought there be no great number of the conspirators) within the 
purvien [sic] of the statute… and so it was resolved in the case of Richard Bradshaw, 
miller, Robert Burton, mason, and others of Oxforshire, whose case was, that they 
conspired and agreed to assemble themselves with so many as they could procure… 
to rise and from thence to go from genltemans house, and to cast downe inclosures, 
as well for inlargement of high-wayes as of errable lands… and it was resolved, that 
this was a compassing and intention to levie war against the queen.455 
  This was similarly the case of “an insurrection against the statute of labourers for the 
inhansing of salaries and wages.” These acts of civil disturbance fell within the common law 
offences of riot and unlawful assembly, and the only difference between them and an act of 
treason under the construction of levy of war was subjective: when the “pretence was publick 
and general, and not private in particular.”456 Thus, in this constructive treason, the central 
element was not the objective one, but the subjective purpose of the act of civil disturbance. 
It should be noted that the terms conspirators and conspired appear again within this context, 
where the central idea or concept is now that of an unlawful assembly or meeting of people, 
and when it becomes an act of treason. The conspiracy refers either to the unlawful assembly, 
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or to the organizing of the unlawful assembly. This is the collective sense of conspiracy, as 
a large gathering of people acting with a common purpose. 
 Finally, a third construction of the meaning of treason is related to the treason of 
compassing the death of the king: the compassing or imagining to levy war as an act in 
evidence of the treason of levying of war. With regard to this, as said earlier, Coke opined 
that one treason “cannot be an overt act for another… a conspiracy is had to levie warre, this 
(as hath been said and so resolved) is no treason by this act until it be levied, therefore it is 
no overt act or manifest proofe of the compassing of the death of the king within this act.”457  
3.3 HIGH TREASON IN HALE 
3.3.1 COMPASSING THE DEATH OF THE KING 
3.3.1.1 SOURCE 
 As Coke, Hale believed that the offense of treason originated at common law, and 
that the Treason Act had declared it.  However, he does explain why this statute was enacted 
in that before “almost every offense that was, or seemed to be a breach of the faith and 
alligeance due to the kin, was by construction and consequence and interpretation raised into 
the offense of high treason.”458 Since the statute had been passed to end with that arbitrariness 
and uncertainty, Hale laid down the principles of how it should be interpreted in that it is: 
Dangerous to depart from the letter of the statute, and to multiply and inhance crimes 
into treason by ambiguous and general words… [and] by construction and analogy to 
make treasons, where the letter of the law has not done it: for such a method admits 
of no limits or bounds, but runs as far as the wit and invention of accusers, and the 
odiousness and detestation of persons accused will carry men.459 
3.3.1.2 MEANING 
3.3.1.2.1 VOLITIVE THEORY 
Matthew Hale’s volitive understanding of the treason of compassing the death of the 
king is in keeping with this narrow view of the meaning of the statute. He described the 
compassing as the “purpose of the mind or will, tho the purpose or design take no effect,” 
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that is as “an internal act”460 or “act of the mind.”461 Likewise, this view leads to the evidential 
view of the overt act. Thus, from the epistemological point of view it was unknowable and 
unaccountable because “without something to manifest it could not possibly fall under any 
judicial cognizance, but of God alone,” and therefore, the “statute requires an overt-act, as 
may render the compassing or imagining capable of a trial and sentence by human 
judicatories.”462 However, this requirement is not merely a procedural matter of evidence but 
is rather a constitutive element of the offense as it shows that in the indictment the 
compassing could not be pleaded generally without averting “the particular overt-act 
certainly and sufficiently.”463 That this requirement was the law though was not explicitly 
stated by the Treason Act, but was demonstrated by the enactment of 3 Hen 7 c 14, which 
“makes conspiring the king’s death to be felony; which it would not have done, if the bare 
conspiring without an overt act had been treason.”464 Likewise, the statute 21 Ric 2 c 3, 4 
“makes the bare purposing, or compassing, treason, without any overt-act… yet it was too 
dangerous a law to put mens bare intentions upon the judgment even of parliament under so 
great a penalty, without some overt act to evidence it: this was the reason of the repeal of the 
treasons declared by the statute.”465  
3.3.1.2.2 ATTEMPT THEORY 
 Yet, at the same time, there is evidence that Hale was aware of the attempt view of 
the offence of compassing the death of the king, so in discussing the liability of foreign 
ambassadors he pointed out that: 
In the case of bare conspiracy against the life of the king, or a conspiracy of a rebellion 
or change of government, novarum rerum molimina, there is a great diversity of 
opinions among learned men, how far the priviledge of an ambassador exempts him 
from penal prosecution as an enemy for such conspiracies or inconsummate attempts, 
that do not proceed farther than the machination, solicitation or conspiracy… they 
assign this reason of the difference between a bare conspiracy or machination against 
the prince, and an actual attempt of treason, whether against his person or 
                                                 
460 Ib., 107. 
461 Ib., 108. 
462 Ib., 107. 
463 Ib., 108. 
464 Ib., 112. See also p. 140. 
465 Ib., 111. 
176 
 
government, which hath attained as great consummtaion (sic), as such embassador is 
able to effect, as procuring the wounding of the prince, or an actual attempt to poison 
him, tho death ensue not… because in these latter the mischief is consummate, as far 
as the embassador could effect it, and so prohibited not only by the civil and 
municipal laws, but by the laws of nations; but inconsummate machinations, 
according to these opinions, are raised to the crimen laesae majestatis by civil or 
municipal laws or constitutions; and they think it too hard, that an embassador or 
forein agent… should be obnoxious to a capital punishment for bare machination or 
conspiracy, which is a secret thing and of great latitude; but this, as I have said, is 
rather a prudential and politic consideration, and not according to the strict measure 
of justice.”466  
In this passage, the central distinction is not between secret purpose and evidence, but 
between consummate and unconsummated attempt, that is, between purpose and failed 
action. In that view, as has been said, the compassing cannot be but an element of the attempt, 
that is, of the purpose of the attempt that makes it to stand for the crime. From this standpoint, 
the mere compassing cannot be punished. However, Hale is only concerned here with the 
rationale of the treason of compassing the death of the king, and he reveals that it is not out 
of reason, natural law nor justice that such purpose is punishable but as matter of political 
expediency. This is as much as an admission that volitive treason is an anomaly against 
reason and justice, maybe subject to the reason of state, but against any sound view of what 
the law should be. In other words, these laws of treason do not purport to do justice, to redress 
any evil, but rather to prevent that this evil happens. It is a matter of “prudencial and politic 
consideration”. That is why only municipal law makes it a “crime laesae majestatis, tho the 
effect be not attainted.”467 That is why the overt act requirement is so important in restoring 
such expedient law to some measure of certainty and justice, in the procedural sense of a fair 
trial. It is an exceptional law, but it should not be applied exceptionally.  
However, this distinction between purpose and execution, rather than between 
purpose and evidence, is more characteristic of the treason of levying war against the king. 
With regard to the issue as to whether an assembly of people to the intent of resisting the 
government’s policy was constructive treason under the Treason Act, Hale remembers that 
it cannot be considered a “bare assembly to that intent to be a sufficient overt-act of levying 
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of war; that was but an attempt and putting in ure, unless they had actually begun the 
execution of that intention, going about, practicing or putting in ure; for this act puts a 
difference between the same and the doing thereof.”468 That is, he considers that in this case 
of the treason of levying war against the king, the law punishes the attempt rather than the 
purpose.  
It should be added, though, that in commenting indictments where multiple overt-acts 
had been laid down, Hale says that “if any overt-act be sufficiently laid in the indictment, 
and proved, any other overt-acts may be given in evidence to aggravate the crime and render 
it more probable.”469 The idea that the other facts aggravate and make the treason of 
compassing more probable implies that these other facts not only confirm with a greater 
certainty the purpose to kill the king, but also point out to the seriousness of the purpose. 
That is, they indicate that the defendant was closer to its execution. This does not deny the 
volitive theory of treason, but it places it within a different frame: that of the sequence or 
process that goes from purpose to execution and effect. Thus, the offense is consummated 
with the purpose, but the fact that the purpose was closer to execution aggravates it. This 
implies that there is a difference between conceiving the death of the king and attempting it.  
3.3.1.3 OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT (BURDEN OF PROOF) 
 As to the requirement that there should be an averment of an act in evidence of the 
purpose, which is not in the letter of the Treason Act, like Coke, Hale believed that at 
common law the treason of compassing the death of the king was vague and ambiguous, and 
that the Treason Act was enacted to put an end to that situation. Likewise, he argued that 
although “the words in the statute 25 E. 3. and be provably thereof attaint by open deed 
(emphasis is not mine), &c. come after the clause of levying of war, yet it refers to all the 
treasons before-mentioned, viz. compassing the death of the king, queen, or prince.”470 And 
that extension of the overt-act clause was proven in that “the statute of 3 H. 7. Cap. 14. makes 
conspiring the king’s death to be felony; which it would not have done, if the bare conspiring 
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without an overt-act had been treason.”471 As to the values that it pursued, Hale thought of 
the overt-act requirement more as a procedural guarantee. The main protection a defendant 
had against an arbitrary conviction was the certainty of the indictment, which meant they 
could traverse it. An indictment framed on the compassing only, can always present the facts 
so that they are interpreted as having the purpose of the death of the king. Thus, when the 
facts are true, and cannot be traversed by the defendant, the burden of proof would lie on the 
latter. And how can the defendant proof that he had no intent? With the overt-act clause, 
things change. Now the purpose is presupposed, and the prosecution would have to 
demonstrate that it was revealed by overt acts. This leads to a legal discussion and 
development as to whether the acts are overt acts or not. This is a matter of law, of the law 
of evidence. That is, this way the burden of proof lay not on the defendant who would have 
to prove that he did not have the presumed purpose, but on the prosecution, which would 
have to prove “the particular overt-act certainly and sufficiently”472 and eventually argued 
that acts given in the indictment act are overt-acts.473 Thus, in commenting the statute 21 Ric 
2 c 3 and c 4, he mentions that it “makes the bare purposing, or compassing, treason, without 
any overt act; and tho it restrain the judgment thereof to the parliament, yet it was too 
dangerous a law to put mens bare intentions upon the judgment even of parliament under so 
great a penalty, without some overt-act to evidence it.”474 (It should be noted that though this 
statute precedes 3 Hen 7 c 14, Hale does not use it as an argument to prove the overt-act 
requirement).  
3.3.1.4 THEORY OF THE OVERT ACT (STANDARD OF PROOF) 
According to Hale, an overt-act is such fact as “may render the compassing or 
imagining capable of a trial and sentence by human judicatures.”475 In other words, it is a fact 
that proves or evidences the unknowable internal act or act of the mind. It is important to 
underline that this is not a fact in evidence of a criminal act, but of a criminal purpose turned 
into the offense itself. Proving a mental event is a far  more hazardous task than proving that 
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a physical action is connected with the commission of a crime, and it always implies some 
form of inference from “circumstances precedent, concomitant, and subsequent with all 
endeavor evermore for the safety of the king.”476  This implies, according to Coke, that the 
prisoner should be probably attainted “upon direct and manifest proof, not upon conjecturall 
presumptions, or inference, or straines of wit.” that is, “good and sufficient proof” standard 
of proof.477 Hale seems to share the same view as to the standard478with Coke, and as him, 
he explained this standard as an account of facts that are considered “direct and plain” proof 
of the conceiving of the king’s death by contrast to those that are conjectural and uncertain.  
3.3.1.4.1 PREPARATIONS 
Like Coke, Hale develops the concept of ‘overt-act’ by listing the particular facts that 
might and might not be considered “good and sufficient proof” of the compassing. The more 
direct one is the case of preparations, as when “men conspire the death of the king and the 
manner, and thereupon provide weapons, powder, harness, poison, or send letters for the 
execution thereof.” However, Hale includes within this view the case in which the 
“conspiracy be not immediately and directly and expressly the death of the king, but the 
conspiracy is of something, that in all probability must induce it, and the overt-act is of such 
a thing, as must induce it.”479 Thus, “conspiring to depose the king, and manifesting the same 
by some overt-act,”480 that is, the conceiving of the deposition of the king, when known by 
certain fact, is interpreted as evidence of the compassing of the death of the king. This is also 
the case when “men conspire to imprison the king by force and a strong hand, ‘till he hath 
gather company or write letters.”481 It should be noted that in this case, the evidence is not 
plain and direct but involves interpretation and inference of the purpose to depose the king 
or to imprison him as a means leading to his death.  
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3.3.1.4.2 WORDS 
According to Hale, spoken words “of themselves cannot make high treason” nor “of 
themselves are… a sufficient overt-act within the statute of 25 E. 3,”482 since “they are easily 
subject to be mistaken, or misapplied, or misrepeated, or misunderstood by the hearers.”483 
Yet there are several exceptions: “that words may expound and overt-act to make good an 
indictment of treason of compassing the king’s death, which overt act possibly of itself may 
be indifferent and unapplicable to such an intent,”484 That is, this again is an interpretive view 
of the evidence, such that certain facts are interpreted along with certain words so that they 
together allow to infer the compassing of the king’s death. This is likewise true of “some 
words, that are expressly menacing the death or destruction of the king.”485 Also, there are 
statutes that made public speeches a treason.486 Words put into paper “by the delinquent 
himself… [or] by any other by his command,”487 however, are considered good evidence488  
under the Treason Act “if the matters contained in them import such a compassing.”489  
3.3.1.4.3 ASSEMBLIES AND ALLIANCES 
 The easiest case of assemblies or meetings of people as evidence of compassing the 
king’s death was that of a group of men “assembling together to consider how they may kill 
the king.” Yet the issue as to whether “a conspiracy to levy war” was “an overt-act, to serve 
an indictment for the compassing of the king’s death”490 was arguable. For one thing, Hale 
points out Coke’s contradictory views: on the one hand, Coke holds that “the clauses 
concerning compassing of the king’s death, and that of levying war, are distinct clauses, and 
declare distinct treasons; and therefore the latter shall not be an overt-act to serve the former, 
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because these were to confound several classes or membra dividentia of high treason.”491 On 
the other hand however, he holds that the case of the Earls of Essex and Southampton to 
“assemble a multitude of people” to the purpose “to go to the court where the queen was, and 
to have taken her into their power, and to have removed divers of her council”492 was 
considered to be an overt act.  
 To support that such a conspiracy to levy war was an overt act, Hale refers to the case 
of the duke of Norfolk, in which a “conspiring with a forein prince to invade this kingdom, 
and signifying it to him by letters” was considered to be an overt act.493 Against Coke’s  
former view, and in support of the latter, Hale cites a case from 1663 in which it was decided 
that “sur indictment pur compassing mort le roy overt fait poet ester layd in consulting a 
levyer guerre contre  lui (que est overt-act de soy mesme) & actual assembling, & levying 
guerre.” The case also mentioned the “case des regicides, Venner, Tonge & Vane, qe sur 
indictment de compassing de mort le roy, consulting a levyer guerre, ou actual assembling 
de guerre fueront evidence, & overt faits provant compassing mort le roy”494 Likewise, in the 
Case of Arden and Somerville and others, “it was resolved by all the justices, that a meeting 
together of these accomplices to consult touching the manner of effecting it was an overt-act 
to prove it.”495 Finally, Hale gives a rationale why such an assembly was an overt act, which 
basically was constructed upon the same principle that this was the means to the end of killing 
the king: 
An assembly to levy war against the king, either to depose or restrain, or enforce him 
to any act, or to come to his presence, or to come to his presence to remove his 
counsellors or ministers, or to fight against the king’s lieutenant or military 
commissionate officers, is an overt-act proving the compassing of the death of the 
king; for such a war is directed against the very person of the king, and he, that designs 
to fights against the king, cannot but know at least it must hazard his life.496  
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In commenting the case of the London weavers who “did agree among themselves to 
rise and go from house to house to take and destroy the engine-looms… assemble themselves 
in great numbers… (and) did in a most violent manner break open the houses of many of the 
king’s subjects… took away the engines and making great fires burnt the same,” Hale 
explained that the court was divided between those judges who thought it was a case of 
levying war against the king, and those who though it was a mere riot. The latter opined that:  
If men assemble together and consult to raise a force immediately or directly against 
the king’s person, or to restrain or depose him, whether the number of persons were 
more or less, or whether armed or unarmed, tho this were not a treason within this 
clause of the statute of 25 E. 3 (levy war clause), yet it was treason within the first 
clause of compassing the king’s death, and an overt-act sufficient to make good such 
an indictment.497  
In commenting the case of John Oldecastle, leader of a Lollard insurrection, Hale 
commented that “the indictment is principally founded upon that article of this statute of 
compassing the king’s death, and yet the overt-act is an assembly to levy war, and actual 
levying of war.” By that assembly it is meant “their first meeting to contrive their coming to 
St. Giles.” By actual levying of war, it is meant “their actual marching in a body modo 
guerrino & modo insurrectionis.”498 
 A question derived from this interpretation of the conspiracy to levy war as evidence 
of compassing the king’s death was whether that included the cases in which there was a 
“levying of a war against the king merely by interpretation and construction of law.”499 Hale 
was contrary to that expansion of the law unless the prisoners “had conspired to have raised 
a war directly against the king or his forces, and assembled people for that purpose, tho no 
actual war had been caused by him.”500 On the other hand: 
A conspiracy of compassing to levy war against the king directly or against his forces, 
and meeting and consulting for the effecting of it, whether the number of conspirators 
be more or less, or disguised under any other pretense whatsoever, as of reformation 
of abuses, casting down inclosures particular or generally, nay of wrestling, football-
playing, cock-fighting; yet if it can appear, that they consulted or resolved to raise a 
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power immediately against the king, or the liberty or safety of his person, this 
congregating of people for this intent, tho no war be actually levied, is an overt-act to 
maintain an indictment, for compassing the king’s death within the first clause of the 
statute of 25 E. 3 for this is the natural or necessary consequence, that he, that attempts 
to subdue or conquer the king, cannot intend less, than the taking away his life.501  
3.3.1.5 THE FIELD OF COMPASSING THE DEATH OF THE KING 
3.3.1.5.1 CONSPIRACY AS A TYPE OF PLAN AS FORM OF VOLITION 
 As with Coke, the ‘purpose’ is referred to with the words compassing, imagining, 
design, purpose, and intent. But by contrast to Coke, the term conspiracy, and its derivative 
forms, becomes widely used as synonym of the former.502  However, while those terms 
suggest both individual and collective agency, the meaning of conspiracy is sometimes 
restricted to those cases in which there was more than one person involved in the offense, as 
showed by the syntagmatic relations of the term in the sentences: “if men conspire the death 
of the king and the manner,” or “if men conspire to imprison the king by force.”503 
3.3.1.5.2 ADHERING THE ENEMY: CONSPIRACY AS A TYPE OF BOND 
 This use of the term conspiracy is related indeed to the treason of adhering the king’s 
enemies in his realm, particularly within the context not of internal but of external enemies. 
In that context, the focus of the term is not so much on the concept of ‘purpose’ as it is on 
the idea of establishing an ‘allegiance or bond’ with the king’s enemies and helping them as 
in “conspiring with a foreign prince to invade this kingdom.”504 This is the most traditional 
usage of the term as ‘alliance or bond against an enemy’. That is why when discussing the 
liability for treason of foreigners living within the realm but subject to a king at war with the 
king of England, such as merchants and ambassadors, the preferred term to refer to such an 
‘alliance or bond’ to help or assist the king’s enemies is that of conspiracy.505 In this context 
the idea that the defendants had conceived the death of the king is not as important to convey 
as that they had become accomplices of the foreign king. In both these cases, merchants and 
ambassadors are acting as proxies or agents of their monarchs who procure them to try to kill 
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the king or invade the realm. Thus, in the discussion of such liability of ambassadors, Hale 
uses the following language: “how far the priviledge of an embassador exempts him from 
penal prosecution as an enemy for such conspiracies or inconsummate attempts, that do not 
proceed farther than the machination, solicitation or conspiracy.”506  
3.3.1.5.3 ATTEMPT: CONSPIRACY AS A PART OF CRIME 
 In the same context, conspiracy referring to ‘purpose’ also appears as a term used 
within the attempt view of the treason of compassing the king’s death. In this view, the crime 
is viewed not as a single event but as a sequence of events, the one leading to the other in a 
causal chain from the will to its execution and effect. The idea of different states in the 
commission of the crime is conveyed by the terms consummate and inconsumate. 
Inconsummate refers to the conception state, whereas consummate refers to its execution. 
That is, there is a distinction between the will that had not been effected, and that which had 
been put into execution. The former is called conspiracy, machination, solicitation; the later 
receives the name of attempt.507  So, in that context, conspiracy is used to refer to a purpose 
or will which had not been put into execution and that deserves no punishment. And it should 
be recalled that in the volitive theory of the treason of compassing the king’s death, 
conspiracy refers to a purpose which is a completed criminal action in itself. Syntagmatically, 
the idea of causal sequence is conveyed with expression like “attempts, that do not proceed 
farther than the machination, solicitation or conspiracy”508 or “is a consummation thereof, 
tho possibly the full effect thereof do not ensue.”509 That is, in this view, the ‘will’ as a cause 
is executed, or proceeds, or ensues.  
3.3.1.5.4 EVIDENCE 
 ‘The fact in evidence of the will’ is referred to with the expression overt-act. Overt 
has an epistemological value meaning judicially knowable and triable, and it is relative to the 
secret nature of the treasonous ‘will’ which is not knowable by humans. Though it is a 
procedural element, as said, it is made a part of the offence as it should be averted in the 
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indictment. In that sense, it is dependent on the concept of ‘will’.  The offence thus consists 
not only of a ‘will’, but also a ‘fact’ revealing that will. Thus, the defendant could traverse 
the evidence as well as plead legal points as to whether this was good evidence. Among the 
facts that had been considered as evidence of the treason of compassing the king’s death, and 
which define the category of ‘overt-act,’ we need only to consider the case of assemblies and 
alliances to levy war against the king.  
 According to Hale, “an assembling together to consider how they may kill the 
king”510 or “a meeting together of these accomplices to consult touching the manner of 
effecting it (the death of the monarch)”511 is evidence of the ‘will of the death of the king.’ 
By construction, this is also the case of “consulting a levyer guerre contre lui… & actual 
assembling” or “consulting a levyer guerre, ou actual assembling de guerre,”512 as well as 
“compassing to levy war against the king directly or against his forces, and meeting and 
consulting for the effecting of it”513 It is important to note the ambiguity of such meeting of 
people which can be considered to be subsequent to the offense, or more or less simultaneous. 
Indeed, such assemblies usually are more or less simultaneous to the act of levying war, but 
subsequent to the purpose to kill the king. That is, ‘a public meeting of accomplices to plan 
and/or execute the offence’ which is referred to with the term conspiracy.514 Thus, the term 
conspiracy is not only used to mean a kind of treason, and therefore made subordinate to the 
category of ‘treason,’ but it also done so as a type of ‘over-act’ or ‘evidence of compassing’.  
Alliance 
3.3.1.5.5 SYNTAGMATIC RELATIONS: THE USE OF BARE  
 In connection with the ‘overt act’ is the term bare, which sometimes indicates the 
‘will of the death of the king’ as opposed to acts in execution of it as in “a bare conspiracy 
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or machination against the prince, and an actual attempt of treason”,515 or as opposed to the 
‘overt-act.’516 
3.3.2 LEVY WAR  
3.3.2.1 THE ELEMENTS OF THE TREASON OF LEVYING WAR AGAINST THE KING 
 The Treason Act established as an act of treason when “man doe levy war against the 
Lord the king in his Realm… and thereof be probably attainted of open deed by people of 
their condition.”517 For analytical purposes, Hale divides this clause concerning levying of 
war in three main elements: the act of raising war, the purpose of that act which must be 
against the king, and the place of that act of treason which must be the king’s realm.518  The 
act of raising the war involves that a war is actually started.519 Though Hale gives no direct 
definition of what war is, focusing only on determining at which point it could be considered 
to have started, it is clear that, in contrast to compassing, he means a collective action. There 
cannot be war raised by a single individual nor by a small number of individuals but by a 
multitude gathering or meeting at some place. That means that they should be in open war 
against the king, that is, they should have declared somehow their hostility towards the king 
appearing as his enemies. In other words, there must be an armed force. 
3.3.2.1.1 MORE GUERRINO ARRAIATI 
 The issue of the act of levying of war is “a question of fact… which may be difficult 
to enumerate or to define; and commonly expressed by the words more guerrino arriati”520 
Specifically, there must be “such assembly as carries with it speciem belli, as if they ride or 
march vexilis explicates, or if they be formed into companies, or furnished with military 
officers, or if they are armed with military weapons, as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes, 
and are so circumstanced, that it may be reasonably concluded they are in a posture of 
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war.”521 Elsewhere, Hale says that there is levy of war “where people are assembled in great 
numbers armed with weapons offensive, or weapons of war, if they march thus armed in a 
body, if they have chosen commanders or officers, if they march cum vexilis explicatis or 
with drums or trumpets, and the like.”522 
But there was room for interpreting when an assembly of people was in position of 
war beyond being that organized. This was the case if the people assembled had the purpose 
“to get arms to arm themselves.”523 The issue as to whether “the greatness of their numbers, 
and their continuance together doing these act may not amount to more guerrino arraiati may 
be considerable.”524 In this regard, it had been argued that when people assembling “had no 
ensigns, yet their multitudes supplied that defect, being able to do that by their multitudes, 
which a lesser number of armed men might scarce be able to affect by their weapons,”525 
though Hale doubted it.526  
3.3.2.1.2 PURPOSE 
 In addition to an armed force, there must be a purpose “expresly and directly” against 
the king, “as raising war against the king or his general and forces, or to surprise or injure the 
king’s person, or to imprison him, or to go to his presence to enforce him to remove any of 
his ministers or counsellors.”527 This requirement specifically excludes a “private quarrel, as 
many times it happend between lord marchers, tho it be vexillis explicates, it seems no 
levying of war against the king,” as well as “a private and particular design, as to pull down 
the inclosures of such a particular common.”528 Those are a matter of the law of riot and 
unlawful assembly.  
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 The purpose of the armed force can also be understood “interpretatively and 
constructively, as when a war is levied to throw down inclosures generally, or to inhance 
servant wages, or to alter religion established by la.”529 This is considered to be “not so much 
against the king’s person, as against his government.”530 The difference, therefore, between 
an unlawful assembly or a riot and an act of treason constructed as a levy of war against the 
king is that the purpose of the people assembled “is general against the king, because it is 
generally against the king’s laws, and the offenders take upon them the reformation, which 
subjects by gathering power ought not to do.”531  
 Another form of treason, as mentioned above, can be constructed when “men 
assemble together and consult to raise a force immediately or directly against the king’s 
person, or to restrain or depose him, whether the number of the persons were more or less, 
or whether armed or unarmed, tho this were not a treason within the first clause of 
compassing the king’s death, and an overt-act sufficient to make good such an indictment, 
tho no war was actually levied.”532 Such conspiracy is made a treason specially “by divers 
temporary acts of parliament, as 13 Eliz. During the queen’s life, 12 Car. 2 during our king’s 
life.”533 Furthermore, in the case of a constructive treason of levy of war against public 
policy, “the bare assembly to that intent (was not) a sufficient overt-act of levying of war; 
that was but an attempt and putting in ure, unless they had actually begun the execution of 
that intention, going about, practicing, or putting in ure.”534 Yet this treason to levy war 
against public policy was an act of treason by other statutes than the Treason Act.535 
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3.3.2.2 THE FIELD OF THE LEVY WAR IN HALE 
3.2.2.2.1 LEVY WAR AS A TYPE OF ASSEMBLY 
 In Hale, levy war clearly appears as a type of ‘criminal assembly’. Since Hale does 
not use this or any other name or expression to refer to this as a category it may seem that it 
is a made-up category. We will later see that the taxonomy of types of levy war and the 
comparison with the offense of unlawful assembly which is not distinguished from riot here, 
point out to such a superordinate. Grammatically, assembly is a collective noun for the 
concept of ‘a group of people meeting at some place to some common purpose.’ So, Hale 
uses to define levy war as “people assembled in great numbers,”536 and to instantiate this 
abstract category with examples as when “a great number of weavers… assemble themselves 
in great numbers at some places, and at others.”537  
But what type of ‘criminal assembly’ is the levying of war? In order to distinguish the 
hyponyms of ‘criminal assembly’, Hale focuses on three aspects of the ‘assembly’: the 
manner or mode of assembling, the purpose of such assembling, and the normative source or 
the offence (and the type of offence). Thus, in the manner, there are two opposed elements: 
the military and the riotous assembly, whereas in the purpose, there are the assemblies against 
the king and the assemblies within the context of private disputes. 
MANNER 
 The military assembly, or military force, “is expressed by the words more guerrino 
arraiati.”538 As said, Hale explains this concept in an extensive way so that the assembly is 
considered to be levy war if “they ride or march vexilis explicates, or if they be formed into 
companies, or furnished with military officers, or if they are armed with military weapons, 
as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes, and are so circumstanced, that it may be reasonably 
concluded they are in a posture of war.”539 A doubtful case is that in which none of the 
abovementioned situations is present but only “the greatness of their numbers, and their 
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continuance together doing these acts.”540 For Hale, this is rather a case of a riotous assembly 
as when the mentioned weavers who commit acts of civil disorder: 
In a most violent manner break open the houses of many of the king’s subjects, in 
which such engine-looms were, or were by them suspected to be, they took away the 
engines and making great fires burnt the same, and not only the looms, but in many 
places the ribbands made thereby and several other goods of the persons, whose 
houses they broke open.541 
PURPOSE 
 The other aspect on which Hale focuses on to distinguish the assembly which amounts 
to levy of war is its purpose, which can be either public or private. The public purpose can 
be “expressly and directly” against the monarch and his officers,542 but it can also be 
construed when such assemblies and public disturbances are “not so much against the king’s 
person, as against his government.543 It is to be noted that the same act intended by the 
assembly of people can be either considered private or public “as for the purpose not to pull 
down all houses or mills, but some special ones; which they thought offensive to them; nor 
to abate the rents of all manors, but of some particular manor, whereof they were tenants; nor 
to make a general abatement of the prices of victuals or corn, but in some particular market, 
or within some precinct.”544 
In conclusion, the category of ‘criminal assembly’ is structured around the distinction 
between ‘assembly in more guerrino against the king/government,’ which is levy war, and 
an ‘unlawful assembly or riot against a private interest’. This in turn leads to two types of 
offence: a treason and a misdemeanor. Thus, the opposition between the unlawful 
assembly/riot and the levying of war entails the gradual opposition between 
misdemeanor/treason. Furthermore, the dimensions upon which this opposition is based 
entail a further opposition between means/purpose, so that assemblies are categorized and 
labelled as treasons or misdemeanors depending either on the manner (more guerrino vs 
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non-more guerrino), or on the purpose. Finally, this last category implies another opposition 
which is reflected here lexically, between private/public, indicating whether it affects the 
whole of the body politics or only an individual.  
3.3.2.3 SOURCE: COMPASSING TO LEVY WAR/LEVY WAR 
It has been said earlier that assembly designates a collective entity. More specifically, the 
concept of ‘assembly’ includes a form of meeting in which people, whether in a larger or a 
smaller number, gather together to deliberate a course of action (a sense that might or might 
not be distinguished from the course action and the general sense), or, as Hale puts it, “if men 
assemble together and consult to raise a force immediately or directly against the king’s 
person, or to restrain or depose him, whether the number of the persons were more or less, 
or whether armed or unarmed,”545 as in the case of “a great numbers of the weavers in and 
about London being offended at the engine-looms… did agree among themselves to rise and 
go from house to house to take and destroy the engine-looms.”546 When this latter sense of 
assembly is invoked, it appears as synonymous with conspiracy (and sometimes 
confederacy), as in the sentence, “a bare conspiracy or consultations of persons to levy a war, 
and to provide weapons for that purpose;”547 or in the sentence, “Robert Burton and others, 
that conspired to assemble themselves and pull down inclosures, and to gain arms at the lord 
Norris’s house.”548  
 In addition to the clause of the Treason Act declaring a treason the act of levying war 
against the king, during Tudor England, several statutes made compassing the death of the 
king a treason. Thus 1 & 2 P&M c 10 (1554) established that it was treason “if any Person 
during the Marriage between the King and the Queen’s Majesties do compass or imagine… 
to levy War within this Realm against the King or Queen.” Similarly, 1 Eliz 1 c 1 (1558) 
considered it a treason to compass, imagyn, invent, devyse or intend… to levye Warre against 
her Majestie within this Realme”. These statutes were in force only during the life of these 
monarchs, but this clause was revived during the Restoration so that it was made a treason to 
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“compass, imagine, devise, or intend… to levy war against his majesty within the realm or 
without.  
 Though the terminology of this statute remained within the domain of the compassing 
the death of the king clause of the Treason Act, with the usual synonyms for that term 
(imagine, invent, device, intent), the fact that it was related to the other clause of levying war 
created some difficulties and raised a series of legal issues that were determined in court. 
Indeed, these problems are displayed by the changes in the terminology used to refer to that 
clause. By the time Hale writes, he almost never used the term compassing but rather talks 
about “conspiring to levy such war.”549  
 The first question that arises because of this statute is whether a conspiracy to commit 
a constructive treason falls within the scope of those statutes. Apparently, the point as to 
whether “the conspiring to levy war for those purposes (was) treason within that clause of 
the act of 13 Eliz 1 c 1” was positively resolved in “Burton’s case and Grant’s case… and 
the like resolution was in the case of the apprentices that assembled more guerrino to pull 
down bawdy houses.”550 Hale, however, argued that the statute:  
3 & 4 Ed. 6. Cap. 12 which makes special provisions to make assemblies above 
twelve to alter the laws and statutes of the kingdom, or the religion established by 
law, or if above forty assemble for pulling down inclosures, burning houses, or stacks 
of corn, treason… these offenses being the same with those adjudged treason in 
Burton’s case… why was it thought necessary for an act of parliament 3 & 4 Ed. 6 to 
make it treason under certain qualifications.551  
Furthermore, he argued that though: 
the unlawful ends of these assemblies thus punished by 3 & 4 Ed. 6. and 1 Mar. were 
much the same with those of Burton and Grant and others, that were adjudged treason, 
yet the difference between the cases stood not in that, but in the manner of their 
assembly… because it was a conspiracy to arm themselves and levy war more 
guerrino… but those thus heightened to treason by 3 & 4 E. 6… were not intended of 
such, as were more guerrino arraiati, nor a levying of war tho their multitudes were 
often great, and tho they did put in ure the things they conspired to effect, and so were 
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but great riots and not levying of war within this clause of 25 Ed. 3 and therefore 
those acts inflicted a new and father punishment on them552 
Summing up, Hale argued that those cases had not been decided under the 
presumption that a constructive conspiracy was within the Elizabethan statute, but rather as 
conspiracies to levy war in an express sense since the purpose of the people so assembled 
was to arm themselves, and this would turn them into a sort of military force. Elsewhere he 
also argues that from that purpose it could be inferred that they intended to act against the 
king since “an assembly of people thus arm themselves, and make good their attempts 
(meaning purpose or intent) by a military force, and to resist and subdue all power, that shall 
be used to suppress them.”553  
For Hale, a similar case was when “divers apprentices were committed for great riots, 
(and) divers other apprentices conspired to deliver them out of prison, to kill the mayor of 
London, to burn his house, to break open two houses near the Tower, where there were arms 
for three hundred men, and to furnish themselves.” In this case “it was resolved, that this was 
treason within the statute of 13 Eliz., for it was an intention to levy war, and altho they 
intended no harm to the person of the queen, yet because it concerned her in her office and 
authority, and was for such things, which the queen by law and justice ought to do, it was a 
levying war against the queen.”554 
The second question that arises is whether the statutes creating the treason of 
compassing to levy war were subject to the same overt-act requirement as the Treason Act 
was. This conspiracy to get arms was indeed considered “an overt act proving this conspiracy 
to levy war.”555 And it was further interpreted that the statutes regulating the punishment of 
the conspiracy to levy war required the indictment “being accompanied with an overt-act 
evidencing it… (that) must be specially laid in the indictment, and proved upon evidence.556 
In other words, in order to accommodate the cases of journeymen assemblies which had been 
convicted for treason under these statutes, an express intent of levying war had been 
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constructed, and the basis upon which the inference had been drawn became an overt act 
evidencing it: the assembly of people to arm themselves. In other words, an assembly of 
people with the intent to arm themselves was considered evidence that this was an assembly 
to levy war against the king.  
A third question, somewhat related to these cases was whether the conspiracy to levy 
war was in some form related to the Treason Act. On this point, it was considered that “if 
men assemble together and consult to raise a force immediately or directly against the king’s 
person, or to restrain or depose him, whether the number of the persons were more or less, 
or whether armed or unarmed, tho this were not a treason within the first clause of the statute 
25 E 3. Yet it was treason within the first clause of compassing the king’s death, and an overt-
act sufficient to make good such indictment, tho no war was actually levied.”557 However, 
though Hale had argued that Burton’s case had not been decided on the grounds of their 
constructive purpose, here he argues that “if be a levying of a war against the king merely by 
interpretation and construction of law, as that of Burton, and others to pull down all 
enclosures… this seems not to be an evidence of an overt-act to prove compassing the king’s 
death… and Burton’s case 39 Eliz. seems to intimate as much, because they took him to be 
indictable only upon the statute 13 Eliz. c. 1 for conspiring to levy war against the queen, 
whereas if this had been an overt-act to prove the compassing of the death of the king, the 
fact had been treason within 25 Ed. 3 as surely it would have been, if he had conspired to 
have raised a war directly against the king or his forces, and assembled people for that 
purpose, tho no actual war had been caused by him.”558  
A fourth question that arises, derived from the latter, is whether the assembly to levy 
war falls within the levy war clause of the Treason Act. The opinion Hale holds here is that 
“a conspiracy or confederacy to levy war against the king is not a levying of war within this 
clause of the statute of 25 E. 3 for this clause requires a war actually levied.”559 Thus he bases 
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this on the argument that, if this had been the case the statutes that “made conspiring to levy 
war… to be treason.” would not have been necessary. 560 
A further question related to the problem of the constructive treason, is whether an 
assembly to commit a constructive levy war can be considered an overt-act making good the 
levy war clause of the Treason Act. Hale is not persuaded of this point: “whether the bare 
assembling of an enormous multitude for doing of these unlawful acts without weapons, or 
being more guerrino arraiati, especially in case of interpretative or constructive levying of 
war, be a sufficient overt-act to make a levying of war within this act, especially if they 
commit some of these acts themselves, is very considerable and seems to me doubtful.”561 
Hence, Hale interprets that the Treason Act distinguishes between the “bare assembly” to 
levy war (whether constructive or not) and the “overt-act of levying of war,” which was “but 
an attempt and putting in ure” of the intent.562 
3.3.2.3.1 CONSPIRACY AS CO-HYPONYM OF TREASON 
The idea of conspiracy as synonymous with assembly within the discussion of the 
treason of compassing to levy war implies that it becomes a co-hyponym of ‘criminal 
assembly’ along with the two types of levy war and the unlawful assembly.  And, at the same 
time, it can be considered a type of treason with the co-hyponyms compassing the death of 
the king, and levying of war, which are distinguished by reason of their source.  
And also, another kind of assembly, that to commit constructive treason, becomes a 
type of conspiracy to levy war, so that this category is potentially divided into conspiracy to 
express and constructive levy of war.  
3.3.2.3.2 CONSPIRACY AS A STAGE OF LEVY WAR: BARE ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY TO LEVY WAR, UNLAWFUL 
ASSEMBLY, LEVYING OF WAR 
So far, we have seen that the term conspiracy is synonymous with assembly, 
particularly when the latter means ‘meeting of people to deliberate to some purpose’. 
Underpinning the issue of the conspiracy to levy war was the problem of determining at what 
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point an assembly of people became a levy of war. We have thus far seen the opposition, 
based on the manner and the purpose, between the unlawful assembly and the levy of war, 
which, it should be recalled, referred to a group of people assembled with arms and the 
purpose to raise war against the king or against the public. Now we have a new opposition 
between assembly, sometimes accompanied by the marker bare, or mere and the assembly to 
levy war, on the one side, and between the assembly to levy war and the levy war on the other. 
This latter entails the part-whole relationship between a stage (conspiracy to levy war, 
execution, levying of war) and the offense understood as a process.  
3.3.2.3.3 CONSPIRACY AS EVIDENCE OF TREASON 
At the same time, this conspiracy to levy becomes an expression within the field of 
‘compassing the king’s death,’ where it assumes different lexical relations as evidence of the 
latter. Furthermore, within the field of the ‘criminal assembly,’ the ‘assembly to arm 
themselves’ becomes evidence of the conspiracy to levy war.  
3.3.3 CONSPIRACY AS A TYPE OF CRIMINAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 In addition to the volitive and collective meanings of conspiracy, we find instances 
of its use as indicating the relationship existing between the accomplices of a crime as 
conspirators. Thus, commenting the treason of killing a chancellor in Treason Act, Hale 
exposes that: 
This statute extends only to the actual killing of some of these officers, and therefore 
conspiring to kill any of these without actuall killing of any of them is not treason; 
but if many conspire to do the act, and one of the conspirators actually do it, this 
seems to be treason in them all, that are abettors or counsellors to do the act.563  
 On the other hand, it can also refer to the relation of procurement or solicitation in 
the context of petit treason, as  “if a wife conspire to kill her husband, or a servant to kill his 
master, and this is done by a stranger in pursuance of that conspiracy” or “the wife and a 
servant conspire the death of the husband, being his master, and the servant effect it in the 
absence of the wife,” or “the servant and a stranger, or the wife and a stranger conspire to rob 
the husband or master, and the servant or wife be present and hold the candle, [while the 
husband or master is killed],” or “the wife or servant conspire with a stranger to kill the 
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husband or master, if the wife or servant be in the same house, where the fact is done, tho not 
in the same room.”564  
3.4 HIGH TREASON IN HAWKINS 
3.4.1 THE COMPONENTS OF TREASON: DEFINITION OF TREASON 
 In Hawkins’s classification, treason was a capital private offense against the king. In 
this he did not separate from the tradition that stemmed from Coke, who had conceived it as 
a sort of murder. However, it was clear that this type of offense had greater implications for 
the community, as shown in the construction of levy war. In any case, the field of these 
offences was divided into treasons and felonies.565 Of the latter, the Henry VII’ statute 
concerning the confederacies within the king’s household was further classified as an offense 
against the Privy Council rather than as against the king directly.566 
3.4.2 THE SOURCE OF TREASON: NARROWING THESIS 
 Like the other authors, Hawkins believed that there was an uncertain and broad high 
treason at common law, and that the statute Treason Act narrowed its scope to a limited 
number of cases. And this statute was considered the law at that time.567 However, when it 
came to analyzing the different clauses of that statute, Hawkins departed from his 
predecessors and reduced the types of treason to four: “that which immediately concerns the 
king, his wife, or children,” “that which concerns his office in the administration of justice,” 
“that which concerns his seal,” and “that which concerns his coin.” Furthermore, he 
considered that the three latter are constructions of the first, for which he called them 
“Interpretive Treasons.”568 This is consistent with the view that treason was a private, rather 
than a public, offense. This notwithstanding, he divides, for analytical purposes, the first 
treason in three clauses which roughly correspond to compassing the king’s death, levying of 
war against the king, and the problem of the overt-act.  
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3.4.3 VOLITIVE THEORY OF COMPASSING THE KING’S DEATH 
 Hawkins holds a volitive view of the compassing the king’s death, arguing that 
compasse and imagine in the Treason Act “have been so strictly followed, that where a king 
has been actually murdered, yet not the killing him, but the compassing his death had in the 
indictment been laid as the treason, and the killing as an overt-act.”569 Thus, he also presumes 
the rule that “some overt act must be alleged in every indictment of high treason, in 
compassing the death of the king, &c. of levying war, or adhering to the king’s enemies.”570  
3.4.4.ARE WORDS OVERT ACT? WORDS ARE ACTS 
 As with the other authors, Hawkins spends more time discussing what does amount 
to an overt act of compassing the death of the king. Among the facts that clearly amount to 
overt acts proving the compassing were “conspiring the king’s death, and providing weapons 
to effect it, or sending letters to incite others to procure it, or actually assembling people in 
order to take the king into their power… the levying war against the king’s person; or the 
bare consulting to levy such war; or meeting together and consulting the means to destroy 
the king and his government; or assembling with others, and procuring them to attempt the 
king’s death”571 Furthermore, “such compassing the king’s death may be manifested not only 
by overt acts of a direct conspiracy to take away his life, but also by such as shew such a 
design as cannot be executed without the apparent peril thereof as… assembling men together 
in order to imprison or depose the king”572 That is, he includes those acts that had been 
constructed as intended to kill the king because of potentially leading to the death of the king.  
 In the way Hawkins has framed these examples there is already a hint of what he 
considers the “great question” concerning the overt acts: “whether words only spoken can 
amount to an overt act of compassing the king’s death”573 Here Hawkins draws a difference 
between what might be called opinions or “words spoken only in contempt and disgrace of 
the king, and not showing any purpose to rebel, or any way to hurt his person, or disturb his 
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government,”574 which rather are “punishable as great misdemeanors, and tending to raise 
doubts, and to disturb the government,”575 and what might be called communicative acts, 
such as “word joined to an act (that) may explain it” and “words of persuasion to kill the 
king, or manifesting an agreement, or consultation, or directions to that purpose.”576 
According to Hawkins, these words should be considered as overt acts because they “are the 
most natural means of expressing the imagination of the heart.”577 The point here being that 
that he who “by command or persuasion induces another to commit treason… does not act 
but by words.”578  
 In other words, Hawkins considers that words are also acts that may disclose the 
treasonous purpose, not in the sense of public speech, but rather in the context of a plot. This, 
as we will later see, has bearing on the field of conspiracy.  
3.4.5 NONSPECIFIC LEVY WAR  
 Hawkins gives no detailed description of the elements of the treason of levy war, and 
makes distinction between express, and constructive levying of war, which for him amounts 
to “directly rebel against the king, and take up arms in order to dethrone him, but also in 
many other cases, those who in a violent and forcible manner withstand his lawful authority, 
or endeavor to reform his government.”579 Nevertheless, Hawkins keeps the distinction 
between public and private purpose to distinguish treasonous from unlawful assemblies: 
“those also who make an insurrection in order to redress a public grievance, whether it be a 
real or pretended one, and of their own authority attempt with force to redress it… but where 
a number of men rise to remove a grievance to their private interest, as to pull down a 
particular inclosure… they are only rioters.”580 He also shares the opinion that “a bare 
conspiracy to levy war” was no treason under the Treason Act, but that “a conspiracy to levy 
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war against the king’s person may be alleged as an overt act of compassing his death, and 
that in all cases if the treason be actually completed, the conspirators, &c. are traitors as much 
as the actors.”581 
3.4.6 THE FIELD OF CONSPIRACY: ACT OF COMMUNICATION 
 The fundamental change in Hawkins is that he considers conspiracy as a type of act 
of communication encompassing persuasion, agreement, consultation, directions, 
procuring, commands, and which frequently takes place in the context of a meeting or 
assembly. In other words, it involves those acts of communication that take place between 
accomplices. This, it should be noted, was consistent with the view that the conspiracy to 
levy war was an overt-act of compassing the king’s death. And this sense of deliberative 
assembly or meeting may also explain why Hawkins does not explain levy of war in terms 
of a type of assembly, but an act of rebellion, or insurrection against the king. He likewise 
does not distinguish between express and constructive treason, because the latter equally 
“tends to a downright rebellion,” by contrast to what he does not term unlawful assembly 
but rioters.  
  
3.4 HIGH TREASON IN FOSTER 
3.4.1 FOSTER’S DEFINITION OF TREASON 
 Foster defines high treason in traditional terms as “an Offense committed against the 
Duty of Allegiance,”582 and divides it into the several kinds of different traditional treasons 
there are. Here, I will discuss the treason of compassing the death of the king, and that of 
levying of war.  
 But before so doing, it should be noted that Foster’s traditional definition of treason 
as a violation of the duty of allegiance to the king hides a different understanding as to what 
was the real rationale for this offence to exist. Thus, in explaining why the king deserves 
special protection by this law of treason he argues that “the King is considered as the Head 
of the Body Politick, and the Members of that Body are considered as united and kept 
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together by a Political Union with Him and with each other. His Life cannot, in the Ordinary 
Course of Things, be taken away by Treasonable Practices without involving the whole 
Nation in Blood and Confusion.”583 
 In this passage, there is a new actor, the political community, considered either as a 
body politick, and in the traditional organic commonwealth, or as a Nation. The seriousness 
of the offense is not only measured by the rank of the person against whom it is committed, 
but by the nature of its consequences: the dissolution of the civil bonds, of the social compact, 
into civil war.  
 Therefore, there is a change in the structure of the category of ‘treason,’ which now 
designates acts against the political community. As a type of offence, the difference between 
it and the other types as felonies and misdemeanors is that it is against this political 
community. That is, such acts may bring about the horrors of a civil war. Indeed, this bears 
on the language with which the hypernyms of treason are described. Particularly that of 
levying war, and the constructive levying of war. The latter is now less a kind of act against 
the king because it is against the public, and more of an act against the existence of the 
community as a whole. Thus, they are described as “insurrections… for redressing National 
Grievances… or for the Reformation of Real or Imaginary Evils of a Publick Nature and in 
which the Insurgents have no Special Interest”, as “risings in order to effect these Innovations 
of a Publick and General Concern,”584 or as “intending to Disturb the Peace and Public 
Tranquility of the Kingdom… to Levy and Raise War, Rebellion, and Insurrection.”585 
3.4.2 THE ATTEMPT VIEW OF COMPASSING THE KING’S DEATH 
3.4.2.1 THE VOLUNTAS INTERPRETATION OF COMPASSING 
 Foster adhered to Coke’s interpretation that the treason of compassing the king’s 
death was an application of the doctrine that the will stands for the act. In his own words: 
The ancient Writers in treating of Felonious Homicide considered the Felonious 
Intention manifested by plain Facts, not by bare Words of any kind, in the same light 
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in point of Guilt, as Homicide itself. The Rule was Voluntas reputatur pro Facto. 
And while this Rule prevailed, the Nature of the Offense was expressed by the Term 
Compassing the Death586 
 Therefore, the statute Treason Act, simply put, declared the common law of homicide, 
which in the case of “common persons” had been “laid aside as too Rigorous” but “in the 
Case of the King, Queen, and Prince, the Statute of Treasons hath with great Propriety 
retained.”587 Under this view, this offence appears as a kind of homicide, and as such, an 
offense against the individual which in this case happens to be the king.  
3.4.2.2 THE OVERT ACT AS ‘ATTEMPT’ 
 In this passage, it seems that Foster’s invocation of the doctrine of voluntas pro facto 
does not help to depart from the narrow view that the Treason Act punishes the purpose as 
“manifested by plain Facts,”588 that is, the volitive view of compassing the king’s death. 
However, it is clear that there is a requirement that “an Overt Act must be Alledged and 
Proved. For the Overt-Act is the Charge to which the Prisoner must apply his Defense.”589 
Here the over act does not appear as the necessary evidence, but as the gist of the offense to 
which the prisoner should apply his defense. In other words, it is against this that the prisoner 
must declare his innocence. This is so because for Forster, the overt act is not averted “merely 
as Matters of Evidence, tending to discover the Imaginations of Intentions.”590 Rather, he 
defines the overt act as “the Means employed by the Defendant for executing his Traiterous 
Purposes” or as “he means made use of to effectuate the Intentions and Imaginations of the 
Heart.”591 
3.4.2.2.1 ATTEMPT AS MEANS TO AN END 
 Foster clearly conceives the overt act as an attempt, and the attempt as the real 
punished conduct. But Foster’s view of the attempt is not Coke’s. For the latter, it was an act 
in execution of the criminal purpose. And by such acts he mainly understood failures. Thus, 
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his conception of the attempt was that of a crime which had already been put into execution, 
and by that he understood mainly failure. In other words, it was about acts that have a certain 
tendency and that, if successful, will bring about the criminal effect. Foster’s concept of 
‘attempt’ as the means to an end was broader. It included not only those actions directly 
involved in the execution of the offense, but also preparations. Indeed, the rule to which 
Foster was hinting at is that the means involved in the commission of a crime is as punishable 
as the crime itself. Or, that within the scope of an offense, all the acts involved in its execution 
fall inside, whether they are preparations or not.  
 In other words, both Coke and Foster consider that the ‘attempt’ is the execution of a 
criminal purpose or will. But they differ as to the point at which the execution actually begins. 
For Coke, it begins with an act that has the tendency, that is, which, if successful, will bring 
about the effect of homicide. This, in other terms, means a failure. For Foster, the execution 
involves all the intermediate acts that lead to that act which have the tendency of leading to 
the homicide. This explains why Foster interpreted that the doctrine of voluntas pro facto 
“considereth the wicked Imaginations of the Heart in the same Degree of Guilt as if carried 
in the same Degree of Guilt as if carried in actual Execution, from the moment Measures 
appear to have been taken to render them Effectual.”592 
 However, Foster also entertains the view that the attempt is an act which tends to 
homicide. He does so mainly because he has to give leeway to the case law of treason: 
The Care the Law hath taken for the Personal Safety of the King is not confined to 
Actions or Attempts of the more Flagitious Kind, to Assasination or Poison, or other 
Attempts directly and immediately aiming at His Life. It is extended to every thing 
Willfully and Deliberately don or attempted, whereby His Life may be endangered. 
And therefore the entering into Measures for Deposing or Imprisoning Him, or to get 
His Person into the Power of the Conspirators, these Offences are Overt-Acts of 
Treason within this Branch of the Statue.593  
 In this passage, Foster faces the problem that his theory of the overt-act as a means 
to an end does not explain why plots to imprison or depose the king had been punished as 
compassing the death of the king. Thus, he has to embrace the construction that these acts 
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have the tendency or put at risk the life of the king. But then, as illustrated by the first lines 
of this passage, he also embraces the view that attempts are mainly failures; acts which might 
directly cause the death of the king.  
CONSPIRACY AS PLOT 
 This conception of the overt act as a means to the end of regicide led Foster to 
conclude that: 
If conspirators meet and consult how to Kill the King, though they do not then fall 
upon any Scheme for that Purpose, this is an Overt-Act of Compassing his death; and 
so are all Means made us of, be it Advice, Persuasion or Command, to Incite or 
Incourage others to commit the Fact, or join in the Attempt.594  
Furthermore: 
Every Person who but Assenteth to any Overtures for that Purpose will be involved 
in the same Guilt… If a Person be but once Present at a Consultation for such 
Purposes and Concealeth it, having had a previous Notice of the Design of the 
Meeting, this is an Evidence proper to be left to a Jury of such Assent, though the 
Party say or do Nothing at such Consultation. The Law is the same if he is Present at 
more than One such Consultation, and doth not Dissent or make a Discovery.595 
In these two passages, Foster argues that the conspiracy falls under his definition of 
overt act. Conspiracy here is understood as those preparatory acts that might be labelled as 
planning or plotting the execution of the crime. This includes the meetings of the accomplices 
and the consulting or delivering about how to do it, but also those people involved in the plot 
by way of delegation and procurement. In general, it can be said that it includes, with the 
exception of the meeting, which is a physical action, all those acts of communication 
associated to planning or plotting. It should be noted that the plot or conspiracy works here 
at two levels: as an overt-act or attempt of regicide, punishable as treason, and as evidence 
of the participation in such an attempt. This is why the accomplices are called conspirators. 
It is not only actively plotting, but the mere fact of attending the meeting, if the person is 
appraised of its purpose, that makes that person liable even if she is not involved in the plot. 
The law presumes, according to Foster, that those who attend give their consent to the plot.  
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3.4.2.2.2 WORDS 
WORDS NOT RELATIVE TO ACTION RULE 
 Regarding the issue of whether words are overt-acts of compassing the king’s death, 
Foster says that he: 
Choose to adhere to the Rule which hath been laid down on more Occasions than One 
since the Revolution, that Loose Words not relative to any Act of Design are not 
Overt-Acts of Treason. But Words of Advice or Persuasion, and all Consultations for 
the Traiterous Purposes treated of in this Chapter are certainly so. They are uttered in 
Contemplation of some Traiterous Purpose actually on Foot or Intended, and in 
Prosecution of it.596 
This requirement, which he attributes to Holt’s ruling597 that words to be considered 
an overt act of compassing the death of the king, nicely fits into Foster’s definition of the 
overt-act as a means to an end. In that sense, he argued that though many: 
considered the Over-Acts required by the Statute, meerly as Matters of Evidence, 
tending to discover the Imaginations of the Heart… I conceive they are not to be 
considered merely as Evidence, but as the Means made use to Effectuate the Purposes 
of the heart… upon this Principle Words of Advice or Incouragement, and above all, 
Consultations for Destroying the King, very properly come under the Notion of 
Means made use of for that purpose.598 
 These are the types of proceedings that earlier were considered as a conspiracy. The 
nature of conspiracy, as it appears here, is that of words that are actions, or instruments to 
advance the treasonous purpose. Indeed, this view of conspiracy as acts of communication, 
and of the overt-act as an attempt, and of the attempt as means to an end, is a better way to 
justify the doctrine according to which conspiracies to levy war are overt-acts of compassing 
the king’s death. 
OPINIONS 
These “Loose Words not relative to any Act of Design” mentioned above express “at 
the worst, nor more than bare Indications of the Malignity of the Heart”599 They “are often 
the Effect of meer Heat of Blood, which in some Natures otherwise well disposed, carrieth 
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the Man beyond the Bounds of Decency or Prudence. They are always liable to great 
Misconstruction from the Ignorance or Inattention of the Hearers, and too often from a 
Motive truly Criminal.”600 
In other words, these loose words are but opinions. The general principle is that mere 
opinion must not be punished for treason because they are not means to move forward a 
criminal purpose. However, when faced with the problem of “how far Words of Writings of 
a Seditions Nature may be considered as Overt-Acts within this Branch of the Statute,” Foster 
admits that “Writing being a deliberate Act and capable of satisfactory Proof certainly may, 
under some Circumstances with Publication be an Overt-Act of Treason.”601 
Indeed, to justify this exception, Fosters is forced to abandon his requirement of a 
direct relation of words to facts, and to introduce new criteria. These seditious printed words, 
he argues, can have “a direct Tendency to involve… Nations in the Miseries of an Intestine 
War, to incite Her Majesty’s Subjects to withdraw their Allegiance from Her, and to deprive 
Her of Her Crown and Royal Dignity.” And therefore “maintained Maliciously, Advisedly, 
and Directly.”602 
 As to the latter, there is a: 
difference between Words reduced in Writing and Words spoken… the Difference 
appeareth to Me to be very Great, and it lieth here. Seditious Writings are Permanent 
Things, and if Published they scater the Poison far and wide. They are Acts of 
Deliberation, capable of Satisfactory Proof, and not ordinarily liable to 
Misconstruction; at least they are submitted to the Judgment of the Court, naked and 
undisguised as they came out of the Author’s Hands. Words are transient and fleeting 
as the Wind; the Poison they scatter is at the worst confined to the narrow Circle of a 
few Hearers. They are frequently the Effect of a sudden Transport, easily 
Misunderstood, and often Misreported.603 
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So that “In the Case of bare Words, Positions of this dangerous Tendency, though 
maintained Maliciously, Advisedly, and Directly, and even in the Solemnities of Preaching 
and Teaching, are not considered as Overt-Acts of Treason”604  
Forster’s main distinction was between words that are actions, and words that express 
opinion. The former can be considered instruments moving forward the criminal action, 
whereas the latter are only evidence of a corrupt heart. To account for certain legislation that 
had made seditious publications a treason,605 Foster introduces a totally different argument: 
what effect might the printed words have on the public opinion, and therefore by 
construction, be acts of treason. Yet this hardly falls within any of the treasons of the Treason 
Act, nor can it be considered an attempt of any of those treasons.  
In discussing this, Foster betrays a Whiggish disposition to adapt the old law of high 
treason to the new constitutional order after the Glorious Revolution, where the freedom of 
speech was to be one of the basic checks on the power of the monarch and the founding 
privilege of parliamentary life. After all, the law of treason had always had the purpose to 
protect the figure of the king, and it had been used to buttress his power. There is no better 
example of this disposition, and the energy and zeal he puts into it, than when he tries to 
refute the tenet going back to Coke that “at Common-Law, Words alone might be an Overt-
Act of Compassing the King’s Death,” and that therefore, the Treason Act simply limited the 
application of the common-law so that “bare Words are not Overt-Act of Treason.”606 This 
view, indeed, Foster said—referring to Hawkins’ theory that words are the best evidence of 
treason, “hath been urged with some Advantage by a Good modern Writer of Crown Law.”607 
This interpretation amounts to admitting that the same ancient law that protected the 
liberties of the subject, at the same time limited his freedom of speech by punishing “bare 
Words not relative to Actions” That is why he sets himself to demonstrate “that the Doctrine 
his Lordship hath advanced upon the Foot of Common-Law, is not supported by any of the 
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Authorities to which He hath appealed.”608 Indeed, he finds that many of those authorities 
support his view that when words had been considered treason it was because “a Consultation 
for taking away the King’s Life undoubtedly was an Overt-Act at the Common-Law, and is 
so under Statute.”609 
3.4.3 LEVY WAR 
3.4.3.1 MANNER 
 Like Hale, Foster considers that the act of levy war involves the act of the assembling 
of a number of people. However, Foster thinks that the distinction Hale makes between 
assemblies of people that are more guerrino is relevant for determining whether there is levy 
of war or not. This is particularly so because in recent cases “of constructive Levying of War, 
there was nothing given in Evidence of the usual Pageantry of War; no military Weapons, no 
Banners or Drums, nor any regular Consultation previous to the Rising. And yet the Want of 
those circumstances weighted nothing with the Court, though the Prisoners Council insisted 
on that Matter.”610  
 This notwithstanding, it should be mentioned that elsewhere, he argues that 
“Insurrections in order to throw down All Inclosures, to alter the Established Law or change 
Religion, to inhance the Price of All Labour or to open All Prisons, all Risings in order to 
effect these Innovations of a Public and General Concern by an Armed Force, are in 
Construction of Law High Treason, within the Clause of Levying War.” And among the 
reasons he gives for this construction, he states that “they have a direct Tendency to dissolve 
all the Bonds of Society, and to destroy all Property and all Government too, by Numbers 
and an Armed Force.”611 
 Likewise, in giving an example of indictment to illustrate the overt-act requirement, 
he argues that in indictments of levying of war “it will not be sufficient to alledge Generally 
that the the (sic) Defendants did Levy War or Adhere. But in the former Case it must be 
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alledged that They did Assemble with a Multitude Armed and Arrayed in a Warlike Manner 
and Levyed War.”612  
3.4.3.2 PURPOSE 
 The true criteria to tell when a number of people assembling can be considered to be 
an act of levying war is “Quo Animo did the Parties Assemble.” Thus, “assemblies Bodies 
of Men, Friends, Tenants or Dependants, armed and arrayed in a Warlike Manner in order to 
effect somme Purpose or other by dint of Numbers and superior Strength” were no more than 
felonies or misdemeanors if their “Purpose (was) of a Private Nature.”613 This included 
“Risings to maintain a Private Claim of Right, or to destroy particular Inclosures, or to 
remove Nuances which affected or were thought to affect in point of Interest the Parties 
Assembled for those Purposes, or to break Prisons in order to Release particular Persons 
without any other Circumstance of Aggravation.” It also included the case of the engine-
loom weavers, which according to Forster was “a Private Quarrel between Men of the same 
Trade about the Use of a Particular Engine, which those concerned in the Rising thought 
detrimental to them.”614  
 By contrast, “every Insurrection which in Judgment of Law is intended against the 
Person of the King be it to Dethrone or Imprison Him, or to oblige Him to alter His Measures 
of Government, or to remove Evil Councellors from about Him, these Risings all amount to 
Levying War within Statute.”615 
3.4.3.3 CONSTRUCTIVE TREASON 
 The above mentioned are acts of levy of war directly aimed at the king. However, as 
said earlier, Foster admitted that “insurrections likewise for redressing National 
Grievances… or for the Reformation or Real or Imaginary Evils of a Publick Nature and in 
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which the Insurgents have no Special Interest… are by Construction of Law within the Clause 
of Levying War. For they are levelled at the King’s Crown and Royal Dignity.”616  
 Though the conspiracy to levy war was considered an overt-act of compassing the 
king’s death,617 it was clear for Foster that “a bare Conspiracy for effecting a Rising for the 
Purposes mentioned… is not an Overt-Act of Compassing the King’s Death.” And that when 
“Conspiracies for these Purposes have been adjudged Treason” it had been based on “the 
Temporary Act of 13. Eliz. which made Compassing to Levy War… High Treason during 
the life of the Queen.”618 
3.4.4 THE FIELD OF CONSPIRACY 
 Conspiracy appears in Foster as ‘preparation or attempt of compassing the death of 
the king carried about by means of words.’ As a ‘preparation or attempt’, conspiracy appears 
as a part or stage in the commission of the crime, as opposed to the execution (which was 
Coke’s view), and the consummation. This is a view of the crime, and particularly of the 
offense of treason, as a process rather than as a single occurrence. The view that every single 
step in that process was potentially criminal was coming across slowly, and there were 
different views as to why. Coke’s view was that since intent was the central element, this was 
what mattered. However, he limited the meaning to failures. Foster had a different view: If 
the crime was a causal chain, and the first element of that chain was the intent or purpose, 
then all the links of that chain were connected to it. But this view depends on a different set 
of goals. The view of Foster is clearly that of prevention.  
Furthermore, since this definition implies that, as a type of words which perform an 
action, conspiracy is opposed to loose words or bare words, which are the expressions Foster 
uses to designate the idea of expressing ‘opinions’. It should be mentioned that the expression 
loose words is further divided into several hyponyms: according to the intent they are uttered 
with, they could be considered to have been uttered maliciously, according to their meaning 
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or content they can be seditious, and according to their form they can be either spoken or 
printed.   
The term conspiracy embraces two different kinds of acts of communication: The 
meeting and consultation, which can be roughly considered as a definition of what a ‘plot’ 
is, and those acts of communication which consist of advice, command, procure, persuade, 
and that can best be described as ‘procurement or solicitation.’ Participating in these 
activities—be the plotting or the solicitation--leads to the creation of a criminal relationship 
between the people involved in them, that of the ‘accomplice,’ which in Foster is also 
designated by the term conspirator as.  
It should also be mentioned that this use of conspiracy as a type of acts of 
communication precludes in Foster the possibility that the term be used to refer to the 
‘assembly’ as the genus of the treason of levying war. Consequently, the term is never used 
but to indicate the preparation of the levying of war. Regarding this, in the constructive 
levying of war, the ‘assembly’ is less important now, and this type of treason is described 
with dynamic terms indicating that in this case, there is more than an assembly, and that 
collective action has begun to take place, such as with insurrection, rebellion, and rabble.  
3.5 BLACKSTONE’S HIGH TREASON 
3.5.1 DEFINITION OF TREASON 
 For Blackstone, high treason belongs to that type of offences that “especially affect 
the supreme executive power of the king and his government.”619 This is thus a definition 
that casts the offense in a modern way, from the constitutional point of view of the division 
of power. It is an interference or obstruction of a certain branch of government. Missing from 
this picture is the other branch of the British government. How can an offence of this nature, 
which according to Foster affected and put at risk the whole political community, not be 
against Parliament as well? As we will see, the answer lies in that some of the conducts that 
fall under the scope of high treason admit different interpretations, and might support one 
branch of the government against the excesses of the other.  
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 Blackstone also adds that this offense “amount either to a total renunciation of that 
allegiance, or at the least to criminal neglect of that duty, which is due from every subject to 
his sovereign” Thus, he explains that allegiance is “the tie or ligament which binds every 
subject to be true and faithful to his sovereign liege lord the king, in return for that protection 
which is afforded him.” From this he concludes that “every offence therefore more 
immediately affecting the royal person, his crown, or dignity, is in some degree a breach of 
this duty of allegiance.”620 This way of characterizing the offense of high treason, by contrast, 
entailed a feudal explanation of royal power which did not agree with the modern 
constitutional theories which Blackstone embraced, much less with the idea of government 
by consent (which as we will see later, was presupposed in the right to resist the abuse and 
oppression of power). Yet Blackstone does not seem troubled by this juxtaposition of 
medieval and modern elements, nor does he try to explain or reduce the medieval to the 
modern ones.  
 He divides the category of ‘offenses against this duty of allegiance’ into treason, 
felonious injurious to the king’s prerogative, praemunire, and misprisions and contempts.621 
As Coke and Hale, Blackstone believes that the offense of treason was created “by the antient 
common law” and that the statute Treason Act had been enacted to declare and ascertain the 
common law because due to the legal uncertainty about the scope of the offense, “there was 
a great latitude left in the breast of the judges, to determine what was treason, or not so: 
whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity to create abundance of 
constructive treasons.”622 
3.5.2 COMPASSING THE KING’S DEATH 
 As Coke, Hale, and Fosters, Blackstone divides treasons into six types framed unto 
the different clauses of the statute Treason Act. His definition of this treason falls into the 
volitive interpretation, for he defines the term compass as “the purpose or design of the mind 
or will, and not, as in common speech, the carrying such design to effect.”623 Therefore, the 
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overt act comes as evidence of a compassing, which as “an act of the mind, it cannot possibly 
fall under any judicial cognizance.” According to Blackstone, the requirement of overt act is 
regulated by the Treason Act, which “expressly requires, that the accussed be thereof upon 
sufficient proof attainted of some open act by men of his own condition.”624 That means that, 
as Coke, he interprets the clause of open act extensively, not only including open acts of war, 
but also compassing the king’s death.  
 Within this setting of the volitive treason in which the behavior regulated by the 
compassing the king’s death clause is considered a type of intent or purpose, Blackstone 
assembles together different, and not totally consistent, views: 
To conspire to imprison the king by force, and move towards it by assembling 
company, is an overt act of compassing the king’s death; for all force, used to the 
person of the king, in it’s [sic] consequence may tend to his death, and is a strong 
presumption of something worse intended than the present force, by such as have so 
far thrown off their bounden duty to their sovereign; it being an old observation, that 
there is generally but a short interval between the prisons and the graves of princes.625  
In this passage, there are several concepts of this treason combined. In the first 
sentence, Blackstone frames the offense as the execution of a plot. It should be recalled that 
in describing these acts of preparation, Hale considered that the acts in execution of the 
conspiracy to imprison the king were overt acts of that purpose to imprison the king, but by 
construction it also was an overt act of compassing the king’s death. And yet the explanation 
of why such acts are interpreted as overt acts of compassing the king’s death is the traditional 
one, according to which, since those imprisoning the king are willing to put at risk his life, 
they are closer to regicide and therefore they can be presumed to have the intent to kill the 
king. There is a third element that should be noticed in this passage. The means by which the 
conspirators plan to imprison the king are described as an assembling company or force, for 
which there is an element of levying war in this overt act. Finally, Blackstone conflates all 
this with Foster’s approach to these treasons as ‘preparations’ or means to an end: “These is 
no question also, but that taking any measures to render such treasonable purposes effectual, 
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as assembling and consulting on the means to kill the king, is a sufficient overt act of high 
treason.”626 
This inserting of Foster’s view within the volitive treason is further illustrated by 
Blackstone’s approach to the issue as to whether words are overt acts of compassing the 
king’s death. He thus frames the problem as “how far words, spoken by an individual, and 
not relative to any treasonable act or design then in agitation shall amount to treason.”627 So, 
in the case of Algernon Sydney, he explains the he was convicted because “some papers 
found in his closet… plainly relative to any previous formed design of dethroning or 
murdering the king, might doubtless have been properly read in evidence as overt acts of that 
treason.”628 
However, Blackstone does not  address the problem from the point of view of Foster’s 
distinction between opinions and actions, but from the traditional argument as to the 
uncertainty and context-dependence of spoken words which “may be spoken in heat, without 
any intention, or be mistaken, perverted, or mis-remembered by the hearers; their meaning 
depends always on their connection with other words, and things… as therefore there can be 
nothing more equivocal and ambiguous than words, it would indeed be unreasonable to make 
them amount to high treason.”629 Likewise, he argues that written words are treasonable not 
because “if the words be set down in writing, it argues more deliberate intention: and it has 
been held that writing is an overt act of treason; for scribere est agere. But even in this case 
the bare words are not the treason, but the deliberate act of writing them.”630 For Blackstone, 
it is not the content of the words that makes them treason but the act and the purpose of 
making them public so that “being merely speculative, without any intention… of making 
any public use of them, the convicting the authors of treason upon such an insufficient 
foundations has been universally disapproved.”631 In other words, Blackstone draws a feeble 
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balance between opinion and the act of rendering it public, for the act cannot be considered 
treasonable without presuming that the content—the opinion—is treasonable. 
3.5.3 LEVYING OF WAR 
 Blackstone devotes little time to discuss this treason. He does not explain the concept 
of ‘levying war’, nor does he distinguish between it and the concept of ‘constructive levying 
of war’. He also does not explain the difference between the “bare conspiracy to levy war” 
and ‘levy war’, and why the former “falls within the first, of compassing or imagining the 
king’s death.”632 He rather goes on to say that levying war “may be done by taking arms, not 
only to dethrone the king but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil 
counsellors, or other grievances real or pretended.” Then he justifies this treason in that “the 
law does not, neither can it, permit any private man, or set of men, to interfere forcibly in 
matters of such high importance; especially as it has established a sufficient power, for these 
purposes.”633  
 Apparently, levying war amounts to “taking arms”, that is to some sort of insurrection 
or rebellion. But the focus here is not on the insurrection against the king, but rather against 
the executive power. The offense is that of trying to “interfere forcibly” in the sphere of 
government, especially because the law “has established a sufficient power, for these 
purposes, in the high court of Parliament.” That is, to check the executive Power and reform 
the law is the business of Parliament.  In this, the tension between Blackstone’s rationale for 
treason as an act against the duty to stay true to the king and his constitutional view of the 
monarchy is manifest. Indeed, Blackstone here draws a constitutional line between such an 
unlawful interference with the government’s powers for “private or particular grievances,” 
and those “cases of national oppression” in which “the nation has very justifiably risen as 
one man, to vindicate the original contract subsisting between the king and his people.”634 
That is, the difference here is between the legitimate right to resist the tyranny of a monarch 
who tries to encroach upon the powers of the Parliament, and the illegitimate interference 
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with the executive powers of the government. So, there is a legitimate case to violate that 
duty of alliance to the king when it comes to defend the constitution against him. 
 This same constitutional view appears in Blackstone’s description of the distinction 
between an unlawful assembly or riot and the constructive levying of war (which again, he 
does not conceptualize in that way), which in the past was based on the distinction between 
the private or public purpose of those involved in it. Blackstone explains that:  
an insurrection with an avowed design to pull down all inclosures, all brothels, and 
the like; the universality of the design making it a rebellion against the state and an 
usurpation of the powers of government, and an insolent invasion of the king’s 
authority. But a tumult with a view to pull down a particular house or lay open a 
particular inclosure, amounts at most to a riot; this being no general defiance of public 
government.”635  
 Summing up, Blackstone has no formed theory as to what the nature of the offense 
of treason is, nor does it seem that he is concerned with this issue since he conflates the ideas 
from Coke, Hale and Foster without hesitation. It seems rather that the focus of his 
description of this offense are the constitutional theories as to when an insurrection against 
the government is justified and when it is indeed against the law of treason. Because whether 
certain acts amount to compassing the king’s death or not depends indeed on the 
consideration as to whether the government is oppressive. And this includes what written 
opinion amounts to treasonable words, and what does not.  
3.5.4 THE FIELD OF CONSPIRACY  
3.5.4.1 COMPASSING 
 Compassing is a type of purpose which is synonymous with design. Thus, among 
other inherited properties, compassing belongs to the mind (synonymous with will). The 
structure of the overt act, as has been said, is not stable. It appears as an act in evidence of 
compassing, but also as an act in execution of compassing, and as an act to render effectual 
the treasonable purposes. In this sense, it is synonymous with measures. This later 
conception of the overt act appears in the distinction of the words that are a type of overt act: 
words related to design and those not related. There is a further distinction between bare 
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words, referring to the ‘opinion expressed in words,’ and the concept of ‘public opinion,’ or 
‘making public use of words.’  
3.5.4.2 LEVY WAR 
 Levy war is a type alongside insurrection and rebellion meaning ‘taking arms’. The 
structure of insurrection is further distinguished by ‘purpose’ and by ‘motive’. Thus, it can 
be an ‘insurrection with the purpose to interfere in public matters and motivated by private 
grievances,’ which is the levy war, or it can be an ‘insurrection with a private purpose,’ which 
is named a riot, or an ‘insurrection motivated by national oppression or public grievances’. 
Blackstone not only classifies this conduct as a type of treason, but also as a type of 
‘usurpation of government powers and invasion of king’s powers’, in what might be called a 
new type of offenses that are ‘against the constitution’. Indeed, when Blackstone classifies 
high treason as a type of crime, the main feature that distinguishes it from other crimes is 
that it is against the supreme executive power which refers to ‘the king and his government’. 
In doing so he is establishing an offense against the constitution rather than against the person 
of the king, or the loyalty to the king.  
3.5.4.3 CONSPIRACY 
 Blackstone uses very little the term conspiracy or its derived forms (only three times) 
as synonymous with compassing. The propositional forms he uses are to conspire against 
somebody, as in “to have conspired in public against his liege lord and sovereign,”636 to 
conspire to do something, as in “to conspire to imprison the king by force,”637 and “a bare 
conspiracy to levy war.”638  
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4. THE RISE OF THE ACTION ON THE CASE 
 The rise of the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy, or malicious prosecution 
as it would be later called, is a central event in the development of the concept of modern 
conspiracy for reasons that would later become apparent. Methodologically speaking, most 
scholars separate both developments as if there were no connections between modern 
criminal conspiracy and action on the case, other than the fact that both are somehow related 
to the medieval conspiracy. This is due partly to a lack of understanding of the process by 
which the action on the case itself came into being.  
 There is a general agreement that the very first reported case where the action on the 
case was “becoming better known,”639 was the case of Fuller v Cook (1584) 3 Leon 100, 74 
ER 567, but that the action had been known for a while before that case.640 There also is a 
view that in the earlier cases it was apparent that “the writ of conspiracy had provided 
inspiration for the action on the Case for malicious prosecution,” though later its form slowly 
departed from that of the writ.641 Furthermore, a relationship with the action for word or 
slander has also been suggested.642 Indeed, as Baker puts it, in the period the action of 
malicious prosecution was born “there are no clear lines to draw between the three,” meaning 
between the former and the action for words, and the writ of conspiracy.643 Beyond these 
suggestions and hints, nothing else in the way of explanation is offered. Baker seems to think 
that the action of malicious prosecution derived from the action from slander, and that, 
nevertheless, it bore some connection with the writ. By contrast, both Winfield and Kiralfy 
derive the action from the writ of conspiracy, though they point out that there was also some 
connection to slander in the early cases. The question remains as to whether the action of 
malicious prosecution derived from either of them, and if so, how.  
                                                 
639 Winfield, Conspiracy, 120-1. 
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 What follows is an attempt to explain the rise of the action of malicious prosecution 
both in terms of the action for words, and the writ of malicious prosecution. As it happens to 
be, the solution to the problem lies in an understanding of the way new concepts are created 
by the process of conceptual blending, and how meaning is constructed dynamically in 
discourse. Only in this way do we come to realize that after the emergence of the action for 
words, lawyers began to draw analogies between the new action and the well-known writ of 
conspiracy, probably due to practical reasons. Out of that mapping between action for words 
and writ of conspiracy, a blended space with elements from both frames emerged. Indeed, 
we can identify this new space as the form of the writ of conspiracy understood in terms of 
the action for words. At the very beginning, this blended form licensed the construction of 
alternative interpretations anchored to the input spaces, that is, lawyers, in their arguments, 
placed themselves in either the action for words or the writ space. But as such arguments 
were made, and because of them, the distinction was gradually made between the blended 
space and the input spaces so that the boundaries of a new concept or frame began to emerge. 
The consequence of this process, as will be seen, is that the whole domain of conspiracy was 
rearranged.  
 To describe this process, I should first briefly talk about how the action for words 
emerged as a response to ecclesiastical defamation.  I will then show how the action for words 
and the writ of conspiracy began to blend.  
4.1 A LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 
 As we will later see in this chapter, the concept of modern conspiracy was a 
consequence of the rearrangement of the law of defamation, which in turn resulted from the 
transformations that its structure underwent due to jurisdictional changes. But before we 
engage with the law of defamation, at least regarding that form of defamation which consisted 
in imputing someone a criminal behavior, we should take notice of the wider cultural and 
social framework within which the law of defamation was conceptually embedded. In other 
words, we should refer to the concepts and social patterns (sometimes conceptualized as 
unitary experiences, sometimes not) that the law of defamation frequently presupposes but 
does not render explicit. I am referring here to the concept of honor, and to the problem of 
an increasingly litigious society that frequently entrenched its disputes by bringing them to 
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court instead of restoring harmony by settling them out of court. Thus, as we will see, the 
law of defamation was an alternative to the culture of honor, and also a hamper or a brake on 
unnecessary prosecution.  
 Maybe because of the noticeable surge in litigation that manifested itself during this 
period, Early Modern lawyers had the perception that there was a parallel and unprecedented 
increase in legal abuses, and particularly a perversion of criminal justice. Hudson bemoaned 
that the Star Chamber was troubled with “many vexatious suits… and many frivolous bills 
put in” and that “this great offense of conspiracy, rarely heard of in former times, but in our 
age grown frequent and familiar.”644 
 Regarding criminal justice, this was facilitated by the existing accusatory system that 
was set in motion with private prosecutions, frequently the alleged victims of crime. It is true 
that for real victims of crime prosecution was many a time burdensome and probably an 
undesirable course compared to some sort of settlement with the offender. However, abusers 
had the possibility of imprisoning, vexing and damaging the reputations of their enemies.645 
And there was no lack of reasons for using this tool. Simple revenge was the most obvious 
motivation,646 but it was not the only one. Resorting to the threat of prosecution had become 
part of the strategy adopted by the parties to business disputes.647 This is the motivation that 
moved a group of creditors to encourage false charges against Stone in the landmark 
Poulterers’ Case (1611) 9 Co Rep 55b, 73 ER 813. Likewise, another of the cause celebre 
of false accusation at the time had originated in an unsuccessful attempt to claim rights in the 
                                                 
644 Hudson TSC, 30, 104. Coke expressed similar complaints about the rise of unnecessary, frivolous, and 
vexatious lawsuits, 2 Inst 28. 
645 Witness to that is how prosecution for defamation had increased in the London Consistory Courts between 
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Decline, 112. 
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land.648 Furthermore, in disputes over land, the possibility of escheat to the landlord after 
conviction of felony was always hovering in cases of conspiracy.649  
4.2 THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 
In the Roman Law tradition, infamia was the bad reputation arising from wrongful 
behavior and disqualifying from holding public duties.650 The importance of such ill 
reputation lies in that when it was well spread it was a cause for suspicion, and therefore a 
good reason to put a man to answer a charge, and for this to undergo legal proceedings in 
order to clear himself.651It was natural for the law to take notice of the danger that such ill 
intended people may have on innocents by spreading false rumors against them. It was the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction that first conceptualized the problem with a constitution enacted by 
the Council of Oxford (1222), which went by the name of Auctoritate dei patris:  
By the authority of Almighty God, We excommunicate all those who, for the sake of 
hatred, profit, or favour, or for whatsoever other cause, maliciously impute a crime to 
any other person who is not of ill fame among good and substantial persons, by reason 
of which purgation at the least is awarded against him, or he is harmed in some other 
manner.652 
 The law of defamation in England developed from this statute in the form of the 
interpretation of the courts and by the doctrine of the jurists. For instance, the constitution 
said nothing of the proceedings, and consequently, both ex officio prosecution and private 
actions were allowed in ecclesiastical courts. The scope of defamation was limited to 
imputations of crime, thus excluding mere insults and imputations of professional 
incompetence.653 However, there were hard cases that fell between the line that separated the 
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imputation of a crime from mere insult.654 The crimes imputed could be both ecclesiastical 
offences and felonies.655 There was no distinction, and/or requirements, between general and 
specific imputations, nor between imputations in the course of legal proceedings and 
imputations in the country. As to the words constituting the insult, there was no clear rule as 
to whether they should be strictly constructed or not, and the general rule was that they should 
be interpreted in their most natural sense. 656 As to the subjective elements, there had to be 
malice (understood as an intent to cause harm) on the part of the person uttering the words, 
but malice was implied from them and consequently, the burden of proof lay on the defendant 
who would have to allege and prove lack of malice. Among the defenses that would defeat 
implied malice there was qualified privilege, that is, privileged situations where actionable 
words were allowed as when the words had been uttered in the course of criminal judicial 
proceedings, because it was a matter of public interest.657 The issue of whether the truth of 
the imputation or justification was a good defense was subject to judicial discretion, and in 
those cases in which it was allowed it seems that it was rather a reason to mitigate the 
punishment than a defense.658 Finally, Auctoritate dei patris required that some form of harm 
had been caused, namely to the plaintiff’s reputation, but there was no requirement of 
allegation of specific damage as physical harm or monetary loss as a consequence of the 
defamation, though plaintiffs frequently added details about how they have suffered further 
damage as a consequence of the false imputation.659 
 For the victim, the immediate effect of a successful action of defamation was clearing 
up the victim’s guilt, and therefore restoring her good reputation. As for the perpetrator, the 
constitution provided that they were to be punished with excommunication though it could 
be lifted by penance.660 The typical penance involved ceremonies in public places in which 
the defendant admitted to wrongdoing, apologized, and asked for forgiveness. This 
                                                 
654 Ib., 577-8. 
655 Ib., 575. See also Milsom, Foundations, 380. 
656 Helmholz, Canon Law, 576-7. 
657 Ib., 579-80. 
658 Ib., 582-3. 
659 Ib., 586-7. 
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ceremonial was clearly designed to restore the peace between the parties661 Furthermore, 
since the defendant admitted to wrongdoing, this also emphasized the falsity of the 
imputation or, in other words, the innocence of the victim.   
 The boundaries of both common law and ecclesiastical jurisdictions with regard to 
defamation began to be defined early on by statutory law, which first limited the range of 
penalties that could be imposed with Circumspecte agatis (1285),662 then, by 1 Edw 3 c 11 
(1327). actions of defamation before ecclesiastical courts against indictors in the sheriff’s 
tourn were forbidden.663 As suggested earlier, since Auctoritatis did not specify the temporal 
or spiritual nature of the imputation, there was potential for a clash between the two 
jurisdictions. The principle setting up the jurisdictional boundaries took shape when the 
King’s Bench began to prohibit defamation suits for imputations of temporal felonies.664 
4.3 ACTION FOR WORDS 
We will see how the development of slander in the common law tradition gave place 
to an action in which the insult was not the cause of action, but rather the pecuniary damages 
as a consequence of it.665 
 There is evidence that between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, local courts 
entertained actions for words.666 In these cases, the plaintiffs complained of insults, which 
many times were general imputations of criminal character or conduct that entailed rather 
than alleged the commission of specific triable crimes, such as calling someone “a thief, a 
seducer and a manslayer.”667 In addition to the insult, these actions did not only allege harm 
to the plaintiff’s reputation, but also consequential temporal damages caused by the insult,668 
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such as a reduction of the term of a lease,669 the abortion of a delivery of goods,670 or the loss 
of a loan.671 
During the medieval period, the notion of defamation also made its appearance in 
common law courts, though there was never an action comparable to that of the ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. The concept was frequently hidden within other forms. In the criminal 
jurisdiction there was for sure the remedy provided by the statute Scandalum Magnatum 1378 
against the slanderers of public officers.672 Some cases involving defamation were brought 
before the Star Chamber as well, but it seems that the grounds of the jurisdiction laid on the 
public consequences of certain slanders rather than on the harm to reputation or the 
consequential damages for the plaintiffs.673 There were also some examples of actions for 
imputing misconduct in the course of legal proceedings. or for slandering in open court 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but these seemed exceptions rather than giving 
rise to an action for defamation in royal courts.674 
Finally, during the fourteenth and fifteenth century, actions involving a claim of 
villainage as a consequence of which the plaintiffs had lost business were brought before 
common law courts. But the merits of the case were buried under the form of a “trespass for 
lying in wait and threatening to seize a man as a villain,”675 where the alleged cause of action 
was not the actual words but the violent assault that led the plaintiff to discontinue his 
business.676 These hidden grounds emerged to the surface at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, when the action for words finally came into being in the common law courts as will 
be seen next.677  
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 Finally, defamation made its way to the common law courts as an action for words 
during the first third of the early sixteenth century.678 The new jurisdiction was carved out of 
the ecclesiastical one. As we will see, the parallelism between the new action for words and 
ecclesiastical defamation was manifest to contemporaries, but the new action owed as much 
to the old local action for words as to the forays of the Middle Ages. This is to say that though 
the action for words was based on the notion of defamation, it construed it in a slightly 
different way 
The foundations of this jurisdiction rested on the distinction between temporal and 
spiritual matters in cases of defamation, and the distinction between temporal and spiritual 
causes of action and remedies. As said earlier, the Oxford constitution did not draw any 
distinction between imputations of ecclesiastical and secular crimes, nor between 
imputations out and in court. Thus, since the question of truth was sometimes raised in 
ecclesiastical courts, the door was opened to these courts to determine issues pending on 
common law courts and thus interfering with their exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
matters. Eventually, this led to the issuing of writs of prohibition. Then, by the end of the 
fifteenth century, defendants in defamation for imputations of crimes began to bring actions 
against their plaintiffs under the Statute of Praemunire because they interpreted that they 
violated the principle that the determination of the Pleas of the Crown was a competence of 
the King’s Bench. By the beginning of the 16th century, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
imputation of felonies had been brought to a halt.679 Apparently, this implied that there was 
no remedy available for words imputing temporal offences.680 In developing a remedy, the 
common law courts laid down the jurisdictional principle that separated the common law 
from the ecclesiastical defamation, and which set up the foundations for further forays of the 
former into the latter.  
As suggested earlier, temporal damage or loss as a consequence of the words became 
the essence of the common law action for words. It was not an action for the words 
themselves but for their consequences. This allegation emphasized the temporal nature of 
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offense, justifying the intervention in an area traditionally linked to the ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, and at the same time showed what the grounds of the special case was. In these 
early cases where the words amounted to an imputation of felony, the special damages 
alleged included the risk to life and liberty, and arrest and imprisonment. In other cases, there 
were allegations of economic loss usually as a consequence of the damaged reputation so 
vital to economic deals.681   
The rule soon became that special damage was not traversable and that the issue 
revolved around the speaking of the words. This entailed that there was no need of proof of 
special damage which could be presumed from the uttering of the words. This would later 
lead to a fourfold classification of the words of which damage could be presumed: imputation 
of offences, attribution of communicable diseases, unfitness for profession, and misconduct 
in an office of profit. In the rest of cases of actions for words, proof of special damage had 
to be made in addition to the utterance of the words.682 
Temporal loss not only served to distinguish the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
defamation from the common law jurisdiction over the action for words, it also became the 
basis of the assault of the latter over the former. The issue of whether it was possible for 
common law courts to try action for words amounting to ecclesiastical offences had been 
raised in early cases such Anonymous (1536) Fifoot, History and Sources 141-2, where 
Fitzherbert and Shelley JJ laid that the only imputations for which common law courts had 
cognizance were treason and felony. However, soon it became established that temporal loss 
as a consequence of imputations of spiritual offenses was triable at common law courts.683 
For instance, it was said that an imputation of bastardy was actionable at common law 
because “for this case the ground of the action is temporal, sc. that she was to be advanced 
in marriage and that she was defeated of it, and the means by which she was defeated was 
                                                 
681 Baker, Spelman, 238, 243. Both are combined, for instance, in an Anonymous case in (1536) Fifoot, History 
and Sources 141, the plaintiff claimed to have been “kept in the Gaol… among the prisoners there lying… and 
by reason of the said words thus proclaimed and published… has not only been harmed and prejudiced and has 
suffered despite in his good name, fame and condition, but also by reason of such aforesaid false imputation of 
crime, has been greatly injured and damnified by much labour and expenses.” This case, thus, averred harm to 
reputation, to the person, and economic loss or vexation. 
682 Baker, Introduction, 446; Baker, Spelman, 240, 245; Milson, Foundations, 385; 3 HEL 347-351. 
683 Plucknett, Concise, 440; Baker, Introduction, 439-40; Milson, Foundations, 383, 5; Helmholz, Canon Law, 
573, Baker, Spelman, 238-41; 3 HEL 350-351. 
227 
 
the same slander, which means tending to such end shall be tried by the common law.”684 
This problem of the separation of ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions would be 
approached from a different take as the common law courts received the doctrines about 
conspiracy developed by the Star Chamber. But we will see that later.  
The first actions for defamation (not under other frames) made their appearance in 
common law courts between 1508 and 1537. The declarations in these actions show that they 
arose out of the blending of the concept of ecclesiastical defamation and the nascent common 
law actions for damages or actions on the case. Thus, in keeping with the former, plaintiffs 
alleged the imputation of a temporal offence (mainly theft), and prior good reputation. The 
words constituting the defamation had to impute an offence.685 This element was again 
present in the ecclesiastical concept of defamation. However, as we have seen, the 
ecclesiastical defamation was limited to imputations of spiritual offences. Therefore, it was 
natural to think that the new common law action was limited to imputations of temporal 
offences. Indeed, it could be said that the new action filled the gap in the law created by the 
prohibitions and the application of the Statute of Praemunire.686 Furthermore, this brought 
forward the idea that the distinction between the ecclesiastical and the civil jurisdiction lay 
in the nature (spiritual or temporal) of the offence. Yet, as we will see, defamation was never 
seen as a unified category. Or to put it in other words, the distinction remained external, that 
is, a separation of jurisdictions, but did not become internal to the category of defamation.  
Most of the early imputations were of theft,687 though there were cases of other 
offences, and of imputations that did not amount to a felony nor even an offence, such as 
claims of villeinage and extortion.688 Like ecclesiastical defamation, the action for words was 
indifferent to whether the imputation had been uttered in legal proceedings or not, but many 
of these early actions alleged some form of prosecution. For instance, in the Anonymous Case 
(1536) Fifoot, History and Sources 141, the declaration averted that the defendant had 
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“caused to be written a certain Bill of Indictment of and concerning [the plaintiff] … and the 
same Bill to be presented before the faithful and beloved Justices of our Lord the King”. And 
in Buckley v Wood (1591) Fifoot, History and Sources 143-4, the defamation seemed to have 
taken place when someone repeated the words of a bill in the Star Chamber as true. This is 
consistent with the rule regarding the nature of the imputation of offence, that it should be 
specific rather than general.689 That is, there should be imputation of a crime committed, 
rather than merely implied by a character attribution (such as calling someone thief, slayer, 
etc.).690 Finally, these words should be published, that is, the imputation should be public.691 
In the early actions, it seems that malice was alleged but, as with ecclesiastical 
defamation, was not traversed but rather inferred from the words and possibly other 
circumstances. This resembles the idea of what would be known as implied malice or malice 
in law.692 However, there were instances of allegations of what would be known as express 
malice or ill-will that appear in early declarations, such as detailing that the plaintiff acted 
upon “scheming to harm his name and estate.”693 As we will see later, this malice only 
became relevant as a replication to the defense of privilege.694 
Though it has been pointed out that plaintiffs found this action for word more 
attractive because of the damages assigned by it, in contrast to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
the civil action was also intended to restore the reputation of the slandered person. That 
means that the action was supposed to clear them from suspicion, proving their innocence. 
In other words, part of the process of defamation implied that the imputation was false 
(though maybe we cannot say that it was procedurally false). This line of thought is clear in 
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Buckley v Wood (1591), in which the accusation had been held to be insufficient. Yet the 
court said that the action laid because “if such matters may be inserted in bills exhibited in 
so high an honourable a Court in great slander of the parties, and they cannot answer it to 
clear themselves, not have their actions as well to clear themselves of the crimes as to recover 
damages… great inconveniences will ensue.”695  
4.4 THE BLENDING OF WRIT OF CONSPIRACY AND ACTION FOR WORDS 
When it comes to explaining why the action that later would be called malicious 
prosecution arose in the common law courts, most legal historians opt for a functional 
explanation. The writ of conspiracy had become fixed in the form of a procurement of false 
indictment by conspiracy. This resulted in two main constraints for using this action to 
remedy similar situations. The first was the plurality requirement, that is, the idea that the 
writ was limited to collective forms of legal abuse. This, obviously, excluded single-man 
prosecutions. The second was that the action did not lie if the innocence of the defendant was 
not proven, that is, the principal cause had to have concluded with the acquittal of the party 
indicted. This meant that those failed prosecutions that had not been able to secure an 
indictment did not give rise to actions by the writ of prosecution. Thus, Winfield points out 
that the writ of conspiracy was already in decline when the new action on the case emerged,696 
and Baker suggests that the action of defamation from which malicious prosecution would 
emerge was immediately perceived as an alternative way “made to do similar work to the old 
action of conspiracy, with the important difference that they could be brought against a single 
prosecutor and without proof of acquittal.”697  
These two explanations dovetail with two different ways of understanding the 
genealogy of malicious prosecution, either as an action on the case that outgrew the medieval 
writ, or as a particular form of defamation that developed from the practice of alleging malice 
in advance of the defense of privilege. In fact, if we think of the early cases of malicious 
prosecution as motivated by prudence and caution on the part of lawyers, it can be said that 
                                                 
695 Fifoot, History and Sources, 143-144. 
696 Winfield, Conspiracy, 141-2 
697 Baker, Spelman, 246. Cf.  
230 
 
the structure of malicious prosecution probably owed to both parents as a blend motivated 
by an analogy between the writ of conspiracy and the nascent action for words.  
 One of the very first questions that lawyers might have struggled with when the action 
for words was being developed was whether it could be brought for imputations of offenses 
in court. That is, whether when faced with the facts of an imputation in court, they could 
invoke the frame of the action for words or not. It was not given that these actions would 
succeed. It is true, as seen earlier, that the ecclesiastical defamation did not make a clear 
distinction between imputations out of court, and those made in the course of legal 
proceedings. And the action for words seemed to fill the gap created by the limitation of the 
ecclesiastical defamation to spiritual offences, leaving without remedy “the most serious 
untruths of all—those which put a man’s life or liberty in jeopardy.”698 Yet, there was already 
a remedy for these untruths when they were so serious as to have been substantiated in an 
indictment: the writ of conspiracy. And the very reason that the ecclesiastical courts had been 
prevented from messing with the criminal process could have deterred these early pioneers 
from bringing actions for imputations in court. Indeed, the prohibition on ecclesiastical courts 
was not only due to a fear that they would make inroads into criminal jurisdiction, but also 
that they would interfere with the course of criminal proceedings.699 Thus, common lawyers 
tempted to use this new action for words against prosecutors might have been concerned with 
the possibility that such actions might be challenged in court on the basis that there was 
already legal remedy for imputations in court by the writ of conspiracy or that there could be 
no actions for words against such imputations because they would discourage criminal 
prosecution.  
 But, as said earlier, one of the clear limitations of the writ of conspiracy is that it 
could not be brought against single prosecutors, or against failed prosecutors. For sure, this 
was equally an abuse of criminal process, but the law did not consider it serious enough to 
deserve either punishment or remedy. This was the field were the action for words seemed 
                                                 
698 Baker, Introduction, 438. 
699 For instance, the statute 1 Edw 3 st 2 c 11 (1327) was intended to restrain litigants from bringing actions 
against presenting jurors in the sheriff’s Tourn on the grounds that “many People of the Shire [would] be in fear 
to Indict such Offenders” if such actions were allowed (cf. Fifoot, History and Sources, 127; Baker, 
Introduction, 438; and Helmholz, Canon Law, 594. 
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to have more potential for redress. But the action for words was of a different nature. The 
focus of the frame of the action for words was not the abuse of criminal process by private 
prosecutors (with or without agreement as the factoring element), but the effect of certain 
words. For sure, if those words are uttered in a certain setting and according to ascertain 
form, we can think of their legal effect—the ensuing of legal proceedings—as the effect of 
those words (notwithstanding other sorts of effects). As we will see, this was part of the 
analogy that lawyers saw between writ and action for words. But the matter of fact was that 
false imputations of offences in Court could be considered either as abuses of criminal law 
or as words that have an effect on the reputation of a person. In this latter case, the fact that 
the words are uttered in a legal setting does not constitute an essential part of the wrong (it 
can take place in or out of court), but it might perhaps be considered as an aggravation. By 
contrast, the uttering of the words in a legal setting was an essential part of the abuse frame. 
After all, the same imputation made in a different context would not amount to an abuse.  
By defect, such imputations would be considered from the point of view of abuses, 
and as such the common law only considered abusive collective criminal proceedings, and 
only once those proceedings had come to an end. Prudence recommended to stick to the old 
writ of conspiracy. 
4.4.5 THE BLENDED FRAME  
The solution was to think of defamation by imputation in court in terms of the old 
writ of conspiracy, but adding up the effect of the words on the reputation of the defendant. 
This was based on an analogy between the two frames of the writ and defamation: both 
included words imputing the crime. In both frames, one of the frame elements were words 
imputing a crime (though in the writ this element was never lexically realized). The main 
difference was in the different perspective they took about these words imputing a crime. 
The writ of conspiracy focused on their illocutionary force, that is, the fact that by uttering 
them in a certain setting—by complaining before a JP, by bringing an appeal, or by bringing 
a bill of indictment—and according to a certain form—swearing to its truth, etc.—these 
words initiated criminal legal proceedings causing a wrongful prosecution. The action for 
defamation focused on their perlocutionary force, that is, the conventional effect that these 
words had, independently of the setting in which they were pronounced, of damaging a 
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person’s reputation.  Because of this analogy, a blended space emerged which contained 
elements from both input spaces, but that also excluded decisive elements from both spaces 
(as we will see, this led to several objections in court). Thus, these actions alleged the 
imputation of offences in court, specifying both their illocutionary force, and their abusive 
nature (the intent was not genuine but pretended), but also their perlocutionary effect.  
This new structure of was what we might call a defamatory writ of conspiracy. It was 
neither an action for words, nor properly the writ of conspiracy—though it was probably 
intended as a species of the latter. We will see how this blended space would later become 
the action upon the case of conspiracy, and then malicious prosecution. We will also see how 
it changed the view of the writ of conspiracy from an action against wrongful prosecution to 
an action for damages.  
I will now show how this blended frame was realized in the allegations of the actions 
that most scholars consider already of malicious prosecution. These scholars normally 
distinguish between early experiments of the action for words and the action for malicious 
prosecution. In doing so, they put the cart before the horse. They ignore the fact that these 
subsequent actions were indeed a conceptual blend of writ of conspiracy and defamation. As 
such, they were still connected to both frames. This means that in framing the issue, lawyers 
could argue, and argued indeed, both that it was either an action of defamation or a writ of 
conspiracy. That is, they would evoke either of these frames to abate the action. It was during 
these arguments that the belief that this was a new type of action emerged. What follows is 
an account of this process and its consequences. 
Indeed, I will seek to show how the presence of lexical elements and expressions that 
invoked the frames encoded in the writ of conspiracy and the action for words reveal this 
potential conceptual blend, at least in the way lawyers framed the factual situations presented 
by their clients.  I will then provide further proof of this conceptual blend in the way lawyers 
evoked both the frames of the writ and those of the action for words to interpret the plaint 
and declarations so that they drew favorable conclusions. Lastly, I will show how all this 
process of frame shifting gave rise to the emergent structure of action on the case first, and 
malicious prosecution later.  
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4.4.5.1 WRONGFUL PROSECUTION 
4.5.4.1.1 CONTROL OF PROSECUTORS 
 Prosecution is usually defined as the initiation and continuation of criminal legal 
proceedings against a defendant. The instigation occurs when someone brings a charge 
against someone, that is, when someone imputes an offence upon someone else, before some 
authority or in a legal setting. This imputation sets in motion the machinery of criminal justice 
that will secure that the accused party appears in court to answer to the charges, upon which 
they would be put to trial.  
Through the course of the common law, there emerged different methods of finding 
out about suspected criminals and bringing them to court, with different legal 
consequences.700  The oldest procedure was the appeal. It was made in a court of law and led 
to the request of the party accused to appear, under threat of outlawry. After they appeared, 
without more, they would be put to answer to the accusation and then submitted to combat 
trial. Though in theory the appellor acted for the king and claimed no damages, this mode of 
prosecution was more of a private action against someone. In that system, the prosecutor was 
frequently the victim or someone of his kin, and they normally initiated prosecution out of 
their own suspicion.  
The development of the Eyre system added a new method of prosecution. Bodies of 
jurors were made to present, that is to inform of, suspected criminals before the Eyre with 
regard to a list of crimes they were inquired about by the justices.701 The jurors themselves 
were supposed to arrest the suspects, though the court also provides for their secret arrest and 
imprisonment if the jurors could not.702 Once presented, they were put to trial by ordeal—
which after 1215 would be jury trial. This was a true system of public prosecution in that 
there was no interested party instigating criminal procedure, but rather a body of neighbors 
                                                 
700 Although these methods were available for the prosecution both of misdemeanors and felonies, I will only 
focus on the methods of prosecution of felony and treason which had far more serious consequences and I will 
omit prosecution by information. 
701 J. G. Bellamy, The Criminal Trial in Later Medieval England (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1998), 19. 
702 Bellamy, Criminal Trial, 19. 
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bringing communal accusations703  on the king’s behalf. It is true, however, that many of the 
crimes the presenting jury apprised the justices of had been previously appealed in the county 
court, but the presentment was not the continuation of these actions. They were neither 
accusers nor witnesses, but rather reported about what was fama publica in the county.704 
In addition to these methods of instigating prosecution, by the last part of the 
thirteenth century, a new method developed that would contribute, along with other 
circumstances, to the change of the presenting jury into the grand jury. When itinerant 
justices were in the county, private complaints could be brought before the court, which 
would pass them on to the presenting jury as part of their supply of information about the 
commission of crimes. However, over time, the presenting jury would endorse them with a 
billa vera, if they considered them true, and with ignoramus otherwise. Initially, this would 
have probably been out of their own knowledge. However, as they stopped being a self-
informing jury, they came to rely on those bills for their indictments. Thus, at this point, it 
could be said that the instigation of prosecution was no longer a matter of the presenting jury, 
but rather of these private complainers who brought the bills upon which the indictment 
would be based.705 This bill procedure reintroduced private prosecution into the system. 
Indeed, in keeping with the appeal procedure, only victims or their legal representatives, or 
the kinsman or servants it they were deceased, were supposed to bring bills of complaint. 
This implied that they would have a first-hand knowledge of the crime. However, as we will 
see in short, these bills did not put the party to answer. That was the duty of the presenting 
jury. In fact, the development of pre-trial investigations along with this jury would make 
these bills less risky than the old appeal. 
It seems clear that before the eighteenth century there was no system of defendant’s 
rights whose violation would defeat the criminal process. Rather, the only real safeguard was 
controlling the quality of the prosecution. And judicial control of prosecutors was linked to 
weighting policy considerations. The general goal might have been to improve the quality of 
                                                 
703 Ib., 24. 
704 Frederick William Maitland, and Frederick Pollock, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward 
I, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898), 672-4. 
705 Bellamy, Criminal Trial, 22-24. 
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prosecution -an issue particularly important in a system of private accusations- that is, of 
securing that only well-grounded and successful prosecutions were brought forward. That 
would spare innocent people from being caught in the crushing judicial machinery, and 
would enhance trust and respect of royal justice. However, quality of prosecution might have 
seemed frivolous a consideration in times of lawlessness, and perceived or real insecurity, 
when too tight a control of prosecutors would inevitably have led to their discouragement, 
leaving crime unpunished. There was always this tension between preventing abusive or 
unnecessary prosecution and encouraging it. Thus, we might find two types of controls 
according to two types of goals: controls aimed at securing the prosecution of crimes, so that 
no crime went unpunished, and controls aimed at securing the quality of prosecution, so that 
only successful prosecution was instigated. And sometimes, the methods of control were a 
combination of both.  
The control and screening of the imputation or accusation of offences on the part of 
the legal authorities to secure that the machinery of justice worked properly depended on the 
method of prosecution. Some of them allowed a pre-trial evaluation of the quality of the 
accusation since there were means to check the imputation, raising the question as to whether 
there was evidence supporting an imputation. Others waited till trial had proven the 
imputation to be false to exert the control of prosecutors, raising the question as to whether 
there was wrongdoing on the part of the prosecutor and providing remedies for it. Some dealt 
with public accusers who had been compelled to inform judicial authorities of crimes, 
whereas others were victims of crimes who, though they had an unenforceable duty to 
prosecute, always had a choice to step up and make a private accusation in the name of the 
king.   
And this latter issue reveals one of the features of the medieval control of process 
agencies in general. Courts did not just quash insufficient imputations; they also presumed 
wrongdoing and punished it. We can see it when the Eyre justices amerce appellors and 
hundred for false appeals and false presentments. Likewise, there is no room for mistake or 
ignorance in reporting crimes.  Failure to make a presentment in spite of good evidence was 
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visited with on the spot amercements for concealing offences.706 This control by Eyre justices 
was exercised ex officio. They had the means to review the imputations since they had the 
records of local courts where appeals and inquests had been made.  
These were pre-trial proceedings that prevented that innocents went to trial, or 
criminals from going unpunished. By the thirteenth century, defendants of appeals also had 
the opportunity to challenge their appellor’s imputations because they had been made out of 
hatred and spite. This issue was first tried by an inquisition, and if it was true that there was 
suspicion of ill-will, the defendant was released and put to trial by jury. An acquittal carried 
the punishment of the appellor as well. Thus, the defendant obtained remedy against wrongful 
imprisonment and avoided the risk of battle.  
But what are the concepts involved in these instruments of control of prosecutors? 
The notions of false appeals, false presentments and concealment as referred to mistakes and 
omissions in the reporting of offences were conceptualized as a neglect of their duty to 
prosecute crime for the king. These imply passive conducts, omissions. One fails to deliver 
something as promised. And the rule is, if you fail, you pay. The idea behind the writ of odio 
et atia is of a different kind. It does not imply a mere default or negligence in carrying out 
one’s duty, but an active conduct; an abuse of law. And abuse here entails that the motive for 
which the prosecutor makes their imputation is ill, and that therefore their purpose is criminal. 
This writ is also a remedy against imprisonment, but the plaintiff does not allege any wrong, 
only the abusive imputation. Consequently, the writ provides a procedure to find the purpose 
of the appellor and then to review the imputation though trial by jury. 
Finally, we get to the writ of conspiracy. As we have seen, the writ was originally 
designed as a catch-all sort of remedy aimed at tackling wholesale corruption of the civil and 
criminal process. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, the courts limited 
its scope to the instigation of criminal proceedings, excluding jurors and officials acting 
under oath (at least in the civil action by writ). Consequently, the writ of conspiracy did not 
primarily focus on the imputation of an offence nor on the prosecutor, but on the involvement 
of third parties with the process along with trial agencies. That meant that the writ fell within 
                                                 
706 F. W. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester (London: Macmillan and Co., 1884), xxxiii; 
see also (Bellamy, Criminal Trial, 33)). 
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the post-trial remedies against wrongdoing rather than being a pre-trial review and control of 
the imputation made. Thus, it usually averred that these people acting together had caused 
him to be unjustly brought to justice and put to trial, for which they claimed damages. 
This use of the writ of conspiracy to cure the misuse of criminal process, indeed, was 
more or less contemporary to the introduction of the bill procedure707 and the end of the Eyre 
system, and thus reflects the complications of a new system of prosecution that was getting 
on its way.  For one thing, it was not clear yet what the role of these private complainers was. 
Were they prosecutors? Were they informants? And the presenting jury: Were they 
prosecutors or a sort of reviewing body deciding on what prosecutions were well grounded 
and should go on to trial? In other words, either we consider private complainers as a source 
among many other ways for a jury to find out about crimes to prosecute, or we consider 
private complaints as the main way by which prosecutions can be started and the grand jury 
as a check on them before putting parties to prosecute.  
It is safe to say that as long as the presenting jury was self-informing and did not 
depend exclusively on evidence presented to them by the prosecutors, relying on other 
sources for finding about crime, private complainers could not be seen but as a sort of 
informant. In other words, the indictment and trial could not be said to originate on their 
imputation but on the grand jury’s. Furthermore, as long as presenting jurors are thought to 
have a duty to report crime, this runs contrary to any weighting of evidence and adjudicatory 
function. The presenting jury is there to report their suspicion of crime mainly based on 
public fama, if not on third party reports, and not to evaluate these private reports or that 
public fama.  
According to the wording of the definition of conspirators, it seems that initially the 
writ of conspiracy did distinguish between those who “indict” and those who “cause to 
indict.” As for the former, it is clear who they are and what they do: they institute the 
prosecution by formally imputing a crime. Those who “cause to indict” are probably those 
who one way or another influenced the indictors. This would in theory include not only 
officers and private individuals but also the representatives of the vill who reported on oath 
                                                 
707 Bellamy, Criminal Trial, 35 points out the connection between writ of conspiracy and bill of indictment. 
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to the hundredors at the sheriff’s tourn. The use of cause to, which does not suggest a 
screening jury, may be explained because of the duty indictors had to report crime once they 
knew about it.  
The initial resolve to make presenting jurors liable was later withdrawn, and only 
those who caused the indictments were to be liable, that is, in the language of the writs, those 
who procured the indictment.  But what does it mean to procure an indictment? For one 
thing, a procurement takes place when a procurer has a procured carry on some undertaking 
for the procurer. To put it in another words, someone gets someone else to do something 
which usually benefits the procurer or is in the procurer’s interest though not necessarily. 
The core main frame elements are the procurer—the agent that makes the procurer to act—
the procured—the person that carries about the undertaking for the procurer—and the 
undertaking—the task or activity that the procurer wants the procured to perform. Sometimes 
the means—that is, the action—by which the procurer gets to procure the procured are 
specified. Usually, these are speech acts, but they can be any other action as we will see.  
Thus, the frame of procurement encodes triangulation in action or using third parties 
to accomplish the given goal. But as there are many ways of triangulating, the term procure 
has several senses, all of which derive by inheritance from the frame of procurement. Among 
these subframes of procurement, attention should be paid to the frames of abetting, packing 
a jury, and bringing about legal proceedings.  
In the frame of abetting, the procurer makes the procured to commit a crime. Thus, 
the distinguishing feature is the nature of the undertaking, which is an unlawful act.  The 
procurer is normally named as the accessory before the fact, and the procured as the principal. 
It should be noted that, within this frame, the procurer and the procured are supposed to 
collaborate or cooperate, and without that cooperation the abetting cannot take place. This 
collaboration can indeed be grounded on a social or economic relationship between procurer 
and procured that makes the whole procurement possible, as in the case of the employment 
relationship which is part of the employment scenario. The means by which the procurement 
takes place is frequently specified. Indeed, the term abetting suggests one of those means, 
but it can also be by means of directive speech acting like commanding.   
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When the unlawful act has to do with the corruption of juries and witnesses within 
the domain of the administration of justice, there are a couple of frames which inherit from 
the frame of abetting. If the means by which the procurer or abettor gets the procured to 
undertake an unlawful act is a monetary compensation or bribe, and the unlawful act has to 
do with committing perjury, we are talking of the frame of subornation.708  If the procured is 
a law officer, such as a sheriff, and the unlawful act consists of impaneling specific people 
to the purpose of committing perjury, we are talking about the frame of packing a jury.709  
There is one more frame inheriting from the frame of procurement that interests us: 
that of bringing about or causing to happen legal proceedings. This frame specializes from 
that of procurement in that the undertaking is these legal proceedings. In this frame, the 
procured and the means of procurement frame elements are not realized, nor is there 
collaboration or relationship between the procurer and the procured. The missing procured 
person is some legal authority empowered to issue processes of law like a court of law, and 
the means can be any speech act that instigates or prompts such authorities to act, such as a 
complaint. The construction that usually realizes this frame is that of ‘agent procures 
undertaking to be made.’ Sometimes, instead of bringing about legal proceedings, the event 
is framed as ‘obtaining legal proceedings,’ where a recipient obtains their issuance from some 
legal authority.  
The Termes de la Ley gives us an instance of both uses at the same time: “the order 
in this case is, first to procure a Certiorari out of the Chancery, directed to the said Iustices, 
for the removing of the Indictment into the Kings Bench; and upon that to procure this writ 
to the Sheriff, to cause his Body to be brought at a day.” In this passage, the first instance of 
procuring evokes the frame of obtaining in which the theme is the Certiorari and the source 
the Chancery. At first sight, the second instance seems to mean ‘to bring or to carry,’ but the 
sheriff here is the procured, and the bringing him out of prison is the undertaking.  
                                                 
708 For instance, “[he who] shal unlawfully & corruptly procure any witnes or witnesses by letters, rewardes, 
promises, or by any other sinister & unlawful labour or meanes whatsoeuer, to commit any wylful & corrupt 
periury,” Act for the punishment of such person as shall procure or commit any wylfull perjury 1563 (5 Eliz 1 
c 9). 
709 So, Coke defines the evil procurers of the statute Quia multi per malitia as “such as use to packe juries by 
nomination, or other practice, or procurement,” 2 Inst 561. 
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Now the existence of all these frames that inherit from the frame of procurement, 
makes the interpretation of the writ of conspiracy tricky, for the term procure can evoke any 
of them. The usual construction of the writ that the plaintiffs “procured the indictment, arrest, 
and imprisonment of the defendant” suggests that the frame evoked is that of bringing about 
legal proceedings, since neither the procured—the jury—nor the means of procurement are 
realized.  The undertaking is the indictment and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of 
the defendant until he was acquitted. That is, the undertaking is the wrong of wrongful 
prosecution. It is clear that the frame of procurement encodes the interference of third parties 
with the process of indictment, but the problem is that the means by which the procurement 
or interference takes place is not specified. It can be by direct corruption of the juries, that is, 
by subornation or by packing the jury. In this case, there would be cooperation between the 
jurors and their procurers. But it can also be by more subtle ways, as by misleading the jury 
into knowledge about suspected criminals, in which case there will not be collaboration 
between the jury, or at least a majority of it, and the procurers.    
The use of the writ of conspiracy in criminal proceedings arose and became fixed at 
a time in which the system of the Eyre was reaching its end, and with it, the self-informing 
jury that had characterized it. Indicting jurors, it has been said, were supposed to know who 
was suspicious of having committed crimes already before coming to court (in fact, since 
they would later form the trial jury, they were supposed to know who was guilty of crime). 
That is to say, they were supposed to learn about suspects of crimes from the representatives 
of the townships who were sworn to report them.  
Yet this use of the writ of conspiracy might be an indicator that things were beginning 
to change and information about suspects was beginning to flow into the presenting jury from 
different sources, and that authorities were growing anxious to control them. For one thing, 
it is certain that by the end of the thirteenth century, the bill procedure was an established 
practice both at the Eyre and the sessions. Furthermore, as the fourteenth century wore on, 
we are certain that presenting juries learned about the commission of crime from victims, 
informants, and officers (but the practice may be older, as the challenge of jurors suggests). 
It could be in informal ways: out of court, as when these agencies approached jurors before 
trials, as for instance in the case of a victim who reports to a friend in a jury, or maybe to a 
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court officer who would later tell the jury. It could be in court, by a formal complaint in a bill 
of indictment to be approved by the presenting jury, or by securing that they are impaneled 
by the sheriff. Thus, someone willing to bring a private accusation to a jury could choose 
either to do it directly by approaching the jury, by making someone to approach the jury with 
the information, by becoming jurors themselves, or formally, by a bill of indictment. Thus, 
the term procure could encode any of these different forms of bringing private accusations.  
The writ of conspiracy as it developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
presupposed, and was embedded within, the medieval presentment system of prosecution in 
which the means by which the prosecution started was the presentment of a dozen upon their 
knowledge of who was suspected of crime. The wrong it remedied was the arrest and 
imprisonment caused by the informal process by which juries learned about suspects of 
crime. In the end, this process necessarily came down to some private informal accusation. 
Indeed, in theory, the basis of the system, the public fama, can be boiled down to private 
informal accusations. It can be said that, in a way, the writ was rendering these private 
informal accusations accountable when they also involved the corruption of criminal process 
and collective action. In that sense, it can be considered a post-trial method of control of these 
private accusations.  
By the sixteenth century, and more firmly since the enactment of the Marian 
committal statutes, a different system had developed that started prosecution with private 
complaints supported by JP’s pre-trial investigation and screened by the Grand Jury. That is, 
the system allowed some pre-trial control of private accusations. In this system, private 
accusers cannot be said to be procurers, but rather prosecutors. That is, they resembled more 
the appellor, than the procurer of juries, that is, of indictments. But what should we make out 
of these imputations in court? Did they entail some wrongdoing?  
Since private prosecutions involved the public utterance of the words imputing and 
offence, in theory, the new common-law action for words could remedy them as harming 
reputation or the purse. But this action did not make any distinction between imputations in 
or out of court, that is, between imputations that involved wrongful prosecution and those 
that did not. But if wrongful prosecution was considered, this was linked to the writ of 
conspiracy and the procurement of juries. In other words, that A prefers a bill of indictment 
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for felony against B before a jury can be framed either as an act of defamation—that the 
defamer utters words imputing an offence to a defamed person—or, and as an act of wrongful 
prosecution—that a procurer procures an innocent to be indicted (or procures the jury to 
indict an innocent); provided that there is indictment, of course, but I will discuss this later. 
The new blended actions combine the point of view of the utterance of the words 
imputing and offence (in court) with that of wrongful prosecution as encoded in the writ. 
Early on, we find allegations of utterances in court such as a bill of information or a complaint 
made before local authorities combined with allegations of arrest, imprisonment, and 
indictment.710 We also find both averments of imputations out and in court as shown by 
(1535) YB Pasch 27 Hen VIII, pl 27 fo 11a-11b, where it was alleged that the defendant 
“imputed to the same R. the crime of theft and larceny at B. in the aforesaid county, and 
expressly and publicly said, named and noted him to be a thief in these recited words, and 
other words to the same function and occupation, in the presence of the council and the 
hearing of many of the lieges of the said Lord King, and he repeated the same frequently.” 
And at the same time it was alleged that afterwards he had “caused a certain bill of indictment 
to be written of and upon the aforementioned (praemissis), and showed (exhibuit) the same 
bill in the presence of the faithful (dilectic & fidelibus) of the Lord King… on the pretext of 
which the same R. then and the same appeared and was examined by the same Justice of the 
aforesaid felony, and the same R. then and the same declared himself to be not guilty of that 
felony in the presence of the same Justice, then and the same by many faithful and worthy 
witnesses.”  
By the end of the sixteenth century, the combination of both frames is manifest. The 
situations continue to be framed as a procurement of wrongful prosecution, but now the 
means by which the wrongful prosecution is procured—an imputation in court—are 
specified, since they are the grounds for the defamation as well. In Fuller and Cook’s Case 
                                                 
710 Baker, Spelman, 238, 243; Baker thinks that these were action for words in which the arrest and 
imprisonment as a consequence of the accusation of felony worked as a special damage, but this obscures the 
blended nature of these actions. Indeed, Baker, Introduction, points out the lack of “clear lines to draw” between 
writ, action for words, and malicious prosecution and the time and gives Pare v Shakespere (1511) (244, n (1) 
as an example in which “the defendant was alleged to have maliciously procured an indictment in order to 
blacken the plaintiff’s name and disinherit him.” Indeed, this allegation of a defamatory purpose contradicts the 
idea that the wrongful prosecution was the special damage of an action for words. 
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(1584), “the defendant had informed one… JP ‘that the plaintiff had stollen the defendant’s 
hogs… by force of which… [the JP] made a warrant, and directed it to the constable of H. to 
apprehend the plaintiff, and to bring him before [the JP]… by force of which, the plaintiff 
was arrested… and there was examined upon the said matter, and bound over by 
recognizance to appear at the next sessions, and there to answer.”711 So in the case of Knight 
v German (1587), where the defendant was reported as having caused “a bill of indictment 
of felony to be written, and the same being so written… exhibited the same to the grand 
jury… whereupon he was indicted of the same felony.”712 In Smith v Cranshaw (1623), the 
defendants “fauxment accuse luy devant un justice del peace del dit county, & q ils out un 
garrant del dit justice al constable de apprehender luy; per q fuit apprehend, & amesne devant 
le dit justice, & commit al prison del Norwich… un inditement fuit prefer al grand 
enquest.”713 In Skinner v Gunton (1670), the defendant was said to have “levied and 
affirmed… a certain plaint of a plea of trespass upon the case… [and] by virtue of the said 
plain, caused and procured to be arrested and imprisoned, and to be detained in prison for 
the space of twenty days and nights.”714 
Sometimes the relation is not instrumental but sequential. Thus, in Hercot v Underhill 
(1615) “[the defendant] brought him before the justices at Westbrummidge, et crimen 
feloniae, & burglarim, ei imposuit (ubi revera nulla felonia, nee burglaria facta fuit) & 
malitiose procuravit ipsum, to be arrested and imprisoned.”715 A more complex sequence of 
alternation between imputation and abuse appears in Doggate v Lawry (1608), where the 
defendant “charged him with felony, and there caused him to be brought before… a justice 
of peace, and procured him [the JP] to bind the plaintiff for his appearance at the general 
gaol-delivery in the county of Devon… [and] there exhibited a bill of indictment.”716 
Likewise, in Manning and his Wife vs Fitzherbert (1633), imputation and abuse are sequential 
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rather than in a causal or instrumental relationship, thus the defendant “had caused her to be 
brought before Mr. Gregory, a justice of peace of the county of Oxon… ad tunc et ibidem, 
‘that he charged her with felony for stealing of an hog from one Hundby his cousin,’ and 
required that she might be bound over to the Assizes, whereupon she was inforced to find 
sureties for her appearance at the Assizes.”717 In Cutler v Dixon (1585), the imputation is 
carried over with a wrongful purpose: “one exhibits articles to justices of peace against 
certain person, containing divers great abuses and misdemeanors… all this to the intent that 
he should be bound to his good behavior.”718 
Yet sometimes the declarations did not specify the imputation in court and simply put 
forward the procuring of wrongful prosecution as in the writ of conspiracy, as in 
Throgmorton’s Case (1597), where the defendant “procured the plaintiff to be indicted as a 
common barrator before the justices of the peace.”719 In Barnes v Constantine (1605), the 
defendant “procured him to be indicted as a common barrator before J. S. and J. D. justices 
of the peace.” 720 In Pescod v Marcham (1607), “[the defendant] caused him to be indicted 
for stealing of a plank.”721 In Lovett v Faukner (1618), “[the defendant] procuravit luy d'estre 
indicte sur l'estatute pur un recusant &c. per que il serroit fait un traitor.”722 In Mills vs Mills 
(1631), “the defendant procured him to be indicted.”723 In Gardner v Jollye (1649), the action 
was brought “for causing him to be endicted of felony as accessary, for suffering a prisoner 
to escape that was convicted of felony.”724 In Atwood v Monger (1653), the action was for 
“causing a false presentment to be made against him before the Conservators of the River of 
Thames.”725 In Chamberlain v Prescott (1659), the action was “for procuring the defendant 
to be arrested in another man’s name,” and declared that “the defendant caused him… to be 
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indicted.”726 In Norris v Palmer (1676), the defendant was sued “for causing [the plaintiff]… 
to be indicted for a common trespass in taking away one hundred bricks.”727 In Pollard v 
Evans and Others (1680) the defendants “did procure the plaintiff to be causelessly indicted 
of, &c.”728 The plaintiff in Savile v Roberts (1699) alleged that the defendant “indictari.. fecit 
et procuravit, ac indictamentum illud versus ipsum… prosecutus fuit et prosecutum esse 
causavit.”729 In Goddard against Smith (1704), the defendants were said to have “caused and 
procured… [the plaintiff] to be indicted.”730. In Jones v Gwynn (1714), the declaration was 
that the defendant “caused him to be indicted for exercising the trade of a badger without 
license.”731. In Pedro v Barret (1717), the indictment was for “procuring him to be indicted 
for conspiring to lay a bastard child to B.”732.  
 Other times the declaration alleges the imputation of an offence in court but does not 
go on to specify the wrongful prosecution, as in Arundell v Tregono (1608), where the 
defendant is said to “quandam billam indictamenti against the plaintiff scribi fecit, continen' 
that the plaintiff amongst others broke and enter'd the house of A. and stole half a bushel of 
wheat ; and exhibited it to the said justices ibid', who caused it to be openly read, and deliver'd 
to the grand jury.”733 In Willins v Fletcher (1612), the defendant “preferred a bill of 
indictment against Willins for being a common barretor”734. In Payne v Porter (1619), “[the 
defendant] imposed upon him crimen feloniae, supposing that he had robbed him; and … 
exhibited against him a bill of indictment, supposing that such a day and year he robbed him; 
and exhibited it to the grand jury in the county of Nottingham.”735 In Wright v Black and 
Black (1620), “[the plaintiff] preferred a bill of indictment, containing that the plantiff 
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felloniously stole two bundles of vetches.”736 In Johnson v Stancliff (1641), the defendant 
“did prefer an indictment… and then he did prefer a second indictment.”737 In Reynolds v 
Kennedy (1748), the defendant was said to have “exhibited an information against the 
plaintiff before the Subcommissioners of Excise.”738 
 The distinction between false imputation and wrongful prosecution or the wrongful 
instigation and continuation of criminal legal proceedings had to do with the stage which the 
criminal proceedings had reached. Imputation was relevant at the pre-trial proceedings; the 
prosecution as a whole did matter once trial had taken place. This can be seen in an 
anonymous case in 1635, where the action was for “causing [the plaintiff] … to be endicted 
for stealing of a mare,” yet after it was found against the defendant, he moved in arrest of 
judgment that “upon preferring of the bill to the grand jury, they found ignoramus… so there 
is a repugnancy in the declaration, which sets forth that the plaintiff caused him to be indicted, 
and yet says that an ignoramus was found.”739  
 That the system was seen as one of private prosecution, tempered by the Grand Jury, 
rather than as public presentments of known criminals is attested by the report case of Andrew 
Henley v Dr. Burstal. Thus, the case reports an action for “indicting the plaintiff,”740 meaning 
the preferring of a bill of indictment, since it also reports “the indictment was found 
ignoramus.”741 That is, in the mind of the reporters, it seems that the imputation in court was 
equivalent to an indictment. Similarly, Wine v Ware (1661) is reported as action for “lo 
defendant… indict le plaintiff pur le embler’ des barbits.”742. Smithson and Symson, Atkinson 
(1674) reports an action for the defendant “indicting the plaintiff of perjury.”743 3 Keble 837, 
84 ER 104 reports the case of Bringham v Brocas (1678) for the defendant “indicting the 
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plaintiff for deceitful sale of hair.” 2 Mod 306, 86 ER 1088 reports an anonymous case in 
1679 in which the plaintiff “was indicted for a common trespass.” 
4.5.4.1.2 COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
 We have seen that the conduct typically described in these blended actions, the 
bringing of a bill of indictment before a court and the consequent prosecution, could be 
framed either as a defamation, if we focus on the imputation of an offence and the harm to 
reputation it effects, or as a wrongful prosecution if we focus on the fact that the imputation 
was in court, and gave rise to wrongful criminal legal proceedings. This conduct can be 
further framed as an individual or a collective behavior.  
 The old writ of conspiracy construed the wrongful prosecution as a collective action. 
This construal was usually encoded in the writ with the expression by conspiracy between 
them before had (or similar expressions). It should be noted that this expression does not 
encode the means but rather the way the action is carried over. This might be seen as a non-
core frame element indicating the collective manner in which the main action is carried over. 
After all, one can imagine a prosecution without any kind of agreement. Or, put in other 
words, one alone can procure a prosecution. However, this became a central aspect of the 
wrong of wrongful prosecution during the Middle Ages, to the point that only the collective 
forms of prosecutions were considered wrongs remedied by the writ. This probably was due 
to the fact that wrongful prosecution was viewed as an essentially collaborative behavior 
involving the coordinated action of several people, particularly during the pre-trial process.744 
Thus, the law could break apart the different crimes involved in unlawful criminal 
proceedings (such as bribery, laboring of jurors, false testimony of witnesses, etc.) by 
assigning individual responsibilities, or it could lump all these conducts together in a single 
collective event: the conspiracy.  
The collective behavior construal can be defined as follows. A behavior is performed 
by a number of agents as a group with shared or joint intention. This meaning can be 
construed using collective nouns making it the focus of attention, but it can also be construed 
with adverbs like together or adverbial expressions like by agreement between them, making 
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the collective behavior the scope of attention. Thus, in the writ of conspiracy, the paramount 
expression by conspiracy between them codifies the wrongful prosecution as a collective 
behavior performed by the defendants as a group with a unity of purpose. In this way, the 
law lumped them together and made them equally liable for the wrong. However, it should 
be mentioned that because of the way in which it is constructed, there is no collective agency 
or entity performing the action but rather individuals acting together.  
 What we have here is a very particular frame that is different from that which we 
started with. The frame we may name as collective prosecution, which was the wrong that 
the writ remedied: to collectively instigate and continue criminal legal proceedings against 
someone. Thus, the frame elements of this frame were the collective agency, the instigators 
otherwise known as the conspirators or conspiracy, and the criminal legal proceedings 
instigated, the collective action. 
 One thing I should remind of is that the term conspiracy here does not encode any 
action, situation, or part of a scene, but rather encodes the scope of the given situation of 
prosecution. Conspiracy does not refer to any activity but to the nature of the action. It turns 
an individual action, that of prosecution, into a collective action or behavior, that is, an action 
performed or carried out by a group of people with a unity of purpose rather than by a single 
individual.  
 Now, we find this collective perspective in the conceptual blend resulting from the 
integration of the writ of conspiracy and the action for words, what I have called the 
defamatory writ of conspiracy. Thus, in The Mayor of Boalton’s Case (1589), it was reported 
that the “defendants did conspire together to delay the plaintiff of his said suit, in peril of his 
debt.”745 In Hercot v Underhill and Rochely (1615), though the reporter summarizes the case 
as an action “for conspiring to indict… of felony,” it follows from the arguments in court that 
the writ included the by conspiracy clause, since it alleged that “procuravit ipsum, to be 
arrested and imprisoned.”746 In Pollard v Evans (1680), “the defendants by combination and 
conspiracy, &c. did procure the plaintiff to be… indicted.”747 In Skinner v Gunter (1670), the 
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defendants “per conspirationem in the name of G. caused the plaintiff to be arrested in great 
actions, to which he could not find bail.”748 In this case we can safely substitute together for 
the expression calling up the frame of collective action without effecting a change in 
meaning: “the defendants together caused the plaintiff to be arrested in great actions…” 
Yet the same collective situation could be framed as a planned behavior. The planned 
behavior is a complex frame made up of a sequence of sub-frames, of which the first one is 
deliberation—the desirability of realizing certain value or achieving a goal is evaluated. After 
positive evaluation, deliberation is followed by the imagining of a course of action for the 
realization of that goal; this is the plan. Then the agent decides to take this course of action 
and is ready to act upon it; this is the formed intent. Finally, the course of action that so far 
did only exist as a project is performed; this is the execution. 
There are some cases revealing this new frame upon the whole issue of unlawful 
prosecutions which was a consequence of the development of this blended action. In Smith v 
Cranshaw & Alios (1626), “le defendants conspire & combine the luy accuser pur treason… 
& sur ceo ils cause le constable the luy arrester, & a portrer luy devant justices del’ peace, & 
la ils. accuse luy de treason. Et sur ceo les justices luy committee al prison, & la il remaine 
tanque al prochain gaole-delivery, & adonque le dit defendant sur conspiracy & per mandate 
del' justices de gaole-delivery preferre un bill de indictment de treason versus luy.”749 Mills 
v Mills (1631) reports that the defendant along with others, “conspired to procure him to be 
indicted of such a felony… [and] such a day procured him to be indicted.”750 In Goddard vs 
Smith (1704), the defendants “contriving and maliciously intending [to defame]… and having 
had a conspiracy between themselves… to cause the said Richard Goddard to be indicted as 
a barretor and public disturber of the peace… in prosecution and execution of their malicious 
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intention and conspiracy aforesaid… caused and procured the said Richard Goddard…to be 
indicted.”751 
In all these examples, plan together can be substituted for conspiracy. As to the sub-
frames of the frame of planned behavior that are evoked, in the first two cases we find the 
plan evoked by conspiracy. As for the execution frame, it is evoked by sur ceo/upon this in 
the first case, whereas in the second one, it is the juxtaposition that signals it. The last example 
illustrates how differently frame elements are realized across frames. Thus, both the course 
of action (the wrongful prosecution) and the purpose or goal (defamation) are specified both 
for the planning stages as well as for the execution state. However, there is a lexical choice: 
contriving and intending to refer to plan with regard to its purpose without reference to the 
course of action, and conspiracy to refer to plan with regard to the course of action or means 
to achieve this purpose or goal.  
 Of course, as said earlier, the planned behavior in these cases is also a collective one.  
Thus, I should talk of plot or plan together rather than plan. What is the difference between 
the collective perspective here and in the frames encoded in the writ of conspiracy? For one 
thing, the focus of this frame is the fact that the wrongful prosecution has been planned and 
executed, not that it has been done collectively. Certainly, a plot is the basis of collective 
action and therefore if a wrongful prosecution has been plotted it means that it should be 
viewed as a collective behavior. However, in terms of what makes this conduct punishable, 
this aspect is not central compared to the fact it is planned behavior. In other words, by using 
this frame, the planned or premeditated and intentional aspects of the wrongful prosecution 
come forward while its collective nature remains in the background, maybe as an aggravating 
circumstance.  
4.5.4.1.3 THE WRIT OF CONSPIRACY ARGUMENTS 
 The connection between this blended defamatory writ of conspiracy and the input 
space of the writ of conspiracy becomes apparent in the way lawyers tried to abate it by 
drawing arguments that were typical of the arsenal of defenses that that form of action availed 
them with.  
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ACQUITTAL REQUIREMENT 
 One of the central aspects of the writ of conspiracy as it developed in court was the 
requirement that the indictment had to be determined and lead to the acquittal of the 
defendant. In other words, the main cause had to be determined before the action for wrongful 
prosecution could proceed. This requirement made perfect sense in a system of prosecution 
by presentment where private parties laid no formal charges but rather informal accusations 
before the jury, which was bound to report them as public fama. Without any pre-trial 
investigation, the quality of these informal accusations could not be tested before trial, hence 
the acquittal requirement.  
For sure, acquittal of the plaintiff after indictment was made part of the form 
declaration of several cases of this blended action,752 following the form of the writ of 
conspiracy. As said earlier, this requirement made no sense within the system of prosecution 
that was crystalizing by the sixteenth century, but its inclusion within the form of this blended 
action was not a merely formalistic one. Thus, counsellors put themselves to work for their 
clients, reasoning as if the blended action were an action by the writ indeed.753  
 In Shotbolt’s Case (1586) 1 Godbolt 76, 78 ER 47 it was argued that “the plaintiff did 
not shew in his declaration, that he was legitimo modo acquietatus.” Clench J agreed that “if 
he were convicted, then there is no cause of action: and he hath not shewed whether he was 
convicted or acquitted… he ought to shew, that he was legitimo modo acquietatus.”  Wray 
CJ in Knight v German (1587) opined that “if two conspire maliciously to exhibit an 
indictment, and the party be acquitted, he shall have a conspiracy.”754 By contrast in Barnes 
v Constantine (1605) Yelv 46, 80 ER 33, the court laid that “this action… well lies, although 
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the indictment is erroneous; or, as it has been adjudged, if a bill is offer’d, and ignoramus 
found.” The same opinion was expressed in Pescod v Marcham (1607) Noy 117, 74 ER 1081 
that the action “is good without saying, legitimo modo acquietatus, in an action upon the 
case, which lies as well before as after the acquittal.” In Arundell v Tregono (1608) Yelv 116, 
80 ER 79 the court conceded the point Yelverton had moved in arrest of judgment that “a 
man shall never be punished for bringing a false action… because non constat what was done 
on the indictment, whether the plaintiff was acquitted or arraigned upon it, or not: and if 
nothing was done upon the indictment, the plaintiff will clear himself too soon, viz. before 
the fact tried, which will be inconvenient.” In an obiter in Crankbancks Case (1618) 2 Rolle 
50, 81 ER 652, Doderidge J said that “home poet aver action sur le case sur faux conspiracy 
d'indicter home coment que il ne soit acquitted, mes conspiracy ne gist, si non que il soit 
indicted & acquitted.”  
In Wright vs Black and Black (1620), the issue turned around whether preferring a 
bill of indictment could give rise to the action, or whether there had to be an indictment too. 
In this case there is no direct reference to the acquittal requirement, but it is implied, since 
after indictment the action could not be brought, and of course, the accusation had to be 
proven to be false. Thus, the Defendant’s counsellor moved in arrest the argument based on 
the writ form which averred the indictment of the party; namely that “the plaintiff had not 
averred in his declaration that the bill was found, but only that he preferred a bill of indictment 
against him containing such a thing; and this is not good… to say the defendants preferred a 
bill of indictment containing that the plantiff stole 2 bundles of vetches, this is only in nature 
of a recital, and no direct affirmation that there was such an indictment.” He added that “the 
action it self [the writ] in this case will not lye, because the indictment was not found, but 
only an evidence [that he gave evidence], and [only] an acquittal [an ignoramus] before the 
grand jury.”755 The plaintiff’s counsel denied the point and argued that “the action is 
maintainable, though it is not shewed that the bill of indictment was found.” The court was 
divided as to whether the action lied, but for different reasons. Only Hobert CJ believed the 
declaration “to be good without any averment of an indictment indeed.”756  
                                                 
755 Winch 28, 124 ER 24. See also Winch 54, 124 ER 46. 
756 Winch 29, 124 ER 25. 
253 
 
 In Smith v Crashaw and others (1626), it was argued by the defendant in arrest of 
judgment that “un action ne git, entantq, un ignoramus est trove, & poet estre trove culp; et 
pur c[eo] l'action ne git… quand un indict[e]m[en]t est p[re]ferre, & ignoramus trove, il poet 
estre nient obstant c[eo] culp: sur q, l'action sur le case ne git.”757 Doddrige J shared the 
opinion: “si le party fueront indicted, & trove men culp. tunc est le suborner punishable per 
cest action, mes nest issint in nostre case, car le indictee nest acquitt per verdict, mes le jury 
trove ignoramus issint [per] que il est subject still al auter indictment,”758 and so did 
Houghton J : “unc[ore] luy se[m]ble, que action ne gist, quia est trove un ignoram[us] 
solem[en]t, q[ue] ne acquit le pl[ein]t[if] del treaso[n], mes est lyable a ceo, p[ur] q[ue] intant 
q[ue]n'est acquit de ceo, n'avera action.”759 The court resolved “que si un home ou plusors 
preferre un bill de indictment de felony falso & malitiose vers un auter home, & le jury done 
ignoramus sur le bill que en ceo case le partie poet aver action sur le case.”760.  
In John Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh vs George Blacke (1662), Hardres, 
arguing for the defendant, already thought that “it is a rule in law, to which all the books 
agree, that an action upon the case or an action of conspiracy lies for a false and malicious 
prosecution, upon which the plaintiff is acquitted or ignoramus found.”761 In Skinner vs 
Gunton, Lyon, and Leason (1670), it was raised in arrest of judgment that “it was no alleged 
by the plaintiff in his declaration that the plaint levied in the compter was determined either 
by nonsuit, or by discontinuance, or verdict against the plaintiff there…As in an action upon 
the case, or conspiracy, for falsely indicting one of felony, the plaintiff should shew that he 
was acquitted of the indictment before he can bring his action.”762 The plaintiff did not 
question the rule but went on to argue that in this case, “the complaint is only of an arrest, 
and not any other proceeding as joint, &c.,”763, that is, that it was grounded on the false arrest 
only. The court did not go into the merits of the argument either and dismissed the exception 
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on procedural grounds because “perhaps it might have been material upon a demurrer; but 
now the verdict has found the defendant guilty, namely, that he has levied a plaint…they did 
not regard whether it was determined or not; for if the defendant would have had advantage 
thereof, he ought to shew it, but he has passed it over by his plea of not guilty, and a verdict 
is found against him.”764 In Pollard vs Evans and Others (1680), the court laid that “in a writ 
of conspiracy, it must be alledged that the party was legitimo modo acquietatus inde, and 
shew that it was a fair acquittal. But this action will lie for such a malicious prosecution 
where [51] the jury find an ignoramus.” (2 Show KB 51, 89 ER 786). Regarding indictments 
of trespass, Holt argued in Savile v Roberts (1699) that when the jury found an ignoramus no 
action laid for preferring a bill, but the action was good when the bill of indictment charged 
felony.765  
In Goddard v Smith (1704), it was debated in a case reserved whether a nolle prosequi 
entered after indictment supported the declaration that the defendant had been indicted “for 
a false and malicious indictment of barretry, whereof he was legitimo modo acquietatus.”766 
Holt CJ thought that “nolle prosequi was only putting the defendant sine die, and so far from 
discharging him from the offence, that it did not discharge any further prosecution upon that 
very indictment…  he who gets off upon a nolle prosequi does not at all get off on the merits 
of the cause; and to maintain a conspiracy, it is necessary to lay and prove an acquittal.” 
Powell J, though he was not certain as to the effect of the nolle prosequi, whether it 
discharged the defendant barring further prosecution or not agreed that the nolle prosequi did 
not make good the declaration and that “this action cannot be maintained but upon an 
acquittal, of the fact charged, by verdict, confession, &c.”767 In Jones v Gwynn (1714), upon 
demurrer, it was debated whether an action grounded on an insufficient indictment could be 
upheld without saying that the defendant “was acquitted by verdict” since “conspiracy lies 
not but for such an indictment upon which the defendant was so acquitted, as that he may 
plead his acquittal in bar of another indictment… [and] by a parity of reason it may be 
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inferred, that an action upon the case will not lie likewise, upon an indictment for a matter 
not indictable; and upon which, consequently, there could not be such an acquittal as could 
be pleaded in bar of another indictment.”768 Parker J argued that “conspiracy lies not without 
acquittal; and the reason of this, and the only one, is, because this is a formed action, and the 
form of the writ in the register is so… There is certainly no arguing from an action which is 
a formed one, for which there is a formal writ in the register, to an action upon the case, that 
is died down to no form at all. If an action upon the case be brought upon an indictment, 
where the jury find ignoramus, there is no possibility that there can be an acquittal.”769 
However, in Lewis v Farrell (1718) “judgment was given for the defendant on demurrer, 
because it was not shewn how the indictment was determined.”770 But Parker’s rule was 
affirmed in Chambers v Robinson (1726), where the issue of the insufficient indictment did 
arise again, and it was held that “the action would lie, though the indictment was bad.”771 
PLURALITY REQUIREMENT 
 The next line of arguments that lawyers derived from the writ of conspiracy was the 
plurality requirement. It was understood that since the writ was brought for a collective 
behavior, as encoded in the term conspiracy¸ it could not be brought against a single 
defendant only. In Shotbolt’s Case (1586), Clench J laid that “there was no difference betwixt 
an action on the case, and a conspiracie, in such case, but onely this, that a conspiracy ought 
to be by two at the least; and an action upon the case may lie against one.”772 Likewise, in 
Knight v German (1587), Wray CJ laid that “and if two conspire maliciously to exhibit an 
indictment, and the party be acquitted, he shall have a conspiracy; so when one doth it, this 
action upon the case lieth.”773 In Marsh v Vauhan and Veal (1599), it was moved in arrest of 
judgment that the action “ought to be against two, and the one cannot conspire alone,” and 
the court laid that “a writ of conspiracy lies not, nor is maintenable upon this verdict. But an 
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action upon the case, in nature of a conspiracy, might have been brought in this case.”774 In 
Willins v Fletcher (1612), the defendant pleaded “that this action doth not lye against him, 
for that he is only one person, and doth only take his oath upon the indictment; but a 
conspiracy is, where two, three, or more do conspire for to indict one; and the same lieth not 
against one.” The court laid that “in this principal case here, an action upon the case, in the 
nature of a conspiracy, doth not lie.”775. However, the grounds for their decision had nothing 
to do with the plurality requirement, but rather with the defense of privilege as we will see 
later.  
In Lovett v Faukner (1614), the rule was taken for granted by the defendant’s 
counselor, who argued that “lou un breif de conspiracie le giseroit si hont estre deux la cest 
action ne gisera lou est forsq; un.”776 In Smith v Crashaw (1622), it was laid by the court that 
“un brief de conspiracy ne gist vers un, car un ne poet solment conspire, car le brief de 
conspiracy ayant un precise forme ne poet estre extende ultra le forme, sed le action sur le 
case nest lye al ascun precise forme, mes est destre frame come le matter require ideo gist, 
coment que un solment fait.”777 In Mills v Mills (1631), it was moved in arrest of judgment 
that the “action lies not, because he did not sue the other as well as the defendant; for 
conspiracy ought to be against two.” The court disagreed, “for an action upon the case may 
well be against one of them.”778 The same argument was raised with the same result in Price 
v Cross and Others (1657).779 In Skinner vs Gunton, Lyon, and Leason (1670), it was moved 
in arrest of judgment “that here is an action of conspiracy which charges the defendants, that 
per conspirationem inter eos habitam, they caused a plaint to be levied, and the now-plaintiff 
to be arrested thereon, and all the defendants, except one, (namely, Gunton,) are acquitted, 
and therefore this action fails; for one defendant cannot conspire alone…and although the 
plaintiff might have an action upon the case against the three defendants, or one defendant 
only… yet here the plaintiff has chosen an action of conspiracy, which is found against him, 
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because the defendant Gunton alone could not levy a plaint, and cause the plaintiff to be 
arrested per conspirationem, as this action supposes.”780 The court decided against the 
defendant that  “it was an action on the case… and the substance of the action was the undue 
arresting of the plaintiff, and not the conspiracy. Wherefore the plaintiff had his judgment by 
rule of the Court.” Morton J dissented because he believed that “it was an action of 
conspiracy, and that two of the defendants being acquitted, the plaintiff could not have 
judgment against the third.”781 In Pollard v Evans and Others (1680), it was moved that the 
action did not lie “for a conspiracy cannot be in or by one, but between two at the least” to 
which it was replied once again that “in a writ of conspiracy it is true (a), but in an action of 
the case it is otherwise; and though this be like the other, yet it is not the same.”782 The 
question seemed to be finally settled by Holt’s opinion in Savile v Roberts (1699): 
where two cause a man to be indicted, if it be false and malicious, he shall have 
conspiracy; where one, he shall have case: so that the actions are founded upon one 
common foundation, but the number of the parties defendants determines it to the one 
or to the other… if such an action be sued against two defendants for procuring a man 
to be indicted of a smaller offence, though the word conspiraverunt be in the writ, yet 
if one of them be acquitted, the other may be found guilty. 11 Hen. 7, 25. Contra, of 
a proper action of conspiracy; for there if the one be acquitted, no judgment can be 
given against the other.783 
 FELONY REQUIREMENT 
 Another area from which common lawyers drew arguments from the writ of 
conspiracy into the blended action was the form of the indictment. Indeed, the writ seemed 
to be limited to false indictments of felony. Thus, in Lovet v Faulkner (1613), the question 
arose as to whether the action on the case could be brought for an indictment of treason. 
Coke, sitting as CJ, believed he had: 
never yet did know in case of high treason, and for the prosecution thereof against 
one, any writ of conspiracy ever brought, there is no case in the law for this, but all 
the presidents are pro felonia; high treason concerns the person of the King; and there 
is no book in law, to warrant the bringing of such an action for a prosecution, pro 
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proditione… It had been a hard and a strange thing, if the powder traitors, for the 
prosecutions against them, might have had writs of conspiracy in case of high treason, 
there was never yet seen any writ of conspiracy, alte proditionis, such a president, 
neither I, nor yet any other ever as yet did see.784  
Though the counsel for the plaintiff, George Crooke, objected that “ceo nest ascun treson fait 
al person del' Roy mes solment fait per statute pur recusancie,” and that “nul action gist sur 
acquittal de treson pur ceo que treson tam altment touch le Crown,”785 rather than the subject, 
the whole court concurred with Coke laying down that “no action upon the case, for 
conspiracy lyeth in case of prosecution against one for high treason, and we will not give 
way to a president, to make a new president in this case, and so the Court inclined to be all 
clear of opinion, that no action upon the case did lie, in this case.”786  
 The issue was raised again a few years later in Smith vs Crashaw, Sprat and Ward, a 
case much argued between 1623 and 1626. The action was brought for a false and malicious 
indictment for uttering treasonable words to which two defendants had pleaded generally and 
one had denied conspiracy and malice. Among other issues, it was moved in arrest of 
judgment that the action on the case did not lie for indictments of high treason.  
The defendants argued that according to Lovett v Faulker,787 there was no precedent of a writ 
of conspiracy for indictment of treason or as the Chief Justice put it, he was doubtful because 
“quo action sur le case ne gist in nature de conspiracy pur le indicter de auter de treason, quia 
conspiracy ne gist de ceo.”788 With regard to this, Doddridge J said “q[ue]il remember le 
case, mes il pense, q[ue]fuit arrest p[ur]fault in le declaration.”789 and that he remembered a 
precedent “de mon knowledge demesne q si home que force auter estre fauxment indicted 
pur treason, & confesse ceo que il est puniable per cest action, come fuit a ore in un case de 
Cambridge-shire, lou un conspire ove auter pur indicter J. S. de treason, que ils font apres 
l'un confesse que le auter ad suborne luy, & que ils font sur ceo malice, sur que il auxi 
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confesse ceo, & conspiracy port sur ceo vers eux, & l'un est a cest jour in prison pur ceo.”790 
It was also argued that “Et en le statute 18 E. 6. cap. 12. malicious prosecution d'un 
endictment de felony est joyne ove treason.”791 The Court finally resolved: 
que il nest ascun diversity perenter le case de felony & de treason, si le accusation 
soit falso & malitiose; car le dit statute de 28 E. 1. & 33 E. 1. ne font aseun difference, 
sed ils parlont indefinite de conspiracy& auxi Fitz. en le brief de conspiracy parle de 
conspiracy del' inditer generalment, Dyer fol. 116. " Auxi come Crewe & Jones, 
l'estatute de 8 H. 6. & 18 H. 6. done action de conspiracy de inditer home en auter 
countie pur treason, & come le offence est greinder si fuit {50} treason, & voyer, 
issint le crime est griever del' accuser home de treason, ou nest voyer.792  
Thus, in deciding the issue, the Court relied and treated the blended action as basically 
principled by the same rules that applied to the writ of conspiracy. In the passage above, the 
medieval statutes that gave rise to the writ are invoked to make sense of this action. This 
shows how the new blended space was still connected to the input spaces.  
Another issue related to the form of the indictment in the writ of conspiracy was 
whether the indictment must be of felony or could just be trespass or misdemeanor. The 
question was raised several times.793 Although the courts were hesitant at the beginning to 
allow the action in this case, later they came to rely on a line of argument based on the 
connection between this blended action and the action for words. For that reason, the question 
of trespass will be discussed later. For now, I just wanted to point out that the argument that 
the action did not lie against indictment of misdemeanor can only be made in connection with 
the writ of conspiracy.  
                                                 
790 2 Rolle 258, 81 ER 785; “il remember, q[ue] deva[n]t le Chief Justice & luy m[esme] al Cambridge Assises. 
2. Confess un malitious p[ro]secution vers un p[er] treason, & fueront indite de ceo, & comit al prison, & la 
remaine a cest temps,” Palm 315, 316; 81 ER 1100, 1101. 
791 Latch 79, 82 ER 284. 
792 Jones W 93, 83 ER 48. 
793 Gardner v Jollye (1649) Style 157, 82 ER 608. Low v Beardmore (1666) Raymond T 136; 83 ER 73; 1 
Sydersin 261, 82 ER 1093; Loe v Bordmore (1666) 1 Lev 169, 83 ER 353; Henley v Burstoll (1670) 2 Keb 494; 
84 ER 310; Norris v Palmer (1676) 2 Modern 51, 86 ER 935; Bringham v Brocas (1678) 3 Keble 837, 84 ER 
1042; Anonymous (1679) 2 Modern 306, 86 ER 1088; Savile v Roberts (1699) 1 Ld Raymond 374, 91 ER 1147; 
5 Modern 405, 87 ER 733; Savile v Roberts (1699) 5 Modern 394, 87 ER 725; Jones v Gwynn (1714) 10 Modern 
214, 88 ER 699; Pedro v Barret (1717) 1 Ld Raymond 81, 91 ER 951. 
260 
 
4.4.5.2 DEFAMATION 
 The writ of conspiracy was concerned with the procurement of false indictments, a 
frame that embraced informal accusations out of court as well as plain corruption of the jury, 
if not the jury itself. Furthermore, the procurement of false indictments was mainly viewed 
as how the judicial wrong of false imprisonment was brought about. We sum up all this with 
the expression procuring wrongful prosecution.  
The formal charge of a crime to a suspect orally before a JP, or written on a bill of 
indictment preferred to a grand jury could be and was framed as a sort of writ of conspiracy 
as we have seen (a special case of conspiracy as we will see later). But it could also be framed 
as an utterance of words imputing (in court) the commission of a crime upon someone 
causing them not only harm to reputation but also economic damages as a consequence of 
the former. Thus, from this point of view, the illocutionary force of these words, the fact that 
the imputation came in as a formal charge in a court of law, did not make any difference 
because this action for words was concerned not with the legal consequences of such formal 
charge but with its extrajudicial consequences. That is, it addressed the expenses made in the 
defense of the accusation and the loss of credit and reputation. Thus, the form of these 
blended actions not only included terms evoking the frame of the writ of conspiracy but also 
terms evoking the common law action for words. 
4.4.5.2.1 SLANDER 
 In Fuller v Cook (1584), the plaintiff alleged that “he was discredited” as a 
consequence of a wrongful prosecution.794 In Savile v Roberts (1699), the plaintiff alleged 
that by reason of a prosecution for a riot, “he lost his good name;”795 In Carlion v Mill (1699), 
the plaintiff complained that an accusation of ecclesiastical offence had been made “to his 
discredit.”796 In Goddard v Smith (1704), the wrongful prosecution was said to have “very 
much hurt and injured in his good name, fame, credit, and reputation.”797  
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 This is as to the declarations of these blended actions. Sometimes, because of the 
presence of this direct reference to slander in the declaration, and sometimes simply because 
the imputation in court also licensed it, the frame of the action for words was evoked so that 
the appropriate arguments could be drawn. Thus, in Barnes v Constantine (1605), the court 
laid that an action that might be defeated on the grounds that the indictment had been 
erroneous if interpreted as a writ of conspiracy was indeed “but for damages for a slander, 
which well lies, although the indictment is erroneous.”798 In Pescod v Marsam (1607), it was 
laid that an action without acquittal was good because it “lies as well before as after the 
acquital, for the infamie by the indictment.”799 In Bradley v Jones (1614), the action was 
brought against one who had exhibited the articles of the peace against another arguing that 
he was an embracer and barretor. The action was upheld on the grounds that the defendant 
had moved his action from Chancery to the King’s Bench, which could not be made, and 
since the action could not be continued the plaintiff could not clear himself “and the oath and 
affidavit in the Chancery doth remain as a scandal upon record,”800 thus implying that the 
ground of the action was the slander. In Payne vs Porter (1619), the Exchequer Chamber, on 
an error that the mere exhibiting of a bill of indictment was no cause of action, laid that this 
conduct was nevertheless “a great cause of slander and grievance, and just ground of action 
for the plaintiff.”801 In Wright v Black and Black (1620), the defendant argued that a 
declaration that only alleged that a bill of indictment had been preferred was good because 
“by this the plantiff [sic] is defamed as much as if the defendants had said [it in public]… 
and this is more then [sic] a defamation by word, and though the indictment was not 
found.”802 The Court was divided with Hobert CJ opining that, indeed, “it is as great a slander 
to preferre a bill of indictment to the grand jury, and to give this in evidence to them, as it is 
to declare that in an ale house.”803 In Gardner v Jollye (1649), the court laid that in this action 
when “the charge of the indictment is for felony, [and] although the matter the party is 
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charged with be not felony,… a scandal lay upon him by it, and therefore the action lies.”804 
In Sir Andrew Henley v Burstal (1669), however, it was laid that when the “indictment 
contains matter of imputation and slander as well as crime; there the action lies; but otherwise 
where the indictment contains crime without slander, as forcible entry, &c. but here is slander 
as well as crime.”805 In Loe v Bordmore (1666), it was moved in arrest of judgment that “the 
action did not lie for such an indictment which does not sound in scandal, but only in 
trespass… but where the indictment sounds in scandal, as felony, &c. there it would lie.”806 
A similar objection was raised in Bringham v Brocas (1678), but the court disagreed because 
the accusation was “a matter criminal and slanderous.”807 In Savile v Roberts (1699), Holt CJ 
argued that among other wrongs, the blended action laid for “first, where a man is injured in 
his fame or reputation, so that his good name is lost; by reason of which injury, if the words 
themselves do not bear an action [of conspiracy], the loss or damage that may ensue, will… 
this action being but for damages for the slander, it well lies, although the indictment be 
erroneous; or, as it has been adjudged, if a bill be offered, and found ignoramus.”808 Finally, 
in Jones v Gwynn (1714) Parker CJ argued that with regard to the rule that “where the matter 
of the indictment, though it be not indictable, is infamous and scandalous, an action upon the 
case will lie; but that it is otherwise where the indictment contains matter neither indictable 
nor scandalous… there is no foundation for such a distinction, as where the matter of the 
indictment is scandalous, and where it is not.”809 Thus he concluded that “here was no reason 
for making a difference, when the matter of the indictment is scandalous, and when not. The 
cases before mentioned speak not a word of this difference; and if scandal be mentioned, it 
is only mentioned in the nature of damage.”810  
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4.4.5.2.2 VEXATION 
 As said earlier, the common law action for words was distinguished from the 
ecclesiastical defamation in that the former was based on the temporal loss as a consequence 
of the utterance of the words (and it should be reminded that temporal loss was not traversable 
when it could be implied from any of four categories of slanderous words). Early on, we find 
averments of temporal damage as a consequence of imputations made in court in the blended 
actions that were brought to court.  
 In Doggate v Lawry (1608), the plaintiff alleged that an ignored bill of indictment had 
“put [him] to great expenses.”811 The same circumstance led the plaintiff in Payne v Porter 
(1619) to declare that “he was inforced to great costs and charges for the defense of his good 
name and fame.”812 In Mills v Mills (1631), the plaintiff was said to be “much vexed” as a 
consequence of a procured indictment.813  In Henley v Burstoll (1669), the complaint was 
that “he was put to great charge,”814 and in Norris v Palmer (1676), that “he was compelled 
to spend great sums of money.”815 In Savile v Roberts (1699), it was complained that the 
plaintiff was “magnopere laesus ac in diversis negotiis licitis et honestis agendis multipliciter 
impeditus existit, verum etiam idem Jacobus valde graves et arduos labores subire et diversus 
denariorum summas pro acquietatione sua praedieta et ejus exoneratione in hac parte 
expendere et erogare coactus et compulsus fuit.”816 In Carlion v Mill, the plaintiff complained 
about having been put to “great charted and vexation.”817 In Goddard v Smith (1704), the 
plaintiff averred that he was “forced to expend and lay out divers large sums of money in and 
about acquitting and discharging himself of the said indictment, and defending his innocence, 
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to the very great discredit and extreme impoverishment of him.”818 And in Reynolds v 
Kennedy (1748), it was said that “the plaintiff has been put to great costs and damages.”819  
 As with slander, either the presence of these expressions or the imputation in court 
allowed lawyers and judges to evoke the frame of the action for words in order to raise 
arguments in court. In an anonymous case in 1635, Roll CJ opines that in the case of a bill of 
indictment not found it was “the trouble the party is put unto by reason of this endictment, is 
the cause of his bringing this action.”820 In Atwood v Monger (1653), in arreste of judgment, 
the defendant questioned the authority of the body which had convicted him upon 
presentment, and therefore the existence of harm. Twisden J argued that “the action is well 
brought, for it is brought for the vexation the plaintiff was put unto by reason of the 
presentment, and the other matter alleged, is but by way of inducement to the action,” so that 
although the body did not have jurisdiction the action lied “for unjustly vexing him.” Roll CJ 
agreed that the action lied “by reason of the vexation of the party, and so it is all one whether 
here were any jurisdiction or no, for the plaintiff is prejudiced by the vexation.”821 In John 
Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh v George Blake (1662), it was conceded by the defense 
counselor that “the party that was molested being now by judgment of the court or other due 
proceedings of law acquitted or discharged… the law allows him recompence for such unjust 
vexation.”822 In Norris v Palmer (1676), the plaintiff demurred on the grounds that the action 
did not lie for trespass, to which it was replied that, given that, the plaintiff “was put to great 
charges.”823 In an anonymous case in 1679, the court laid that an action for an indictment of 
common trespass “will lie for the charges and expences in defending the prosecution.”824 In 
Savile v Roberts (1699), Holt laid that one of the damages that would support the blended 
action was “damage to a man's property, as where he is forced to expend his money in 
necessary charges, to acquit himself of the crime of which he is accused, which is the present 
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charge. That a man in such case is put to expences is without doubt, which is an injury to his 
property.”825 In Jones v Gwynn (1714), confirming Holt’s opinion, Parker CJ contended that 
“damage … to property, is there looked upon as strong as any.”826 In Farmer v Darling 
(1720), there was a motion for a new trial, and the defendant who argued that the damages 
were excessive said that “there could be no injury but to his property; there was none, to his 
fame. He could be intitled to no compensation for any thing else but pecuniary damage.” The 
plaintiff replied that “this prosecution of the indictments was at the peril of the defendant's 
trade: which would have been destroyed,” and that “the distress and vexation, and all the 
inconveniences the plaintiff was put to, may fairly be taken into the consideration of his 
damages, as well as the pecuniary expences.” Lord Mansfield denied the motion on the 
grounds that the effect of the false indictments that the jury had found was to “to drive this 
plaintiff from his business of a poulterer, after having long carried it on. This was sworn to 
have been the prosecutor's view in preferring them. And they might affect the man's 
credit.”827 In Chambers v Robinson (1726), an action was said to lay upon an ill indictment 
because “a bad indictment serving all the purposes of malice, by putting the party to expence, 
and exposing him, but it serves no purpose of justice in bringing the party to punishment if 
he be guilty.”828  
4.4.5.2.3 ECCLESIASTICAL DEFAMATION 
 As said earlier, the action for words had been derived by analogy with the 
ecclesiastical offence of defamation as well as actions for defamation in local courts. That, 
at first, meant that the common law action for words was connected to the mental space of 
the ecclesiastical defamation. This can be seen in the presence of elements from the frame of 
the ecclesiastical offence such as the allegation of previous good reputation.  
Defamation in ecclesiastical courts was thought of as a change in status, so that 
someone who was already of bad reputation could not be harmed by any imputation. At least, 
this followed from the auctoritate dei patris statute, which restricted the harm of defamation 
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to persons “not of ill fame among good and substantial persons.829 Only someone who is held 
in high esteem and who is thought to be honest by his neighbors can be defamed.830  
Thus, the presence of this allegation is another evidence of this blended action’s 
connection to the action for words. In Arundell v Tregono (1608), the plaintiff declared that 
“he was of a good reputation, &c. free from theft.”831 In Wright v Black and Black (1620), it 
was noted that the plaintiff “was of good fame.”832 In Smith v Crashaw (1623), the averment 
was that the plaintiff “fuit un des bone subjects [de] le Roy.”833 In Goddard v Smith (1704), 
it was alleged that the plaintiff “is a good, true, faithful, peaceable, and honest subject and 
liege man of our lady the now Queen, and was of a good name, fame, reputation, 
conversation, behaviour, and condition, and as a good, true, faithful, peaceable, and honest 
liege man and subject of the said lady the now Queen, being without any scandal, imputation, 
or reproach, and hath not behaved or demeaned himself at any time from the time of his 
nativity hitherto as a barretor or disturber of the peace of the said lady the Queen, nor was in 
suspicion of the like crime amongst his neighbours and other subjects of the said lady the 
Queen to whom the said Richard Goddard [the plaintiff] was known, and by reason of his 
honest and quiet conversation aforesaid, for the whole time aforesaid, lawfully and honestly 
gained and acquired great credit and esteem, and also divers great gains and profits from his 
neighbours and other subjects of our said lady the Queen, with whom the said Richard 
Goddard [the plaintiff] had commerce for the support of himself and his family.”834 In Jones 
v Gwynn (1714), the plaintiff declared that “he had always maintained a good and honest 
character among his neighbours.”835  
Likewise, the argument that the common law courts have jurisdiction over 
ecclesiastical offences as long as there are consequential damages shows how lawyers evoked 
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xxxiv-xxxv 
831 Yelv 116, 80 ER 79. 
832 Winch 28, 124 ER 24. 
833 Latch 79, 82 ER 284; “il fuit un loyal subject,” in Palm 315, 81 ER 1100. 
834 6 Mod 261, 87 ER 1007. 
835 10 Mod 214, 88 ER 699. 
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the frame of the action for words in order to bring in these blended actions for imputations 
in ecclesiastical courts. Thus, in Norris v Palmer (1676), where the defendant demurred on 
the premise that the action did not lie for an indictment of trespass, the Court did not grant it 
on the grounds that “the action would lie after an acquittal upon an indictment for a greater 
or lesser trespass: the like for citing another into the Spiritual Court without cause.”836 In 
Carlion v Mill, the action was brought because the defendant “without colour or cause of 
suspicion of incontinency… procured the plaintiff, ex officio, to be cited to the Consistory-
Court, &c. and there to be at great charges and vexation until he was cleared by sentence, 
which was to his discredit and great expences.”837 In another case, the cause of action was 
that certain churchwardens had conspired “to draw the plaintiff within the ecclesiastical 
censures for adultery with A. S.”838  
4.4.5.3 ABUSE (NON-JUSTIFIABLE PROSECUTION) 
 So far, we have seen how this blended action combined the frame of defamation as 
causing harm to reputation by words imputing an offence, and that of the writ of conspiracy 
as procuring a false indictment and imprisonment. The false imputation in court could also 
be conceptualized as an abuse or, in the language of the time, a perversion of justice. That 
meant the use of a legal process for an unlawful purpose other than that intended by the law, 
which in the context of prosecution, is bringing offenders to justice. It should be noted that 
from the point of view of this frame, the focus changes from the actual wrong (defamation) 
and the action that causes the wrong (imputation in court) to the mind of the person bringing 
the accusation. In other words, to say that a person abuses the law is to say that they are 
bringing about a legal process with a certain state of mind.  
  This concept of abuse appeared within the frame of pleading to the new action for 
words. Early on, the action was defended by pleading in confession and avoidance that the 
imputation had been made in due course of justice upon reasonable suspicion. 839 That is, 
                                                 
836 2 Mod 51, 86 ER 935. 
837 Cit. in Savile v Roberts (1699), 5 Mod 409, 87 ER 736; see also 5 Mod 394, 87 ER 725. 
838 Cit. in Savile v Roberts (1699), 5 Mod 405, 409, 87 ER 733, 736. 
839 Baker, Spelman, 235. Baker suggests that the plea was brought in analogy with the action by the writ of 
conspiracy (247), but in most cases the defense against the writ was brought by jurors rather than prosecutors, 
and they alleged that they were protected by their oath. Furthermore, a similar defense had been wielded in the 
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although harm to reputation by the imputation of an offense was admitted, it was held to be 
justified in that it had been made in the course of justice. Plaintiffs first responded with the 
general replications that the action was not in due course of justice but “de suis precogitatis 
malicia odio mundia et injuria et absque causis, etc.”840, but by the 1540s, they began to 
anticipate such defense by declaring that the prosecution was brought “ex perverse malicia 
et absque racionabili causa.”841 According to Baker, this practice gave birth to the action of 
malicious prosecution, as a special form of the action for words with the allegation of what 
later would be called special or express malice.842 As this allegation would be traversed by 
the plea of what would later be called the privilege, the issue would revolve around the 
question of whether the defendant brought the action with malice or not. This will be 
discussed later, but for the moment I will try to establish what the concept of malice was in 
this plea.  
 The abovementioned expression “de suis propiis precogitatis malicia odio mundia et 
injuria” smacks of conceptual blending. For one thing, it reminds us of the expression de odio 
et atia, referring to the motives of a prosecutor. It also reminisces the expression malice 
aforethought, referring to the deliberate and not spontaneous nature of a criminal intention. 
Furthermore, mundia suggests a view of an impure corrupt heart, as the term wickedness. 
These things, indeed, point out to different aspects of the mind. Hatred refers to what we will 
call an emotion or a passion, which can be defined as a dislike towards someone coupled 
with a desire that that person should suffer pain. Deliberation or planning refers to our 
capacity to imagine and foresee goals and actions in advance, and finally wickedness refers 
                                                 
Ecclesiastical forum (Helmholz, Canon Law, 579, 580). Obviously, this plea presupposes an imputation of an 
offence in court. Thus, it is not clear whether the plea was to speaking the words in the course of justice or to 
bringing the charges. There is a clear difference between the two. In one case, the plea would include witnesses, 
but in the other it would be limited to prosecutors. 
840 Baker, Spelman, 236. 
841 Ib. The chronology is not clear, nor it is the causal relationship between allegations of malice and plea of 
privilege. There are early actions which declare special malice. In Pare v Shakespeare (1511) where “a single 
defendant was alleged to have maliciously procured an indictment in order to blacken the plaintiff’s name and 
disinherit him.” Cit. in p. 236, n (1). In an Anonymous case (1536) Fifoot History and Sources 141, the 
declaration laid that the defendant “contriving unjustly to prejudice the aforesaid R. and to deprive him of the 
good name and fame which he has hitherto borne from the day of his of his birth and to harm, detract from and 
corrupt the fame and report of his said good name and also to draw the said R. into perturbation and infamy.” 
842 Baker, Introduction, 445; Baker, Spelman, 247. See also Plucknett, Concise, 497.  
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to a general disposition of character or attitude towards evil. How did all these come together, 
and what does it mean to combine them altogether in the expression above? The expression 
is usually interpreted as an intention or motive to cause harm, but in doing so intention and 
motive are assimilated. Yet one might have a motive to inflict harm, such as hatred, but not 
the intention to. And certainly, one might have the intention to cause harm, but not out of a 
desire to cause harm. And here is when the rubber hits the road of our problem of why intent 
and motive are frequently mistaken.  
 The plea ex malicia sua praecogitata, as a replication to the justification that a bill of 
indictment had been brought in due course of justice, should be understood against the 
backdrop of the frame of justifiable wrong. The plea of justification was in confession of the 
alleged wrong of defamation, but it pretended to avoid liability in that the wrong was 
committed in due course of justice. Thus, it was a very different strategy to deny slander and 
put it to the jury. And the natural replication was denying that the imputation in court had 
been brought in pursuance of justice and claiming instead that it had out of hatred with an 
evil heart.  
Thus, within this frame, malice refers not only to the intention to cause harm but also 
to that intention as caused by an evil heart rather than by the desire to bring offenders to 
justice. Before we go over the presence of elements of this frame within the blended action, 
it is important to keep in mind that sometimes reference is made only to the intent to cause 
harm, presupposing an evil heart, and sometimes reference to the evil heart, hatred, and greed 
is also made. Furthermore, we should not forget that the allegation of malice in this context 
evokes the frame of justification or justifiable prosecution. That is, in this case, the allegation 
of malice implies the lack of justification (pursuance of justice) for causing someone to be 
slandered in bringing charges against them. 
4.4.5.3.1 THE FRAME OF ABUSE WITHIN THE BLENDED ACTION 
This way, the mind of the defamer made its entrance into this blended action. Before 
I discuss how the frame of justification transpires in the form of this blended action and the 
arguments lawyers raised in court, I should first note that the terms we use today to refer to 
malice within the frame of defamation are express and implied malice. Express malice is 
usually referred to the allegation of an intent to cause harm in a specific and detailed way 
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rather than generically, using adverbial expressions like maliciously. This is intended to mean 
that this allegation will be later proved or disproved with evidence, which would be weighted 
by a jury. Implied malice by contrast, refers to these generic expressions entailing that malice 
will be presumed from the action or the circumstances surrounding the action, and that 
therefore it need not to be proved and found by the jury. These terms, therefore, background 
the frame of seditious libel, rather than slander in general, and refer to the problem of whether 
the intention of the defamer by libel was to be presumed by the judge or whether juries had 
a say in determining that seditious intention. But in this context, the question juries would 
have to answer was whether a prosecutor was justified in bringing an imputation in court or 
not.  
Now as I said, at first sight, the allegations we are going to discuss now seem to mean 
nothing but intention to cause harm, but in this context, it should be taken rather as meaning 
an evil heart, that is, a desire that someone suffer harm springing from rage or greed, and 
which motivates the prosecution. That is why along with the allegations of ill will we will 
also find the term maliciously, which was traditionally used to mean ‘intention to cause 
harm’. And that is why it is usually followed by the allegation that the prosecutor had no 
cause of suspicion in bringing the charge which was the requirement that protected innocents 
from wrongful prosecution.843 
THE POLICY OF PROSECUTION FRAME AND THE PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION 
 As said earlier, as this new action was emerging, one of the issues that were raised 
was whether prosecutors should be held liable to civil litigation at all. From the get-go, this 
innovation was met with the opposition of part of the judiciary that was contrary to the idea 
of holding prosecutors accountable to an action for damages. This transpires in the arguments 
they made to allow prosecutors to make a plea of justification. The issue was indeed debated 
and framed normatively in court. The normative frames were that of what we might call 
efficacy or effectiveness of the law, and that of the protection of the innocent from 
prosecution. Indeed, one side tended to frame the innovation of a civil action as a problem of 
                                                 
843 Bellamy, Criminal Trial, 29 shows that prosecutors by bill of indictment already framed their charges with 
allegations of public fama or common knowledge, so that if the defendant was acquitted, they won’t be made 
to answer a writ of conspiracy. That is, the plea of reasonable cause was already available to defendants of 
conspiracy. 
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efficacy, that is, as throwing a stick on the wheel of criminal justice, thus concluding that the 
action should not be allowed, or at least that it should be allowed only in a number of cases. 
The other side tended to view the action as a means of controlling prosecutors and hence 
protecting innocent people from prosecution.  
In Jerome v Knight (1587), Gawdy J seemed inclined to allow actions against 
prosecutors under certain conditions because “otherwise every one shall be in danger of his 
life, by such malicious practices.”844 In Cutler v Dixon (1585), the court is reported to have 
determined that action should not be allowed because “if action should be permitted in such 
cases, those who have just cause of complaint, would not dare to complain for fear of infinite 
vexation.”845 In Throgmorton’s Case (1597), the counsels for the defense argued in arrest of 
judgment that prosecutions under conditions were to be protected because otherwise “it 
would be in hinderance of justice.”846 In Arundell v Tregono (1608), the defendant moved in 
arrest of judgment, and the court agreed with him, that “if men should be punished for 
preferring indictments, it would be a great hindrance of justice.”847 In Willins v Fletcher 
(1612), it was moved and held by the whole Court that the action did not lie because “then 
no man would dare to complain, if for so doing he should be liable to an action.”848 In Wright 
v Black (1620), Winch J opined that bringing bills of indictment to a court of justice “ought 
not to be punished by an action upon the case, for that will deterre and scare men from the 
just prosecutions in the ordinary way of justice.”849 In Paulin v Shaw (1649), it was argued 
in arrest of judgment and the court seemed to agree that these actions “would be a great 
discouragement to the execution of justice on malefactors.”850 In Chamberlain v Prescot 
(1659), it was said in arrest of judgment that “if it should be allowed, it would discourage 
                                                 
844 Cro Eli 134, 78 ER 391. Cf. Cro Eli 70, 71; 78 ER 331 which reports Gawdy dissenting “that the action doth 
not lie, for then every felon that is acquitted [meaning by a Grand Jury] will sue an action against the party.” It 
might be that he changed his opinion as this report is dated Trinity 29 Eliz and the other Pasch 30 Eliz. 
845 4 Co Rep 14b, 76 ER 886. 
846 Cro Eliz 565, 78 ER 808. 
847 Yelv 116, 80 ER 79. 
848 1 Bulstrode 185, 80 ER 873. 
849 Winch 28, 29; 124 ER 24, 25. 
850 T Jones 20, 84 ER 1127. 
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prosecutors.”851 In Sir Andrew Henley v Dr. Burstal (1669) , the defendant argued in arrest 
of judgment that “such action doth not lie, because it deters a man from prosecuting for the 
King.”852 And so did the defendant’s counselor in John Vanderbergh and James 
Vandervergh v George Blake (1661): “If this action were allowed, it would discourage and 
overthrow all proceedings of this nature; because after judgment given for the informer, he 
would not be sure that he was in peace, but would be liable to be disquieted by another action 
for malicious prosecution; and this would be a mean to prevent, if not to subvert all justice, 
which the law protects and advance.”853 In Loe v Bordmore (1665), it was argued in arrest of 
judgment again that this action “would be too great a discouragement to persons to prosecute 
for the King.”854 In Savile v Roberts (1698), Holt CJ warned and the Court agreed, that 
“though this action will lie, yet it ought not to be favoured, but managed with great 
caution.”855 In Jones v Gwynn (1714), talking about a prosecution upon an insufficient 
indictment, Parker said that “the only remora to those actions is the fear of discouraging just 
prosecutions… [but] It is certainly not reasonable, that more favour should be shewed to a 
bad indictment than to a good one. It ought to be considered, that a small slip vitiates an 
indictment; and if that shall protect a man from an action, a way is opened for the malicious 
to ruin the innocent; for how easily may a slip be made on purpose?”856 Along similar 
grounds, Lee CJ warned in Reynolds v Kennedy (1748), that “although an action will lie 
against one for proceeding wrongfully in an Inferior Court in many cases, yet it is a kind of 
action not to be favoured; and whenever such action is brought.”857  
 On the other hand, in Atwood v Monger (1653), Roll CJ said that “I hold that an action 
upon the case will lye… if such actions were used to be brought, it would deter men from 
such malitious courses as are too often put in practice.”858 Likewise, in Wright vs Black and 
                                                 
851 Raym T 136, n (1), 83 ER 73. 
852 Raym 180, 83 ER 95. 
853 Hadre 194, 197; 145 ER 447, 449. 
854 1 Lev 169, 83 ER 353. See also Low v Berdmore (1665) 1 Syd 261, 82 ER 1093. 
855 1 Ld Raym 374, 381; 91 ER 1148, 1151. 
856 10 Mod 214, 218; 88 ER 699, 701. 
857 1 Wils KB 232, 233; 95 ER 591. 
858 Style 378, 379; 82 ER 793. 
273 
 
Black (1620), Hobert CJ said that “it is true that the ordinary course of justice, ought not by 
any means to be stopped or hindred, and as that may not be obstructed, so neither may the 
good name of a man in any thing which concerns his life be taken away, and impeached.”859 
THE PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION 
 The political issue as to what policy should be favored regarding prosecution has its 
technical translation in the argument as to whether the plea of justification was allowed in 
these actions, and if so, what its scope was, and thus, whether it was absolute for all 
prosecutors, or prosecutors were to be justified only to a certain length, under certain 
conditions. Moreover, there was a further discussion about what was and was not traversable 
by this plea, that is, what was going to be tried and what was to be formally alleged but 
merely presumed by law. In sum, wrongdoing such as slandering someone, putting him to 
expenses, or even causing him to be imprisoned was justified under certain conditions that 
must be pleaded by the defendant. But what did this plea and its replication consist in? Here, 
several slightly different ways of understanding what the justification was can be 
distinguished.  
IN DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE 
 The simplest way to frame justification is by simply stating that the prosecution was 
carried out according to the due process.860 That is, this is a merely formal argument that the 
wrong took place in the course of justice, as part of prosecution proceedings. Thus, in Cutler 
v Dixon (1585), it was argued that a prosecutor was justified because they “have pursued the 
ordinary course of justice.”861 In Throgmorton’s Case (1597), an action was brought against 
someone for indicting someone as common barrator at the Sessions, who was acquitted 
afterwards. In arrest of judgment, Anderson and Beumond held that the action did not lie, 
“for when one prefers an indictment, and is sworn thereupon, it is to be intended that he 
prefers it lawfully.”862 In Arundell v Tregono (1608), after finding for the plaintiff, the 
defendant moved in arrest of judgment that he “has done nothing but in a course of justice to 
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prefer an indictment, and that is lawful; for if men should be punished for preferring 
indictments, it would be a great hindrance of justice.”863 The court agreed with him. In 
Bradley v Jones  (1614), where articles of the peace had been exhibited in two different 
courts, it was resolved by the court that “a man might pray the peace or good behaviour of 
any other man in any of the Kings Courts: but then it must be done in due form of law: and 
if he do it so, no action upon the case will lie.”864 In Wright v Black and Black (1620), the 
defendant moved in arrest of judgment that he had brought a bill of indictment against the 
defendant in the course of justice. Winch J opined that “the framing of an indictment in a 
Court of Record, is not any cause of an action, for it is a proceeding in an ordinary course of 
justice; and for that reason ought not to be punished by an action upon the case, for that will 
deterre and scare men from the just prosecutions in the ordinary way of justice.”865 In Palke 
v Dunnyn (1635), the defendant objected that the prosecution was alleged “solement d'estre 
fait ordinariment per un legal Proceeding.”866 In Paulin v Shaw (1649), it was excepted in 
arrest of judgment that exhibiting a bill of indictment “is in course of justice, and it would be 
a great discouragement to the execution of justice on malefactors.”867  
 A more detailed view of what a prosecutor is in the course of justice is offered by 
Coke in Knight v German (1587). Coke distinguishes those cases in which a prosecutor acted 
in due course of law, as when “one come voluntarily into the Court and discover felonies, 
and if it be true which he saith, or if he come in Court and draw an indictment by the command 
of the justices, or if he be bound by order of law, to cause the party to be indicted, or to give 
in evidence, although he do it falsely,” from those in which they come “gratis with malice in 
him before, and maliciously and falsely cause the party to be indicted.”868 He draws the 
distinction between those who were bound to prosecute at the sessions or assizes under 
pretrial process, and those who simply appeared to report crimes.869 For Coke, the former are 
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excused from liability in that they act under compulsion of the law. Regarding the latter, 
Coke wants to distinguish the honest and good-faithed prosecutors, who would be protected 
from liability, from those who are not. 
 Likewise, in Hercot v Underhill & Rochley (1615), Haughton J argued in a dictum 
that when a prosecutor brings a bill of indictment and “he was before bound by his oath to 
do this, and therefore urged, that this shall not be said to be done by him, malitiose.”870 And 
in Carlion v Mill, the defendant objected in arrest of judgment that “he did not cite him but 
as an informer, and by virtue of his office.”871 
ZEAL OF JUSTICE 
Sometimes, not only formal and objective prosecution was mentioned, but reference 
was made to the mind of the prosecutor, to what his motivation or purpose were. The 
prosecutor had to act not only in the course of a judicial proceeding, but also for justice’s 
sake. In Throgmorton’s Case (1597), an action was brought against someone for indicting 
someone as common barrator at the Sessions, who was acquitted afterwards. In arrest of 
judgment, Anderson and Beumond held that the action did not lie because “for when one 
prefers an indictment, and is sworn thereupon, it is to be intended that he prefers it lawfully, 
and in zeal of justice.”872 And in Hercot v Underhill & Rochley (1615), Croke J believed that 
when a felony was committed, after acquittal the defendant “shall not for this prosecution 
have this action, because this is in advancement of justice, and for the finding out and due 
punishing of offenders.”873 This plea indeed echoes the view that the oath protects the 
prosecutor as they swear that they bring the prosecutor in pursuance of justice, and not for 
revenge and/or lucre.  
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EX MALITIA SUA 
The usual replication denying that the wrong was not justifiable was to allege that it 
was not in pursuance of justice but “ex malitia sua,” of his own malice, that is, it was his 
wrong, a wrong attributable to him for which he might respond. This formula was usually 
alleged by the plaintiff either in the form of the action or in the declaration, but it could also 
appear as a replication. In other instances, the term maliciously seemed to fulfill this function 
of denying justifiable prosecution. As Wray CJ put it, an “indictment being written and 
preferred maliciously, it is no reason but an action should lie to punish it.”874 The term 
maliciously was part of the form of the writ of conspiracy, and it appears in the declaration 
of many of these actions, but it does not seem to bear any particular meaning, nor does it 
necessarily convey something the plaintiff is ready to prove. Maybe because of that, 
sometimes the meaning is specified so that along with maliciously there are other expressions 
referring to the mind of the prosecutor. And here, the case-law shows different aspects of that 
mind.  
 The most common declaration does not refer to the motives of the prosecutor, but 
only to his unlawful intention to cause harm to the defendant by means of the prosecution. 
Thus, it appears in the declaration made by plaintiffs in anticipation of the plea of 
justification. In Knight v German (1587), it was alleged that the plaintiff had brought a bill 
“intending to detract from his name and fame, and put his life in jeopardy”875 In Wright v 
Black (1620), it was declared that the defendants had preferred a bill of indictment “intending 
to make away his good name, and to cause him to lose his goods.”876 In that case, another 
case was mentioned in which the defendants had brought a prosecution against someone 
“intending to take away his good name” (ibidem). In Palke v Dunnyn (1635), it was alleged 
that “le Defendant falsò &maliciosè ambiit & conatus fuit a luy indicter del dit felonie, &c.” 
at the Assizes.877 In Low v Beardmore (1665), the plaintiff had brought an action “against the 
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defendant for falsely and maliciously indicting the plaintiff for a rescous.”878 In arrest of 
judgment, Twisden thought that “if the action had been laid more specially, viz. that the 
defendant knowing it to be false, did it purposely to vex him and to draw him into trouble, 
and to cause him to expend his money, perhaps the action had been maintainable.”879 In 
Savile v Roberts (1698), the record of the case reproduced in error the declaration of the 
plaintiff that the defendant “malitiose intendens ipsum Jacobum minus rite praegravare ac 
eum variis laboribus et expensis... opprimere et multipliciter damnificare.”880 Likewise, an 
action against certain churchwardens was brought because they prosecuted someone in 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction “to the intent to draw the plaintiff within the ecclesiastical censures 
for adultery with A. S.”881 In Goddard against Smith (1704), it was declared that the 
defendant “maliciously intending not only to deprive him the said Richard Goddard of his 
good name, fame, and esteem aforesaid, but also to bring him the said Richard Goddard into 
ignominy and public disgrace, that by reason thereof the subjects of the said lady the Queen 
might without themselves from the fellowship of him the said Richard Goddard, and might 
altogether cease and desist from dealing and having commerce with him in any manner…did 
falsly and maliciously prosecute and cause to be prosecuted the said indictment against the 
said Richard Goddard.”882 In Jones v Gwynn (1714), the defendant was said to “malitiosi 
intendens, & c. caused him to be indicted for exercising the trade of a badger without a 
license.”883 
It should be noted that while in most of these cases the intention of the prosecutors is 
qualified as tortious, either to cause harm to someone’s reputation, and/or to vex them, 
sometimes a more felonious intention to take away the life of the innocent is alleged.884  
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In keeping with this view of malice as intention to cause harm by prosecution, this 
intention must be proved directly by words,885 or indirectly, as in Johnson v Stancliff (1641), 
where malice was inferred from the plaintiff having prosecuted criminally a case for which 
there was a civil action, and from the fact that after the prosecution failed, he indicted another 
person for the same offence. The court concluded contra that “for the party whose goods are 
stolen, may proceed both ways without malice, and also it was held a second Indictment may 
be preferred upon better Evidence without making the prosecutor liable to this Action.”886  
 Sometimes, the motives that brought the defendant to prosecute are specified. Thus, 
in Manning and Wife v Fitzherbert (1633), the plaintiff declared that “the defendant ex 
malitiâ upon the plaintiff's wife crimen feloniae imposuit,”887 In Savile v Roberts (1699), Holt 
J argued that “if there be an injury done to a man's property, occasioned by a wicked and 
malicious prosecution, it is all the reason in the world that a man should have an action to 
repair himself.”888 He further explained that in cases of prosecutions of trespass, “there must 
be express malice found, that it may appear that the prosecution was not for the sake of 
justice, but to gratify the party's peevish revenge or malice.”889 And in Jones v Gwynn (1714), 
Parker C. J explained that “the word "malitia" is an abstract of malus, which imports what is 
wicked, and can admit of no possibility of excuse. Among the Romans, it signified a mixture 
of hatred and fraud, and what was utterly repugnant to simplicity and honesty: and thus it is 
defined by Cicero, in his third book De Natura Deorum, and in this third book of Offices. 
Thus it is used in the civil law, and thus in our's.”890  
PREMEDITATION (PRAECOGITATA) 
 In Jerom v Knight (1587), the plaintiff had successfully brought an action against his 
prosecutor after she was indicted and acquitted thereof. She had alleged that the defendant, 
“intending to detract from his name and fame, and put his life in jeopardy, did maliciously 
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cause a bill of indictment of felony to be written, and the same being so written, at such a 
sessions of the peace at Newgate, exhibited the same to the grand jury.”891 The defendant 
moved in error that he “came into the Court where the sessions was holden, and complained 
of the plaintiff for the said felony, for which the justices there comanded her [the defendant] 
to cause an indictment to be drawn.”892 The issue, therefore, was whether the defendant was 
excused insofar he had brought the prosecution under compulsion of law. 
 Coke distinguished those cases in which a prosecutor acted in due course of law, as 
when “one come voluntarily into the Court and discover felonies, and if it be true which he 
saith, or if he come in Court and draw an indictment by the command of the justices, or if he 
be bound by order of law, to cause the party to be indicted, or to give in evidence, although 
he do it falsely”893, from those other cases in which they come “gratis with malice in him 
before, and maliciously and falsely cause the party to be indicted.”894  
He further argued that the issue of malice should be put to the jury the same way as 
in murder, where “malice makes the difference betwixt murder and manslaughter,” and 
insisted that when one comes before a justice of the peace and accuses someone upon prima 
facie evidence “and then upon examination he shall be bound to come and give in evidence 
against the party, &c. and in such case although that his evidence be false, yet he is not 
punishable.”895 And since in this case the jury had found an indictment that stated that the 
defendant came to court with a bill of indictment already drafted, Coke thought that this was 
liable “for the drawing of an indictment is not the office of a witness, but if it were by the 
commandment of the Court, or of one justice of peace, it should be otherwise, for there he 
goes by course of justice” and by way of analogy he added that “if one conspire with another, 
and afterwards he procures himself to be one of the indictors, his oath shall not excuse his 
malice before.”896  
                                                 
891 Cro Eli 70; 78 ER 331. 
892 1 Leon 107, 74 ER 99. 
893 1 Leon 107, 74 ER 99, 100. 
894 Ibidem. 
895 Ib. 
896 1 Leon 107, 108, 74 ER 99, 100. 
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In this argument, to account for his distinction, Coke is frame shifting. First, instead 
of focusing on the allegation of ill will, that is, that the defendant was “intending to detract 
from his name and fame, and put his life in jeopardy,”897 he chooses to focus on the fact that 
the defendant had prepared a false bill of indictment in advance of her coming to the quarter 
sessions, which Coke frames as malice aforethought, as deliberate wrongdoing. Thus, he 
draws an analogy between the frame of murder and this case, so that he can project the rule 
that malice aforethought is what distinguishes the prosecutor who brings a bill from he who 
simply comes to court and reports, and is made to make a bill, in the same way it distinguishes 
murder from manslaughter. Indeed, he frames the writ of conspiracy in the same way as 
encoding premeditated wrongful prosecution so that the oath of an indictor “shall not excuse 
his malice before,” understanding the conspiracy as planned wrongful prosecution. In other 
words, he is framing conspiracy as planned wrongdoing, and making this deliberate or 
planned character of if the fulcrum of the liability, the same way it is in murder.  
By the time this case was decided, there were two types of prosecutors. Those who 
were bound to prosecute at the sessions or assizes under pretrial process, and those who 
simply appeared to report crimes.898 For Coke, the former are excused from liability in that 
they act under compulsion of the law. Regarding the latter, Coke wants to distinguish the 
honest and good-faithed prosecutors, who would be protected from liability, from those who 
are not. That prosecutor who “come gratis with malice in him before, and maliciously and 
falsely cause the party to be indicted,” that his, who has planned to bring the false bill of 
indictment, is to be liable, because “this malicious intention and endeavour before the bill 
exhibited, is to be punished, although the indictment was lawful to be preferred by any one 
for the Queen.”899 Thus, with this argument, Coke moves from the question regarding the 
motives of the prosecutor, whether he comes to court out of hatred or greed, to the question 
                                                 
897 Knight v German (1587), Cro Eli 70, 78 ER 331. 
898 Indeed, Coke will distinguish between two types of prosecutions concerning the problem of the liability of 
prosecutors. Those prosecutors who come under compulsory process of law, bound by a JP, and those who 
come spontaneously, voluntarily. This bears on the new practice of pretrial investigation and compulsion of 
prosecutors after the Marian statutes. In theory, this new kind of prosecutor is not only protected by his oath 
that he brings an accusation upon evidence, and not for hatred or profit, but also the compulsory process. 
Therefore, there are two types of prosecution: voluntary and process-compelled. 
899 The idea of premeditation also appears in Savile v Roberts (1699), where the plaintiff had declared that the 
defendant had prosecuted him “ex malitia sua praecogitata,” Cro Eli 134, 78 ER 391. 
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of whether the prosecutor planned a wrongful prosecution. These are two very different 
questions to be put to a jury, since, whereas the former issue would require for the plaintiff 
to show in some previous circumstance the motives of the prosecutor, or imply it from the 
lack of a cause of suspicion, the latter issue can presume or imply the motive and the wrongful 
intent from the fact that the prosecutor had prepared a bill of indictment which was false.900  
Sometimes, this planned wrong appeared not as premeditation and as an element 
destroying the possibility of justifying a prosecution, but as a punishable plan or collusion 
and the very cause of action. In Cockshal and the Mayor of Boalton’s Case (1589), an action 
on the case was brought against the mayor of Bolton for having conspired and let a debtor 
out without bail to the delay of the creditor who had a pending suit with him. Periam J thought 
that the mayor was acting within the purview of his authority “for the not taking of bail is a 
Judicial act, for which he shall not be impeached.”901 However, the rest of the justices opined 
that “the not taking of bail is not the cause of the action, but the conspiracy.”902 This case 
was not properly of an imputation in court, but maybe because of the allegation of conspiracy, 
it was classified as action on the case in nature of conspiracy. It is true that it resembles Jerom 
v Knight in that for Periam is evoking the frame of justification of the wrong caused by the 
conduct of an official in the performance of his duties. But the other justices evoke the frame 
of planned action and the theory that planned action need not be consummated to be 
punishable as long as it has been put into execution. In that sense, the issue is not whether 
the defendant was or not justified in causing harm, but whether he had planned or not to cause 
harm. 
In Wright v Black and Black (1620), an action had been brought against someone for 
preferring a bill of indictment. The plaintiff had not declared what the grand jury’s verdict 
was, so Winch Justice argued that “this action upon the case, is in the nature of a writ of 
conspiracy, and for that reason there ought to be some act made, or else an action of 
conspiracy will not lye upon a bare attempt.”903  
                                                 
900 1 Ld Raym 374, 91 ER 1148. 
901 1 Leon 189, 74 ER 174. 
902 1 Leon 189, 74 ER 174, 175, 
903 Winch 28, 124 ER 24. 
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Likewise, in Skinner vs Gunton (1670), an action on the case had been brought, 
alleging that the defendants  
by a conspiracy between them there first thereof had to aggrieve and impoverish the 
said plaintiff, and to cause the said plaintiff to be arrested at the suit of the said 
William Gunton, (one of the defendants,) and to deter the friends and neighbours of 
the said plaintiff from becoming bail for the said plaintiff, to the intent that the said 
plaintiff should be detained in prison for want of bail, and so without any just cause 
to lose and be deprived of his liberty, without any just cause levied and affirmed in 
the name of the said William, (namely, the said Gunton, one of the defendants,) a 
certain plaint of a plea of trespass upon the case, to the damage of the said William 
of 300l... [and] by virtue of the said plaint, caused and procured to be arrested and 
imprisoned, and to be detained in prison for the space of twenty days and nights.904  
Upon not guilty pleaded, the jury acquitted all the defendants but Gunton, who moved 
in arrest of judgment. Initially, the counsellor for the defendant argued that “the writ is not 
generally machinantes & intendentes to grieve him, but barely a conspiracy,” that is, arguing 
from the frame of the writ of conspiracy, this action did not lie, because there was no 
allegation of acquittal, but merely an allegation that the defendants planned to harm the 
plaintiff. However, the court thought that the action was not alleging “properly conspiracy, 
but a malitious agreement to charge the then defendant with a great action, to which he could 
not find bail… for here the conspiracy is but an inducement to the charging” 905  
In Savile v Roberts (1698), Holt met the objection that the fact that this action was 
grounded on the harm caused by prosecution was not supported by the ancient law, that is by 
the common law, because these cases “were grounded upon a conspiracy, which is of an 
odious nature, and therefore sufficient ground for an action by itself.”906 He replied that “that 
conspiracy is not the ground of these actions, but the damages done to the party; for an action 
will not lie for the greatest conspiracy imaginable, if nothing be put in execution; but if the 
party be damaged, the action will lie.”907  
                                                 
904 1 Wms Saund 228, 85 ER 249. The parentheses are not mine.  
905 2 Keble 473, 84 ER 297. 
906 1 Ld Raym 374, 378; 91 ER 1148, 1150. 
907 Ibidem; “no action lies for the bare conspiracy, but it is the malicious prosecution which is the ground of the 
action,” 5 Mod 405, 407; 87 ER 733, 735; the meaning of bare conspiracy as planned wrongdoing is clearly 
limited here to the framing of failed prosecutions, as Holt expresses in his final argument that “unless the bill 
be found, no action will lie, for that the party is not damaged ; neither is it a good ground of action or indictment 
against a man, that he barely procured him to be falsely indicted” (ib.). He nevertheless admitted that “the 
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The declaration in Goddard against Smith (1704) alleged among other things that the 
defendants “having had a conspiracy between themselves falsly and maliciously to cause the 
said Richard Goddard to be indicted as a barretor and public disturber of the peace…in 
prosecution and execution of their malicious intention and conspiracy aforesaid… falsly and 
maliciously caused and procured the said Richard Goddard… to be indicted.”908  
DISHONESTY 
 As said earlier, one was justified if he prosecuted for the sake of justice, not to cause 
harm to someone. It followed that if he did so, and he still claimed to be acting for the king, 
he was being dishonest. Sometimes plaintiffs emphasized this bad faith, the idea that 
prosecutors knowingly pursued ungrounded actions, with expressions like, they acted 
“colourably, p[er] voy de execution del justice,”909 “by colour of justice,”910 “praetextus et 
colore justitiae et legis procressus.”911 In Loe v Bordmore (1665) 1 Lev 169, 83 ER 353, a 
similar expression after an inducement explaining that the plaintiff was not a dishonest person 
was that the defendant was not “ignorant of the premises.”912 In this case, Twisden J thought 
that an action grounded on a false indictment of trespass would perhaps have lied if special 
allegation had been made that “that the defendant knowing it to be false, did it purposely to 
vex him and to draw him into trouble, and to cause him to expend his money.”913 In Carlion 
v Mill, the defendant was said to have acted “upon pretence of fame.”914  
                                                 
conspiracy, though it be not put in execution, is a crime, and is punishable in the leet.” 1 Ld Raym 374, 379; 91 
ER 1148, 1150. 
908 6 Mod 261, 87 ER 1008. 
909 Smith v Crashaw (1625) Latch 79, 82 ER 284. 
910 John Vanderbergh and James Vandervergh v George Blake (1661) Hadre 194, 145 ER 447. 
911 Savile v Roberts 1698) 1 Ld Raym 374, 91 ER 1148. 
912 Goddard against Smith (1704) 6 Mod 261, 87 ER 1007 “praemissorum non ignarus.” Jones v Gwynn (1714) 
10 Mod 214, 88 ER 699; Parker CJ implied the lack of probable cause from “an averment of the plaintiff's 
honesty, &c. and that the defendant praemissorum non ignarus.” 
913 “Que si scienter & maliciose soit in le declar' & l'intent pur luy vex' &c.,” Low v Berdmore (1665) 1 Syd 
261, 83 ER 1093, 1094. 
914 Cit. in Savile v Robert (1699) 5 Mod 405, 409; 87 ER 733, 736. 
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REASONABLE CAUSE 
Another part of the case for justification was the plea that the prosecutor had acted 
with reasonable cause of suspicion. This allegation sometimes appears together with the 
mental element, and sometimes does so alone.  
Sometimes, the whole plea of justification consists in the allegation that the 
prosecutor had a cause of suspicion. In Jerom v Knight (1587), Gawdy J argued that “if the 
party had taken upon him to proceed against the party upon any good presumtions, he might 
have pleaded it, as to say, he found the party in the house. suspiciously, &c.”915 In Varrel v 
Wilson (1589), the defendant pleaded “que ses biens fui feloniousment esloigne, & il eux 
trove en le possession le pl[aintiff],” and on demurrer the court held that “le justificac[i]on 
fuit bone, quia le trover des biens en le possession le pl' fuit sufficient cause de suspition.”916 
Likewise, in Doggate v Lawry (1608), the defendant pleaded “he had divers sheep stolen, 
and missed divers others, which were found in the plaintiff's possession, going with twelve 
sheep which were stolen,” to which it was replied that it was “de son tort demesne sans tiel 
cause.” After the issue was found for the plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgment that the 
defendant was justified as acting in the course of justice but the court did not agree, “for the 
plaintiff having laid it to be falsely and maliciously, and the jury having found it to be sans 
tiel cause, it all appears to be without any ground, and therefore he is punishable.”917 In 
Johnson v Stancliff (1641), the defendant pleaded and proved that the plaintiff “had goods 
stolen.”918  
Plaintiffs seemed to have assumed that this circumstance was part of their case and 
made this part of their declarations. In Lovet against Fawker (1614), it was said that the 
defendant “sine ullâ verâ et legitimâ causâ, procured the plaintiff to be indicted.”919 In Wright 
v Black (1620), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “without cause… prefer a bill of 
                                                 
915 1 Leon 107, 108, 74 ER 99; Knight v Jermin (1587) Cro Eli 134, 78 ER 391 “If the defendant did it upon 
good presumptions, he ought to plead them; as that he found him in the house, &c. or the like cause of 
suspicion.” 
916 Moor 600, 73 ER 785. 
917 Cro Car 190, 79 ER 166. 
918 Reports of the Pleas of Assizes of York, 85. 
919 Cro Jac 358, 79 ER 306. 
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indictment at the sessions of peace, containing that the plantiff stole two bundles of 
fetches.”920 In John Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh v George Blake (1661), it was 
alleged that the defendant had brought an information “without any probable cause.”921 In 
Skinner v Gunton, Lyon, and Leason (1670), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “without 
any just cause levied and affirmed in the name of the said William, (namely, the said Gunton, 
one of the defendants,) a certain plaint of a plea of trespass upon the case,”922 In Pollard 
against Evans and Others (1680), the declaration was that the defendant “did procure the 
plaintiff to be causelessly indicted.”923 In Savile v Roberts, the prosecution was alleged to be 
“sine causa rationabili.”924 In Goddard against Smith, the case was that the defendants had 
planned to prosecute the plaintiff “without any cause or colour of such crime being 
committed by [the plaintiff], and thus had prosecuted him “without any lawful or true 
cause.”925  
Similarly, judges considered reasonable suspicion to be a necessary part of the case 
of the plaintiff, and not only a defense against the action. In Throgmoton’s Case (1597), 
Walmsley thought that “there is not any reason, if any one, without cause, will procure 
another to be indicted, but that an action will lie against him.”926 In Payne against Porter 
(1618), the Exchequer Chamber upon a writ of error laid that “although the exhibiting of a 
bill upon true and just presumptions be excusable, and no action lies, yet [it is not the case] 
when it is alledged that he falsely and maliciously, without any such cause, had accused him 
of felony, and exhibited this bill falsely and maliciously.”927 In Wright v Black (1620), Hobert 
CJ said that “the good name of man in things which concern his life [ought not to] be taken 
away without good cause.”928 In Atwood v Monger (1653) Roll CJ held that the action lied 
                                                 
920 Winch 28, 124 ER 24. 
921 Hadre 191, 194; 145 ER 446, 447. 
922 1 Wms. Saund. 228, 85 ER 249. 
923 2 Show KB 51, 89 ER 786. 
924 1 Ld Raym 374, 91 ER 1148. 
925 6 Mod 261, 87 ER 1007 
926 Cro Eliz 565, 78 ER 808. 
927 Cro Car 490, 79 ER 418-9. 
928 Winch 28, 124 ER 24. 
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“for maliciously bringing an action against him where he had no probable cause.”929 In Norris 
v Palmer (1676), Pemberton for the plaintiff argued that “it is now settled, that an action on 
the case will lie for a malicious arrest where there is no probable cause of action.”930 In Jones 
v Gwynn (1714), Parker CJ affirmed that “the grounds of this action are, on the plaintiff's 
side, innocence, and on the defendant's, malice.”931  
The relation between this element and the mind of the prosecutor was another of the 
issues. Was it necessary to avert and prove both? Could they imply each other? In John 
Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh (1661), the action declared that the defendant had 
seized the goods of the plaintiff “unduly without any good cause” and prosecuted him 
“without probable cause.”932 Hadres for defendant argued that “unless were falsly and 
maliciously, conspiracy [action on the case of or action of] lies not… But if a man be 
prosecuted with all possible violence, and with apparent malice expressed in words or 
otherwise, yet if the prosecution were for a just cause, and the party be condemned, such 
action lies not, for the law takes no notice of malice, where the cause of the prosecution is 
not false.”933 In an anonymous case in 1679, the Chief Justice argued that in cases of 
indictment of trespass the prosecution would be considered to be malicious and liable to 
action for damages “though the prosecution be for a trespass for which there is a probable 
cause, yet after acquittal it shall be accounted malicious; the difference only is where the 
indictment is for a criminal matter: but where it is for such a thing for which a civil action 
will lie, the party can have no reason to prosecute an indictment ; it is only to put the 
defendant to charges, and to make him pay fees to the clerk of the assizes.”934 Thus, in this 
case, having a reasonable cause does not excuse the prosecutor. In Savile v Roberts (1698), 
Holt CJ laid that when the action is brought for a prosecution of trespass “if the indictment 
be found, the defendant… will not be bound to shew a probable cause, but the plaintiff will 
                                                 
929 Style 379, 84 ER 793. 
930 Mod 51, 52; 86 ER 935. 
931 10 Mod 214, 217; 88 ER 699, 700. 
932 Hadre 194, 145 ER 447. 
933 Hadre 194, 195; 145 ER 447, 448. 
934 2 Mod 306, 86 ER 1088. 
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be constrained to shew express malice and iniquity.”935. In Carlion v Mill there was a 
prosecution at an ecclesiastical court “maliciously, without colour or cause of suspicion.” 
The defendant pleaded he was acting in pursuance of justice but the court replied that “he 
falsò et malitiosè caused him to be cited upon pretence of fame, when no such offence was 
committed, and avers, that there was not any such fame, so as he did it maliciously and of his 
own head.”936. In Jones v Gwynn (1714), it was objected “that the indictment was declared 
only to be brought falsò et malitiosè, but not absque rationabili et probabili causâ.” Parker 
CJ, delivering the opinion for the court, argued that “this action cannot, indeed, be supported, 
unless the indictment was groundless, and without a probable cause,” but that it was not 
necessary to put forward such words because “the word malitiosè implies it to be absque 
rationabili et probabili causâ.”937 Indeed, Parker suggested that the word means such 
circumstances (i. e. lack of probable cause) that would make a wrong inexcusable. He further 
argued that “it is to be considered, that the grounds of this action are, on the plaintiff's side, 
innocence, and on the defendant's, malice.”938 Thus, by this point, malice or the mental 
element was beginning to be identified with the absence of any reason for suspicion. We are 
on the verge of the distinction between express and implied malice. Thus, already by 1766, 
in Farmer v Darling, in a motion for a new trial, Lord Mansfield reported that he instructed 
the jury that “the foundation of this action was malice; which must be either express… [and 
thus] to consider of the implied malice, from the groundlessness of the prosecution.”939 The 
counsellors for the defendants argued that “malice alone is not sufficient: it must also be a 
prosecution without any foundation. These are two independent essentials to the maintenance 
of this action; there must be both malice and falsity.” And they added that “whatever motive 
might induce the prosecutor to indict the person guilty of the offence. It would be of 
dangerous consequence, to make a prosecutor liable to this action, where there is a probable 
                                                 
935 1 Ld Raym 374, 381; 91 ER 1148, 1151. 
936 Cit. in Savile v Roberts (1699) 5 Mod 405, 87 ER 733 
937 10 Mod 214-5, 88 ER 699. 
938 10 Mod 214, 217; 88 ER 699, 700. Cf.  Jones v Gwynn (1713): it was objected that “the declaration was, 
that the indictment was said to be falsò et malitiosè, and not absque probabili causâ.” The court rejected the 
objection because “in the case of an [insufficient] indictment, falsò et malitiosè without absque probabili causâ, 
is enough: but had it been an action for a malicious prosecution, those words must have been in,”10 Mod 148, 
88 ER 668-9. 
939 4 Burr 1971-2, 98 ER 27. 
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cause for indicting an offender.”940 The court agreed that “that malice, (either express or 
implied,) and the want of probable cause must both concur.”941 Yet, if malice was implied 
from the lack of probable cause, only the latter was effectively to be laid down and proved, 
the former being a mere formalism. Conversely, in Reynolds v Kennedy (1748), an action 
was brought against a customs officer informer, after the jury found for the plaintiff, and 
judgment was arrested. Then on error it was moved that judgment should had been for the 
plaintiff. Lee C. K. argued that “whenever such action is brought, the express malice and 
grievance must be laid in the declaration, and proved; and it is not enough to say that the 
defendant brought an action against the plaintiff ex malitia, & sine causa.” He further 
explained that “the gist of these sort of actions arises from some evil practice or malice in 
him who sues or prosecutes.”942  
JUSTIFICATION AND THE PROSECUTION OF TREASON  
 The tension between the control of prosecution through this action and the 
effectiveness of the law that underlined the frame of justification manifested itself with 
greater virulence in prosecutions of treason, particularly at the commencement of the Stuart 
period. The issue presented itself for the first time in Lovet v Fawkner (1614), where the 
plaintiff had been prosecuted for attempting to “persuade and withdraw the defendant, being 
a subject of the King, from his obedience, to the Romish religion,”943 that is, it was treason 
for uttering words in favor of recusancy. After verdict for the plaintiff, the issue was arrested 
on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the judges who determined the indictment had not been 
correctly ascertained.944 But Coke J, in an obiter, said that there was another more telling 
reason for which the judgment ought to be arrested. According to him there could not be 
action because there was no precedent of a writ of conspiracy brought for an indictment of 
                                                 
940 4 Burr 1972, 98 ER 28. 
941 4 Burr 1971, 1974; 98 ER 27, 28. 
942 1 Wils KB 232, 233; 95 ER 591. 
943 Cro Jac 358, 79 ER 306; Lovett v Faukner 1 Rolle 109, 81 ER 364; Lovet v Faulkner 2 Bulst 270, 80 ER 
1114. 
944 Bulstrode reports that the judgment was arrested on that ground, 2 Bulst 271, 80 ER 1115. In the body of the 
text, Croke, who was a judge in this case, reports that “judgment was stayed,” but in a note to that text, the 
editor warns that “no judgment ever was given.” But this probably means that judgment was not given in the 
arrested proceedings, that is, that judgment was arrested. But judgment was given in the arrest proceedings 
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treason .945 Coke went further and explained that this was so because “every man is bound to 
discover treason, and ought not to conceal it for the least time, because it is against the state 
of the commonwealth, which every one is in duty to maintain.”946 It would have been an 
embarrassment “if the powder traitors, for the prosecutions against them, might have had 
writs of conspiracy in case of high treason.”947 Furthermore, because “treason is secret, and 
lieth in the heart of man; and every one is bound to disclose such matters as tend thereto… 
[and it is] dangerous for any man to conceal any thing which may tend to treason” the action 
of conspiracy should not lie. Otherwise if would discourage the difficult prosecution of such 
critical offence.948 Haughton J and Dodderidge J agreed that, “by his oath of allegeance, is 
bound to discover treason, and to have one punished for this, by an action upon the case in 
the nature of a writ of conspiracie, to be brought against him; this should be very hard… we 
will not give way to a president [sic], to make a new president [sic] in this case.”949  
The grounds for not allowing this action in cases of treason were a combination of 
formal and policy arguments. It was held first that by analogy with the writ of conspiracy, 
there was no precedent of such action. And the explanation for that was half political, half 
technical. The offence of treason concerned the security of the whole political community 
for which its prosecution should be a priority. Furthermore, being an offence that was 
difficult to detect and prove, as evidence of an intent to kill the king was gathered from 
circumstantial evidence or overt acts, especially in this case of treasonous words, allowing 
an action would discourage prosecutors. For that reason, it was advisable not to allow these 
actions, and consequently, a plea of justification was advanced in these arguments based on 
the oath of loyalty that would bind all subjects to reveal any knowledge they might have of 
this dangerous crime.  
                                                 
945 Ib. As said earlier, this showed the presence of the frame of the writ of conspiracy. 
946 Ib. 
947 2 Buls 270, 271; 80 ER 1114. 
948 Cro Jac 358, 79 ER 306. 
949 2 Bulst 270, 271; 80 ER 1114, 1115.   
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This issue was revisited again, not as an obiter but as the main issue, in Smith v 
Cranshaw (1622).950 In this case, Rowland Smith brought an action against Cranshaw and 
others alleging that they had complained to a JP that he had spoken treasonous words, and 
that, consequently, he had been arrested and imprisoned until the next Assizes where they 
brought a bill of indictment for these treasonous words. This bill was ignored by the Grand 
Jury.  
The defendants moved in arrest of judgment that there was no precedent of writ of 
conspiracy for indictment of treason “quia ceo [treason] gist in le ceux [parrols] de home, & 
ne poet mults foits estre directment prove… & si conspiracy giseroit pur indicter un de 
treason, ceo represser homes de revealing ceo, car perchance le jury ne voilt luy sole credit.” 
Furthermore, Cranshaw’s plea was good because “si jeo scavera jeo, si ceo ne reveal ceo, jeo 
incur misprision de treason.” And the precedent of Lovet v Fawkner was mentioned in 
support of this argument.951  
The counselor for the plaintiff replied that action and writ lied for both accusations 
of felony and treason “car ambideux sont choses encounter le bien publick coment nient en 
owell degree.” He further argued in defeat of the justification advanced by the defendant that 
“le malitious imputation de ceo al un que est pluis honest, que le accuser mesme, coment 
poet estre pluis digne de punishment, & le pluis inconvenient, que tiel malice serra impunie.” 
By malice he meant the “prosecution sur le bitter fruit & nourished ove long & inveterate 
malice purtary ove grand violence, & hatred oi a most devilish mind, not onely to deprive an 
innocent of life, but even of his reputation, and brand him with parrande, & stigmatize tout 
son posterity, come le offspring.”952  
The Chief Justice thought that the action did not lie because there was no precedent 
by the writ of conspiracy, and agreed with the arguments of policy and the technical 
difficulties involved in the prosecution of treason, as well as with the justification pleaded by 
                                                 
950 2 Rolle 258, 81 ER 785; Palm 315, 81 ER 1100; W Jones 93, 93 ER 298; Latch 79, 82 ER 284; Smith v 
Chrashaw, Sprat, & Ward (1625) Latch 79, 79 ER 618; Smith v Crashaw (1625) Benl 152, 73 ER 1019; Smith 
against Crashaw, Ward, and Ford (1625) Cro Car 15, 79 ER 618; Smith v Cranshaw & Alios (1625) Jones W 
93, 83 ER 48. 
951 2 Rolle 258; 81 ER 785. 
952 2 Rolle 258-9; 81 ER 785-6. 
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Cranshaw.953 Haughton J by contrast adopted a compromising technical view on the issue 
and opined that “s[er]ra  mischievo[us], si s[er]ra  dispunishable p[ur] accuser de subject ove 
treason,”954 and that “que si le malice soit prove, & le party quitt conspiracy giseroit.”955 
However, the action could not lie in this case because “est trove un ignoram[us] solem[en]t, 
q[ue] ne acquit le pl[ein]t[if] del treaso[n], mes est lyable a ceo, p[ur] q[ue] intant q[ue]n'est 
acquit de ceo, n'avera action.”956 Doddridge J agreed with the Chief Justice that “ou 
conspiracy est port for accusing another for trayterous parolls, he may by plea discharge 
himself, as if he say, that he heard the plaintiff per le tiels parolls, & come ceo fuit son duty 
il revealed ceo, & les justices caused luy destre indicted accordant.”957 However, if the plea 
was general to the action, the action did lie “si soet trove culpable p[ur] indictm[en]t, & apres 
acquit sur son arraignm[en]t,” but it did not “si le p[ar]ty no soet acquit del crime, come n'est 
icy sur le ignoram[us], la ne gist, & le jury in ceo action ne luy acquit del treason, mes 
solem[en]t trove un malicio[us] p[ro]section.”958 And where “le p[ar]ty ad estre cleare, & 
legitimo modo acquietatus, n'est questio[n] forsq[ue] un conspiracy gist in case de treason, 
cy bien q[ue] in case de felony.”959  
And though the plea in this case did not seem to stand because “per verdict in cest 
action est trove que tout fuit sur malice,” the matter of fact was that “cest verdict [does] no 
acquitt luy de le indictment & pur ceo jeo pute, il parle dubiously que judgement no serra 
done, & action no gist.” But he did not believe that Lovet v Fawkner was a good precedent 
since “le judgement fuit estoppe pur misrecital del' statute.”960  
In conclusion, the court decided that the action could not lie without the acquittal of 
the plaintiff because the prosecution of treason was a matter of great importance and allowing 
it would discourage it for the reasons explained. And it was held that an ignoramus did not 
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clear the prisoner from suspicion and they could be held to further prosecution. It neither 
made the indicting jurors perjurers. However, they agreed that “p[ur] tiel p[ro]secution 
malicious, le p[ar]ty serra indite p[ur]le Roy.”961  
In this decision, Justices Robert Houghton and John Doddridge, along with Chief 
Justice James Ley, were sitting at the King’s Bench, but Thomas Chamberlain was absent. 
As Houghton died in 1624 and Chamberlain in 1625, and Ley stepped down in 1625, James 
Whitelocke, Willian Jones, and Randolph Crewe were appointed to replace them. Perhaps 
these changes encouraged the plaintiff to bring a new action upon the same grounds. All the 
defendants pleaded generally except Cranshaw who pleaded by way of justification that “le 
dit Sprat dit a luy, q[ue], le plaintiff ad dit ceux parols, & a discharge luy mesme del aspersion 
de concealement del treason, il accuse luy devant un justice, & ad luy arrest. Absque hoc, 
quod falso conspir. &c.”962 The jury found for the plaintiff and the verdict was moved in 
arrest of judgment again. 
 Like in the former action, it was objected that the action did not lie “si le accusation 
fuit pur felony,” because the plaintiff could not allege an acquittal. And that “coment action 
pur tiel accusation pur felony est bien maintenable tamen pur accusation pur treason il ne 
gist.”963 The reason the action was not sustainable in case of treason was that “quia c[eo] est 
un tender cas; quia si l'action serra maintainable, voil estre un terror al subject de prosecute 
un pur treason,” while at the same time “si le subject conceale le treason, donq[ue] est en 
danger d'estre an traytor.”964  
 The plaintiff’s counsellor argued that in cases of felony “un action sur le case en 
nature de conspiracy [gist] apr[es] ignoramus trove. A fortiore ad estre enditer del treason, q, 
est un pluis transcendent crime.” To this the defense replied that “treason concern le Roy, & 
le publiq[ue], state; & nemy folony [sic], mes solement le concerne d'un private person: et 
pur c[eo] le ley permitter en c[est]: case de felony, le party d'aver un action a remedier le tort 
fait a luy: mes nest ascun tiel action en case del treason.” As for Lovet v Fawkner, the 
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defendant’s counsellor argued that “la fuit un judgement en case de treason sur nihil dicit, & 
un breve d'enquire de damages, nul judgement fuit pur les dammages, quia nul president puit 
estre trove.”965  
 The court did not arrest judgment, and they held that the action lied. It seems that the 
justices had reached this conclusion through different ways966 though in the reports their 
opinions are not distinctively identified. The issues they addressed can be divided into three: 
Whether there was any precedent of actions against prosecutors of treason, and whether Lovet 
v Fawkner was a good precedent that it did not lie; whether the prosecution of treason was 
justifiable or not; and whether an action against a prosecutor could lie without previous 
acquittal of the plaintiff. Of course, the answers to these questions would depend on the 
different frames evoked. 
 With regards to the first issue, it was argued that among other sources the “statute de 
28 E. 1. & 33 E. 1. ne font ascun difference, sed ils parlont indefinite de conspiracy.”967 And 
the action in Lovet v Fawker was stayed because “il want le parol (falso), quia falso, & 
malitiose doient estre en le declaration, pur q, le declaration ta fuit male,”968 not because it 
was held that actions did not lie for accusation of treason.  
With regards to whether the prosecution of treason was justifiable, it was argued that 
the defendant “poet doner notice del' son conusans ou suspition, sed null est tenust de reveal 
ceo, que nest voyer neq[ue]; de accuse ascun de treason malitiose sans verity”969 And in this 
case it had been found that “fuit fait falso & malitiose de son mesme teste, & sans ascun 
ground,”970 and also “had sworn the matter thereof to be true, whereas it was false, and they 
knew it to be false.”971 For it was argued that if prosecutors could bring such actions without 
fear of any legal consequence “then no person would be safe…. and the parties endangered 
                                                 
965 Ib. 
966 Latch 79, 80; 82 ER 284; Jones W 93, 83 ER 48, 49; Cro Car 15, 16; 79 ER 618, 619. 
967 Jones W 93, 95; 83 ER 48, 49; see also Cro Car 15, 16; 79 ER 618; Latch 79, 80; 82 ER 284. 
968 Latch 79, 80; 82 ER 284, 
969 Jones W 93, 95; 83 ER 48, 50. 
970 Latch 79, 80; 82 ER 284. 
971 Cro Car 15, 16; 79 ER 618. 
294 
 
thereby should have no remedy.”972 Thus, the plea defeating justification would include 
malice, lack of suspicion, and falsehood. As for the relation between these three elements it 
was said that the action did not lie “si le prosecution soit falso sed nemy malitiose, sed tamen 
voyer, null action gist car malice, & bon informe & false information si malicious null 
punishment, mes lou contra cognitam veritatem falso & malitiose prosecute un pur son vie, 
& il receive losse pur ceo action gist.”973  
Finally, regarding the issue as to whether the action lay without the previous acquittal 
of the plaintiff, Jones argued that the action did lie because the writ of conspiracy was in 
affirmance of the common law that “false accusations & conspiracies concernant le vie d'un 
home al common ley fuit offence & injury al party coment null indictment fuit preferre.”974 
A different, formalistic argument was that “sont 2 briefs ou actions pur conspiracy, l'un le 
brief de conspiracy enserte en le register, & l'auter est un action sur le case, & si home port 
brief de conspiracy mention en le register il doit estre indicte & acquitte, & si ne soit acquitte 
null action gist.” And yet another argument was based on the harm caused the action, because 
“un endeavour falso & malitiose d'indicter home per que est grieve per imprisonment ou 
auterment coment que fuit un ignoramus sur ceo.” 975 
In Lovett v Fawkner, it was argued that prosecutors of treason were protected from 
civil actions as long as their accusations were grounded on suspicion, without malice, and 
they had been admitted by a grand jury. The way this was framed was through the plea of 
justification. The content of such plea within this frame of prosecution of treason was a 
general duty to reveal treasons grounded on the oath of alliance. The prosecution of treason, 
by the way, was framed as a matter concerning the security of the political community, by 
contrast to the prosecution of ordinary crime. Within this frame, as within the frames of 
prosecution of crime in general, the term malice as ‘ill will,’ appears as a replication to the 
plea of justification along with lying and lack of reasonable suspicion.  
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 The core of this idea was confirmed in Smith v Cranshaw, but there was still the issue 
of determining at what point of the prosecution prosecutors were liable to civil actions. In 
Lovett, it had been laid down that unsuccessful prosecutions were not liable. This conclusion 
had been reached by reasoning in terms of the writ of conspiracy. Thus, the issue was seen 
through the frame of the action of conspiracy and its acquittal requirement. After all, this new 
action was emerging from the blend of the frame of the writ of conspiracy with that of the 
action of defamation. It was suggested indeed that this was a new action different from the 
action of conspiracy in that there was no acquittal requirement, nor joint liability. However, 
in order to overcome this argument, others tried a frame shift. Thus, the frame of the action 
for defamation was evoked where the grounds were the damages because of the imputation. 
And also, the frame of planned wrongdoing was evoked, that is, framing the failed 
prosecution as a deliberate act in execution of a previous plan. Indeed, the plea of justification 
and the attempt are combined in the statement that “un serra charge fauxment, & 
malitiousment pur treason, c[eo] est un tort al Roy de traher le vie de son subject en question 
sans cause.”976  
4.4.6 PERJURY 
It is possible that lawyers also toyed with the idea of framing the failed prosecution 
as perjury, as prosecutors swore to the truth of the facts alleged in the bill of indictment. The 
frame can be viewed in the plaintiff’s allegations. In Knight v German (1587), it was alleged 
that the plaintiff exhibited a bill of indictment “et falso deposuit omnia in ea contenta fore 
vera.”977 In Arundell v Tregono (1608), the plaintiff declared that “the plaintiff at the same 
time affirmed the matter in the said bill contained to be true.”978 In William against Fletcher 
(1612) the defendant “preferred a bill of indictment against Willins for being a common 
barretor, and he was sworn before the justices of peace, that the matter in his bill contained 
was true.”979 In Hercott against Undehill (1615), Doddrige J remarked that the defendant 
“did exhibit his bill… and… he took a false oath.”980 In Payne against Porter (1619), the 
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action alleged that the defendant “exhibited it to the grand jury in the county of Nottingham, 
and affirmed the matter in the bill to be true, ubi revera it was false.”981 In an anonymous 
case cited in Wright v Black (1620), it was said that the defendant “exhibited a bill of 
indictment, containing that the plantiff did felloniously ravish the said Dorothie their 
daughter, and did give this in evidence to the grand jury.”982 In Smith v Cranshaw (1623), 
the action laid down that one of the defendants “jure malitiose & falso le dit indictment estre 
voier lou fuit faux.”983 
4.4.7 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACTION ON THE CASE 
 So far, we have seen how in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a 
new action on the case made its appearance in the common law courts to control prosecutors 
and protect innocents by giving a civil remedy to defendants in court. Specifically, these 
actions claimed damages against individual prosecutors, who brought bills of indictments 
that may or may not have been ignored or quashed. We have seen how this special case was 
framed by analogy to other existing forms of action in a blended space which drew from 
different input spaces, such as the frame of the writ of conspiracy, or the frame of defamation. 
Indeed, lawyers tried to bar or move forward this action drawing arguments from these input 
spaces, if not directly arguing that there was a remedy already. In other words, they basically 
thought of the new action in terms of an existing one. However, in the course of these 
arguments, and because of them, a new emergent structure or frame began to crystallize. This 
becomes apparent in the belief that this was a distinct form of action different from its models. 
Indeed, as we will see later, by the end of this period an even more general structure emerged, 
which unified the whole field of the procedures against prosecutors. This change, in point of 
fact, is most important to understand the changes that took place in the conceptual structure 
of conspiracy during this time.  
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 At first, courts took this action on the case to be derived from the writ of conspiracy, 
hence the expression action on the case in the nature of conspiracy to refer to it984 to import 
that it was a form of action identifiable by formal or procedural differences with the writ of 
conspiracy, but in all the rest governed by the same rules that governed the writ. Fitzherbert 
may have been the first to talk about some writs of conspiracy: “Writs of conspiracy grounded 
upon Disceit, and Trespass upon the Case; which are properly Actions of trespass upon the 
Case.”985 There is an intrinsic ambiguity in this passage that indicates that Fitzherbert did not 
know whether to put these cases in one category or another. As seen in the first chapter, the 
scope of medieval conspiracy was broader. As a matter of fact, it is not clear whether the 
cases of prosecution of trespass, forgery and deceit, and impersonation that Fitzherbert lists 
after this passage are to be considered actions on the case or writs of conspiracy. All this 
indicates that probably no one before Fitzherbert had referred to a trespass on the case986 on 
the basis of the writ of conspiracy.  
 In any event, at the opening of the section about the writ of conspiracy, as Fitzherbert 
describes the form of this writ, he adds by way of commentary that:  
This writ lieth against two Persons at the least who do so conspire; for if one Person 
of Malice and false Imagination do labour and cause another falsely to be indicted, 
the Party who is so indicted, shall have a Writ of Conspiracy, &c. but an Action upon 
the Case against him who so caused him to be falsely indicted.987  
Hence, in this passage he suggests not only that the action on the case derives from 
the writ of conspiracy, but that the main difference between them is a formal variation. The 
writ is limited to joint defendants, but the action can be brought against individual ones. But 
it seems that both share the previous acquittal of the plaintiff requirement. In other words, it 
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is suggested that the action on the case had been born to give remedy to this situation which 
was not redressed on merely technical grounds.  
How should we understand the passage above in the light of this one? The action on 
the case described here is much narrower than the one described above and which was 
supposed to be grounded on specific harms such as deceit and trespass (used in a general 
sense). One explanation is that maybe Fitzherbert is trying to make this action on the case 
look a little older that it was. Precedents of actions of conspiracy against a single defendant 
dated back to a few decades only. Maybe Fitzherbert thought that these precedents were 
related to earlier fourteenth and fifteenth precedents of writs of conspiracy where the gist was 
not the procurement of a false indictment.988 Thus, by making this action on the case of 
conspiracy to look older that it probably was he gave it the texture of a form of action. Indeed, 
in a subsequent passage he combines both ideas: “if the Writ of Conspiracy be brought 
against two, then it shall be said properly a Writ of Conspiracy. But if it be brought against 
one Person only, then it is but an Action upon the Case upon the Falsity and Deceit done, 
because one Person cannot conspire with himself.”989  
However, it might be, the case-law shows how courts entertained this idea that there 
was an action on the case of conspiracy based on this formal distinction. Thus, in Shotbolt’s 
Case (1586), Clench J opined that “there was no difference betwixt an action on the case, 
and a conspiracie, in such case, but onely this, that a conspiracy ought to be by two at the 
least; and an action upon the case may lie against one.”990 In Knight v German (1587), Wray 
CJ argued that “if two conspire maliciously to exhibit an indictment, and the party be 
acquitted, he shall have a conspiracy; so when one doth it, this action upon the case lieth.”991 
In that case Coke agreed that, “as a writ of conspiracy lieth against two, so here against 
one.”992 In Throgmorton's Case (1597), referring to the writ of conspiracy, Anderson and 
Beaumond explained that “where two or more conspire together to procure one to be indicted 
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of felony or trespass, and he is afterwards acquitted, it shall be intended by law to be 
maliciously done, for which conspiracy lies; but no action lies, where only one prefers a bill 
of indictment.”993 Now, since there is no mentioning of an alternative form of action for this 
circumstance, it follows that they did not believe this action stood in court. In Marsh against 
Vauhan and Veal (1599), on the issue of whether the writ should abate on account that one 
of the two defendants was found not guilty of conspiracy, the court laid that “a writ of 
conspiracy lies not, nor is maintainable upon this verdict. But an action upon the case, in 
nature of a conspiracy, might have been brought in this case.”994 In Lovet v Faulkner (1614), 
Coke cited Knight v German (1597) as “the first case, of an action upon the case brought for 
a conspiracie, and in that case it was ruled, that the writ of the conspiracy lieth not, but in 
case where two do conspire; and if onely one, then an action upon the case, in the nature of 
a writ of conspiracy lyeth.”995 In Smith v Cranshaw & Alios (1625), the Court laid down that 
“un brief de conspiracy ne gist vers un, car un ne poet solment conspire, car le brief de 
conspiracy ayant un precise forme ne poet estre extende ultra le forme, sed le action sur le 
case nest lye al ascun precise forme, mes est destre frame come le matter require ideo gist, 
coment que un solment fait.”996 In Skinner v Gunton and Lyon (1670), the defendant argued 
in arrest of judgment that “it is an action of conspiracy, which doth not lie against one only”997 
. The defendant replied that “albeit onely one be found guilty… this being an action sur case 
in nature of a conspiracy, and not a conspiracy at common-law.”998 It was held that “this is 
but an action sur case and no formed action it is sufficient, as Marsh and Vaughan 3 Cr. 701, 
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& F. N. B. albeit onely Gunton is found guilty, which the Court agreed”999 Furthermore, it 
added that “the writs being the same, it's one or the other, as the plaintiff titles it, albeit the 
word conspiracy be used.”1000 Morton J dissented because he “was of opinion that it was an 
action of conspiracy.”1001 The reporter noted that “it seems to me that the plaintiff ought not 
to have had judgment in this case, because it appears to be a formed action of conspiracy by 
these words, namely, per conspirationem inter eos habitam.  And the verdict has falsified the 
declaration; because by the acquittal of all the defendants but one, the verdict has in effect 
found that it was not by conspiracy, as the plaintiff has declared.” (ibidem, note). Finally, in 
Pollard against Evans and Others (1680), it was raised in arrest of judgment that “it appears 
the declaration is false; for a conspiracy cannot be in or by one, but between two at the least.” 
The court resolved that “in a writ of conspiracy it is true, but in an action of the case it is 
otherwise; and though this be like the other, yet it is not the same.”1002 In sum, as March put 
it “if two falsly and malitiously conspire to indict another, and after hee that is so indicted, is 
acquitted, a Writ of conspiracy lyes. So if one only falsly and malitiously cause another to 
bee indicted, who is therupon acquitted, an action upon the case in nature of a conspiracy.”1003 
Given this connection with the writ of conspiracy from which the new action on the 
case seemed to be derived, it was all but logical that lawyers and judges thought that maybe 
that pesky acquittal requirement of the writ was the other formal difference that distinguished 
writ from action. Or to put it in other words, it might also be the case that this new remedy 
fixed that problem allowing a tighter control of prosecution. All in all, there were now more 
ways to screen prosecutors. 
In any event, we find traces of this idea that the action on the case derives from the 
writ by suppressing the acquittal requirement in the case-law. The issue as to whether the 
acquittal of the party was necessary for this action to lie was long debated. Here there were 
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two main options: either to make it necessary or to consider that the action on the case was 
indeed a solution to that problem of the writ, or to come up with a different rationale 
altogether as will be seen later.  
At first, courts seemed reluctant to depart from the form of the writ other than in the 
plurality requirement. In Lovet v Faulkner (1614), Coke CJ, commenting on Knight v 
Germin, said that it was “the first case here now brought, of this nature, ad generalem gaolao 
deliberationem, if it be not expressed in the declaration, quod legitimo modo acquietatus, no 
writ of conspiracy, nor yet any action upon the case lyeth.”1004 In Cranbancks Case (1618), 
Doddrige said in an obiter that “que home poet aver action sur le case sur faux conspiracy 
d'indicter home coment que il ne soit acquitted, mes conspiracy ne gist, si non que il soit 
indicted & acquitted.”1005 In Wright vs Black and Black (1620), it was moved in arrest of 
judgment that the action did not lie “because the indictment was not found.” The counsellor 
for the plaintiff replied that “the plantiff here may not have a writ of conspiracy, for the 
indictment was not found, but yet if we should admit that he may have a writ of conspiracy, 
yet he may as this case is have an action upon the case at his election,” implying that the 
action lied without acquittal where the writ did not.1006 In Smith v Cranshaw (1622), the Chief 
Justice laid that “conspiracy ne gist, si home ne soit legittimo mode acquietatus, issint quo il 
doit estre indict, & auxi acquitte, mes action sur le case gist coment que il fuit indict.”1007 Yet 
Doddrige again disagreed, for when “le indictee nest acquitt per verdict, mes le jury trove 
ignoramus issint que il est subject still al auter indictment.”1008 Likewise, Houghton J said 
that “que action ne gist, quia est trove un ignoram[us] solem[en]t, q[ue] ne acquit le 
pl[ein]t[if]… mes est lyable a ceo, p[ur] q[ue] intant q[ue]n'est acquit de ceo, n'avera 
action.”1009 However, when the case was revived, the Court laid that “Et touts disont que sont 
2 briefs ou actions pur conspiracy, l'un le brief de conspiracy enserte en le register, & l'auter 
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est un action sur le case, & si home port brief de conspiracy mention en le register il doit 
estre indicte & acquitte, & si ne soit acquitte null action gist… sed si home port action sur le 
case il est sufficient coment que null acquitall.”1010 In Skinner vs Gunton, Lyon, and Leason 
(1670), it was argued in arrest of judgment that “it was not alleged by the plaintiff in his 
declaration, that the plaint levied in the compter was determined either by nonsuit, or by 
discontinuance, or verdict against the plaintiff there; for otherwise the plaintiff hath 
commenced his action too soon. As in an action upon the case, or conspiracy, for falsely 
indicting one of felony, the plaintiff should shew that he was acquitted of the indictment 
before he can bring his action.”1011 The Court laid “that perhaps it might have been material 
upon a demurrer… [but after verdict] now it may be intended that the plaint was determined; 
but they did not regard whether it was determined or not; for if the defendant would have had 
advantage thereof, he ought to shew it, but he has passed it over by his plea of not guilty.”1012 
In Pollard against Evans and Others (1680), it was laid that “in a writ of conspiracy, it must 
be alledged that the party was legitimo modo acquietatus inde, and shew that it was a fair 
acquittal. But this action will lie for such a malicious prosecution where the jury find an 
ignoramus.”1013 
Another formal distinction that could be made to explain the action on the case as an 
offshoot of the writ of conspiracy was the nature of the indictment. Thus, in Skinner v Gunton 
and Lyon (1670), it was said that “albeit the writs of conspiracy and this action by bill be the 
same in form, yet when this is but on a trespass it's action sur case.”1014  
Likewise, the remedy given was another way of formally distinguishing the writ of 
conspiracy from the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy. In Cranbacks Case (1618) 
                                                 
1010 Smith v Cranshaw & Alios (1625) Jones W 93, 83 ER 49-50; “si un home soit endite de felony fauxment, 
conspiracy gist apres acquittal, & un action sur le case en nature de conspiracy apr[es] ignoramus trove.” Smith 
v Crashaw (1625): Latch 79; 82 ER 284; “acc[i]on de conspiracy ne g[is]t sinon q[ue] le p[ar]ty soit legittimo 
modo acquietatus. Mes acc[i]on snr [sur] le case g[is]t s[an]s ceo,” Smith v Crashaw (1625) Benl 152, 73 ER 
1019. 
1011 1 Wms. Saund. 228-9; 85 ER 249-250. 
1012 1 Wms Saund 228, 229; 85 ER 249, 251. 
1013 2 Show KB 50-51; 89 ER 786. 
1014 2 Keble 476, 84 ER 298; “and according to the offence, if felony, conspiracy; if but trespass, action sur 
case,” 2 Keble 497, 84 ER 312. 
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it was noted that “le judgement sur action del' conspiracy est villanous judgement, & icy le 
plaintiff est lie in action sur le case come appiert per le bill, & sur ceo il avera judgemen.”1015  
Another way to look at this action was to think that it derived from defamation, and 
that therefore it was an action for damages as consequence of a false imputation of an offence. 
In Pescod v Marcham (1607), it was explicitly laid by the court that “it is good without 
saying, legitimo modo acquietatus, in an action upon the case, which lies as well before as 
after the acquital, for the infamie by the indictment.”1016 In Wright vs Black and Black (1620), 
Hobert CJ argued that “it is as great a slander to preferre a bill of indictment to the grand 
jury, and to give this in evidence to them, as it is to declare that in an ale house… and the 
indictment in writing, and the preferring that to the grand jury containes the scandal: and I 
am of opinion that an action upon the case lyes well.”1017 The conflict between the two views 
of the action arose in Manning and his Wife v Fitzherbert (1633), where it was objected that 
the action could not lie because it “join actions for words and in nature of a conspiracy 
together.” The Court in fact tended to interpret it as an action for words where the other 
allegations were “not in nature of a conspiracy, but an aggravation of the false and malicious 
accusation.”1018 This latter case shows how the view that this was an action for damages, 
provided that the intention and the absence of a reasonable cause of prosecution was proved, 
would explain why this action began to be called malicious prosecution 1019The name that 
would become in the end the name of this form of action.  
Indeed, the view that this was an action for damages as a consequence of words 
imputing an offence ultimately carried the day. The idea became fixed as Holt attempted to 
draw a theory on the rationale of this action based on a substantive analysis rather than a 
mere formal comparison between actions in Savile v Roberts (1698). The central idea was 
that “that this action is not grounded upon the conspiracy, but upon the damage, and therefore 
                                                 
1015 2 Rolle 50, 81 ER 652. 
1016 Noy 117, 74 ER 1081. 
1017 Winch 28, 29; 124 ER 24, 25. 
1018 Cro Car 271; 79 ER 836. 
1019 John Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh v George Blake (1661) Hadre 194, 197; 145 ER 447; 449; 
Pollard against Evans and Others (1680) 2 Show KB 51, 89 ER 786. 
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the plaintiff must prove his damages, otherwise the action will not lie.”1020 He then proceeded 
to sketch a tripartite classification of the types of damages that supported the action: “the 
damage to a man's fame, as if the matter whereof he is accused be scandalous… such as are 
done to the person as where a man is put in danger to lose his life, or limb, or liberty… [and] 
damage to a man's property, as where he is forced to expend his money in necessary charges, 
to acquit himself of the crime of which he is accused.”1021  
With this classification, Holt was not only providing a rationale for this action on the 
case, but also a general category of action for damages as a consequence of prosecution, 
which embraced both the writ of conspiracy and this action. The writ was conceived as an 
action grounded on the damages to the person. In other words, this allowed for a substantive 
distinction between the writ and action forms in that the former “lies only for procuring a 
man to be indicted of treason or felony, where life was in danger.” This meant the action on 
the case was not conceived as deriving from the writ, but rather both as deriving from a 
common foundation.1022  
Holt’s classification was confirmed, and his analysis in terms of damages by Parker 
CJ in Jones v Gwynn (1714). There, indeed, Parker rejected this analogy between action and 
writ for  
There is no arguing from one sort of action to the other. —Actions of conspiracy are 
the worst sort of actions in the world to be argued from; for there is more contrariety 
and repugnancy of opinions in them than in any other species of actions whatever… 
[writ of] Conspiracy lies not without acquittal; and the reason of this, and the only 
one, is, because this is a formed action, and the form of the writ in the register is so… 
There is certainly no arguing from an action which is a formed one, for which there 
is a formal writ in the register, to an action upon the case, that is died down to no form 
at all.1023  
Thus, in Parker’s view, the action on the case was completely independent 
from the writ. It did not make sense to continue to reason as if it were like the writ in 
                                                 
1020 Savile v Roberts (1699): 3 Salked 16; 91 ER 664. 
1021 1 Ld Raym 374, 378; 91 ER 1148, 1149-50. 
1022 However, at the same time, Holt mustered Fitzherbert’s formal argument that writ and action “are founded 
upon one common foundation, but the number of the parties defendants determines it to the one or to the other, 
”1 Ld Raym 374, 379; 91 ER 1148, 1150. 
1023 10 Mod 214, 218-9; 91 ER 699. 701. 
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all but some elements. Besides, as Holt had laid down, both belonged to the same 
type of actions for damages as a consequence of prosecution. 1024 
This view that writ and action were remedies deriving from the same substantive 
foundation, as a consequence of the blend in this action, can be seen much earlier. As seen, 
under this view, the writ of conspiracy becomes an action that remedies the imprisonment 
and/or compensates the risk to life that they had undergone. This view of the prosecution as 
putting at risk the life and the writ as a remedy transpires from other cases.1025  
In keeping with this idea, it should be noted that the development of this action on 
the case changed the way scholars thought about the writ of conspiracy. It was now framed 
as an action for harm because of the imputation of an offence limited to prosecutors who 
could not justify their imputations. Thus, though neither Staunford nor Coke mentioned the 
action on the case in their treatises, the influence is manifest. Staunford integrated the lack 
of justification in his definition of the form of the writ of conspiracy, so that “cestuy qui serra 
charge in conspiracy, duist estre charge que il ceo fist faulxement & maliciousement sans 
ascun bon foundacion.”1026 Likewise, Coke held that “in a writ of conspiracy… [one] should 
recover damages for satisfaction in regard of the infamy, imprisonment, and vexation 
done.”1027 And in explaining the punishment of conspirators by criminal procedure he says 
that one of the reasons for instituting the villainous judgment was that the prosecution 
involved perjury and was “under pretence of justice and by course of law, which was 
                                                 
1024 Despite this view, as late as 1766, lawyers were still drawing analogies with the writ of conspiracy. Thus, 
in Farmer v Darling (1766), it was said that in the action on the case “as in a writ of conspiracy, falsity is 
necessary to be charged,” 4 Burr 1972, 98 ER 27. This is consistent with Holt’s view of the action on the case 
as action for consequential damages by contrast to trespass as action for direct damage 
1025 For instance, Saunders believed that “conspiracy lies for divers other matters than for false or malicious 
indictments, where the life of a person is put in jeopardy.” Skinner vs Gunton, Lyon, and Leason (1670): 1 
Wms. Saund. 228, 229; 85 ER 249, 250. Cf. with the substantive analysis of the defendant’s counselor in John 
Vanderbergh and James Vanderbergh (1661), who argued that “it is a rule in law, to which all the books agree, 
that an action upon the case or an action of conspiracy lies for a false and malicious prosecution, upon which 
the plaintiff is acquitted or ignoramus found; and the reason is because now it appears there was no cause for 
it: the party that was molested being now by judgment of the court or other due proceedings of law acquitted or 
discharged ; and therefore the law allows him recompence for such unjust vexation,” Hadre 194, 196; 145 ER 
447, 449. 
1026 Staunford PC Liber 3 173 E 
1027 2 Inst 381. 
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instituted for the protection and defense of the innocent.”1028 Furthermore, the idea that what 
distinguished the writ from other actions is that it compensated the risk the plaintiff 
underwent can be seen in that the writ of conspiracy was now described as an action in cases 
“concerning life,”1029 because if the accusers “had attainted the innocent, he should have lost 
his life… his lands, his goods, and his posterity.”1030    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1028 3 Inst 143. 
1029 2 Inst 561. 
1030 3 Inst 143. 
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5. THE REARRANGEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
5.1 CONSPIRACY IN THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 
  The development of this new form of action was not only the result of the common 
law litigation. As we will see, the Court of Star Chamber also played an important role as it 
opened its own forum to the same kind of complaints that were reaching the common law 
courts, offering its own remedy against failed prosecutions. When it came to framing these 
cases, the same analogies mapped these complaints, and the same kinds of arguments were 
raised to defeat or bolster them.  
However, before even engaging in these issues, actions had to overcome the threshold 
of the Court, and for that some watchwords were necessary. Determining the Star Chamber’s 
jurisdiction over these cases was peremptory. And this was not a minor issue that lawyers 
had to raise in court, for there was a long tradition of dealing with prosecutors in the common 
law courts through the writ and the indictment of conspiracy. There were two approaches as 
to how the Star Chamber could offer a remedy for failed prosecutions. It could, for instance, 
assume that it had cognizance of ordinary cases of conspiracy, and then go on to extend this 
jurisdiction to new cases such as failed or individual prosecutions. As we will see, this path 
would lead to frame these new facts either as a special case of the writ of conspiracy or as 
leading to an action for consequential damages to an innocent’s reputation.1031 However, it 
could also frame these cases so that their facts amounted to offenses known to be within the 
purview of the Star Chamber, such as subornation of perjury, forgery, or inchoative crimes. 
The result of this second alternative would mean a deep change in the structure of conspiracy, 
as one of its peripheral forms would end up structuring the whole category.  
5.1.1 ANALOGY WITH THE WRIT OF CONSPIRACY 
As mentioned above, it seems that, at least for some authors, the Court of Star 
Chamber assumed that the jurisdiction over cases of what would amount to an action on the 
case derived from its jurisdiction over cases of conspiracy. From that point of view, the 
misdemeanor the court punished was modelled in purely formal terms as a special case of 
conspiracy, distinguished from the form of conspiracy in the variation of certain 
                                                 
1031 In turn, this blended space would consolidate as a new form of action. 
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requirements. There is no better example of this opinion than Hudson’s description of the 
court’s jurisdiction over “conspiracy and false accusation.” Indeed, the use of these two 
expressions seems to designate the classical view of conspiracy as encoded in the writ of 
conspiracy, and the variations of the action of the case.  
 Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, Hudson notes that in Rochester v Solm (1600), 
Coke believed “after his acquittal he was to prefer his indictment at the common law, where 
conspirators were to have their villaines judged.”1032 He thus implied that no suit could be 
brought to the Star Chamber for conspiracy. However, Egerton affirmed the jurisdiction of 
the Star Chamber over cases of conspiracy “manifesting that notwithstanding the party might 
have his indictment, yet that excludeth not the court of jurisdiction.”1033 And, although 
Egerton’s opinion was expressed in a relatively recent case, Hudson argued that this 
jurisdiction was exercised as early as the reign of Henry VIII, with several cases to prove 
it.1034  He then added that, though “this court hath jurisdiction in all cases of conspiracy where 
the common law hath any… [it also has jurisdiction] in divers cases further than the common 
law.”1035 These were cases in “which there appears no indictment or acquittal,” and where 
“one man falsely accuse [sic] another.”1036 That is, they are the same type of cases that would 
develop the frame of the action on the case of conspiracy as an action devised to overcome 
the acquittal and plurality requirement.  
I will turn now to those elements of the blended space that are the result of the 
mapping of the form of action of the writ onto the facts. It should be recalled that, as this 
blended space tended to include facts that not only did not match the writ, but were 
inconsistent with it, in time, courts began to think of this blend not as within the periphery of 
the writ of conspiracy but as a category of actions itself, an action on the case. And it should 
                                                 
1032 Hudson TSC, 204. 
1033 Hudson TSC, 104. 
1034 Hudson TSC 106. See also the Tudor cases cited in 9 Co Rep 57a, 73 ER 815; and in Moore (KB) 817, 77 
ER 924. Since the punishment of the criminal conspiracy involved forfeiture of land, one may wonder whether 
extending the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber to this offence did not violate its jurisdictional limitations to 
misdemeanors, HLC 564. 
1035 Hudson TSC 106. 
1036 Ib.  
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be also mentioned that this would be a double scope blend.1037 As we will see later, some of 
the facts of the base space will be projected onto the blend and then mapped onto different 
frames.  
I will show next how the facts of the cases that came before the Star Chamber were 
mapped onto the frame of the writ of conspiracy, and how the blended space resulting from 
these projections allowed lawyers to draw inferences as to the cases they were arguing about. 
The previous agreement of the formula of the writ appears among the facts declared 
in several cases before the Star Chamber. In Remington & al. v Allen & al. Pasc. (1625), the 
defendants “by Conspiracy met together, and procur'd an Indictment of Barratry against the 
Plaintiffs.”1038 In Bacon v Boulton & al (1631), the defendants “by like Conspiracy and 
Agreement… preferred… an Indictment.”1039 
However, the previous agreement does not seem to imply the doctrine developed by 
the courts that there had to be at least two defendants for the action to stand. As has been 
mentioned in passing, paralleling the contemporary development of the action on the case in 
the nature of conspiracy, Hudson says that at the Star Chamber, suits could be brought against 
a sole defendant. Indeed, there are several cases brought against a sole defendant, but the 
issue as to the plurality requirement was never raised by them.1040  
 As in the action on the case, wrongful prosecution mostly meant complaining before 
a JP and being detained and bound to appear before court as a consequence of it. In the 
Poulterers’ Case (1610), the defendant complained of having been “apprehended, examined, 
and bound to appear at the assises in Essex.”1041 In Monk v Blackburn & al., the defendants 
                                                 
1037 Fauconnier and Turner, Think,131-5  
1038 SCR 1-4. 
1039 SCR 28-34. 
1040 See the cases cited in Hudson TSC 104-106, Moore (KB) 816, 817, 77 ER 924 and 9 Co Rep 55b, 57a; 73 
ER 813, 815 another case against a sole defendant is Floyd v Barker (1608) 12 Co Rep 23, 77 ER 1305. 
Interestingly enough, Robert Scarlet’s Case (1612) 12 Co Rep 98, 77 ER 1373 resembled the early writs of 
conspiracy’s allegations of corruption as there was a sole defendant who was said to have been “by confederacy 
betwixt him and the clerk, procured himself to be sworn of the said grand inquest.” 
1041 9 Co Rep. 55b, 73 ER 813. 
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fabricated evidence that led to a warrant, the examination and the imprisonment of the 
plaintiff.1042 
 The wrongful prosecution was framed as procured. It should be recalled that the term 
procurement could be used to evoke several different frames inheriting from the meaning to 
cause someone to do something. Indeed, these frames appear sometimes evoked by the term 
procurement, sometimes by other terms. The main consequence thus is that the wrongful 
prosecution is always presented as something that the defendants procure or cause to be by 
their agreement. This way of framing the wrongful prosecution also appears in the actions 
brought before the Star Chamber. In the Poulterers’ Case (1611), it appears as misleading or 
deceiving a public officer or a jury into doing something unlawful by crafting a false 
accusation, so the defendants were said to have intended “to procure him to be indicted, 
arraigned, adjudged, and hanged,” and they “procured divers warrants of justices of 
peace.”1043 In Remington & Al. v Allen & al. (1625), the defendants were alleged to have 
“procur’d and Indictment of Barratry against the Plaintiffs.”1044 In Tyler v Towlin & al., the 
defendants “procured a Warrant for him from a Justice of Peace,” and after the accuser 
retracted, again “they procured another Warrant against him, and got him bound over to 
answer it at the Assizes, where they procured a Bill of Indictment to be preferred against 
him.”1045  
Procurement could also mean corruption or abetment of another person. The 
subornation of witnesses not only was in analogy of the writ of conspiracy, but also brought 
the case within the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber as this court was responsible for the 
punishment of the subornation of witnesses. In Anthony Ashley’s Case (1611), the defendants 
were said to have been suborned by another defendant to accuse the plaintiff of murder “and 
that he should procure witnesses to convict the plaintiff of murder.” In Phips Cler. v Eyres 
& al. 1046(1631), the defendants were said to have, “by Persuasions, Promises of Reward, and 
                                                 
1042 SCR 28-34. 
1043 9 Co Rep 55b, 73 ER 813. 
1044 SCR 1-4. 
1045 SCR 15-20.  
1046 12 Co Rep 90, 91, 77 ER 1366, 1367. 
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Solicitations, … procured… [the defendants] to consent, to accuse the Plaintiff of a 
Rape.”1047 In Lord Wentworth, Lord Deputy of Ireland, against the Lord Mountnorris, Sir 
Pierce Crosby and others (1639), the defendant was said to have “stirred up… [one of the 
defendants] to prosecute [the plaintiff]” and offered her money to maintain the suit.1048 
Corruption is not explicitly mentioned but implied in Robert Scarlet’s Case (1612), where 
the defendant was said to have “procured himself to be sworn of the… grand inquest.”1049 In 
Monk v Blackburn & al. (1632), there rather was abetment, as one of the defendants was said 
to have “procured the other Defendants to insert treasonable words [in some intercepted 
letters], and scandalous matter against the Lord Gray and cunningly drop'd one of those 
Letters in a Market-Town, so as it might come to her hands again, and then carried them to 
the said Lord Gray.”1050  
 Some cases in the Star Chamber included the allegation of the previous acquittal of 
the plaintiff.1051 Other cases were brought where there was no acquittal alleged.1052 The issue 
as to whether the previous acquittal was a requisite to bring a suit for conspiracy before the 
Star Chamber was raised several times, revealing the analogy with the writ. Thus, in 
Sydenham against Keilaway (1574), where the question had been raised, Popham J. conceded 
that “where two conspire to indict one falsely, and the party is not indicted, because the jury 
had not sufficient evidence, but returned an ignoramus upon the bill, no conspiracy lies, 
because he never was indicted nor acquitted,” and tried to argue against it.1053 Likewise, the 
objection was raised in the Poulterers’ Case (1611) that “no writ of conspiracy for the party 
grieved, or indictment or other suit for the King lies, but where the party grieved is indicted, 
                                                 
1047 SCR 20-28. 
1048 HC 885-946. 
1049 12 Co Rep 98, 77 ER 1373. 
1050 SCR 28-34. 
1051 Muck’s Case, Hamersley v Shappard cit. in Moore (KB) 817; Rochester v Solm (1600) Hudson TSC 
104,105; Remington & al. versus Allen & al. (1625) SCR 1-4; Tayler versus Tolwyn & al. (1628) SCR 15-20, 
Bacon ver. Boulton & al. (1631) SCR 28-34. 
1052 Cuther Laughton vs Palin and Blackwell (1516) cit. in Hudson TSC 106; Constance v John Young (1527) 
ib.; Beverly versus Power & al. Pasc. (1625) SCR 1-4. 
1053 Cro Jac 8, 79 ER 7. 
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and legitimo modo,”1054 and in Sir Anthony Ashley's Case (1611) “by the law, conspiracy lies 
when a man is indicted, and legitimo modo acquietatus: but here he was never indicted.”1055 
We will see later how the Court of Star Chamber got around this objection by mapping these 
facts onto a different frame, thus changing the structure of the offence of conspiracy.  
5.1.2 ANALOGY WITH DEFAMATION 
Another way to bring failed prosecutions or prosecutions of lesser offences within the 
purview of the Star Chamber was to frame them as cases of slander.1056 In his treatise, Hudson 
explained that cases in which “life was not in jeopardy” because the indictment was 
insufficient or because the accusation was of trespass, a suit lies at the Star Chamber because 
“that tendenth to the utter ruin of a man’s reputation, which is as carefully preserved in this 
court as life itself.”1057  
There is some evidence of this way of framing the case in several cases. For one thing, 
failed prosecutions were cases of imputations out of court clearly within slander, and in Lee 
Case it seems that there was a false spreading of rumors with no bringing of charges.1058 
Some cases, like Dr. Peterson Deacon of Exeter v Travers Cler. & al Michael (1632) SCR 
4-53, were based on a conspiracy to accuse the plaintiff of an ecclesiastical offence. 
Sometimes defamation was mentioned by name, as in Beverly versus Power & al. Pasc. 
(1625) SCR 1-4 a deserted false prosecution was punished by the Star Chamber as a “meer 
Libel and Scandal.”  
The high-profile case of Lord Wentworth, Lord Deputy of Ireland, against the Lord 
Mountnorris, Sir Pierce Crosby and others (1639) HC 885-946, on the verge of civil war, 
further illustrates not only the connection between slander, but also how conspiracy could be 
used to frame a false accusation as a form of attempt of homicide.1059 The defendants were 
                                                 
1054 9 Co Rep 55b, 56a; 73 ER 813. 
1055 12 Co Rep 90, 92; 77 ER 1366, 1368. 
1056 For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber over defamation see 8 HEL 333-338; 5 HEL 208-
212. 
1057 Hudson TSC, 106-107. 
1058 Hudson TSC 106. 
1059 For more see later. 
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charged “for raising and divulging Scandals of the Lord Deputy of Ireland, giving out as if 
he was guilty of the death of one Esmond, proceeding from Sir Pierce Crosby's malice, who 
drew unto his Confederacy the other Defendents; who all repining at the Lord Deputy, 
resolv'd generally to make use of the death of one Esmond a sick and infirm man.” They were 
additionally accused of having approached Esmond’s wife and “got her into their 
Confederacy, and tell her, The Complaints will be well received in England, offering her 
1000 l. to come over.”  
Summing up, Pierce Crosby had been charged firstly of plotting with others that they 
would have Esmond’s wife come to England to complain that on being charged with 
contempt for refusing to take aboard the King’s timber, Esmond was brought before Lord 
Wentworth, and that the latter struck him with a cane with such intensity that Esmond would 
had died some time later as a consequence of the wounds. Secondly, Crosby was charged of 
spreading the rumor that this had happened and that a complaint was being made.  
After examining the evidence, the court had a diversity of opinions as to the grounds 
on which to punish the defendants. Lord Cottington’s held that “Pierce Crosby endeavour'd 
to draw this scandalous Accusation upon this Lord, and hath bin a Publisher of it,” and the 
many of the other defendants “guilty of spreading this Scandal.” Lord Chief Justice Finch 
thought it to be “a Conspiracy to raise a Scandal, to bring my Lord Deputy in question, both 
in his Honour, Life, and Fortune,” however, considering that there was “a single Testimony 
in the main point for the Conspiracy,” he could not bring himself to “condemn any of them 
of a Conspiracy, or of a Practice with others, to raise this Scandal ab origine, to bring my 
Lord Deputy in danger of his Life.” But he thought there was sufficient proof of the slander. 
Sir Thomas Jermain saw no plot and only slander, which was “the greater, because it was 
against a great man.” Juxton, Bishop of London and Lord Treasurer found the slander and 
that Pierce Crosby “is a great Delinquent, if not a Plotter; Yet a subtil, industrious and diligent 
Labourer in the Prosecution. If it took no effect, it was no Fault of his.” Lord Archbishop of 
Canterbury believed that Lord Wentworth had done the right thing in bringing the matter to 
the Star Chamber because “the Report was spread so far and so high, that if it had bin suffered 
[sic] to have lain asleep, it might have endangered my Lord Deputy, and his Posterity after 
him,” and that this way “the Innocency of my Lord Deputy might the more clearly appear” 
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(the clearing function of defamation should be recalled here). He found “the Defendents… 
guilty of a grievous, malicious, and dangerous Scandal; and whether true or false it is no 
matter, for it stands against the Foundation of all Law, that if the thing were true, yet they are 
scandalous Reports.” And added that “if such a thing shall go unpunish'd, or with a light 
Punishment, no man in his Place can live in Safety of his Life, Honour, and Fortune.” Lord 
Keeper concurred with Lord Archbishop of Canterbury that “it was necessary for him in the 
point of his Honour, for I am very confident, that had he not taken that way, this Rumour and 
Calumny had spread so far, that of necessity it would have required him at last for his Safety 
to do this.” And he found the slander.  
But perhaps the best evidence of the analogy with action defamation as well as 
ecclesiastical defamation was the use of repentance as one of the wide range of remedies and 
punishments with which this court visited those convicted of conspiracy.1060 As in 
ecclesiastical defamation, the court sometimes bound defendants to show repentance in 
public places. In Tayler v Tolwyn & al. (1628) SCR 15-20, some defendants were bound “to 
acknowledge their Offences, and ask the Plaintiff forgiveness at the Assizes.” In Phips Cler. 
v Eyres & al. Hil. (1631) SCR 20-28, they were bound “to acknowledge their Offence, and 
ask the Plaintiff forgiveness in his Parish-Church.” In Dr. Peterson Deacon of Exeter v 
Travers Cler. & al Michael. 8 Car. (1632) SCR 44-53, the defendants were sentenced to the 
pillory and “there to make an acknowledgment, and ask the Plaintiff forgiveness.” 
Furthermore, the court continued the practice in cases of defamation of giving damages in 
addition to punishment.1061 
5.1.3 UNJUSTIFIED PROSECUTION 
 While establishing its jurisdiction over failed prosecutions, the court of Star Chamber 
jurisdiction also discussed the issue as to when prosecutors were justified in bringing charges 
and free from liability from any wrong they might have caused to the other party. This further 
illustrates the connection between the development of conspiracy in the Star Chamber and 
                                                 
1060 On the extrajudicial power of this ritual of public repentance, which could even be negotiated 
extrajudicially, see the Poulterers Case below. 
1061 See Beverly versus Power & al. Pasc. (1625) SCR 1-4; Monk versus Blackburn & al.; Conspiracy to accuse 
the Plaintiff of Treason. Hill. 6 Car. (1632) SCR 28-34; Dr. Peterson Deacon of Exeter versus Travers Cler. & 
al Michael. (1632) SCR 44-53; Lord Wentworth’s Case (1639) HC 885-946. 
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that parallel of the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy in common law courts. We 
shall see how justification appeared in the cases brought.  
 The allegation that prosecutor acted upon malice and without reasonable cause is a 
constant in the Star Chamber cases. In Palin and Blackenball Case (1516) Hudson TSC 106, 
the defendants were sentenced for they did “maliciously and without cause reasonable” 
accuse the defendant. In Sir Anthony Ashley's Case (1611) 12 Co Rep 90, 77 ER 1366 the 
motives of the defendant for procuring the false indictment of the plaintiff were duly 
explained in that there was a previous land dispute between them in which the defendant had 
not been able to prevail. As the conspiracy moved forwards by means of a petition to the 
King, it was certified that there was a “false conspiracy to indict Sir Anthony without any 
just ground. The false juror in Robert Scarlet's Case (1612) 12 Co Rep 98, 77 ER 1373 was 
charged with procuring “himself to be sworn of the said grand inquest, with intent to indict 
his neighbours maliciously… upon his own knowledge.” In Remington & al. v Allen & al. 
(1625) SCR 1-4, the plaintiff argued? that the defendants “out of malice to the Plaintiffs, and 
by Conspiracy met together, and procur'd an Indictment of Barratry against the Plaintiffs.” 
In Bacon v Boulton & al. (1631) SCR 28-34, the defendants were said to have “out of Malice 
to the Plaintiff… conspire[d] together to accuse and indict him for supposed stealing of 
several petty thing.” In Phips Cler. v Eyres & al. Hil. (1631) SCR 20-28, the charge was that 
“out of Malice to the Plaintiff, for that he had caused one Jemmet, an uncomfortable Minister, 
to be put from being Lecturer of their Parish, raised a same {alike}, that the Plaintiff had 
ravished, or attempted to ravish a Woman of Sandford, where the Plaintiff had formerly 
dwelt.” In Monk v Blackburn & al. (1632) SCR 28-34, the defendant “out of malice to the 
Plaintiff, for that he had caused her Husband to be arrested for Debt” procured the fabrication 
of certain evidence against him. In Dr. Peterson Deacon of Exeter v Travers Cler. & al. 
(1632) SCR 44-53, the defendant Travers “upon some heart-burning and discontent taken 
against the Plaintiff for crossing his Advancement to the Place of a Canon-Residentiary in 
the Church of Exeter, did conspire with the Defendant Frost, and Katharine Bampton, his 
Daughter, falsely and maliciously to accuse the Plaintiff with the foul {false} Crime of 
Incontinency with her the said Katharine.”  
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 The issue as to whether prosecutors ought to be justified on the grounds that they had 
acted upon reasonable suspicion and therefore without malice, lest they be discouraged 
against the principle that crime must not go unpunished, was also discussed in the Star 
Chamber.  
 In Rochester vs Solm (1600) Hudson TSC 104-5, Solm had accused along with others 
Rochester of having struck his father to death on the grounds that the latter had so confessed 
at his deathbed. This was held as a good justification. The court argued that “it is no ground 
to say [that] the jury acquitted him, and therefore your indictment was false, for many times 
great offenders escape upon indictments.” Furthermore, “perhaps the prosecution is not 
without malice (for the truth may be accompanied with malice).” Moreover, the court 
concluded that if actions were allowed against his indictors, “then I know not but every 
acquitted delinquent may bring his writ of conspiracy.”  
 Likewise, the defendant in the Poulterers’ Case (1611) objected that: 
Every one who knows himself guilty, may to cover their offences, and to terrify or 
discourage those who would prosecute the cause against them, surmise a confederacy, 
combination, or agreement betwixt them, and by such means notorious offenders will 
escape unpunished, or at the least, justice will be in danger of being perverted, and 
great offences smothered.1062  
 In Sir Anthony Ashley's Case (1611), the defendant objected that: 
the bill upon the said conspiracy did not lie, and that it should be dangerous to 
maintain it; for if it should be lawful for every one who is accused, or was in fear to 
be accused of any capital crime, to exhibit his bill in this Court against the accuser 
and all the witnesses, and by many captious and intricate interrogatories severally to 
examine them, to find contrariety in them incircumstances [sic]; this will deter men 
to prosecute against great offenders, and thence great offences will pass unpunished, 
which will be dangerous to the weal public.1063  
In Tailor and Towlin's Case (1628) Godb 444; 78 ER 261, Hyde C.J. held that “upon 
probable proof a man might accuse another before any justice of peace, of an offence; and 
although his accusation be false, yet the accuser shall not be punished for it. But where the 
                                                 
1062 9 Co Rep 55b, 56a; 73 ER 813, 814. 
1063 12 Co Rep 90, 91; 77 ER 1366, 1367-8. 
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accusation is malitious and false, it is otherwise; and for such accusation he shall be punished 
in this Court.” 
In Sir Anthony Ashley's Case, the Star Chamber also laid down what the grounds were 
for someone to arrest a suspect so as to bring him to justice: 
1. That a felony be done… 2. That he who doth arrest hath suspicion upon probable 
cause, which may be pleaded, and is traversable…3. That he himself, who hath the 
suspicion, arrest the party. For he cannot command another to do it, for suspicion is 
a thing individual and personal, and cannot extend to another person than to him who 
hath it. 
 As to what amounted to reasonable suspicion, it was said that:  
if felony be done, and one hath suspicion upon probable matter that another is guilty 
of it, because that he had part of the goods robbed, and is indigent, or if the party be 
indicted, or if murder be committed, and one is seen near the place, or coming with a 
sword or other weapon embrued with blood, or that he was in company of felons, or 
hath carried the goods stolen to obscure places, or such like things, these are good 
causes of suspicion.1064 
Likewise, “if felony be done, and the common fame and voice is that one hath 
committed it, this is good cause for him who knows of it to arrest the party, to the 
intent that he may be brought to justice.”1065 
The question as to whether juries, court officers and judges had immunity from the 
action of conspiracy was finally settled in the Star Chamber in the landmark decision of Floyd 
v Barker (1608) 12 Co Rep 23, 77 ER 1305. The essence of the court’s argument in upholding 
this immunity of legal agencies was based on the protection of the oath these agencies took. 
It should be recalled that in the discussion of the medieval conspiracy we saw several 
examples of the oaths given to jurors, justices, and sheriffs. The formula of these oaths more 
or less repeated the idea that the person taking them would not depart from justice for gain, 
hatred, fear or love, and would do his duty accordingly. This meant that the law would 
presume that they acted this way when they were in court, that is, after they had taken the 
oath. Otherwise, it would be perjury and for this there was a different procedure. 
                                                 
1064 12 Co Rep 90, 92; 77 ER 1366, 1368. 
1065 Ib. 
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Furthermore, after they had taken their oaths, they were supposed to act under the compulsion 
of the law. 
Thus, since indicting jurors “are returned by the sheriff by process of law to make 
inquiry of offences upon their oath, and it is for the service of the King and the 
commonwealth… they shall not be impeached, for any conspiracy or practice, before the 
indictment: for the law will not suppose any unindifferent [sic,] when he is sworn to serve 
the King."1066 A witness, on the other hand, “if he conspire [sic] out of the Court, and after 
swear in the Court, his oath shall not excuse his conspiracy before; for he is a private person, 
produced by the party, and not returned by the sheriff, who is an officer sworn.”1067As for 
judges, “be he Judge of Assise, or a justice of peace, or any other Judge, being Judge by 
commission and of record, and sworn to do justice, cannot be charged for conspiracy, for that 
which he did openly in Court as Judge or justice of peace: and the law will not admit any 
proof against this vehement and voilent [sic] presumption of law, that a justice sworn to do 
justice will do injustice.” This extended to JPs’ pretrial proceedings: “due examination of 
causes out of Court, and inquiring by testimony, et similia, is not any conspiracy, for this he 
ought to do.” However, JPs have no immunity for any other conduct that is not part of his 
purview such as “subornation of witnesses, and false and malicious prosecutions, out of 
Court, to such whom he knows will be indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an 
unlawful conspiracy.”1068 
5.1.4 DISTURBANCE OF PRIVATE RIGHT 
 There were also instances of the use of conspiracy as agreement to support each other 
in disturbance of private right. In Scrogs v Peck and Gray (1599) Moore (KB) 563, 72 ER 
760, there was a prior land dispute between Peck and Gray. Peck claimed a lease in reversion 
from Gray, and Gray claimed the rent to commence at the same time as the lease. Scrogs 
complained that “Peck & Gray conspire q[e] Gray exhibite un bill en Chancery vers Peck 
supposant que il ad le lease en rev[er]c[i]on, & combine ove Scrogs d[']obscure ceo & 
p[re]nder aut[er] lease pur defeat le rent. Sur que ils agreo[n]t de faire p[ur]ose per 
                                                 
1066 12 Co Rep 23, 77 ER 1305-6. 
1067 12 Co Rep 23, 77 ER 1305, 1306. 
1068 12 Co Rep 23, 24; 77 ER 1305, 1307. 
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testimoignes del lease en rev[er]c[i]on, et del rent sans vocant Scrogs a ceo.” The Star 
Chamber fined them because “le matter dagreem[en]t [est] en p[er]judice d[']un terce 
p[er]son sans son privity.” 
 In Lord Seignior Greyes Case (1608) Moore 788, 74 ER 907, the tenants of the Manor 
of Broughton Aston, Leicester, agreed to join in a petition to the King claiming that the 
customs of the Manor compelled the Lord to make a new estate for life for the son or daughter 
of a deceased tenant. They also agreed to share the costs. The Star Chamber considered this 
maintenance in the sense of interference: “le joyner en fuit & contributer al charge pur 
common ou custome est loyal pur touts queux claime m[eme] le custome, mes n'est issint lou 
le tenure est en question, quia le tenure d[']un n'est le tenure dun aut[er].” Popham went 
further and affirmed that it was “un illoyal combinac[i]on n'est justifiable coment que 
contribuc[io]n soit [loyal].” They all agreed that it was “un illoyal combinac[io]n, coment 
que le complaint n'est censurable.” 
5.1.5 THE POULTERERS’ CASE AND SIR ANTHONY ASHLEY’S CASE (1611) 
 We have come now to what has been considered the most important case in the history 
of modern conspiracy, a case that textbooks never fail to mention whenever they discuss the 
law of conspiracy.1069 Although it is not the convention to do it this way, for reasons that will 
become clearer later, I have decided to join it to the sister Sir Anthony Ashely Case, which 
was almost simultaneous to it. There are good reasons to believe that in deciding the 
Poulterers’ Case, the counsellors of the Star Chamber were also thinking in a principle that 
would apply to Sir Anthony Ashley’s Case. For one thing, as we will see, in the Poulterers’ 
Case there was an actual failed execution of the plot, for which the action was more in the 
nature of a remedy. In Sir Anthony’s Case the plot had been set into motion, but had not 
failed. It was rather prevented from ripening by the Star Chamber.  
 As for the facts of the Poulterers’ Case as revealed by the records of the Star 
Chamber, they illustrate many of the themes we have seen so far. They show how in actual 
                                                 
1069 E.g.: “The first significant expansion of conspiracy occurred with the decision by the Court of the Star 
Chamber in 1611 of Poulterers’ Case… thus, Poulterers’ Case gave rise to a doctrine which survives to this 
day: the gist of conspiracy is the agreement, and so the agreement is punishable even if its purpose was not 
achieved,” La Fave, W. & Scott Jr., Austin, Criminal Law, 2nd. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1986), 525. 
Cf. Fletcher, Rethinking, 222. 
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practice there was a connection between the ecclesiastical defamation, the new action on the 
case for slander, and the development of conspiracy in the Star Chamber. The case had started 
with an action for slander, which prompted a false prosecution, which prompted the action at 
the Star Chamber, which prompted an extrajudicial attempt to settle it by the ritual of public 
repentance. It also brings forward how important one’s social capital was in the management 
of litigation, and how the litigation was the scenario where each side to a feud measured its 
power against the other. The Poultereres used all their resources to bring Stone down, and 
they incurred in all possible crime in relation to justice from barratry, maintenance, 
intimidation and threats, and countenance. Had he not been able to produce fifty witnesses at 
the Assizes, and to manage his multiple process through the assistance of his friends, it is 
safe to say that Stone would have been doomed.  
 The connection between slander and the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Star 
Chamber over conspiracy is particularly strong in this case. Initially, he sought to stop rumors 
accusing him generally of being a thief, and specially of having robbed Walters, by the action 
of slander. The consequence of his action was escalation and his prosecution. In that sense, 
it is necessary to remark that after he had been cleared at the Assizes, he moved an action 
before the Star Chamber, and the defendants offered public repentance if he dropped it. This 
is consistent with the idea that an ignoramus did not remove all suspicion from a person, and 
that the Star Chamber protected the reputation of the individual. As was the case with 
canonical purgation, in deciding a case of conspiracy the court would also adjudge whether 
the accusation was true. In other words, it is hard to think that after the Star Chamber 
conviction the Poulterers could be tempted to press charges again against Stone. What Stone 
mainly sought by bringing the action before the Star Chamber was to vindicate his reputation 
after he had been prosecuted. 
 The connection with the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy is manifest in 
the emphasis that these depositions collected by the commissioners put on the issue of ill 
will. If anything, the interrogatories focused on three main things: what the motives of 
Walters and the rest of the Poulterers were in prosecuting Stone, whether Walters or the 
others had some reasonable ground to suspect Stone, and what they intended with the 
prosecution. And what really transpires is that they did not act in pursuance of justice but out 
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of bad blood towards Stone. These depositions prove that the Poulterers held an old grudge 
against Stone for having started litigation against them, and that because of that they began 
to spread false rumors imputing him a robbery that had been committed upon Walters. They 
also show that Walters had no reasonable basis to identify Stone as one of the criminals other 
than a supposed false beard he would have worn the day of the robbery, and that his 
recollections of the facts were contradictory. Furthermore, they reveal that the hatred of the 
Poulterers grew in intensity when they were sued by Stone. And finally, they show that the 
Poulterers expressed their murderous intent in encouraging the prosecution against Stone.  
5.1.5.1 THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
 According to the depositions, the background of the case was a previous dispute 
between Stone and the other defendants. It all began when Thomas Stone married Alice 
Pigborne, widow of the late James Pigborne, poulterer, and decided to recover the debts owed 
by several members of the Company of Poulterers to the latter1070 For that purpose he brought 
several actions against Edwarde Leake, John Vowell, Allen Baker, Thomas Moyse, Richard 
Keyes, Edward Hunter, and Thomas Okeley and his wife.1071 At the time of the events that 
brought the case to the Star Chamber took place, the suits had been pending for 4, 5, and 6 
years1072 It transpires from the inquisitions taken by the Star Chamber's commissioners that 
“defendants along with other members of the trade had maliced and born evill to the 
complainant,”1073 showing clearly a pattern of intimidation and harassment: they molested 
the trade of his wife, and they threatened Stone, forcing him to flee his home in Gracechurch 
Street.1074  
The events of the case unfolded against this backdrop when Ralph Walters, apprentice 
with John Woodbridge and Henry Bates, appeared with a broken head and a bloody bandage 
                                                 
1070 Stone v Walters. The National Archives: STAC 8/259/31. 1b. I use the page numbering indicated in the 
Annex II. To avoid being repetitive, I will omit “ib.” 
1071 1b, 13b. 
1072 1b. This was a pattern of litigation at the time: a “woman who married, or a widow who remarried, might 
acquire a partner who took it upon himself to pursue claims possessed by his spouse which she had not dared 
do anything about,” Bellamy, Bastard Feudalism, 57. 
1073 1b. 
1074 13b. 
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at the church of Ugley and to Newport pond in Essex to rise the hue and cry for a robbery.1075 
John Avery, who would later be a juror at the Essex Assizes where Stone was prosecuted, 
wrote down the hue and cry report.1076 Walters reported that one of the robbers rode a grey 
horse, that he was robbed a fardel of gear from one Morris, and that the robbers bonded his 
hand and foot, to which his swollen hands attested.1077 He also reported that one of the men 
had his face covered with a false beard.1078 After that, John Avery came to some people of 
the party of the Hue and Cry, including the high constable, to check whether Walters' report 
was true.1079 The members of the party confirmed that when they got to the crime scene they 
found Walters's horse, and that the surcingle was cut, the panniers riffled, and the stuff of the 
saddle plucked out as if someone had searched for valuables.1080  
Walters went next to Geoffrey Nightingale, JP in the county of Essex who examined 
the whole matter. Since Walters could not produce the names of the robbers, the JP withheld 
issuing any warrant for the apprehension of the suspect and told him to wait until the next 
Sessions and see if he was able to learn their names.1081 The next Thursday after the robbery 
Walters took John Woodbridge and some other Poulterers, later defendants in the action at 
the Star Chamber, to the scene of the crime where they sought the money they believed the 
robbers to have let fall.1082 That Sunday, some witnesses saw a horse riding alone that was 
probably Walters'.1083  
On May 5, 1608 Walters, along with Anthony Hakes and Simon Joy, tried to 
apprehend Thomas Stone at Enfield.1084 They were riding together on the King's Highway, 
when Walters told them that he thought he had recognized the man who robbed him of his 
                                                 
1075 70b, 71b, 73a, 83b, 84b. 
1076 Not numbered page, 41b 
1077 Not numbered page, 71b, 72 b. 
1078 73a. 
1079 71b, 72a, 73a. 
1080 70b, 71a. 
1081 70b, 72a, 73b, 85a-85b, 87b. 
1082 72b. 
1083 76a. 
1084 37b. 
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clothes. Hakes made him ride back and make sure it was him.1085 As he was positive, the 
three men chased Stone. Then Hakes went to Enfield to ask for help, where the constable was 
lame and the headborough was not available. He was told by the people he asked for help 
that anybody could stop a suspect of felony. When Hakes came back for Walters and Joy, 
they had apprehended Stone. Hakes recognized that Stone was a member of the Company of 
Poulterers and a servant to the king, and thought that Walters might be wrong about him, and 
wanted him to let Stone go.1086 Stone, indeed, was on his way to let Lord Denny know that 
the king intended him and Sir Henry Cock, who was sending Stone, to have dinner at the 
latter's house the next day.1087  
Stone reported the incident to the Greencloth, and Walters was summoned before Sir 
Henry Cock, Sir Robert Banester, and Sir Marmaduke Correll. He was charged with 
assaulting Stone and accusing him of robbery while on the king's service.1088 Walters said 
that he was mistaken, and prayed that his offence would be forgiven and remitted.1089 The 
court bound him to good behavior. Henry Stapleford, who was there along with other of the 
later defendants in the Star Chamber, undertook the bond, saying that Walters was an honest 
man.1090  
The following days the Poulterers began to spread false rumors about Thomas Stone 
in London. Walters, Hakes and Joy said at Newgate Market that Stone was a “theife and a 
gentleman theife.”1091  Walters also told George Bromeley and John Woodbridge, and his 
wife that he had been robbed by Stone.1092  Another Poulterer said at a place called the 
Shambles that Stone was known by a scarf he wore about his neck and face, and that he knew 
a man who had escaped robbery from him.1093  After May 10, at Gracechurch Street, one of 
                                                 
1085 168b. 
1086 169b. 
1087 38b. See also 132b, 143a-143b, 101b-102b. 
1088 38b, 143b. 
1089 38b. 
1090 38b-39b, 143b, 146b. 
1091 1b-2a, 7a. 
1092 105b. 
1093 38b. 
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the Poulterers' wives reported that Walters had been robbed, and that before the JP he had 
taken Stone by the beard saying that that beard had robbed him.1094  In early June, Avis 
Barrakey, a chairwoman and servant to Stone, while at the house of James Harlowe, heard 
his wife Elizabeth telling him that she once heard a washwoman she had at home asking 
whether Stone was a gentleman thief. Elizabeth asked her husband if this was true, but he 
reprehended her.1095  Other defendants’ wives also reported that Stone was robbing people 
under color of the king service to maintain his children and wife.1096 
Stone tried to put a stop to the rumors by bringing a new action at the Greencloth1097 
against Hakes, Nicholas Kefford, William Burte, Allen Baker and wife and sister, James 
Harlow and wife, and Walters, for slandering him with false reports that he was a gentleman 
thief and that he had committed the robbery on Walters. Henry Stapleford and William 
Woodbridge came along with Walters.1098 Walters told the clerk of the Greencloth that he 
was mistaken.1099  The other defendants persuaded Walters to withstand his accusation so 
that they would not be adjudged for slander,1100 and Henry Stapleford promised that John 
Woodbridge would be bound in 100 pounds that Walters would press charges against 
Stone.1101 The Poulterers unsuccessfully tried to stay the proceedings by suing a writ of 
privilege to remove the action to the Common Pleas,1102 and then by a writ of habeas corpus 
to remove it to the King's Bench.1103 The verdict was for Stone, giving him damages in a 
hundred marks,1104 but the Poulterers were able to stay judgment for nine month by suing a 
                                                 
1094 89b. 
1095 53b, 130a, 147b. 
1096 4a. On the role of women in defamation see (Helmholz, Canon Law, 575-6). 
1097 50b. The source speaks of the counting house but I presume that it is the Greencloth. Later it talks about a 
suit for slanderous words at the Sheriff's court in the Guildhall of London. Again, it is probably the same case 
that might have been removed to this court. Or maybe the deponents were mistaken about what the court was.  
1098 2a, 7a-8a, 39b, 42b, 126b. 
1099 126b, 132b. 
1100 2a, 7b. 
1101 132b. 
1102 42b, 43b, 127a, 102b-103a. 
1103 144b, 43b, 44b, 103a. 
1104 44b. 
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writ of error and having Walters banished from London.1105 Henry Bate paid all the fees and 
charges for Walters.1106  
  While the sue was still pending, upset because Stone had not warned them of the 
lawsuits, Henry Stapleford, Nicholas Kefford, and William Birte  met at the Guildhall "to 
Consulte plott practize conspire or conclude to haue [Stone] indicted for robbing Raphe 
Walters… or to take awaye… [his] lyefe in that respecte, or to begg his lands goods 
Chattells… under coulor [of the law].1107" That very same day, the Masters and Wardens of 
the Company of Poulterers sent their beadle for Margory Bromeley to come to the hall. They 
wanted to learn from her mouth what the estate and wealth of Stone was.1108  
Then, they procured a warrant from Sir Thomas Bennet JP, for the arrest of Stone.1109  
He was brought to be examined before another London JP, Stephen Soame.1110 Walters 
charged Stone with having robbed him of 30 shillings, a cloak, a hat, and the outside of a 
woman's gown.1111 He affirmed that at the time of the robbery Stone was wearing a false 
beard.1112 Soame bound him to give evidence at the Sessions at Newgate.1113 
  Within a quarter hour from the arrest, William Birt and the Master Warden of the 
Company of Poulterers came into Stone's shop demanding from his servants and Stone's wife 
whatever goods he might have.1114 They told them that Stone should have taken his complaint 
to the Company of Poulterers and that Stone was doomed.1115  Stone's wife, who was 
expecting, was so scared that she was afraid she was going to have an untimely delivery.1116  
                                                 
1105 43b, 44b, 45b, 50b, 103b, 144b. 
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1110 49a, 94b. 
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  During the following days before the Assizes, the Poulterers engaged in a systematic 
campaign to make the lives of Stone and his family unbearable, and to interfere with their 
trade and ruin his reputation. They told them that they would force them to leave Gracechurch 
Street.1117 They took away the wares of his mother-in-law without paying.1118 They said to 
other people that if they could find a hole in his coat they would hang him off it, and that 
they would have his wife and mother-in-law crying in the streets.1119 The defendants' wives 
came to Stone's house to watch the goods carried out from it intending that he would be 
hanged.1120  One of them mocked her for saying that her husband was an honest man, and 
told her that after they were done with him they would make her go back to the place where 
she was born.1121 Other defendants spread the rumor that Stone had sold his royal office to 
beg his pardon.1122 They continued to call him a gentleman thief and a knave.1123 
  At the Sessions held at the Old Bailey, Walters repeated what he had declared before 
the JP, but he was warned by the Lord Bishop of London that the wearing of the false beard 
was very unlikely because Stone usually wore a natural one.1124 The court determined that 
because the events had taken place in Essex, the case ought to be heard at the next Assizes at 
Chelmsford. Stone was bound to answer, and Walters to give evidence. Henry Bate, John 
Woodbridge, Allen Baker, and Anthony Baker, who were present, were bound by 
recognizances as sureties for Walters.1125 After the Sessions, they went to a tavern to drink, 
where they were heard to have said that they would have Stone hanged.1126 
                                                 
1117 1b, 3b. 
1118 1b, 7a. 
1119 3b. 
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  The Assizes at Chelmsford were held on July 4, 1608.1127 Henry Bate, John 
Woodbridge, Anthony Hake, Symon Joyce, Edward Leake, Allen Baker, Henry Stapleford 
and John Raymond came along with Walters, giving evidence to the Grand Jury and 
affirming his honesty.1128 Upon oath Walters gave evidence repeating the same charges he 
had given before the JP and at the Quarter Sessions in the Old Bailey.1129  He denied that 
those who robbed him had any grey horse. However, John Avery, who had taken the report 
after the hue and cry, and who was now one of the jurors, showed a copy of Walters's own 
words affirming that there was a grey horse.1130 Nightingale JP certified the examinations he 
had made at the time of the hue and cry.1131 It seems that some people had bribed the sheriff's 
men to have Stone into the dock among the other felons to disgrace him.1132 One of the 
justices of Assize commented on the people that came along and encouraged Walters that 
they seemed to be willing to have Stone hanged.1133 
  Stone, nevertheless, had an alibi. He had been in London the day the robbery was 
supposed to have taken place. Stone brought some thirty people to bear testimony to his 
abode in London the day of the crime as well as for his honesty and good character.1134  The 
witnesses were heard but they were not allowed to swear to their testimony because they 
were not of the prosecution.1135 Among others, Thomas Standford had been with him around 
2 pm. One Richard Palfreman had been with him between 4 pm and 6 pm. Robert Hull was 
two times at his house.1136 Furthermore, his horse was all day at one Hall's Stable. The jury 
found an ignoramus and Stone was discharged.1137 
                                                 
1127 146b; 1609 in 48b. 
1128 3a, 15b, 106b, 99b. 
1129 Not numbered, 3b, 9b, 15b, 41b, 70b, 99b, 105b. 
1130 41b. This proves that in many respects juries continued to be self-informing into the seventeenth century. 
1131 89b. 
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  Subsequently, Stone brought an action before the Star Chamber to “cleere & free 
himselfe from the imputation & practices contayned in his Bill against the defendants in this 
Court [Star Chamber].”1138 The now defendants tried to settle this extrajudicially. Bates and 
Woodbridge admitted to Stone that they might have been mistaken, and sent him a letter 
proposing that he if dropped the suit “Walters should submitte himself and vpon his knees 
acknowledge before the Greeneclothe, openly in the Guildhall where the s[ay]ed Cause 
depended, and amongeste his neighebors, in the p[ari]she Churche, that hee the sayed Walters 
had mistaken the s[ay]ed Stoane wronged him in falsely chardging him w[i]th the s[ay]ed 
robbery.”1139 Several other defendants asked John Marshall, a chandler, to help them make 
peace with Stone. They told him that they never held any ill will towards him, that they 
always thought well of him as an honest man and never gave him any reason for suing 
them.1140 Later, when the process started, they accused Stone of barratry,1141 and intimidated 
some of his witnesses.1142 
5.1.5.2 THE ACQUITTAL REQUIREMENT 
At the Star Chamber hearing, the counsel for the defendant objected two main issues. 
Firstly, that “admitting this combination, confederacy, and agreement between them to indict 
the plaintiff to be false, and malicious, that yet no action lies for it in this Court, or 
elsewhere… because no writ of conspiracy for the party grieved, or indictment or other suit 
for the King lies, but where the party grieved is indicted, and legitimo modo acquietatus.”1143 
Coke tells us that the court conceded this, but that it declared and applied the common 
law principle that “a false conspiracy betwixt divers persons shall be punished, although 
nothing be put in execution.”1144 And in support of that principle, the following authorities 
were rallied: 
                                                 
1138 58a. 
1139 Not numbered b. 
1140 55a. 
1141 49b-50a, 53b, 
1142 4b, 6a, 12b, 13a, 18b, 129b, 134b. 
1143 9 Co 55b-56a, 73 ER 813, 814. 
1144 9 Co Rep 55b, 56 b; 73 ER 813, 814. 
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In 27 Ass. P. 44 in the articles of the charge of enquiry by the inquest in the King’s 
Bench, there is a nota, that two were indicted of confederacy, each of them to maintain 
the other, whether their matter be true, or false, and notwithstanding that nothing was 
supposed to be put in execution, the parties were forced to answer to it, because the 
thing is forbidden by the law… so there in the next article in the same book, inquiry 
shall be of conspirators and confederates, who agree amongst themselves, &c. falsly 
to indict, or acquit, &c…. and there is another article concerning conspiracy betwixt 
merchants… and it is held in 19 R. 2 Brief 926. a man shall have a writ of conspiracy, 
although they do nothing but conspire together, and he shall recover damages, and 
they may be also indicted thereof. Also the usual commission of oyer and terminer 
gives power to the commissioners to enquire, &c. de omnibus coadunatibus, 
confoederationibus, et falsis alligantis… in these cases before the unlawful act 
executed the law punishes the coadunation, confederacy or false alliance, to the end 
to prevent the unlawful act, quia quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et id per quod 
pervenitur al illud: et affectus puniter licet non sequatur effectus; and in these cases 
the common law is a law of mercy, for it prevents the malignant from doing mischief, 
and the innocent from suffering it. Hil. 37 H. 8. in the Star-Chamber a priest was 
stigmatized with F. and A. in his forehead, and set upon the pillory in Cheapside, with 
a written paper, for false accusation. M. 3 & 4 Ph. & Ma. one also for the like cause 
fuit stigmaticus with F. & A. in the cheek, with such superscription as is aforesaid. 
Vide Proverb' 1. Si te lactaverint peccatores et dixerint, veni nobiscum ut insidiemur 
sanguini, abscondamus tendiculas contra insontem frustra, &c. omnem pretiosam 
substantiam reperiemus et implebimus domus nostras spoliis, &c. Fili mi ne ambules 
cum eis, &c. pedes enim eorum ad malum currunt, et festinant ut effundant 
sanguinem.”1145  
It has been pointed out that Coke’s sources do not support this proposition, and that 
they all postdate the Statute of Conspirators so that it cannot be argued as a common law 
rule.1146 Most important, however, is the range of authorities that Coke cites in support of 
this principle: from the Year Books, to the articles of the Eyre, to legal maxims and citations 
from the Bible. It is highly possible that this incoherent assortment was the result of Coke’s 
editing. Since the Star Chamber was a collegiate court and it was normal that the councilors 
each gave their own opinion, it all seems to indicate that Coke synthesized them into this 
principle, and that here he subsumes the authorities on which each of these opinions were 
based under this principle as if they all concurred on the grounds for this decision.   
The real sense of this passage becomes clearer if we interpret it considering what we 
know about Coke’s use of the doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed. In doing so, 
                                                 
1145 9 Co Rep 55b, 56b; 73 ER 813, 814-5. 
1146 Wright, Conspiracy, 13-14. 
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it becomes self-evident. We already know that Coke held that at the ancient common law the 
doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed applied to acts tending to the execution of 
an intent. We also know that for Coke, acts tending to the execution of an intent meant what 
we will call a failure, that is, a consummated act that nevertheless did not have the expected 
consequence.  It should be recalled here that Coke understood this doctrine not as if the intent 
was punishable in itself, but in the sense that what makes an act criminal is the intent, 
independently of the consequence. And finally, we know that for Coke this doctrine made 
the false accusation to appear within the periphery of murder, as a sort of or kind of murder. 
Therefore, Coke considered the offense of conspiracy to be based on the ancient law that the 
intent to murder by color of law was itself punishable. The insistence of the depositions of 
the Poulterers' Case on the murderous intent of the defendants supports this interpretation.  
These would be the grounds upon which the Court of Star Chamber visited malicious 
prosecutions with punishments, as attempts of murder. Further evidence that the Court of 
Star Chamber held this view can be inferred from the punishment mentioned here of branding 
the false accusers in the head with the letters F. and A. This punishment appears in most the 
abovementioned cases decided in the Star Chamber. This is clearly inspired by the Roman 
punishment for the calumniator of branding the letter K on his forehead. This implies that the 
councilors of the Star Chamber drew an analogy with calumny. And this offence was first 
visited with the talionic punishment which presumes that accusers were murderers in will.1147 
                                                 
1147 Radin, Maintenance, 52, n (16). It should be noted that the opposite of this principle, that is, that the intent 
must not be taken for the action, was appealed to protect local officers in Bagg’s Case (1616), 11 Co Rep 93b; 
77 ER 1271 where the issue was raised as to what was sufficient cause to disenfranchise a freeman of a city of 
his liberty. Having resolved that “the cause of disfranchisement ought to be grounded upon an Act which is 
against the duty of a citizen or burgess, and to the prejudice of the public good…and against his oath” (98a, 
1278) it was determined that “words of contempt… are good causes to punish him, as to commit till he has 
found sureties of his good behavior, but not to disenfranchise him” (11 Co Rep 98a-b). And the rationale was 
that “if he intends, or endeavours of himself, or conspires with others, to do a thing against the duty or trust of 
his freedom… but he doth not execute it… non officit conatus, nisi sequitur effectus; and non officit affectus, 
nisi sequitur effectus… the matter which shall be a cause of his disfranchisement, ought to be an act or deed, 
and not a conation, or an endeavor, which he may repent of before the execution of it, and from whence no 
prejudice ensues; and they who have offices of trust and confidence shall not forfeit them by endeavours and 
intentions to do acts, although they declare them by express words, unless the act itself shall ensue, as if one 
who has the keeping of a park should say, that he will kill all the game within his custody, or will cut down so 
many trees within the part, but doth not kill any of the game, nor cut down any trees… without any act done, in 
none of those cases is it any cause of deprivation; for in those cases, voluntas non reputatur pro facto "(98b, 
1278-9); see also 1 Rolle 224. 
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5.1.5.3 SIR ANTHONY ASHLEY’S CASE (1611) 
In the abovementioned passage, Coke said that “in these cases before the unlawful 
act executed the law punishes the coadunation, confederacy or false alliance, to the end to 
prevent the unlawful act.”1148 Strictly speaking, this principle could not be applied to the 
Poulterers’ conspiracies which had been executed. Stone did not seek prevention, but rather 
redress. Instead, this comment might have been made with reference to the case of Sir 
Anthony Ashley, which was pending in the Star Chamber since 1609, and about to be 
decided. 
Born to a noble family, under the patronage of Lord Chancellor Hutton, Sir Anthony 
Ashley, had been elected MP in 1588 and 1592, and had been appointed clerk to the Privy 
Council in 1587. After Hutton was succeeded by Lord Burghley as Lord Chancellor, he was 
disgraced by accusations of corruption and perversion of justice leading to his suspension 
from office. Although he was to be reappointed again in 1603, he was suspended again in 
1609 when he was charged with the murder of William Ryce in 1591.1149 
During the proceedings at the Star Chamber, it came out that James Creighton had 
bought a pretended right in lands Sir Anthony was possessed of. Probably seeking the escheat 
or at least to get his rights via forfeiture of Sir Anthony Ashley’s lands, Creighton then moved 
several actions in the Common Bench to recover unpaid fines for several misdemeanors 
committed by Sir Anthony Ashley. It was at this point that Ashley had been suspended from 
office. As probably Creighton continued to be unsuccessful in his purpose, he planned with 
Henry Smith, former servant of Sir Anthony, that the latter would accuse him of the murder 
by poisoning of William Rice, the husband of Mary Rice, deceased some eighteen years 
earlier (probably from some venereal disease). In exchange for that, Sir James Creighton 
promised and obliged himself, putting into writing that Henry Smith should have a share in 
the forfeitures, an office for his uncle, a royal protection against his creditors, and a general 
pardon of all offences. In addition to that, James entered in a similar agreement put into 
writing, to share a portion of the lands, goods, and chattels that would be forfeited from 
                                                 
1148 9 Co Rep 56b, 57a; 73 ER 813, 815. 
1149 Michael Hicks, "Ashley, Sir Anthony, baronet (1551/2–1628)," first published 2004, online edition, Jan 
2008. Oxford DNB http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/757 
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Ashley with John Cantrell, who was made responsible for bringing the witnesses against 
Ashley.  
According to their plan, they had the widow of Rice bring a petition to the King, 
accusing Sir Anthony Ashley of the alleged murder. The petition was referred to the Chief 
Justice of the King’s Bench, who, after examination of the witnesses on both sides, 
determined that there was “a false conspiracy, to indict Sir Anthony without any just 
ground,”1150 taking notice of the written agreements. Thus, the case was assigned to be heard 
and determined at the Star Chamber.  
Upon hearing, the defense counsel raised two issues. The first was that allowing such 
proceedings in which defendants are able to “exhibit his bill in Court against the accuser and 
all the witnesses… will deter men to prosecute against great offenders, and thence great 
offenses will pass unpunished, which will be dangerous to the weal public.”1151 The second 
was that “by the law, conspiracy lies when a man is indicted, and legitimo modo acquietatus: 
but here he was never indicted.”1152 It was ruled against the first objection that “in this case 
the bill was maintenable, although that the party accused was not indicted and acquitted 
before, as it was resolved in this Court [Star Chamber], Hil. 8 Jac in Poulterers’ Case.”1153  
Now, according to the reports, in this case there never was an indictment against Sir 
Anthony.1154 Thus, in this case it can be said that the conspiracy was crashed before it had 
been put into execution. In this way, it is probable that the Poulterers’ Case was decided with 
an eye on this case that was going to be decided almost at the same time, and which, indeed, 
ended up citing it.  
                                                 
1150 12 Co Rep 90, 91; 77 ER 1366, 1367, 
1151 12 Co Rep 90, 91; 77 ER 1366, 1367-8. 
1152 12 Co Rep 90, 91; 77 ER 1366, 1368. 
1153 12 Co Rep 90, 92; 77 ER 1366,1368; Moore 816, 817. 
1154 Hudson refers to this case inconsistently, saying that “his accusers prosecuted him by indictment at the 
common law; he sled to this court to stop the current of their malice; and he complained that divers persons, 
some out of malice, some out of covetousness, and some to relieve their necessities, had conspired together 
falsely and unjustly to accuse him of this act, to beg his estate of his majesty to themselves; and thereupon 
obtained a stay of the prosecution against him, and proved his accusation against Sir James Creton,” Hudson 
TSC 17, 18. Elsewhere, however, he referred to Sir Anthony Ashley’s as having been “discovered before it come 
so far” as the indictment, ib. 105, but only a petition to the King to inquire on this matter. 
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In support of this thesis it can be added that Coke added a note to the reader of the 
case specifying the requirements these conspiracies punishable before execution should 
meet, among which was the requirement that “it ought to be declared by some manner of 
prosecution, as in this case it was, either by making of bonds, or promises one to the 
other.”1155 Now, he could not be referring to the Poulterers’ Case because there was no such 
evidence as bonds or promises, but clearly to Sir Anthony Ashley’s Case, where James 
Chreighton had bound himself to the people who were going to bear the accusation and 
evidence promising them a share in the estate of the victim. 
5.1.5.4 THE NARROW PRINCIPLE 
 Having said all this, it follows that Coke, or the Star Chamber for that matter, did not 
intent to lay down a general principle in this case. In is true that the principle was expressed 
with general words such as that conspiracies were punishable before execution at common 
law. But, as I have tried to argue, the idea behind this principle is that a false accusation is a 
form of homicide, and that according to the doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed, 
a failed or thwarted false accusation is an attempt of murder. Thus, the application of the 
principle is limited to the context of the perversion of justice.  
 There is no better evidence that this narrow interpretation as to the scope of the 
principle expressed in the Poulterers’ Case than the note Coke added explaining the 
requirements that “these confederacies, punishable by law, before they are executed” must 
fulfill: “1. It ought to be declared by some manner of prosecution, as in this case was, either 
by making bonds, or promises one to the other: 2. It ought to be malicious, as for unjust 
revenge, &c. 3. It ought to be false against an innocent: 4. It ought to be out of Court 
voluntarily.”1156 
The first condition expresses a rule of evidence that should be interpreted upon the 
similar requirement in high treason that the compassing or imagining of the death of the king 
must “declare the same by overt act.” which there was defined as an act “tending to the 
                                                 
1155 9 Co Rep 55b, 57a; 73 ER 813, 815. 
1156 Ib. 
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execution of his intent.”1157 That is, for a mere intent to murder to be punishable, it must be 
declared by some overt act, since intent itself is not knowable. There Coke seemed to consider 
only failures as such acts, but in this case, he is referring to mere preparations. Indeed, the 
mere agreements are considered here as an overt act. As mentioned above, the example Coke 
provides of overt act may well refer to Sir Anthony’s Case. 
The second and third requirements are the same subjective grounds that grant an 
action upon the case in the nature of conspiracy: ill will and falsehood. These requirements 
are inconsistent with the former, since if the punishable thing is the plot or purpose of the 
agreement, as revealed by the written agreements, it is redundant to say that it need be 
malicious and false. But then again, we should think that these requirements were elaborated 
when thinking in two different cases. If we think of the circumstances of the Poulterers’ 
Case, where the plot or conspiracy was consummated but did not have the expected effect 
because the jury ignored the bill of indictment, then, in that circumstance, the decisive 
elements that turn this bill into a malicious prosecution were the malice and falsity. It was 
the Poulterers who acted for unjust revenge.  
The fourth requirement also belongs to the frame the action on the case. It limits the 
scope of such form of prosecution granting immunity to those who are acting under a judicial 
office or who are bound by oath and court proceedings to act for the king: judges of record 
and jurors. This was but affirming the principles recently laid down for the proceedings by 
writ and indictment of conspiracy by the Star Chamber in Floyd v Barker (1608) 12 Co Rep 
23-5; 77 ER 1305-8. 
In conclusion, whereas the Poulterers’ Case lent itself to be decided on similar 
grounds to those of malicious prosecution, Sir Anthony Ashley’s, where there was no Grand 
Jury ignoramus, was better suited for the view that a plot to murder should be punished in 
itself. The test is that in the latter there was no actual wrongdoing and damage, and that it 
would had not given right to bring an action upon the case. In other words, there was no 
wrongful prosecution. But in the Poulterers’ Case there was such wrongful prosecution with 
                                                 
1157 3 Inst 7. 
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its share of slander (as it comes across the depositions) and false imprisonment. This wrong, 
indeed, was part of the rationale of the case.  
5.1.5.5 THE LAW OF MERCY 
The second issue that was raised in the Poulterers’ Case was whether allowing an action 
after ignoramus would not spur:  
Everyone who knows himself guilty… to cover their offences, and to terrify or 
discourage those who would prosecute the cause against them, surmise a confederacy, 
combination, or agreement betwixt them, and by such means notorious offenders will 
escape unpunished, or at least, justice will be in danger of being perverted, and great 
offences smothered.1158 
 As we have seen, this argument was raised by those who believed that prosecutors 
should be protected from legal actions,1159 and that things should remain the same with the 
writ and indictment of conspiracy as the only remedies available against legal oppression and 
abuse of the criminal procedure. However, the Star Chamber was more concerned with the 
protection of the innocent from oppression by the machinery of law than with the protection 
of prosecutors from disgruntled defendants. As we have seen, the Star Chamber took notice 
that false prosecutions could be really damaging for defendants, and that in any case they 
vexed and unnecessarily troubled defendants.   
Thus, in the Poulterers’ Case it was argued that in punishing conspiracies before 
execution, “the common law is a law of mercy, for it prevents the malignant from doing 
mischief, and the innocent from suffering it.”1160 This concept of the ‘law of mercy’ can be 
understood in a narrow sense as embracing rights prisoners’ enjoy as common law procedural 
protections. Thus, according to Coke, among other reasons, the common law was a ‘law of 
mercy’ in that “the innocent shall not be worn and wasted by long imprisonment, but… 
speedily come to his triall,” that “prisoners for criminal causes, when they are brought to 
their trial, be humanely dealt withal,” and that “the judge ought not to exhort him to answer 
                                                 
1158 9 Co Rep 55b, 73 ER 813. See also Sir Anthony Ashley’s Case where it is said that punishing prosecutors 
“will deter men to prosecute against great offenders, and thence great offenses will pass unpunished, which will 
be dangerous to the weal public 12 Co Rep 90, 91, 77 ER 1366, 1368.  
1159 Cf. 12 Co Rep 90, 91; 77 ER 1366, 1368) Latch 79, 79 ER 618; Benl 152, 73 ER 1019; Raym T 180, 83 
ER 95. 
1160 9 Co Rep 55b, 57a; 73 ER 813, 815. 
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without fear, and that justice shall be duly administered to him.”1161 In the Poulterers’ Case, 
this principle was rephrased as that the common law “not only favours the life, but also the 
liberty of a man, and freedom from imprisonment,” and the old procedure by the writ of odio 
et atia is presented as evidence of the “means by the common law before indictment to protect 
the innocent against false accusation, and to deliver him out of prison.”1162 Thus, in a wider 
sense, the concept of the ‘law of mercy’ means the protection of the innocent against legal 
abuse in general.1163 
This suggests that the Court saw the main goal of the common law conspiracy as 
protecting innocents against false accusations (see also, in discussing the different forms of 
punishment available at the Star Chamber, how Hudson argues that among other crimes 
branding is applied for “conspirators to take away the life of innocents.”1164 Indeed, as we 
have seen, both the writ and the indictment of conspiracy were thought to be instituted for 
the protection of the innocent’s blood. That means that Coke understood these remedies as 
aimed at the protection of defendants’ rights. Thus, in this debate between those who sought 
to protect prosecutors from criminal or civil liability, Coke chose the defendants and 
preferred to discourage prosecution. This is a change with regard to the traditional view that 
always looked with suspicion at those who had been charged with some offence. But it also 
was a way to regulate private prosecutions so that only serious charges that would secure 
conviction would be brought.  
5.2 THE INTEGRATION OF HIGH TREASON: STARLING CASE (1665) 
 In this case the attorney general had proceeded against Samuel Starling and other 
members of the Corporation of London Brewers by information that they did:  
factiously and unlawfully assemble themselves, and conspire to impoverish the 
excise-men, and made orders, that no small-beer called gallon beer should be made 
for such or so long time to be sold to the poor, not no ale but of such a price, with the 
intent to move the common people to pull down the Excise-House, and bring the 
                                                 
1161 2 Inst 315-6. 
1162 9 Co Rep 55b, 56b; 73 ER 813, 814. 
1163 For instance, the concept of law of mercy could also embrace the procedural discretional penalties of the 
amercements in civil litigation because they “deterre both demaundants and plaintiffs from unjust fuits, and 
tenants, and defendants from unjust defences,” 2 Inst 28. 
1164 Hudson TSC 224. 
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excise-men into the hatred of the people, and to impoverish and disable them from 
paying their rent… to the King.1165 
The jury found the first part of the information comprising the unlawful assembly and 
the conspiracy, but acquitted the brewers of the actions taken as a consequence of the those. 
The facts found by the jury can be listed this way: 
-The brewers had factitiously and unlawfully assembled together. 
-The brewers had factitiously and unlawfully conspired together. 
-The object of the conspiracy was to restrict the production of beer. 
-The object of the restriction of the production of beer was to bring common people 
to pull down the excise house, to impoverish the tax farmers, and to render them unable to 
pay their rent to the king. 
Subsequently, the brewers moved in arrest of judgment raising three issues: that 
lacking the formulaic vi & armis, the allegation of unlawful assembly was insufficient; that 
the conspiracy was not punishable without any act done in prosecution of it; and that having 
been found that the purpose of the assembly and conspiracy was only to impoverish the tax 
farmers, that was not a public purpose, and therefore was not punishable.  
These objections already hint at the several mental spaces that the information against 
the London Brewers activated: the frame of unlawful assembly (“unlawfully assembled 
themselves”), that of high treason (“conspire to… made orders… intent to move down 
common people to pull down the Excise-House, etc.), and within this, that of constructive 
treason (assemble themselves and conspire… with intent to move people, etc.). In addition 
to these, there were two other frames that were activated by this: the action on the case frame 
(conspire to impoverish the excise-men), and the precedents of conspiracy frame (conspire 
to… and made orders, that, etc.). 
Though the Court agreed that the London brewers were punishable for conspiracy 
and unlawful assembly as described in the information, the justices disagreed as to how to 
interpret the facts contained within that information as listed above, and therefore, as to the 
                                                 
1165 1 Lev 125, 83 ER 331; See also 1 Sid 174, 83 ER 1039. 
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rationale for punishment. There were three main interpretations: that the brewers had 
committed a punishable plot revealed by the overt act of assembling; that they had committed 
an unlawful assembly punishable because of its public purpose; and that they had entered 
into a punishable alliance. As we will see, these interpretations relied indeed on mappings 
between the several frames that the information activated. 
5.2.1 THE BREWERS AS HAVING COMMITTED A PUNISHABLE PLOT  
It should be recalled now that the mapping between the offense of compassing the 
death of the king, and the doctrine that the will must be taken for the deed, resulted in the 
interpretation that compassing was like punishable intent, and that since intent was not 
cognizable to human mind, it follows the requirement that there should be an overt act 
revealing that intent to the world. Within the domain of high treason, conspiracy was 
synonymous with compassing, alongside with design, plot, machination, etc., denoting all of 
them the concept of ‘plan or plot to do something.’ The fact that all these structural lexical 
relations remained within the target domain implied that these words would be seen also as 
denoting the same concept of ‘intent.’1166 And the causal slot or frame within which intent is 
viewed in the domain of the doctrine of voluntas, as the cause of an action rather than its 
direction, would also transfer from that domain to that of high treason. Furthermore, because 
this mapping resulted in turn in a new blended domain, this potentially led to a new category 
of offenses, that of the crimes or offences of the will, onto which the factual situations of 
what we might call today murder attempt, and within this, false accusation, or robbery 
attempt, would be integrated.  
The next step in the transformation of high treason was the mapping of the 
‘compassing the king’s death’ onto the case of high treason of ‘levy war,’ thus resulting into 
a new possibility, the treason of ‘compassing to levy war,’ or, as it was put, the treason of 
‘conspiring to levy war.’ And this allowed another analogy between this new mapping and 
the treason of constructive levy of war, from which the possibility of a ‘compassing to 
commit a constructive levying of war’ resulted. All along these mappings, the requirement 
                                                 
1166 (Thus, in the reports of Starling Case the term conspiracy would occur meaning ‘plot’, and as a synonym 
of consultation, plotting, contriving, design; 1 Lev 125, 83 ER 331; 1 Keble 650, 83 ER 1164; 1 Keble 675, 83 
ER 1179. And the adjective bare usually implies the distinction between bare conspiracy and overt act, that is 
mere intent as in spoken words, and written words and other acts evidencing that intent.   
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that there must be an overt act was transferred to the target domain. Thus, finally, in the case 
of the brewers, under this interpretation, they would have committed such offence as 
constructive treason.  
One line of argument was objecting that the information did not support the overt act 
requirement. Thus, the defense argued that “the defendants were charged for conspiracy to 
deprive the King of his customs and excise, and to depauperate the fermors, which is not 
material, the defendants being found not guilty of all the overt acts alledged in pursuit of the 
conspiracy, and of any hindring the Kings revenue.” The prosecutor replied by implying the 
overt acts from the allegation of unlawful conspiracy which would entail “their agreement to 
contribute money to take away the gallon trade, and that they made orders to brew only small 
beer for three months.” And also, that “the conspiracy, although an act ad intra, yet the 
communication thereof is an overt act… and punishable although nothing ensue thereon, and 
the conspiracy is the crime… the other acts are but particular instances of it”. But part of the 
court relied on the argument that “the very consultation is an offence, as Poulters case, 
without any overt act.” 1167 
This argument of the prosecutor showed how the blended form could be integrated 
within the category of ‘conspiracy’ along with precedents such as the Poulterers’ Case, and 
understood now as crime of the will. Although the inference was now different as this 
category appeared conceptualized as a “a conspiracy to do an unlawful thing”, which is 
“punishable without any overt act done.”1168 Thus, Keeling Justice opined that “this bare 
conspiracy is a great crime, where it is to do that which is evil, although to private person; so 
is the Poulterers case.” In other words, the integration of the Poulterers’ Case, along with 
others, within the same category of crime of the will led to a different conclusion, as the overt 
act requirement was not explicitly expressed in that case (though the frame was implicitly 
entailed in the note that set forth the conditions such conspiracies must comply with).  
                                                 
1167 1 Keble 650, 83 ER 1164. 
1168 1 Lev 125, 83 ER 331, the precedents being Lord’s Grayes Case, which was a case of maintenance, and 
Scrogg and Midwinter’s Case, of which I shall speak in short. 
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5.2.2 THE BREWERS AS HAVING ENTERED INTO A PUNISHABLE ALLIANCE 
This integration was only possible if the Poulterers’ Case was interpreted in a certain 
way as dealing with a crime of the will. Windham J., however, took a different view on both 
the Poulterers’ Case and the reasons for punishing the Brewers. He mapped the Poulterers’ 
Case with the definition of conspirators of the Statute of Conspirators, and with the action 
upon the case, to draw a distinction between ‘conspiracy’ and ‘confederacy.’ Thus, he argued 
that the brewers were “acquitted of conspiracy, which properly is where its [sic] to indict 
men for their lives, and this is that whereon the writ lieth; but the false alliance and union by 
mutual swearing to maintain quarrels, is rather a confederacy… it if were a conspiracy, there 
ought to have been some overt act expressed.”1169 
That is, on the one hand, Widham interprets the conspiracy to falsely indict someone 
as a crime of the will, subject to the overt act requirement, “as if H. be indicted for 
forestalling, or being common thief, or barretor or conspirator”. On the other hand, he seems 
to interpret the Poulterers’ Case from the point of view of the Definition of Conspirators, 
where confederacy means ‘false alliance and union by mutual swearing’, punishable in itself. 
Thus, he interpreted that “the defendants [are] found guilty of confederacy, as in the 
Poulterers case,” and therefore, “here is enough found to give judgment against them for a 
confederacy, by their assembling together, their consultation and conspiracy, which is as 
much a false alliance, as if they had bound themselves by oath, &c.”1170 Thus, Windham 
takes indeed the crime of conspiracy to be part of this category of crimes of the will, and 
distinguishes it from ‘confederacy,’ meaning a bond or association to pursue some unlawful 
purpose as in this case.  
This must be the sense with which the prosecution argued that “the very conspiracy 
to do a lawful act to the prejudice of a third person is enquirable and punishable in B.R. inter 
les articles, 27 Ass.”1171 
                                                 
1169 1 Keble 675, 83 ER 1179. 
1170 Ib. 
1171 1 Keble 650, 83 ER 1164. Notice that the articles of 27 Ass. were cited in the Poulterers’ Case. 
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Twisden J., who by contrast, believed that the brewers had committed a crime of the 
will rather than one of association, replied to Windham that “intent, whilst private, is 
fluctuating, and so cannot be punished, but when declared by act, is punishable…” and 
although he qualified this in that “voluntas non reputabitur pro facto,” that is, intent cannot 
be the basis for full liability for a crime, “it shall not be punished so fully, but it is still 
punishable.” Hence, within his framework, “the false alliance or binding by oath, is but a 
farther degree of conspiracy, which is all one, and synonymous with confederacy, and of 
which the assembly and consultation is a sufficient fact.” That is, Widham’s ‘confederacy’ 
for Twisden is but a form of intent or plot revealed by the assembly.1172 
5.2.3 THE BREWERS AS HAVING COMMITTED AN ASSEMBLY TO SOME UNLAWFUL PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 If within the above interpretation the unlawful assembly works as evidence of a 
punishable intent, within the domain of constructive treason the relationship reverses and the 
intent becomes the determinant element in turning an assembly into an unlawful one. Earlier, 
I defined assembly as used in this domain as a ‘meeting of people to some purpose’ which 
can be indeed to deliberate between them a course of action, or to take immediate action. 
Such assemblies could be considered illegal depending on their manner and their purpose. 
With regards to the latter, the same sort of conduct would amount either to an act of levying 
of war or simply to a mere public disturbance under unlawful assembly and riot depending 
on whether the purpose of such assembly or meeting of people was public or private. Now, 
this domain was evoked by the information, and thus the court engaged in an argument as to 
whether the conduct of the brewers was treasonous or not.  
 Thus, it was objected by the defense that “this is only against private men, and not 
punishable at the King’s suit, but by suit by the parties,”1173 because it was found by the jury 
“only that they did factiously and seditiously assemble and conspire to depauperate the 
fermors; but it does not say in the excise, which being incertain… are not to be made good 
by intendment.”1174 The counsel for the king argued that it was “an inevitable consequence 
that the King must lose his rent where his fermors are depauperated; and although it may 
                                                 
1172 1 Keble 675, 676; 83 ER 1179, 1180. 
1173 1 Lev 125, 83 ER 331. 
1174 1 Keble 655, 83 ER 1167-8. 
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mitigate the matter, that the particulars are not found, yet it remains a great offence, and of 
publick concernment.”1175 He further argued that “the jury have found it seditiously done, 
which cannot be in cases of publick concernment.”1176  
Then it was also argued that “to assemble his friends for his defence against H. that 
lay in wait in passage to the market, was held unlawful, although to a lawful end.”1177 This 
argument not only mapped onto the domain of treason, but also built onto the domain 
developed from the problem presented by these assemblies with were fell short of having 
either direct or indirect purpose of levying of war, or were not more guerrino arraiati, but 
which, by their number, could be construed as being treasonous. That is, it entailed the idea 
that numbers may provide even a greater threat of force than a smaller but armed group.  
Furthermore, the counsel argued that “in Midwinter against Scrogg in the Star- 
Chamber… the butchers of London were fined 3000l. for glutting the markets, to the 
impoverishment of several country fermors, because it was of publick concernment, and 
consequence.”1178 This argument, indeed, partly plays onto the entailment that being tax 
farmers, anything affecting them affected the King’s revenue, and therefore it was public. 
However, it also partly mapped onto the domain of unlawful trade agreements, and collective 
action such as monopolies, forestalling, etc. Indeed, the counsel also argued that “the very 
conspiracy to raise the price of pepper is punishable, or of any other.”1179 
The Court was also divided as to whether there was unlawful assembly only or 
whether the action amounted to something else. Keeling adhered to the argument that 
“whatever concerns the King’s revenue is publick.” Windham agreed that “had the persons 
been found guilty of the whole declaration, they should have been ransomd rather then (sic) 
fined, because it tends to rebellion.”1180 He believed though, that the purpose of the brewers 
was private only, and that the fact that the farmers were publick officers did only aggravate 
                                                 
1175 1 Keble 655, 83 ER 1168. 
1176 1 Keble 655, 656; 83 ER 1167. 
1177 1 Keble 655, 656; 83 ER 1167, 1168. 
1178 Ib. 
1179 1 Keble 560, 83 ER 1164. 
1180 1 Keble 675, 83 ER 1179. 
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the offense, but it did not make it a different one. Indeed, as mentioned above, for Windham, 
the offense was an illegal association or confederacy, and within this framework, “their 
assembling together, their consultation and conspiracy… is as much a false alliance, as if 
they had bound themselves by oath.”1181 Thus by conspiracy he means ‘association or 
alliance,’1182 which he takes to be synonymous with confederacy. Twisden agreed that “this 
impoverishing of the fermors, doth implicitly find the diminishing of the Kings revenue, as 
said earlier,” but he did not consider the assembly to be the offence but the overt act proving 
the punishable conspiracy. Finally, Hyde straddled between the two of them, and argued that 
“such assemblies are punishable because prohibited by law, although no other act done.”1183 
5.2.4 THE CATEGORY OF CONSPIRACY AFTER STARLING (TOWARDS THE CATEGORY OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY) 
 The blended structure between the crime of the will and high treason, that is, the idea 
that a crime of the will is punishable as long as it has been revealed by an overt act, began to 
be projected onto the category of conspiracy, shaping its form and making it a type of crime 
of the will along with treason. For instance, in Rex v Opie and Dodge (1671), a case of 
embracery of jurors, the information had been framed in the following way: 
[the defendants] contrived, conspired, and among themselves unlawfully agreed, by 
rewards and other ways and means, unlawfully to procure a verdict to be given for 
the defendant: and to perform their said most wicked intentions, contrivances, and 
conspiracies…[they] agreed that the said Stephen Trehance and Edward Dodge, for 
divers sums of money… should procure themselves… to be sworn de circumstantibus 
for the trial of the said issue, and should give a verdict for the defendant. And 
according to the said agreement… by unlawful ways and means, procured themselves 
to be sworn de circumstantibus for the trial of the said issue; and being so sworn, 
together with the other jury sworn to try the said issue, then and there gave their 
verdict for the defendant.1184 
 This information alleges two main offenses: a procurement of false verdict upon a 
“plea of trespass upon the case” by conspiracy, and the very embracery. The first offence 
was not within the writ of conspiracy in a narrow sense, although the way it was worded 
recalled the writ. But the important thing is that the facts of the information had been mapped 
                                                 
1181 1 Keble 675, 676; 83 ER 1179, 1180. 
1182 1 Keble 650, 83 ER 1164. 
1183 1 Keble 675, 676; 83 ER 1179, 1180. 
1184 1 Wms Saund 300, 85 ER 418. 
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onto the frame of the punishable plot to commit the said embracery, and then the embracery 
appears as an execution of that plot, which could be considered indeed as an overt act. Thus, 
the information allowed for two possible interpretations: as an act of embracery, of which 
the plot would amount to malice or intent, or as a punishable plot or intent, revealed by the 
embracery. Indeed, the reporter ambiguously described it as an “offence in the nature of 
embracery,”1185 suggesting perhaps that, though the form was that of conspiracy, the 
substance of the factual basis of the case entailed embracery. But the mappings between 
conspiracy and unlawful assembly, as they were being shaped in Starling Case and the 
Poulterers’ Case, took different shapes, forms, and flavors, that is, the facts that were 
interpreted or framed according to these cases varied in their nature, resulting in a series of 
mappings of the kind ‘x is a conspiracy.’ And it should always be understood here that 
‘conspiracy’ was now partly structured as a punishable plot, that is, as a crime of the will (or 
maybe mind or thought). In other words, this new structure of ‘conspiracy’ made it a 
specifically fruitful metaphor to understand other situations, many of which were not 
sanctioned as crimes by any law, neither statutory nor at common law. Many of these 
situations had nothing to do with the scheme of the false accusation.  
5.3 PUNISHABLE PLOT FRAME 
5.3.1 BLACKMAIL AS A PUNISHABLE PLOT 
 In talking about the action on the case, we have seen how the public reputation of 
individuals emerged as a sphere of life to be protected both by the law of slander and by the 
action on the case which protected people from legal slander. Among the many behaviors 
that could be a cause of discredit of a person, sexual intercourse outside procreation and 
marriage was one of the more salient in this period. Furthermore, since sexual intercourse 
was indeed not only a matter of the morals of the community but also of public regulation, 
the protection of public reputation involved also the protection of the innocent. In other 
words, since sexual intercourse involved the commission of ecclesiastical offences, and the 
attachment of civil consequences, the vindication and remedy of one’s sexual reputation was 
at the same time the protection of the innocent against legal oppression.  
                                                 
1185 1 Wms Saund 301, 85 ER 419. 
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 The vindication of one’s reputation is indeed an indication of how important this issue 
was for social life. Thus, it is not strange that some people felt tempted to use this to their 
advantage. That is, those suspicious of illicit sexual intercourse could always try to blackmail 
and extort money from their victims, who would face not only public disapproval but also 
legal sanctions. The problem was how to conceptualize and frame such practices within the 
existing legal framework. Here two analogies appeared. If the blackmail had been executed, 
and the party was innocent, the case would have resembled that of an action on the case. 
Thus, the damages would be the cause of action. If, however, the blackmail had not been 
executed, and there was some form of complicity involved, the offense could be reframed as 
a punishable plot to falsely accuse someone.  
5.3.1.1 TIMBERLY CASE (1663) 
 In this case the defendants were charged with having indicted someone “with having 
carnal knowledge of a woman, and did so, and that the child she went with was H.’s,”1186 
with the intent to “deprive the plaintiff of his credit, and to extort several sums of money 
from him,”1187 probably at the Sessions. That is, they were charged with the offence of 
fornication punishable by ecclesiastical courts by Cannon 109, and by 13 Edw 1 st 4, and 
with the charge of bastardy which by 18 Eli c3 was a matter of the JPs’ jurisdiction, who 
could hold parents liable to punishment and to the maintenance of the children, which 
otherwise would be chargeable to the parish. The determination of bastardy was indeed an 
ecclesiastical competence: it was certified to common law courts so that they could proceed 
in matters affected by the status of bastardy such as inheritance, or in this case, the 
maintenance of the children.1188 
The defendants moved to quash the indictment, arguing that this “was matter not 
within the conusance of this Court.” Thus, this objection could refer both to the fact that 
defamation for fornication was triable in ecclesiastical courts only, and also that the 
determination of bastardy belonged to that jurisdiction. It followed that abuses related to 
those matters belonged to ecclesiastical courts only. By analogy with the action for words, 
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the Court disagreed because it argued that though these were ecclesiastical matters, there was 
a civil damage in that the father would be chargeable,1189  and “cest Court ad conusance de 
chescun illegal chose per que damages poit de veign al party come icy poit.”1190 Furthermore, 
Foster opined that “if it be to do an act unlawful, the very conspiracy is a crime,” and Twisden 
that the inquiry of “omnibus coagulationibus” was part of the articles of the peace. The charge 
was found and then the defendants moved again in arrest of judgment that this was a matter 
ecclesiastical and that “as Poulters case, by the common law, no conspiracy lay till after 
acquittal; but doth now lye for a conspiracy to indict; but it must be such as may draw the 
party in peril.”1191 The court disagreed. Windham J. said that “the crime is the conspiracy, 
which whither it be only to defame, or disgrace men, or had it been to charge him with heresy, 
it had been punishable by common law, though no prosecution be had thereon.” Twisden J. 
opined that “this is no indictment for having a bastard, which is seldom, but it is a conspiracy 
for lucre and gain, to discharge one with a bastard, which is well actionable.” And Foster J. 
believed that “the very act of conspiring is so odious, for the ill consequences, that it cannot 
have good intent.”1192 
 The main issue in this case, therefore, was whether an indictment lies for a conspiracy 
to indict of trespass before ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Although this matter had been 
positively answered in 29 Edw 1 as it appears in 2 Inst 562, this authority was not cited in 
court. Instead, the strategy had been to draw an analogy (see below) with the action on the 
case, and with the precedent of the Poulterers’ Case.  
 The second analogy was drawn with regard to the Poulterers’ Case precedent. In that 
case, it had been held that conspiracy was punishable before execution. And the sense of 
conspiracy there was that of ‘plot’, which in turn blended with murder and the doctrine that 
the will must be taken for the deed. In that case, the offense was the plot to falsely indict 
somebody without regard to the result of the accusation; in this case, the analogy was that 
there was a plot to accuse somebody without regard to the nature of the accusation. Yet, 
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implicit in the Poulterers’ Case mapping with murder and the doctrine that the will must be 
taken for the deed was the idea that what was punishable was the intent to cause the death of 
an innocent, and therefore that the accusation was of felony. However, in Timberly Case 
there was not a murderous intent, but rather a tortious one, since the alleged purpose was to 
defame and extort the defendant. Thus, this case foreshadows a further blending between the 
Poulterers’ Case precedent and the action upon the case in the rule that a plot to damage 
someone is punishable without regard to its execution.  
5.3.1.2 ARMSTRONG’S CASE (1678) 
 We have seen how in Timberley Case the main issue was whether common law courts 
had jurisdiction over indictments of ecclesiastical offences. The point was argued in two 
ways, and one of them was an early mapping onto the Poulterers’ Case and the frame of the 
crime of the will or crime of intent. The Court had jurisdiction because it was a punishable 
plot. However, there was no further discussion as to whether the overt act requirement 
applied or not. 
 In Armstrong Case (1678), the accusation was that the defendants had conspired “to 
charge one with the keeping of a bastard-child, and thereby also to bring him to disgrace.”1193 
Thus, the defense moved in arrest of judgment that “the bare conspiring, without executing 
of it by some overt act, was not subject to an indictment according to the Poulterers’ case.”1194 
The missing overt act here was “that he was actually charged with the keeping of the child… 
[though] ‘twas but a pretended child, neither was he by warrant brought before a justice of 
peace upon such account.” That is, there was no actual prosecution by pressing charges 
against the person wrongly accused. In other words, the defense was also mapping his 
argument onto the writ of conspiracy frame where there was an acquittal requirement, that 
is, that there was a false indictment. The Court, however, did not allow the point to stand 
because “there was as much an overt act as the nature and design of this conspiracy did admit, 
in regard there was no child really, but only a contrivance to defame the person, and cheat 
                                                 
1193 1 Ventris 304, 86 ER 196; notice that the indictment was also framed as ‘plot’ to defame. 
1194 Ib.; notice how Starling Case was beginning to shape the emerging category of conspiracy so as to map 
onto the Poulterers’ Case. 
348 
 
him of his money, which was a crime of a very heinous nature,” suggesting maybe that the 
meeting and consultation were enough overt act of this plot.1195 
5.3.1.3 BEST CASE (1705) 
 These interpretations came together in Best Case, where there was an indictment for 
conspiring to charge a man with the filiation of a bastard child. The indictment averred that 
the defendants: 
Malorum nominum, &c et compassantes devisantes et inter se conspirantes how to 
cheat the Queen’s subjects of their money… falso nequiter et astute machinantes 
intendentes et inter se conspirantes… non solum de pecuniis suis decipere, et eundem 
P. in maximum scandalum, contemptum, et infamian, apud omnes ligeos et subditos 
of the Queen inducere…. falsò, illicite, deceptive, malitiose, et ex inqui lucre causa 
inter se conspiraverunt, machinaverunt, consultaverunt, et agreeaverunt, falsò, 
injuste, nequiter et diabilice ad onerandum et accusandum praedictum P. esse patrem 
infantis, unde praedicta E. E. one of the defendants tune gravida fuit… P tunc nuper 
praeantea habuisset carnalem cognitionem corporis ipsius praefatae Eliz. E. et ipsam 
preaefatam E. E. carnaliter cognovisset… ac quod pro ulteriori executione… inter se 
agreeaverunt et conclusere, quod ipse praedictus B. ad praefatum P. accederet, et 
eundem P. accusaret…quod praedictus Best in executione praemissorum, ac 
secundum praedicta conspirationem, consultationem, et agreeamentum… onerabat et 
accusabat praedictum P… ad grave damnum, scandalum, et defamationem praefacti 
P.1196 
 Thus, this indictment evokes several possible frames of understanding as to what the 
legal nature of the facts of the case could be. The concept of ‘false indictment’ called for the 
‘writ of conspiracy’ frame. The allegations as to the nature of the offence falsely indicted, 
‘fornication’ and ‘being the father of a bastard’ referred to the precedents of ‘false indictment 
of ecclesiastical offense.’ The terms used to refer to a ‘plot,’ (compassantes, deivantes, 
conspiraverunt, machinaverunt, consultaverunt, agreeaverunt) along with the executory 
clauses (ac quod pro ulteriori executione, in executione praemissorum) ac secundum, evoke 
the crime of the will frame (plot-overt act). The former terms can also evoke the frame of 
‘assembly’ and that of ‘alliance.’ The intent to ‘slander’ (de bono nomine fama statu et 
credential suis deprivare) and ‘to cheat or fraud by collusion’ (de pecuniis suis decipere et 
                                                 
1195 Ib.; (86 ER 196) (Cf. with Daniell (1704). Later Holt would express the opinion that “a conspiracy to charge 
one with bastard child is indictable, but if one should advise another to do it without more, it would not.” (6 
Mod 99, 100; 87 ER 856, 857). 
1196 2 Ld Raym 1167, 92 ER 272; also 6 Mod 186, 87 ER 941; 1 Salked 174, 91 ER 160. 
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defraudare), along with the allegation of such damages (ad grave damnum, scandalum, et 
defamationem) evoked the frame of the ‘action on the case in the nature of conspiracy.”  
 In contrast, the defense argued by framing the indictment against the domain of the 
crime of the will, arguing that “this indictment is grounded merely upon the conspiracy to 
charge falsly; and this conspiracy with the subsequent false affirmation, is sufficient to 
maintain the indictment within the express resolution of The Poulterers’ Case.” The defense 
followed suit and pleaded the overt act requirement since “it does not appear that any thing 
was done in pursuance of the conspiracy, and that also ought to appear, according to The 
Poulterers’ Case.”1197 Indeed, as said earlier, the Poulterers’ Case admitted both 
understandings since it was framed both against the crime of the will frame as well as against 
other frames in which conspiracy did not mean plot-intent. And the overt act requirement 
was only manifest when framed against Starling Case. 
 Holt built his interpretation against these other frames, particularly that of the 
Definition of Conspirators, arguing that “here is a confederacy to charge a man falsó, 
nequiter, malitiosè, &c. and though the word confederaverunt be not in, yet there are the 
words machinaverunt et aggregaverunt, which are as full.” He then went on to say that “a 
formed conspiracy, strictly speaking… will not lie until acquittal, or and ignoramus found… 
but this seems to be a conspiracy late loquendo, or a confederacy to charge one falsly, which, 
sure, without more is a crime,” adding that “if in an indictment for such confederacy you 
proceed further, and shew a legal prosecution of the confederacy, there you must show the 
event thereof, as “ignoramus” returned on the indictment, or an acquittal… but where you 
rest upon the confederacy, it will be well without more.” Thus, framed against the Definition 
of Conspirators, and the articles of enquire and all other sources cited by Coke in the 
Poulterers’ Case,1198 the meaning of conspiracy was that of ‘alliance,’ signaled by the word 
                                                 
1197 Lord Raymon reports that “it did not appear, that any thing came of this conspiracy, and bare conspiring to 
do an ill thing by another is not criminal, unless the thing to be done; for it is the damage the party receives by 
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false conspiracy, without further act of pursuance, is indictable,” 6 Mod 186, 87 ER 941. 
1198 Thus, Salkeld reports the Court opinion that “confederacies are one of the articles in the commission of oyer 
and terminer, to be inquired of, ”1 Salked 174, 91 ER 160.  
350 
 
confederacy, which acquires here a more general meaning, leaving the term conspiracy for 
the frame of the action of conspiracy (or the writ of conspiracy). 
 Thus, the Court decided that “the defendants were charged at least with a conspiracy 
to charge the prosecutor with fornication. And though that was a spiritual defamation, the 
conspiring to do it was a temporal offense and indictable,”1199 because “agreeing together to 
charge a man with a crime falsly, is a consummate offence, and indictable,”1200 and therefore, 
“the confederacy is the git of the indictment.”1201  
5.3.1.4 KINNERSLEY CASE (1705) 
 This was a case in which the blackmail involved the threat of revealing homosexual 
intercourse. Thus, the indictment was framed as a punishable plot of the defendants who 
would,  
in order to extort money from [the prosecutor] … did conspire together to charge 
[him]… with endeavouring to commit sodomy… and in execution of this conspiracy 
they did in the presence of several persons falsely and maliciously accuse my lord, 
that he conatus fuit rem veneream habere with the defendant… and so to commit 
sodomy.1202  
 Thus, it was objected by the defense that “bare words are not a sufficient overt act, 
without alleging something actually done towards putting the conspiracy in execution.”1203 
That is, in this case, the conspirators had not pressed any charges of sodomy against anybody, 
but had only revealed it in public. The prosecutor replied that “there was no occasion to lay 
any [charge]. The conspiracy is the git of the charge, and the other only matter of aggravation, 
of which the defendant may be acquitted, and found guilty of the conspiracy 
                                                 
1199 2 Ld Raym 1167, 1169;92 ER 272, 273. Cf. 6 Mod 186, 187; 87 ER 941, 942: “it is a conspiracy to charge 
one falsly with fornication, which, though it be no crime at common law, is punishable in the Spiritual Court.” 
1200 Paraphrased in the opinion as “a confederacy falsly to charge with a thing that is a crime by any law is 
indictable,” 6 Mod 186, 187; 87 ER 941, 942. 
1201 6 Mod 186, 187; 87 ER 941, 942. Cf. Lord Raymond: “the conspiracy was the gist of the indictment… the 
Chief Justice said, that confederacies were one of the articles in the commission of oyer” 6 Mod 186, 92 ER 
272; Salkeld’s report also hinted at an ‘assembly’ rather than an ‘alliance’: “several people may lawfully meet 
and consult to prosecute a guilty person; otherwise if to charge one that is innocent, right or wrong, for that is 
indictable” 6 Mod 186, 187; 87 ER 941, 942. Cf. with Holt’s obiter that “people may lawfully meet, and contrive 
and agree to charge a guilty person,” 6 Mod 186, 84 ER 941. 
1202 1 Stra 193, 93 ER 467; for an early case of a conspiracy to commit sodomy see Blood’s Case, Raym T 417, 
83 ER 218. 
1203 1 Stra 193, 93 ER 467. 
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notwithstanding.”1204 And in support of this proposition he mentioned that “a conspiracy to 
charge a man with being the father of a bastard child was held well laid, without any overt 
act.”1205 Thus, in this case the defense subscribes to the alternative interpretation of the 
Poulterers’ Case that a plot is punishable without overt act, relying on the precedent of 
Timberly’s Case. But the interesting thing is that the aggravation argument. This argument 
had been evoked in the cases of cheats as a way of disregarding the allegations of collusion 
(or conspiracy) as not being substantive for the case by contrast to the cheat—1206, but here 
it was an argument to disregard the actual behavior (the overt act of denouncing someone as 
having committed sodomy) by contrast to the conspiracy. The court dismissed all the 
objections.  
5.3.2 CHEAT AND FRAUD BY COLLUSION AS PUNISHABLE PLOT 
 In Paris Case (1670) (2 Keble 572, 84 ER 360), the defendant had obtained a 
judgment of debt by cheating a woman into signing a warrant of attorney and a release of 
errors for a supposed action of debts owed to him under the pretense that the document she 
was signing was intended to better help her to marry a wealthy man. Then an information 
was brought. The reports of this case do not agree as to how to qualify the information, which 
is described either as conspiracy1207 or as “un cheat.”1208 By contrast, Ventris reports the 
information as if it were against Paris only, “for that he faudulenter & deceptive procured 
one… to give a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment.”1209 Probably, as we will see later, 
there were both allegations of a conspiracy1210 and a cheat.   
 What that case hinted at, but did not explicitly say, appears expressed in the 
indictment of Thody’s Case (1673), which put forward that the defendants “conspiratione 
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1206 See below. 
1207 2 Keble 572, 84 ER 360. 
1208 1 Sid 432, 82 ER 1200. 
1209 1 Ventris 50, 86 ER 35. 
1210 The information was brought indeed against “Paris et alios”, 1 Sid 432, 82 ER 1200, suggesting that there 
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inter eos habita, they enticed J. S. to play, and cheated him with false dice.”1211 This formula, 
indeed, was discernibly built in analogy with the writ of conspiracy, particularly the 
conspiratione clause and the Year Books’ cases, but alleging forgeries and deceits instead of 
a false accusation. This mapping facilitated the drawing of inferences from the structure of 
the writ of conspiracy.  
 So, did the defendant in this case who pleaded the plurality requirement in a motion 
in arrest of judgment since judgment had been entered against him while the other defendants 
had not yet been arraigned. Hale initially drew an analogy with the rule that “if one be 
acquitted in an action of conspiracy, the other cannot be guilty: but where one is found guilty, 
and the other comes not in upon process, or if he dies hanging the suit, yet judgment shall be 
upon verdict against the other.” His distinction was between plurality requirement in the case 
of acquittal of one party, and in the case of conviction of one party before the rest have 
pleaded to the indictment. Wylde Justice, by contrast, opined that the plurality requirement 
did not apply in this case because “the difference was, where the suit was upon conspiracy 
wherein the villainous judgment was to be given, and where the conspiracy is laid only by 
way of aggravation, as in this case.” That is, this was not a case of conspiracy but rather one 
grounded on the cheat. Then Hale said that the opinion that plurality applied to acquittal—
meaning that the acquittal of one implied the acquittal of the rest—but not to conviction of 
one defendant  before the rest have pleaded “would be the same in an action against two upon 
the case for conspiracy; but not in such actions, where tho’ there be a charge of conspiracy, 
yet the gist of the action is upon another matter”1212 This implies that  such actions are not 
grounded on conspiracy and therefore the plurality requirement does not apply.  
 In any case, the important issue here is that the situation described in the cause of 
action was interpreted in at least two ways, each of them corresponding to the mapping onto 
some form of action or precedent, or legal concept. Thus, if we start with the concept of 
‘aggravation,’ and the situation ‘cheat’, and the frame of the action on the case of conspiracy 
(or perhaps the writ of conspiracy modified), the cause of action becomes one of cheat by 
collusion, where conspiracy means collusion. A similar use of the frame appears in the 
                                                 
1211 1 Ventris 235, 86 ER 157. 
1212 Ib., 
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grounds of accusation of the case of King vs Salter (1685), where the indictment alleged that 
the defendant “being an evil man, &c. and conspiring to aggrieve one Land, pretended that 
he had broke his arm, and accordingly counterfeited the same, and upon presence to seek his 
living by any labour, and exhibited a complaint against him to the justices of the peace.”1213 
In this case, the cause of action lay on a fraud to cheat the local authorities to claim poor 
relief, and the allegation of conspiracy appears as ‘collusion,’ or the means by which the 
fraud is carried out. Thus, conspiracy is not the cause of action but an aggravation of the 
cheat. In other words, a collusion is not wrong in itself but rather something that aggravates 
the wrong of cheating. That means that it appears not as an element of the fraud or cheat that 
would still exist without the collusion.  
 If we start with the framework of the writ of conspiracy, then there cannot be a cause 
of action, since there is no procurement of false indictment but only a cheat. Besides, the 
plurality requirement is projected onto the situation, and therefore there cannot be an acquittal 
of one only (though it seems that the Court was inclined to consider the possibility of a 
conviction of one before the others had been charged). But this framework was susceptible 
of new interpretations.  
 Thus, in Thorp’s Case (1697), the cause of action was that the defendants “wickedly, 
unlawfully, and deceitfully, conspire… to take one… being under age of eighteenth years… 
to carry him out of the custody of his father, without his notice, and against his will, and to 
marry him to… a person of ill name, and of no fortune.” Then the defendants had “unlawfully 
assembled themselves together to accomplish the said conspiracy and wicked intentions,” 
after which they  
by divers false, malicious, and deceitful insinuations, did falsely, unjustly, 
maliciously, and deceitfully persuade the said [young man]… to hate his father… and 
did unlawfully and deceitfully, by false speaches, persuade and solicit him to be 
married to her… by divers false assurances and promises, solicit, invite, and procure 
[the young man]… to leave the said school, against the will and without the notice or 
consent of his father, and did receive, maintain, and keep him, with an intent to 
persuade him to marry the said [defendant].1214 
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 The situations described in this information could be paraphrased as cajoling a young 
man into marrying a woman of no wealth, and doing so without the knowledge or consent of 
his father. Though the cause of action does not correspond exactly to a fraud or cheat by 
collusion, there are elements in the information that allow the framing of it in that way, such 
as the adverb deceitfully, the adjective false, and conspiracy. In addition to this, there is a 
‘plot,’ and also an ‘unlawful assembly’ with that purpose. Thus, the cause of action can be 
framed either as a fraud or enticement by collusion, as an act against the patria potestas, as 
a crime of the will, or as an unlawful assembly. Of these, we are concerned with the following 
mappings:  
5.3.2.1 CONSPIRACY AS PROCUREMENT OF FALSE ACCUSATION 
 One of the strategies of the defenses in cases of collusion is to partially map 
conspiracy onto the frame of the writ of conspiracy and draw the inference that the defense 
of plurality requirement applies: “it is laid by way of conspiracy, and the defendant Thorp 
being only found guilty, there can be no judgment against him, because one cannot conspire.” 
Likewise, it was argued for the defendant that “every act which is laid to be done by them is 
in order to accomplish a joint intention… so that all being acquitted but Thorp, the verdict 
has falsified the information; for one cannot conspire.”1215 
5.3.2.2 CONSPIRACY AS FRAUD BY COLLUSION 
 The replication to this argument on the part of the prosecution was drawn by mapping 
this case with the abovementioned precedents of fraud by collusion, to infer that the rule 
applied that “it is not only an information grounded upon a conspiracy, but it is laid by way 
of aggravation in the beginning.”  The same conclusion that “notwithstanding these words 
per conspirationem (italics are mine), &c. it was an action on the case, the substance whereof 
was the illegal arresting the plaintiff, and not the conspiracy” was drawn by mapping this 
case onto the action upon the case frame of Skinner v Gunton.  
5.3.2.3 CONSPIRACY AS SCHEME TO DEFRAUD  
 This frame is not the basis of any argument, but it is clearly present in the way the 
facts of the case were framed into the information. Thus, the information is partially mapping 
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the facts onto the precedents of Starling Case and Poulterers’ Case, and integrating these 
into the frame of conspiracy. So, the ‘conspiracy with the purpose of enticing the young man 
to marry someone without the consent of the father’ maps onto the ‘plot,’ and the unlawful 
assembly to that purpose, and the diverse acts in execution of the plot, are mapped onto the 
‘overt act.’ Furthermore, these precedents are structured according to the mappings that intent 
is force, and plot is intent, and therefore ultimate cause. And then the rule that intent is 
punishable if revealed to the world, from that frame of punishable plot is applied. Thus, 
within this frame, the cheat no longer appears as a collusion. Therefore, in the resulting blend 
conspiracy appears as a ‘scheme or design’ that is to be put into execution.  
 The same mapping appears in an obiter by Holt Justice in the case of Macarty (1705). 
This was a case of a fraud in which a broker and a wine-merchant had defrauded another of 
his goods by selling him an adulterated beer under the pretense that it was Portuguese wine. 
Though this was the cause of action, Holt J. argued that they had also committed “a 
combination to cheat,”1216 giving thus way to use of the term combination as a scheme to 
defraud.  
 And it also appears in a case of false accusation of ecclesiastical offence as we will 
see in short, which could be framed as a “contrivance to defame the person, and cheat him of 
his money.”1217  
5.3.3 DUELS AS PUNISHABLE PLOT 
 Another domain which could be projected against the frame of the punishable plot 
was that of the duels that could be seen as act in execution of a murderous intent. Thus, in 
Britton Case (1703), the indictment was that the defendants: 
Unlawfully, clandestinely, devilishly, and maliciously… consult, machinate, propose 
and intend, and did among themselves…. Confederate and conspire, and each of them 
did machinate, propose, and intend to beat, wound, and evilly treat the said William 
Colepeper… either by Duel or Assasination, feloniously and maliciously to kill and 
murder.1218  
                                                 
1216 6 Mod 302, 87 ER 1040. 
1217 Armstrong Case (1678) 1 Ventris 304, 305, 86 ER 196, 197. 
1218 8 ST 178. 
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 From this point of view, the rest of counts of the indictment alleging the challenges 
and assault against their victim that the defendants had been involved in became actions in 
execution of this murderous intent, or, as the Counselor for the Queen put it “they are all 
several Overt-Acts of the Conspiracy:”1219 
Nathaniel Denew, with Force and Arms, and lying in wait of his Malice, Fore-
thought, and Assault premeditated… offered himself to fight a mortal Duel… against 
the said William Colepeper… Richard Britton, with Force and Arms, Malice, fore-
thought, and Assault premeditated, and then and there offered himself to fight a 
mortal Duel… and that the said Nathaniel Denew, and John Merriam…. With Force 
and Arms, with Malice, Fore-thought, by lying in Wait, and premeditated Murder, 
assaulted him the said William Colepeper; and with drawn Swords, sharply, cruelly, 
and with all their Strength, tried, and long contended, to wound, kill, and murder 
him.1220 
Thus, during the trial, the defense observed that “the Indictment is laid several Ways: 
Besides the Confederacy, they charge us with particular Offences in Challenging…they say 
they entered into a Conspiracy, to consult and contrive how they might do a Mischief to Mr. 
Colepeper,” and he argued that “they have endeavour’d to support a Conspiracy: and if they 
fail of the Proof of it, they know their whole indictment fails,”1221 suggesting that the grounds 
of the accusation lay on the conspiracy rather than the challenge. Indeed, he went on to say 
that “suppose that there should be some warm Words between Gentlemen, and those Words 
indictable, unless there be some Things premeditated in order to bring pass such 
Conspiracy?” Thus, since “they have not produced any Evidence whatsoever, that Mr. 
Britton, one of them, ever spoke to, or saw the other two… there can be no manner of a 
Conspiracy.” Furthermore, since it was proved that Merriam retired, it was clear that “Mr. 
Denew is alone in the Conspiracy: he conspired by himself and there must be Three to make 
it a Conspiracy.”1222 The jury found the defendants not guilty of the conspiracy, and guilty 
of other counts of the Indictment. 
 The interesting thing in this indictment is its dual construction. On the one hand, 
framed against the crime of the will, it alleged a punishable plot to cause someone to die by 
                                                 
1219 8 ST 178, 193. 
1220 8 ST 178-179. 
1221 8 ST 178, 193. 
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dueling with him rendered manifest through the actions of challenging him to duel, and trying 
to engage in such duel or assault. On the other hand, as pointed out by the defense in the 
passage above, the plot became evidence of the mental elements of these offenses of assault 
and the challenge (malice aforethought, assault premeditated), or as the defense counsellor 
put it, “suppose there should be some warm Words between Gentlemen, are those Words 
indictable, unless be some Things premeditated in order to bring to pass such a 
Conspiracy?”1223 That is, these words become a challenge to duel with the purpose to cause 
someone to die in the light of the previous plot of which they are the execution. Unless there 
is malice premeditated, insulting and challenging words cannot be considered as an offence. 
In other words, it could be framed as a plot to kill somebody by dueling with him that was 
put into execution (in which case conspiracy means a plot which is punishable) and therefore 
revealed to the world by an assault and a challenge to duel, or it could be framed as an assault 
and challenge to duel that has been premeditated (in which case conspiracy still means ‘plot,’ 
but no longer as the crime itself but merely as further evidence of malice aforethought).   
5.3.4 ENTICEMENT AS PUNISHABLE PLOT 
 In the case of The Queen against Daniell (1704), we have an interesting example of 
how the mapping onto Starling was used to draw legal arguments. This case was one of 
indictment of enticement against one for “à shopà et domo, et à servitio praed. Joseph 
discedere, et seipsum absentare procuravit, allexit, persuasit, et causavit.”1224 But there was 
no evidence that the servant left service, and that there was a breach of contract, but only that 
the prospective employer had a beer with him, persuading him to leave employment. Thus, 
drawing an analogy between the meeting and persuasion and conspiracy or plot and unlawful 
assembly to plot in Starling, the defense excepted that “in no case is the bare giving advice, 
or endeavoring to persuade one to do an ill thing without more, punishable,”  though “if 
several conspire and confederate together to do an ill thing, though nothing more be done, it 
will be indictable, because the meeting together in order to such confederacy is unlawful,”  
because “the rule is non oficit conatus nisi sequitur effectus.”1225 
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 Furthermore, he mapped onto Cockshall Case, and argued that “if a freeman of a 
corporation endeavor, intend, or conspire with others, to do acts that tends to the prejudice 
of the corporation, yet if there be no act done, it is no good cause of disfranchisement, nor of 
indictment; a fortiori, it will not be a good cause here, where the endeavor is only to the 
prejudice of a single person in one particular instance.” This last clause also refers to Starling, 
where “it was an indictment for meeting and conspiring together how to impoverish the 
farmers of the excise; and the reason why that was held indictable was, because such thing 
would affect the publick revenue.”1226 
 In this way, the enticement was framed in two different ways. As against the 
punishable plot frame it was a plot or conspiracy between two, but it followed that since there 
was no overt act it was not punishable. As against the unlawful assembly, it was a meeting 
between two, but it was not punishable because it had a private rather than a public purpose. 
Holt C. J. agreed that “it two or more confederate and agree to indict a man of a crime of 
which he is not guilty, the very meeting and agreement is an ill and unlawful act, but not 
indictable perhaps.” He added that if a meeting be to rob or kill, it may be indictable; but 
even there advising one to rob or kill, without something be done thereupon, is not 
indictable.”1227 From this it follows that Holt considered the meeting to commit murder or 
robbery as of public concern, and that likened advising someone to do something to 
conspiracy or plot. On the other hand, Powell J. opined that according to the Poulterers’ 
Case, a “bare conspiracy without more was held indictable.”1228  
5.4 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION FRAME 
 We have seen how the action on the case grew apart from the writ of conspiracy as 
the independent frame of malicious prosecution. At first, the focus of the action was on 
malicious prosecution rather than the old procurement of false indictment, but maybe because 
of the analogy with slander and vexatious lawsuits the cause of action came to be considered 
the damages or injury inflicted on the defendant by means of a malicious prosecution, 
                                                 
1226 Ib. 
1227 6 Mod 99, 87 ER 856. Cf. with Holt later “a conspiracy to charge one with a bastardchild [sic] is indictable; 
but if one should advise another to do it without more, it would not; 6 Mod 99, 100, 87 ER 856, 857.  
1228 6 Mod 99, 100; 87 ER 856, 857. 
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particularly slander and vexation. Then the question arose: if slander (by malicious 
prosecution) was the cause of action, could a slander by mere accusation (of ecclesiastical) 
offense be punished by conspiracy? 
 There are clear signs to suggest that lawyers drew analogies on malicious prosecution 
to frame the indictments for blackmailing as punishable plots to bring false accusations of 
ecclesiastical offenses. The basis of the analogy was, of course, that accusations of 
ecclesiastical offences, though not actionable under the writ because they did not charge 
felony, had been proved to be actionable under the action on the case which admitted 
accusations of trespass as a cause of action. And the argument went that such accusations of 
trespass were actionable at common law because the cause of action was the damage to the 
individual. Likewise, the analogy went that cases of accusation of fornication,1229 and cases 
of accusation of sodomy1230 would be punishable because of their intent to cause damage to 
the party. This analogy with the action on the case can further be detected in the form of the 
indictments, which included averments of the intent of the defendants to cause damage both 
to the reputation and to the purse of the defendant by their accusation.1231 Clearly, there is no 
actual damage alleged as in the action on the case, but rather the idea that there was an intent 
to cause damage to the party. This in turn would lead to the integration of elements of 
malicious prosecution into the frame of conspiracy as a punishable plot.  
5.4.1 INNOCENCE REQUIREMENT 
 In this section, we will see how lawyers framed arguments upon the writ and the 
action on the case. 
                                                 
1229 Such as Timberly’s Case (1663) 1 Keble 203, 83 ER 900; 1 Sid 68, 83 ER 974; 1 Lev 62, 83 ER 29; 1 Keble 
254, 83 ER 930; Armstrong Case (1678) 1 Ventris 304, 86 ER 196; Best’s Case (1705) 6 Mod 186, 87 ER 941; 
1 Salked 174, 91 ER 160; 2 Ld Raym 1167, 92 ER 272. 
1230 Such as Blood’s Case (1608) Raym T 417, 83 ER 218, and Kinnersley and Moore’s Case (1719) (1 Stra 
193, 93 ER 467. 
1231 “To deprive the plaintiff of his credit, and to extort several sums of money from him,” 1 Keble 254, 83 E 
930; “to bring him to disgrace,” 1 Ventris 304, 86 ER 196; “in order to oppress and defame… and to get unto 
themselves unlawful gains of money,” 6 Mod 186, 87 ER 941; “de pecuniis suis decipere et defraudare… 
etiam… de bono nomine fama statu et credential suis deprivare… in maximum scandalum, contemptum, et 
infamiam, apud omnes ligeos et subditos of the Queen inducer…. ad grave damnum, scandalum, et 
defamationem (of the defendant),” 2 Ld Raym 1167, 92 ER 272; “in order to extort money,” 1 Stra 193, 93 ER 
467. 
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 In all these cases of blackmailing, it seems that there was no indictment or 
information, or any other formal action, but at best a public imputation. This amounted to 
slander, and, as said earlier, if the blackmail had been executed, then it would amount to 
some form of malicious prosecution. But did then the requirement in malicious prosecution 
that there should be at least some form of prosecution as by pressing charges apply (a 
requirement that was confirmed in the Poulterers’ Case)? Did the acquittal requirement 
apply? To raise these questions, the lawyers had to draw analogies with malicious 
prosecution and with the old writ of conspiracy indeed. Thus, in Best Case there was a false 
accusation that a man was the father of a bastard, and that therefore he had committed 
fornication. An analogy is drawn between the acquittal requirement within the frame of writ 
of conspiracy and the fact the indictment did not aver that the defendant “was not the father 
of it,” to conclude that “it was essentially necessary to the maintaining such indictment to 
aver that the party was innocent,”1232 because “a conspiracy to charge a man with a fact that 
is true, is not punishable; and therefore the indictment ought to have said, the prosecutor was 
not the father of the child.”1233 Obviously, this was not a merely formalistic requirement, 
since the prosecutor then would have had to prove that he was not the father of the child, 
which was only determinable by due process of law. Holt Justice agreed that “though a 
conspiracy to charge falsly be indictable, yet the party ought to shew himself to be innocent, 
for people may lawfully meet, and contrive and agree to charge a guilty person… here if the 
defendants had pleaded not guilty, they must have been acquitted; for the order of two justices 
standing in force, would have concluded Peter Pickering from giving evidence of his 
innocency.”1234 Likewise, Montague for the defendants argued that “it ought not only to 
appear that the accusation was false, but that it was before a lawful magistrate; otherwise it 
could not be a legal accusation,” and that “if this were a writ of conspiracy, it would not have 
lain before an acquittal, and then there would be no need of an averment of the party’s 
innocence, because the acquittal would be tantamount.”1235 The Court decided that “it need 
not be averred that H. is innocent, for it is said, that the defendant did falsely affirm him to 
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1234 6 Mod 186, 87 ER 941. 
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be the father, and innocence is to be intended till the contrary appears;”1236 and in support of 
the thesis that averment of innocence was not necessary they cited both Kimberley and 
Armstrong’s cases.1237  
 Similarly, in a case of false accusation of sodomy, the defense raised in arrest of 
judgment that “it should appear upon the record, that the party accused is innocent; for it is 
no crime to charge a guilty person with such an offence… in actions for a malicious 
prosecution the plaintiff must shew the former action to be determined, and how; so likewise 
he must shew an acquittal upon an indictment.”1238 Likewise it was argued that “the 
defendants are justified, till it is falsified in a legal manner, either by ignoramus or acquittal… 
and the Court will not suffer the party accused to bring this action, till he has manifested his 
innocence; because otherwise there might be contradictory judgments, for the parties might 
be condemned in an action for that prosecution, which they might afterwards establish, and 
then those two judgments would be inconsistent.”1239 The prosecution replied that “it is 
expressly laid, that the defendant did falsely charge, which could not be, if the accusation 
was true” And in support Best’s Case was cited as making good an indictment without 
averment of innocence though “a difference was taken in an indictment for perjury, where 
you must aver the oath false; and also in actions for a malicious prosecution, where it must 
appear the party was innocent, to intitle him to damages.”1240 Since the Court unanimously 
overruled all the exceptions, these arguments must be considered valid.  
 However, now the question was not framed as whether the party was acquitted, or 
whether the accusation had been found groundless by the Grand Jury, but rather whether the 
party should allege his innocence. The question could be rephrased in contemporary terms 
this way: is there blackmailing if the accusation is true? For sure, for us it would be so, but 
since the blackmailing was framed as a punishable plot to falsely indict someone, the question 
is relevant, since this presumes that the indictment was false. But how can they know that 
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before there was even some form of prosecution? Or as Holt put it, plotting to accuse 
someone of something true was not necessarily a wrong. The Courts relied on a presumption 
of innocence, implying that until prosecution was initiated, verbal accusations were 
considered to be false.  
 This also shows how the category of conspiracy was becoming detached from its 
procedural elements. The writ of conspiracy required the acquittal of the party indicted, the 
action on the case was grounded on some form of prosecution, and so was the Poulterers’ 
Case, but by now there was no need even for the existence of formal proceedings to ground 
the prosecution for conspiracy.  
5.5 UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY FRAME 
5.5.1 UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND CHEATS 
 Though the punishable plot is not in the arguments of Thorp’s case (see above), the 
mapping with Startling Case is active. That is why one of the concepts dealt with in that case 
serves as rebuttal against the argument that “by the laws of England a young man of the age 
of fourteen years and upwards may dispose of himself in marriage; and it is no offence to 
persuade him to marry… the plaintiff ought to shew, that the defendant did solicit or procure 
his son to be married by some unlawful means. The information is too general; he should 
have shewed a particular offence.”1241 Thus, mapping the assembly in the information onto 
the arguments about unlawful assembly in Starling Case, the defense inferred the proposition 
that “that which is lawful for one man to do, may be made unlawful to done by conspiracies… 
it is lawful for any brewer to brew small beer, but if several shall conspire together to brew 
no strong but all small beer, on purpose to defraud the king of his duties, such conspiracy is 
unlawful.”1242 The argument was further refined by the Court in the argument that “it is true, 
it is lawful to marry, but if it be obtained by unlawful means, it is an offence,” implying that 
enticing and persuading someone can be considered unlawful if done by means of a collusion. 
Thus, this reverses the idea that a collusion is an aggravation, and made it a part of a cheat 
(though this is not clearly a cheat, but mere persuasion, which indeed, may be part of a cheat).  
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 This latter mapping of cheating onto unlawful assembly could explain the Court’s 
argument in a case of cheating per conspirationem that the indictment should not be quashed 
because “that being a cheat, though it was private in the particular, yet it was publick in its 
consequences.”1243 That is, this case mapped onto Thody in that both were cheating per 
conspirationem to invoke the principle as applied to unlawful assembly that something 
private might have a public purpose or consequence.  
5.6 FALSE ACCUSATION FRAME 
 Another element of the frame of the writ of conspiracy was the defense of the plurality 
requirement. Thus, in Thody’s Case (1673), the defense inferred from that requirement that 
“judgment might not be entred against him until the others came in; for being laid by way of 
conspiracy, if the rest should chance to be acquitted, no judgment could be given against 
him,” to which Hale J. replied that “where one is found guilty, and the other comes not in 
upon process, or if he dies hanging the suit, yet judgment shall be upon the verdict against 
the other.”1244 Likewise, the Court in the Thompson Case (1688) opined that the acquittal of 
one is the acquittal of both,” (3 Mod 221, 87 ER 142) and the defense in Kinnersley argued 
that “to every conspiracy there must be two persons at least, whereas here is only one brought 
in and found guilty. If hereafter the other should be found not guilty, that will consequently 
be an acquittal of [the other]” to which it was replied “this is arguing from what has not 
happened, and probably never will; for though Moore may have an opportunity to acquit 
himself, and is not concluded by verdict as Kinnersley is; yet as the matter now stands Moore 
himself is found guilty, for the conspiracy is found as it is laid, and therefore judgment may 
be given against one before the trial of the other,”1245  that is, if conspiracy, meaning the plot, 
is found, the order in which the defendants are convicted does not matter. This is consistent 
with the idea that the gist of the action is the plot, and if the acts in execution of it are not 
found with regard to one of the parties, that party is still guilty of the crime.1246 
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5.7 HAWKINS 
5.7.1 THE PROBLEM OF FAILED PROSECUTIONS 
 The last stop in this account of the rise of the modern offense of conspiracy after the 
Star Chamber had been abolished is Hawkins’ Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, which 
would prove to be very influential. In it, William Hawkins classified this offence within his 
system as one against the subject: a non-capital, inferior offense that does not amount to an 
actual disturbance of the peace, committed by common persons, under the infamous and 
grossly scandalous, proceeding from principles of downright dishonesty, malice or 
faction.1247 I will comment on the implications of these classifications later.  
 As we will see in short, Hawkins sets up his description of the offence partially as a 
legal argument against the opinion that there was an acquittal requirement for the action by 
the writ of conspiracy to lie. This formal requirement implied that those prosecutions that 
failed to secure an indictment were not liable to any action or prosecution because they fell 
beyond the scope of the writ. As we have seen earlier, the courts developed an action on the 
case that made these failed prosecutions liable to civil remedy. But the cause of action in this 
action was no longer the malicious procurement by conspiracy or collusion, but the damages 
defendants had undergone as a consequence of the prosecution (slander, vexation, 
imprisonment). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the acquittal requirement came to be considered 
as one of the elements that may distinguished the action on the case in the nature of 
conspiracy from the writ. Likewise, in the Poulterers’ Case, the Star Chamber had developed 
a parallel doctrine according to which such prosecutions could be considered plots punishable 
under the view that they were crimes of the will, as long as they had been put into execution. 
In other words, the law did not punish the false charge as such but as revealing a murderous 
intent.  
 The development of the action and the indictment sparkled a debate as to whether 
prosecutors ought to be held liable for failed prosecutions. This was a matter of the policy of 
the law. There were two main camps as to what were the values or interests that the law 
should protect. On the one hand, there were those who thought that the law should have as a 
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priority the prosecution of crime, and that, therefore, making prosecutors liable to civil 
damages or to punishment would discourage prosecution. On the other hand, there were those 
who believed that above all the law should protect the innocent from false imprisonment, 
vexation and injury to their reputation.  
5.7.2 HAWKINS’ VIEW OF THE ACQUITTAL REQUIREMENT  
 The originality of Hawkins is that in addition to these remedies, he argues that the 
offense of conspiracy does not require the acquittal of the party grieved indeed. As will be 
seen in short, his argument derives from a change in the frame against which he chooses to 
interpret the cause of action in the writ of conspiracy: the statute 33 Edw I that provided the 
definition of conspirators as those “that do confeder or bind themselves by oath, covenant, 
or other alliance.”1248 Thus, he infers that “from this definition of conspirators it seems clearly 
to follow… those also are guilty of this offence, who barely conspire to indict a man falsly 
and maliciously, whether they do any act in prosecution of such conspiracy or not; for the 
words of the statute seem expressly to include all such confederacies under the notion of 
conspiracy, whether there be any prosecution or not.”1249 
 In this passage, Hawkins uses the expression barely conspire of the crime of the will 
frame, meaning the unexecuted intent. However, by the term conspiracy he does not mean 
‘plot.’ Instead he frames the term against the definition of conspirators where it means 
‘alliance’ or ‘association.’ That is why he uses the term confederacy as synonym of it.  Thus, 
he paraphrases barely conspire as “barely to engage in… an association.”1250 It is this 
association or alliance that is the grounds of indictment according to the statutory definition. 
Thus, this frame contrasts with the crime of the will in that the association is rather an external 
act, punishable in itself without the need of an overt act revealing it.1251  
 This interpretation leads him to conclude that Coke’s definition of the offense of 
conspiracy “whereby the lawful acquittal of the party grieved is required to make the 
                                                 
1248 2 Haw PC c 72. 
1249 Ib. s 2. 
1250 Ib. 
1251 Note that since Hawkins chooses here the statute as his starting point defining the wrong, this entails that 
the source of the wrong is this statute and not the common law as Coke claimed. 
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offenders guilty of this crime” is wrong. But a hypothetical rejoinder would argue against 
this point that Coke’s definition was consistent with the form of the writ of conspiracy, which 
did not follow the definition of the Definition of Conspirators. Hawkins, indeed, concedes 
that that “there is no formed writ of conspiracy in THE REGISTER for a malicious 
indictment of appeal, but what supposes such indictment to have been actually brought, and 
the party to have been legally discharged,” though he found an instance of such writ brought 
“against one who had been non-suited in a malicious appeal of felony.”1252 
 To overcome this second line of argument based on the settled form of the writ 
according to the Register, and confirmed by Coke’s definition, Hawkins draws an analogy 
between the writ of conspiracy and the action on the case. Thus, he applies the same analysis 
in terms of damages to the writ of conspiracy. In other words, by mapping the writ onto the 
action on the case, he could infer that the damages the party suffered was the cause of action 
in the writ. Thus, though he found that “a bare conspiracy to indict a man will not maintain 
a writ of conspiracy at the suit of the party grieved, because it doeth not do him any actual 
damage,” he also believed that “the malicious putting of a man to the unreasonable charge, 
scandal, and trouble of a criminal prosecution, which is so palpably groundless as not to have 
probability enough to induce a grand jury to find an indictment, should... be as good a 
foundation of complaint, and a grievance as much within the meaning of the statute,” since 
there was evidence in the Register that there was a writ of conspiracy for “the putting one to 
charge and vexation of a groundless action, either in temporal or spiritual court… without 
making use either of the words acquietatus fuisset, or quietus recessit.”1253 
 ‘Unreasonable charge,’ ‘vexation,’ and ‘scandal,’ are all concepts belonging to the 
frame of the action on the case, but here they are suggested as “as good a foundation of 
complain [sic]” for the writ of conspiracy. Thus, Hawkins is opposing a substantive argument 
about what the cause of action is in this writ, to a more traditional and formalistic approach 
based on what the fixed form of the writ had become. This parallels Holt’s reasoning in the 
Savile Case. In other words, ‘malicious prosecution’ came to mean ‘damage to person caused 
by a malicious prosecution,’ but the wrong in the form of the writ was the ‘procurement of a 
                                                 
1252 2 Haw PC c 72 s 2. 
1253 Ib. s 2. 
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false indictment by conspiracy or collusion.’1254 The result of Hawkins’ mapping is the 
potential blending of the frames of the writ and the action on the case so that ‘private injury’ 
by prosecution becomes the cause of action in both. Indeed, Hawkins later concedes that 
since “an action on the case in the nature of such writ doth lie for a false and malicious 
prosecution… and that the same damages may be recovered in such an action as in a writ of 
conspiracy, it hath been thought needless to inquire, whether such writ may be maintained 
for such a prosecution or not,”1255 meaning the failed prosecution without acquittal. In this 
passage, both actions give the same remedies. But this is inconsistent with Hawkins’ former 
argument that the definition of conspirators set up a ‘confederacy to falsely accuse 
somebody” as the grounds of indictment. As we will see in short, the two grounds will blend 
into Hawkins’ interpretation of the Poulterers’ Case case-law.  
 In addition to these arguments allowing to hold failed prosecutions liable to action by 
the writ, Hawkins also entertained that a confederacy to indict a man is not only within the 
letter of the statute, but “also within the meaning of it, since it is a high contempt of the law, 
barely to engage in such an association to abuse it, to serve the purposes of oppression and 
injustice… so evidently contrary to the first principles of common honesty.”1256 In this 
passage Hawkins changes gear and reasons in a different way, not in formal terms but in 
terms of the values that the law seems to protect by punishing false indictments. Indeed, it 
hints at several possible hypernyms in a system or classification based on the values protected 
by the offense. It can be though as belonging to the category (or domains) of the ‘perversion 
of law,’ or to that of ‘oppression against innocent.’ Furthermore, here it is suggested that the 
statute is an expression of the principles of morals or as he puts it, against “the first principles 
of natural justice” against which the association to pervert the law would be. Each of these 
focus on different facets or domains of the situation of the false indictment: the dignity of the 
process of administration of justice itself, and the protection of innocents. In other words, 
under this interpretation, the coming together to falsely indict diminishes or affects the 
dignity of justice, and aggrieves the innocent. Yet the focus of Hawkins is no longer on the 
                                                 
1254 And Coke’s definition, as shown earlier, blended the plot frame with the formal elements of the writ. 
1255 Ib. 
1256 Ib. See also s 14. 
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actual act of bringing a false indictment but on the act of coming together. Under this view, 
associating or coming together or joining in some purpose could be seen as a criminal activity 
itself, as in this case, when it is for some unlawful purpose.  
 After exploring these arguments, Hawkins admits that “it doth not appear to have 
been solemnly resolved, that such an offender is indictable upon the statute.” Then he holds 
that it is: 
more safe and adviseable to ground an indictment of this kind upon the common law 
than upon statute, since there can be no doubt but that all confederacies whatsoever, 
wrongfully to prejudice a third person, are highly criminal at common law; as where 
divers persons confederate together by indirect means to impoverish a third person, 
or falsly and maliciously to charge a man with being the reputed father of a bastard 
child; or to maintain one another in any matter, whether it be true or false.1257 
 This passage reveals the discursive strategy and purpose of Hawkins in beginning this 
section the way he did. He rhetorically argues some points that are not going to be accepted, 
to finally give in and introduce a new definition that picks up his two previous points (that 
confederacy and consequential damage can be the grounds of the writ). It shows the way in 
which the spaces generated by the arguments1258 blend into a new space unknown until now: 
a common law offence defined as ‘a confederacy to wrongfully prejudice a third person.’ 
Thus, we have elements of the Definition of Conspirators, or the idea of a ‘punishable 
association,’ and we also have elements of the action on the case, that is the idea that the 
purpose of such association to be punishable should be to wrongfully injure a person.  
 With this blend, Hawkins is able to place the case-law derived from the Poulterers’ 
Case within a new category. That is, instead of deriving it from the offense of conspiracy, he 
creates a wider offense including the statutory one, and all the other cases that did not fit in 
the frame of the false accusation (such as the Starling Case). But this is the first time that 
these are mentioned as a common law offense (note that this is not the same as Coke’s 
conspiracy, which was rather the plot). However, it should be noted that although the 
Poulterers’ Case was cited here as an instance of such offense, the very same case is 
                                                 
1257 Ib. 
1258 If we start mapping the writ against the Definition of Conspirators as reference frame (the association to 
falsely accuse without regard to actual prosecution) and that if we continue with the mapping of writ onto action 
on the case (the writ as grounded on damages to the person caused by prosecution independently of acquittal). 
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mentioned earlier as an example that his opinion that bare conspiracies are punishable under 
the Definition of Conspirators is not “wholly unsupported by authority.”1259  
 This new category allows Hawkins to reconsider several issues from a new viewpoint. 
In so doing he is, in fact, blending all other categories into one single larger concept, that of 
the wrongful confederacy.  
 This new offense allows Hawkins to strike new arguments against old defenses. Thus, 
he creates a mental space where there is a hypothetical “confederacy to carry on a false and 
malicious prosecution.”1260 This space is within the frame of malicious prosecutions, where 
defenses against an action are that “the indictment or appeal which was preferred, or intended 
to be preferred, in pursuance of it, was insufficient… or that the matter of the indictment did 
import no manner of scandal, so that the party grieved was in truth in no danger of losing 
either his life, liberty, or reputation.”1261 However, within the new space of the common-law 
confederacy, these defenses do not hold because “notwithstanding the injury intended to the 
party against whom such confederacy is formed, may perhaps be inconsiderable, yet the 
association to pervert the law in order to procure it, seems to be a crime of a very high nature, 
and justly to deserve the resentment of the law.”1262 Put differently, it is a confederacy to 
wrongfully prejudice a third person.  
 Likewise, coming back to the issue of the policy of the law, Hawkins can reframe it 
in terms of the common-law confederacy, that is, mapping the policy domain onto the 
common law confederacy. Thus, concerning the defense of immunity of prosecutors, 
Hawkins now thinks that it is not a good defense “that nothing more was intended by him, 
but only to give his testimony in a legal course of justice against the party whose prejudice 
such confederacy is supposed to have been formed for.” 1263 
                                                 
1259 Ib. 
1260 Ib. s 3. 
1261 Ib. s 2.  
1262 Ib. s 3. 
1263 Ib. s 4.  
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 The same thing happens with the defense of reasonable cause from the action on the 
case frame that now becomes blended into the wider frame of the offense of common law 
confederacy (note that this does not mean that the statutory conspiracy derives from this, but 
rather that it is understood in these terms, or framed or organized this way). Thus, Hawkins 
argues that  
no confederacy whatsoever to maintain a suit can come within the danger of the 
statute, unless it be both false and malicious. For it would be a most dangerous 
discouragement of all legal prosecutions, if those who engage in them upon a 
probable cause, should be in danger of being found guilty of so heinous a crime… 
and from the same ground it follows, that if the defendants in a writ of conspiracy can 
shew a probable cause of suspicion, they shall be discharged.” (s 7) (also note 
elements of the writ and statute frame).  
 Thus, we can now understand why Hawkins classified conspiracy the way he did, as 
a misdemeanor “infamous and grossly scandalous, proceeding from principles of downright 
dishonesty, malice, or faction. 
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CONCLUSIONES 
Como se mencionó en las páginas que abrían esta tesis, la historia del delito de 
conspiración en la tradición del common law, como la historia de esa tradición en general, es 
un laberinto en el que uno puede acabar perdido para siempre, probablemente devorado por 
el minotauro. Precisamente, una de mis preocupaciones desde el principio ha sido conseguir 
un hilo de Ariadna que me ayudara a encontrar la salida. El de la historiografía de este delito 
ha sido determinar cuándo surge el delito de common law, si en la Edad Media (a la vista del 
capítulo segundo, esta tesis casi se puede ya descartar), si en la Moderna, si en el siglo XIX. 
El mío ha sido la lingüística cognitiva.  
Con dicho apoyo teórico, he tratado de mostrar cómo podemos explicar el tránsito 
desde la aparición del término conspiracy vinculado al concepto de corrupción del proceso 
en la Edad Media hasta su moderno sentido de tentativa. En otras palabras, he tratado de 
mostrar que, a través de un incesante proceso de integración conceptual, el dominio 
conceptual de dicho término ha ido incorporando elementos de otros ámbitos conceptuales 
en los que se proyectaba mediante la analogía. Sólo de esa manera podemos apreciar 
parentelas conceptuales que de otra manera permanecerían ocultas. En nuestro caso, hemos 
podido apreciar en qué medida la forma moderna del delito de conspiracy tiene una 
genealogía que la vincula al concepto de homicidio, al de high treason y al de difamación.  
Claro está que muchas cosas quedan todavía pendientes de explicación. En ese 
sentido, con esta tesis se abren nuevos caminos que pretendo recorrer en el futuro inmediato. 
Por supuesto, hay que completar el cuadro histórico de la genealogía del delito con el 
desarrollo jurisprudencial y legislativo del mismo durante los siglos XVIII, XIX y XX. Y 
urge clarificar qué lugar ocupa en esa genealogía la aplicación del delito de conspiración a 
las asociaciones de trabajadores en el siglo XIX de la que hablé en el primer capítulo. Por no 
decir que la historia de la genealogía conceptual del delito de conspiración no puede 
detenerse en las islas. El delito fue trasplantado a las colonias. En particular, el desarrollo 
jurisprudencial del delito en los EE. UU es también complejo y conecta la genealogía del 
delito a la Sherman Antitrust Act (1890). 
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En el plano teórico también se abren nuevas posibilidades. Salta a la vista que el 
planteamiento de esta tesis tiene mucho de experimental. Por lo tanto, doy por descontado 
que una vez recoja los resultados de ese primer intento de escribir una historia conceptual 
razonada, quedará un largo periodo de ajuste y nuevos experimentos. Porque no era esta la 
sede, ni tampoco había tiempo para más, he desistido de pergeñar una teoría de la lingüística 
cognitiva aplicada al ejercicio de la historia. De hecho, no tiene sentido tratar de elaborar tal 
teoría en abstracto sin ver que problemas surgen al aplicarla a casos concretos como el de la 
historia del delito de conspiración.  
En ese sentido, uno de los problemas que se presentan y que habrá que afrontar es el 
de casar el relato histórico con la explicación lingüística de manera que estén integrados y no 
sea una mera yuxtaposición de ambos. No es cuestión baladí. El conocimiento histórico, la 
historia como disciplina, tiene más de conocimiento de experto que de saber científico. Con 
ello no me refiero a la manera en que se razone o argumente con evidencia una tesis 
historiográfica. Me refiero a que si uno preguntara a un historiador en qué fundamenta su 
comprensión de una fuente, probablemente no sabrá qué decir. Se trata de un conocimiento 
tácito, por usar la terminología de Polanyi, que tras años acopiando información histórica, 
permiten al historiador interpretar una fuente en la plenitud de su significado. O, por ponerlo 
en otras palabras, el conocimiento histórico es, ante todo, erudición. Por eso, los historiadores 
deben contarse entre los pocos profesionales que continúan mejorando con la edad. En ese 
sentido, no existe la historia como conocimiento, sino grados de ignorancia histórica.  
Sin erudición, las fuentes permanecen en silencio. Pero, una vez comienzan a hablar, 
podemos quedarnos escuchando embelesados, y dar luego cuenta respetuosa de lo que nos 
dijeron. O bien, podemos dejar la historia de lado y tratar explicar algún aspecto de nuestra 
condición de humanos como por ejemplo el derecho. Para ello necesitamos teorías. Ahora 
bien, dado que hemos dejado la historia de lado, y puesto que historia es erudición, 
inevitablemente la explicación que demos va a tener un elemento idiosincrático, invisible, 
que la alimenta pero que no aparece en ella. En otras palabras, parte de la explicación será 
ese conocimiento tácito que está interpretando la fuente. Con lo que al final volvemos al 
punto de partida.  
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Queda, por lo tanto, un largo camino por recorrer hasta encontrar el minotauro de la 
historia del delito de conspiración en la tradición del common law. Y si se encontrara, habrá 
que construir una teoría a partir de las piedras que formaban el laberinto.  
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